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Abstract 
Recently, the strategy formation process literature has claimed that organisations increasing^l` 
have to adjust dynamically their characteristics to the requirements of the environment by 
constantly changing their strategies and strategic capabilities (e. g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Mintzberg, 1994). Behind these claims lies the interest to develop an 
interdisciplinary view of strategy that captures the interplay between the company and its business 
environment. This thesis makes a marked contribution to this debate by arguing that a ke` 
component in a firm's strategic response to a change in market conditions is the result of the 
interpretation people develop about the event itself. It is argued that this development is a context 
dependent process, with outcomes emerging not merely as a product of bounded rational debates, 
but also shaped by the interest, commitment, and perception of individual organisational members 
who interpret the gross changes in the environment based on individual, organisational and 
business environmental stimuli. This study therefore argues that an understanding of the 
development of this cognition/action relationship is critical as it filters management's perceptions 
about the way they make sense of what is (likely to) happen(ing) and what actions should be 
taken. Although there are previous attempts that link managerial sensemaking to strategic action 
in the light of dynamic events (e. g. Bogner & Barr, 2000; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), no study thus 
far has focussed on the development of the interpretation of one strategic pattern in real time. In 
order to explore this issue, this research seeks to shed light on the following question: `'How do 
managers of multinational firms perceive and respond to the impact of the Euro over time? " 
Following the tenets of the interpretivist approach and the underpinnings of contextualism 
(Pettigrew, 1985b), a qualitative case study methodology was used to examine the context 
dependent cognition/action relationship in eight multinational organisations by tracing the 
intended strategy before the event took place, and compare it with the realised strategy after the 
Euro was introduced to find out to what extent and in which ways managers (re)anticipate the 
impact of the Euro to determine an appropriate course of action. In total 87 interviews and 16 
focus group discussions were conducted to capture the plausible and coherent explanations. The 
findings presented in this study not only provide a unique insight into how the response patterns 
evolve over time within the sampled firms, but also show how this process is influenced by 
perceptions, understanding, expectations and predictions of individual managers. The main 
contributions of the research are related to contextual and cognitive explanations of differences in 
the timing of response to the unfolding patterns of the impact of the Euro. What our study 
suggests is that the probability of firms introducing new strategies quickly and proactively 
depends on the anticipation, interpretation and capability of managers to recognise and to exploit 
changes. Motivation to do so is based on the perceived match or mismatch of the developments 
with the strategy in use prior to change. As such, this study provides new insights into the 
interrelationship between the changes in cognition and the changes in strategic response over 
time. These insights have an important influence on our understanding of the strategic decision- 
making process. 
Keywords: strategy formation, decision making process, strategic change, sensemaking, 
managerial cognition, Euro, multiple case study 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
1.1 Research objectives and significance 
The strategy formation literature has long been concerned with understanding how firms adapt to 
the changing market environment. Whilst it has been stressed that it is of critical importance for 
firms to monitor the environment and make strategic decisions that keep them aligned with ncvv 
opportunities and threats in the environment (e. g. Mintzberg, 1978; Quinn, 1980), it is only recent 
that researchers start to ask more dynamic questions to develop an understanding how firms 
should accomplish this alignment (e. g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; D'Aveni, 1994; Meyer et al., 
1990; Volberda, 1998). 
Amongst the proponents of this dynamic approach there is the consensus that firms operate in 
turbulent environments which are `hypercompetitive' (D'Aveni, 1994; Lewin & Volberda, 1999), 
high velocity' (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), or shaped by `jolts' (Meyer et al., 1990). Within such 
an environment, several critical themes become apparent that question the depth and 
comprehension of the traditional `step-by-step' approach of strategy formation. It is argued that 
managers should have a complex and sophisticated view of their business environment in order to 
avoid oversimplification or ignorance of potential threats or opportunities. Several attempts are 
made to provide tools to develop such a vision including Hamel and Prahalad (1989; 1990) who 
propose the concept of strategic intent; Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) who suggest a semi- 
coherent strategic direction for the firm, and Hedlund (1994) who introduces the N-form which 
explains the elements of the ideal organisation. 
All these attempts to improve the dynamic character of strategy share one common feature: it 
challenges the role of managers as a sensemaker. More specifically, it is agreed that strategies v III 
be adopted as a result of ke\ individuals recognising opportunities or threats in the firm's 
environment and convincing others in the controlling dominant coalition of the accuracy of their 
interpretation and the appropriateness of the proposed response (Dutton & Duncan, 1987: 
McKelvey, 1997; McKelvey, 1997). However, this interpretation is a necessary simplification of 
the environmental stimuli which is shaped by the interest, commitment, and perception of the 
individual who interpret the gross changes in the environment based on a combination of many 
other individual, organisational and business environmental stimuli. Whilst this simplification 
helps the manager to resolve complex problems (Porac & Rosa, 1996; Porac et al., 2002), it also 
creates a path of dependency in which decisions are made (Scarbrough, 1998). Consequently, the 
level of strategic success can be attributed to the accuracy and judgement of (a relative small 
group of) individual managers. 
This recognition of sensemaking as the key component in a firm's strategic response to a change 
in market conditions raises a number of important questions concerning the development of such 
an interpretation over time, including the factors that influence this development. For example, 
how do managers' interpretations evolve over time? To what extent and in which ways do 
managers anticipate the impact of a change in market conditions? To what extent and in which 
ways do managers reveal resistance to change there current strategy in order to adapt to a change 
in the market conditions? To what extent and in which ways do managers reveal limitations in 
strategic choice due to internal barriers? To what extent do changes in interpretation about the 
impact of changing market conditions lead to changes in strategic response? 
An answer to these types of questions provides insight into how firms currently adapt to a change 
in market conditions. It also explores issues such as why some firms are able to overcome internal 
forces of inertia, which further explains why some firms are able to adjust to market changes and 
other fail. Overall, this insight might serve as an important asset to improve the current tools for 
dynamic strategy formation. 
Despite the increasing attention recently given to sensemaking processes (Barr et al., 1992, Barr, 
1998; Isabella, 1990; Weick 1995), much is still to be learned about the relationship between 
interpretation and environmental shifts. In particular, the way interpretations change over time as 
the event unfolds and creates new realities of understanding that ultimately lead to the generation 
of new programmes of action in organisations. Empirical research thus far has been cited for its 
lack of conceptual coherence, but more importantly for having a research methodology that is 
invisible due to the nature of cognitive elements such as noticing, intention, beliefs, anticipation. 
I 
In addition, only a few studies (see Bogner & Barr, 2000 for a notable exception ) focus on the 
sensemaking process as a whole. 
This study takes up the challenge to explore the interplay between managerial cognition and 
strategic adaptation under the conditions of uncertainty. The following three sections will 
respectively outline the context in which this interplay is studied, the scope and nature of the 
research, and the research setting and methodology used. Following this we will provide an 
overview of how this thesis is organised. 
1.2 The context of the study 
The desire to bring the interests of Europe into harmony by eliminating trade barriers has been an 
ongoing process since the Second World War. Developments in the last decade have further 
promoted free trade. First, the foundations of a level playing field were laid with the creation of 
the Single Market in 1992. This enhanced the possibilities for business by extensively reducing 
the regulations on cross-border trade within Europe. Second, this Single Market project was 
supplemented by the single currency, the Euro, which has been introduced in, thus far, eleven of 
the fifteen Member States of the EU in January 1999. 
The key motivation and purpose of the Euro is both political and economical. Its primer aim is to 
create a stable European environment by putting an end to monetary tensions, exchange rate 
crises, and macroeconomic imbalances. From a economical point of view, the Euro has brought 
about fundamental changes to the economic and financial environment in the Eurozone and 
beyond. With its key effects being the lowering of transaction costs and the enhancment of price 
transparency, the single currency represents a major contribution to fostering competition and 
efficiency in goods and financial markets across the Eurozone. From a political point of view, the 
introduction of the Euro represents a quantum leap towards completing a fully integrated Single 
Market in the EU and lays a solid basis for the improvement in the living standards of European 
citizens. Besides these welfare-enhancing effects on the "domestic" economy of the Eurozone, the 
new setting also has far-reaching consequences for the world economy and the international 
community. 
With the arrival of the Euro many questions emerge from many different perspectives as the 
expected implications of the Euro can be used not only for different functions, but also by 
different groups of economic agents. From an academic point of view, a predominant interest has 
been devoted to the financial structural Euro environment and conjunctural economic Euro 
environment (e. g. Begg, 1998; Grabbe, 1996; Redwood, 1997; van Everdingen & Bamossy. 
2000). The adaptation and use of the Euro in the private sector has received much less attention, 
yet, it is the effect of the common currency on trade that is changing the behaviour of the private 
sector. It is this behaviour that dominates the `internationalisation' of the Euro. Thus, in this thesis 
we focus on the commercial adaptation and use of the Euro for businesses operating in the 
Eurozone. This implies the Euro adaptation process which involves issues such as order 
processing, invoicing, contractual positions, pricing, budgeting, payrolls, manufacturing, costing, 
software, and staff education. It also deals with behavioural issues being the result of cognitive 
and affective processes related to the stimuli that people have to deal with the Euro such as, what 
are competitors going to do, what will the impact of price transparency be, how is the Euro 
affecting products, packaging and distribution, what is the impact in terms of European 
orientation, and does the pricing strategy need revision. 
1.3 The scope and nature of the study 
Inspired by the need for further theoretical development that explores the interplay between 
sensemaking and strategic response to changing market conditions, this thesis aims to fill this gap 
by focussing on the perceived and challenged impact of the Euro on continuity or change in 
complex organisations over time. This behavioural issue involves the attitude the manager takes 
towards the Euro before, and after its introduction. This attitude is considered to be the result of 
their personal attempt to come to terms with various sources of input at the individual, 
organisational, and business level. This attitude might therefore be broad in scope ranging from, 
for example, a manager who might value the ability of the Euro to create a stronger 'European 
image', or a manager who might only focus on the potential disadvantages or obstacles to the use 
of the Euro. As such, it is expected that attitudes will vary as they will be context dependent. 
What this research aims to explore is to what extent and in which ways this attitude -, w ill affect the 
response of each organisation to the impact of the Euro. More specifically, we highlight one 
particular unfolding contextual pattern - the impact of the Euro - and aim to explore; what actors 
understand about this pattern; how this understanding is influenced by established processual 
patterns; and \\ hat actions are taken as a result of both issues. This research interest into "how do 
managers perceive and respond to the impact of the Euro over time? " has led to the following ke` 
research question and its derived sub questions: 
1. Key question: Hoitw do firms adapt to a change in market conditions? 
2. Sub question: How do managers develop an interpretation about a change in market 
conditions? 
3. Sub question: What are the key barriers or enhancements to the ability or likelihood of 
strategic change? 
Thus, from an analytical point of view we are particularly interested in three aspects of 
development: managerial sensemaking (cognition), strategic response (action) and the interplay 
between both. In other words, we claim that in order to understand this interplay one must have 
sufficient insight into how managers make sense of environmental changes and how they relate 
this impact to their firm. With this particular focus in mind we adopted a design that aims to 
gather and analyse data at multiple levels, whilst focussing on the manager as the primary unit of 
analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989a) which is embedded in the second unit of analysis, the context of 
organisations. The integration and interplay of both processes and its evolving pattern of strategic 
change can be seen as the third level of analysis. 
By exploring these aspects of development in the context of the unfolding impact of the Euro we 
aim to contribute to deepen our understanding of how this interplay between cognition and action 
evolves over time in order to explain the strategic change the firm is undergoing as a result of the 
identified impact. 
1.4 The research setting 
The empirical focus of the thesis is the Consumer Electronic (CE) and the fast moving consumer 
good (FMCG) industry in a period from February 2001 to October 2002. This was an era when 
the Euro was introduced at a consumer's level on I of January 2002, involving compulsory 
elements of adaptation for all firms operating in the Eurozone. This study adapts a dual time 
frame methodology to trace sensemaking and action in real time, before, and after the introduction 
of the Euro. Indeed, it is only through time that we can gain a better appreciation of how the 
interpretation of impact evolves, how the firm aims to align to its interpreted environment, and to 
what extent they succeed in doing so. 
We explore patterns of sensemaking and action through examining the strategic development of 
four multinational companies (MNEs) in the food industry and four MNEs in the CE industry. 
Follo\\ in`g the tenets of the interpretivist approach and the underpinnings of contextualism 
(Pettigrew, 1985a), a qualitative case study methodology was chosen as the appropriate research 
methodology for observing this type of behaviour within the context of the circumstances of each 
particular organisation and its operating environment (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Hambrick, 1980; 
Pettigrew, 1985a). This allowed us to examine interpretation 'in the wild' (Hutchins, 1995) of 
strategy making by following the perceived and challenged impact of the Euro over a period of 
months to understand not just the defined strategy itself, but also how this strategy is produced. 
The research sample was selected through the process of theoretical sampling following several 
criteria to optimise the balance between similarities and differences. 
i aale 1.1: -eieci eu eases 
Company Division Origin Function Key Business 
Philips CE Dutch EHQ Consumer Electronics, 
SemiConductors, Lightning, 
Medical systems 
Sharp CE Japanese Subsidiary Consumer Electronics, 
SemiConductors 
Pioneer CE Japanese Subsidiary Consumer Electronics 
Kenwood CE Japanese EHQ Consumer Electronics 
Nutricia Food Dutch EHQ Food and Dairy 
Hero Food Swiss/ Subsidiary Food and Dairy 
German 
McCain Food Canadian EHQ Frozen Food 
Nestle Food Swiss Subsidiary Food and Dairy 
The sites selected and researched in this study were as listed in table 1-1. The data collection was 
conducted over a time period of two years, involving preparatory fieldwork and two main 
empirical research stages. The timeframe was guided by pragmatic considerations in order to 
clarify the beginning and end of data collection. The timeframe focussed on one major breakpoint, 
the introduction of the Euro at a consumer level. The data collection stages were designed around 
this breakpoint. From February 2001 to August 2001(T°), semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups and documentations were used to investigate the anticipated impact of the Euro before its 
introduction. The follow up took place 10 months after the introduction of the Euro in October 
2002 (T') to find out how the impact was perceived and if the interpretations and challenges 
changed over time. 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 highlights current debates and 
perspectives related to the areas of strategy development and sensemaking. In addition, various 
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theories and ideas rooted in the study of organisational behaviour, internationalisation and 
standardisation are also examined. After presenting the two main approaches to strategy 
development - the strategy content approach and the strategy process approach - three critical 
themes that question the depth and comprehension of these approaches are discussed based on a 
dynamic view of strategy. Firstly, it is argued that most firms operate in a turbulent business 
environment. Secondly, it is emphasised that an organisation that operates in such an environment 
must be in a continuous state of aligning itself to this environment, which stresses the importance 
of understanding the changing interrelationship between content, process and context in which 
strategy is developed. Thirdly, we argue that the environment that is understood by the manager is 
the environment to which organisations respond. Based on these critical themes we first describe 
how five alternative literatures aimed to incorporate the conditions of nonlinearity and uncertainty 
into strategic development. After that the remainder of this chapter focuses on the role and 
importance of managerial interpretation in the formulation of a dynamic strategic response. In 
particular, we first detail the process of sensemaking and its relationship to strategy formulation 
which outlines issues such as `problem identification' and `problem definition'. Second we 
examine the existing literature on cognitive and organisational heuristic devices and its related 
existence of inertial forces that sediment and dominate perceptions of managers. Finally, the three 
earlier presented research questions derived from the examination of the current literature are 
investigated at the end of this chapter. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological concerns related to this study. This chapter is divided into 
two sections. The first part will outline the methodological framework that guided this research. 
In this section we will first present a graphical overview of the methodological framework. The 
purpose of the analytical framework is to provide an early classification of constructs scope and 
context of the research. This framework is used throughout the remaining chapters as a source of 
reference and guidance. After that the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of this 
framework will be portrayed. This will be followed by the research strategy, which will outline a 
multilevel approach, its units of analysis, and a selection of qualitative strategies and methods 
under guidance of the contextualist approach. A unique model of sensemaking and the usage of 
strategic formation as defined by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) are presented followed by its 
related innovative techniques of switching path analysis and reflexive interpretation, which will 
detail how we trace and verify the perceived and challenged impact of the Euro. The second part 
of the chapter will demonstrate how this strategy is utilised by presenting the data collection 
methods and the analysis methods that helped to fulfil the research objectives. In particular. this 
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part provides the details of its unique approach and the steps that were taken to ensure validity. 
The combination of both parts will provide an overall understanding of the methodology and will 
discuss its application to the research findings as presented in chapter five and six. 
In Chapter 4 we present the data collected from the eight case sites. Again we divided the chapter 
into two parts which corresponds with the two industries that are examined in this thesis. Both 
parts are structured similarly; however, a distinction is made based on the industry specific 
constructs. In this chapter the narrative of each case is told separately, presenting the 
idiosyncratic language of the field (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). We use the set constructs of the 
framework as presented in chapter 3 to structure each of the cases similarly, facilitating 
comparison of patterns and themes. The same framework is also used to structure chapter 5 and 6 
to provide a consistent set of construct to analyse the cases. The combination of chapter 5 and 6 
involves the presentation of the research findings based on the analysis of empirical data collected 
from the eight research sites. 
In chapter 5 we present the T° analysis which examines the situation before the introduction of the 
Euro. This chapter involves the analysis of three specific themes; the identification of the 
European positioning, the definition of sensemaking direction dependency, and the interpretation 
and development of the intended Euro strategy. Chapter 6 presents the T' analysis which 
examines the situation after the introduction of the Euro. In this chapter we will first analyse the 
extent to which the intended strategy became the realised strategy. Second we will analyse the 
extent to which the perceived changes in market environment led to a new course of action. The 
two analysis chapters together provide a detailed picture how the interpretation and its related 
attitude and response changed over time. 
In chapter 7 the findings of the study are further analysed and discussed and compared with the 
current literature as outlined in Chapter 2. We could derive a schema from each of the analysis 
chapters that is used as a framework to explain how the firms perceived and challenged the impact 
of the Euro before the introduction of the Euro (figure 7.1) and after the introduction of the Euro 
(figure 7.4). Constructs within these schemas variously explain the anticipation of emerging 
market changes, the interpretation of loci of causality, and the resulting transitory states of 
adaptation. Brought together, these constructs present a holistic view of the interrelationship 
between the changes in cognition and the changes in strategic response. This provides a more 
dynamic explanation of how interpretations evolve over time. In particular it explains the variance 
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between the cases and outlines how and why collective interpretations move from unformed and 
tentative to well-constructed, well processed viewpoints at significant different speeds. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. This chapter illustrates how this thesis has made a number 
of important contributions to deepen our understanding of how the interplay between cognition 
and action evolves over time. After an overview of the study we present and elaborate the main 
contributions on the interplay between interpretation and strategy development and its 
implications for theory and practice. We particularly highlight the contributions made in terms of 
managerial anticipation, managerial interpretation, strategic behaviour, strategic orientation, and 
strategic capabilities. After that we outline the methodological contributions and implications and 
explain its importance for research of this particular nature. Following, the limitations of the 
current study are acknowledged. In particular we explain the limitations of the chosen method, the 
issue of reflexivity and the difficulty of separating the Euro process from other strategic 
development. Finally, future research agenda's are outlined highlighting key issues that deserve 
further attention. 
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Chapter Two: 
Current Debates and 
Perspectives 
This chapter provides an examination of literature which aims to inform and underpin the central 
research question of this study; "How do managers of multinational firms perceive and respond to 
the impact of the Euro over time? " Before we discuss the current debates and perspectives we . -, ill 
introduce the two main bodies of this literature review; the dynamic perspective of strategy 
development and the underlying process of sensemaking. In this section we will also define some 
key terms that will feature in the subsequent analysis. After that wie will present the objectives and 
scope of this review which will provide us with a theoretical framing that will serve as a guide to 
specify how we integrate the wide ranging literatures on strategic management, organisation 
studies and cognition. Based on this framework we will briefly outline what key questions this 
chapter aims to answer, and consequently, how this chapter is structured to answer these 
questions. 
2.1 Main bodies of literature and Definitions 
The two main bodies of literature reviewed in this study are those concerning strategy 
development and sensemaking. In addition, various theories and ideas rooted in the study of 
organisational behaviour, internationalisation and standardisation are also examined. Strategy 
development refers to the course of action that is undertaken to achieve an organisations purpose. 
Sensemaking refers to an interpretative process in which people assign meaning to ongoing 
occurrences (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, Weick, 1995). As such, sensemaking is a necessary 
precursor to all purpose activities such as planning actions, making decisions and so fort. 
In the field of strategy development researchers have frequently distinguished between content, 
process and context of strategy (De Wit & Meyer, 2004, Mintzberg, 1990; Pettigre', v-, 1985). This 
fragmentation of strategy has led to the development of separate content and process traditions. 
The content tradition emphasises the importance of strategies themselves. Two fundamentally 
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different streams of research have dominated the strategy content literature in the past decades. 
One school of thought is most closely associated with the work of Porter (1980; 1985). It assumes 
that the structure of the industry in which the firm operates largely determines the firm's freedom 
to manoeuvre (Teece et al., 1997). Mintzberg (1990) described this approach as the positioning 
school. More recently, Wernerfelt (1984) set trend for the resource-based view. This view argues 
that the fundamental determinant of a firm's performance is the distinctive resources it controls. 
In contrast, the process tradition is concerned with understanding how organisational strategies 
are formulated and implemented and how these strategies change over time (Chakravarthy & Doz, 
1992). The great bulk of contributions of process scholars to strategic management have been in 
the study of choice and formation. Thus the strategic choice scholars (March & Simon, 1958; 
Pettigrew, 1973; Quinn, 1980) use a rational scheme of intentional choice to project choice 
behaviour. The formation process scholar (e. g. Mintzberg, 1978; Miller & Friesen, 1980; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) explored why there were often gaps between formulation and 
implementation of strategy. 
While this distinction in content, context and process is proved to have analytical benefits, it is 
often argued that these three dimensions of strategy strongly interact (De Wit et al., 1994; 
Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991). As such, this distinction and the role of these concepts in the strategy 
formulation process have often been challenged from a more dynamic perspective and from a 
sensemaking perspective. The dynamic view focuses its argument on the macro dimensions of 
strategy development arguing that organisations are not rationally moving from one strategic state 
to another, but instead are moving across dynamic and complex patterns to adapt to the 
environment (e. g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Porter, 1991). It not only 
challenges the linear sequential phases of analysis - formulation - implementation, it also argues 
that it is virtually impossible to get various aspect of the organisation all lined up to go through a 
change at the same time (e. g. Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). The sensemaking perspective criticises the strong emphasis on rationality in the 
traditional views of strategy development (e. g. Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Milliken, 1990; Thomas, 
1993; Weick, 1979). According to these authors, strategising is about people's minds as frames, 
models, maps, concepts or schemas which develop a set of ideas with explanatory possibilities 
(Weick, 1995). In other words the sensemaking perspective views the strategist as a sensemaker 
who formulates a strategy based on the anticipation and interpretation of company surroundings 
(Weick, 1979). 
2.1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Literature Review 
This literature review has three interrelated objectives. First, it seeks to review the chosen 
literature critically and sympathetically in order to expose current debates and perspectives in the 
chosen areas of investigation. This leads directly to the second objective, which is to identify 
major theoretical gaps that need to be filled. Following on from this, the third objective is to 
formulate researchable questions that address the need for further theoretical development. 
The rationale behind focusing on the dynamic view of strategy and sensemaking is fourfold. First, 
a specific typology of strategy development from a dynamic point of view provides an ecological 
view on the different elements of strategy development as it explores content, context, and 
process simultaneously. Secondly, an analysis of the characteristics of strategic development 
helps to explain the complexity of interrelationship between the elements and suggests that a 
holistic view of the dynamics of strategy in an organisational context is needed (Porter, 1991). 
Thirdly, the sensemaking perspective broadens this view as it provides an understanding of the 
underlying patterns of how people are making sense of the environment that surround them. 
Fourthly, the combination of both categories recognises the dynamic and multilevel character of 
the content, context and process of strategy which allows us to raise a number of important 
questions not only about the emergence and development of strategy over time, but also about the 
managerial perspectives that influence this adaptation process. 
2.1.2 The Key Research Questions and the Structure of the Literature 
Review 
This thesis argues that a key component in a firm's strategic response to a change in market 
conditions is the combination of the interpretation people develop about the event itself and the 
key dimensions of their strategy. Following this argument, three key research questions, 
articulated through a review of the main body of the literature, may be summarised as follows: 
How do firms adapt to a change in market conditions? 
2. How do managers develop an interpretation about a change in market conditions? 
3. What are the key barriers or enhancements to the ability or likelihood of strategic change? 
In order to address the relevant literature related to these key research questions, wie divided this 
chapter into five sections. Following this introduction, the first section discusses the main schools 
of thought ww ithin the strategy content and process literature. From a content perspective the 
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positioning school and the resource based view will be discussed. From a process perspective we 
will particularly address the issue of strategic formation including choice behaviour. The second 
section will describe significant criticisms about these perspectives. Together the first two 
sections detail the relevant literature on adaptation, directly addressing the first research question. 
After that the third section is concerned with central debates and perspectives on sensemaking. In 
this section we will discuss the elements of sensemaking followed by a review of the sensemaking 
process. This section provides details about the underlying cognitive process of strategy 
formulation, which further helps us to understand how managers develop an interpretation. The 
fourth section discusses the discontinuous change perspective. In this section we «will review the 
current understanding of the key barriers or enhancements to the ability or likelihood of strategic 
change. In particular we will explore the concept of inertia from a cognitive and an organisation 
point of view. Moreover, in this section we will also present the key firm abilities and capabilities 
that influence inertia. In the final section, we will briefly summarise and point out the key 
relationships of the defined research questions with the reviewed literature. 
2.2 Strategy adaptation processes 
The key question strategic adaptation aims to answer is; how can the current, and potential, 
strengths and weaknesses of the organisation be aligned with the current, and potential, 
opportunities and threats, in such a way that the firm will be able to reach its aims (De Wit & 
Meyer, 2004). As such, a definition of strategic adaptation very much depends on the context in 
which it is studied (Van de Ven, 1992). Since the term `strategic adaptation' evokes irresolvable 
controversy regarding the importance of the adaptation that occurred, it maybe less confusing and 
more useful to refer to `adaptations of strategy' rather than strategic adaptation. From this point 
of view, the content perspective addresses the issue of adaptation from a `what did the firm (or 
should hai e) decide(d)' viewpoint, while the process perspective is primarily concerned with 
`how did the firm (or should have) form(ed) the strategy'. In this section both perspectives are 
discussed. 
2.2.1 Content perspective 
Strategy content research is concerned with the effective positioning of the firm vis-ä-vis its 
environment (Pettigrew, 1992). From this point of view, strategy researchers have long been 
interested in performance differences across firms. A portion of these differences may be due to 
unique firm characteristics and actions (Wernerfelt, 1984); another portion is due to the conditions 
in the industries in which firms operate (Porter, 1980). Traditionally', industrial organisation 
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research has addressed the latter. This perspective provides an important backdrop for strategy 
research (Montgomery et al., 1989). More recent developments break with this traditional 
research by recognising that firms in fact can and do influence the structure of industries in ýý hich 
they compete (Teece et al., 1997). While both views share the assumption that an alignment 
between the firm and the outside world must be established and maintained, what divides them is 
their way of achieving such fit. We will discuss both the positioning school and the resource 
based view in more detail. 
2.2.1.1 The positioning school 
The positioning school (Mintzberg, 1990)emphasises the importance of a firm taking their 
environment as a starting point when determining their strategy (Rumelt, 1980). It is argued that 
successful companies are externally-oriented and market driven (Day, 1990). Such companies 
take their cues from customers and competitors in order to set their own strategy, Nherebv 
strategists analyse the environment to identify attractive market opportunities (Porter, 1980). In 
other words, this approach argues that understanding the structure of the industry allows firms to 
position them in such a way that they can take advantage of the insights gained (Caves, 1980; 
Hatten & Schendel, 1977; Hofer & Schendel, 1978). The belief that there are a limited number of 
viable strategies2 to do so is an essential feature of the positioning school and has practical 
implications for firms. A generic strategy that matches the conditions at hand is selected (Hofer & 
Schendel, 1978; Mintzberg et al., 1998) and the organisation adjusted to deliver that strategy. 
This also asserts that industry structure determines firm conduct and assumes that firms are 
homogeneous (Cool & Schendel, 1988). This suggests that there will be one optimal strategy that 
all firms in an industry will adopt (McGee et al., 1995). However, empirical studies show that 
groups of firms cluster around different strategies or positions on a range of strategic dimensions 
(McGee & Thomas, 1986; Cool & Schendel, 1988). Caves and Porter (1977) suggest that 
strategic `groups are formed partly as a result of variations within the industry structure and partly 
as a result of similar investment decisions in the past. 
2.2.1.2 The resource based view 
While the positioning school argues that companies should adapt itself to its surroundings, the 
resource based view (RBV) proposes that the firn should attempt to adapt the surroundings to 
itself by aiming to achieve an environmental fit based on its resource based strengths. From a 
2 Sec for example Porter's (1980) three generic strategies, cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. 
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strategic point of view, the emergence of the RBV of a firm in the 1980s first focused attention on 
the internal assets of an organisation and their relationship to competitive advantage. Based on 
earlier work of Penrose (1959), the RBV of strategy argues that organisations are bundles of 
resources which managers have to develop and build towards achieving their strategic objectives 
(Grant, 1991; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Wernerfelt, 1984). These basic resources constitute inputs 
into more complex resource clusters built up within each organisation. How effectively these 
clusters are built and managed is determined by managerial competencies or capabilities 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Since such managerial competencies will vary, this suggests that 
two firms with the same physical resources but with different managerial or organisational talent 
will generate different levels and types of performance (Teece et al., 1997). RBV researchers 
therefore argue that different strategies may be pursued in the same industry resulting in different 
performance levels, as a result of similar resources but different competencies (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). 
Wernerfelt (1984) sees resources as anything that could be thought of as a strength or weakness of 
a firm. In suggesting this Wernerfelt adopts Caves (1980) definition of tangible and intangible 
assets that are semi-permanently tied to the firm. Capabilities then refer to the capacity of a team 
to perform some task or activity that may involve one or more combinations of resources (Grant, 
1991). Capabilities are made up of complex patterns of coordination between people and other 
resources. From this perspective Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that capabilities may be a 
routine or a number of interacting routines. Teece et al. (1997) argue that the RBV recognises the 
nature of importance of resources and capabilities for the sustainability of the competitive 
advantage(s) of the firm; however, it does not attempt to explain this nature. 
2.2.1.2.1 Dynamic capabilities 
In attempting to identify the dimensions of firm-specific capabilities, the authors introduce the 
concept of dynamic capabilities. These dynamic capabilities are defined as strategic routines by 
which firms achieve new resource configurations to deal market changes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). So in order to generate new strategies the managers pool their various business, functional 
and personal expertise together to make strategic choices that shape the strategic moves of the 
firm (e. g. Eisenhardt, 1989b; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Judge & Miller, 1991). Therefore, 
Teece et al. (1997) characterised dynamic capabilities as unique and idiosyncratic processes that 
emerge from path-dependent histories of firms. 
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2.2.1.3 Criticism of the strategy content approach 
The positioning approach to strategy has come under significant criticism since the 1980s. 
Typically the positioning school has been described as `prescriptive' (tiiintzber- &H& Waters, 
1990), linear (Chaffee, 1985) or economically rational (Knights & Morgan, 1991). Similar 
comments have been made about the RBV (Conner, 1991; Oliver, 1997). Much of the criticism 
relates to the adaptation of ideas stemming from the planning school (Mintzberg, 1978). In 
particular the decoupling of strategy making from strategy implementation has been widely 
criticised (Kauffman, 1995; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). This has significantly increased the 
debates about the focus of content strategy on the firm or the industry rather than taking a multi 
level view (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Critics have also raised particular conceptual and empirical 
concerns that relate directly to the content of strategy. It is argued that there is not a single vision 
of the firm based on resources, competences; rather there are several views of the resource-based 
(Teece et al., 1997) firm. Most of these views are essentially static (Barney, 1991, Peteraf, 1993; 
Liebeskind, 1996), whereas other are more dynamic (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Teece et al., 
1997; Nonaka et at., 2000), but introspective and centred on the firm itself. In addition, the 
adaptation of more dynamic approaches has been hindered by the research methods commonly 
utilised. Cross sectional methods with data collected from a single point in time dominate 
research on strategy content. These methods are biased towards a static perspective. 
2.2.2 Process perspective 
The process perspective pays more attention to strategically relevant events taking place within 
corporate entities. Key emphasis is put on the question how the formation of strategy takes place, 
as well as how the process of strategy formation can be made more effective. This approach deals 
with issues such as the impact of strategic planning efforts or the influence of decision making 
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). As such, strategy process formation is portrayed as a linear 
progression through a number of distinct steps (De Wit & Meyer, 2004; Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985). This linear progression is predominately researched from three different perspectives, the 
planning perspective, the learning perspective and the combination of both perspectives. Before 
discussim, the concept of strategic formation, it is important to understand the positioning of these 
perspectives within the strategic decision making literature. Strategic models of strategic decision 
processes aim at depicting and explaining the process of strategic decision making. Since they are 
based on varying notions of organisations (e. g. Allison, 1971; Chaffee, 1985. Lyles & Thomas, 
1988), their conceptualisation of decision processes can differ significantly. We Ný ill first discuss 
the most distinct differentiation which is drawn between two opposed models: the rational- 
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analytical model that proposes the need for planning and the adaptive (contingency) model that 
argues for the importance of learning. 
2.2.2.1 Planning versus Learning 
Formal strategic planning is an explicit and ongoing organisational process with several 
components, including establishment of goals and generation and evaluation of strategies (Ansoff, 
1965; Armstrong, 1982; Steiner, 1971). As such, planners collect data, forecast, model and 
construct alternative future scenario's (van der Heijden, 1996). A distinct group of authors, «ho 
have addressed the issue of process formulation, have presented their arguments based on the 
need for rationality, logic, and comprehensiveness (e. g. Fredrickson, 1983; Miles, 1980). The 
main premises of this `planning' approach are that strategy formulation is a controlled process 
whereby the unique strategy is designed by the strategist in great detail so it can be implemented 
once it is formulated (Mintzberg, 1990). 
In contrast, adaptive models focus on decision processes related to firms adapting to 
environmental circumstances (Lindblom, 1959). Organisation theorists (e. g. Duncan, 1972; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969) assume the environment to be a source of critical contingencies. Thus, 
environmental factors serve as vital influencing factors on strategic decisions (Barney & Ouchi, 
1986). The key argument of this approach is that it sees the environment as subject to influence by 
individuals (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). The idea of learning as part of organisational 
adaptation is widely supported in the literature. Cyert and March (1963) make the point that 
organisation learn by adapting their goals, their attention rules and their search rules. These ideas 
are echoed to some degree by Argyris (1999) in his concept of single and double loop learning, as 
well as the idea of espoused theories and theories in use. Managers from this point of view have 
the freedom to change contextual factors. Organisations are therefore continually constructed, 
enacted and changed by organisational members. Accordingly, the manager can be said to have a 
proactive role in guiding the process of adaptation. Following this argument, incrementalism 
derived contrasting the planning approach (e. g. Quinn, 1980; Wrapp, 1984). The main 
contribution of this approach is the observation that managers of successful firms are able to make 
and remake strategic decisions in order to respond to the changing market environment (see for 
example Mintzberg & Quinn, 1991; Wrapp, 1984). In other words, it is assumed that learning, 
especially in unstable environments, is a vital element that acts as a precursor of strategic decision 
making (Mintzber`g, 1994; Mintzberg & Quinn, 1991). Unlike the rational approach, plans are 
rarely announced or recorded in a formal planning document, but remain broad, general and non 
quantified (Quinn, 1980). Despite the plea for incrementalism, and hence high levels of 
collaboration and flexibility (Volberda, 1998), Quinn's view (1980) seems to be that the top team 
remains the architect of strategy, like the planning school. 
2.2.2.2 Choice behaviour 
While both models seem to be in strong conflict, supporters of each have been moving closer 
together (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). The number of authors who argue for elements of both 
models has increased (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Hitt & Tyler, 1991). This has resulted in the 
emergence of the strategic choice model which is positioned between the two conflicting models. 
Child (1972) most explicitly argued for a less rigid view of the interaction between organisations 
and their environment. He called for a more voluntaristic or `strategic choice' approach to 
organisation-environment relations. In other words, the strategic choice perspective suggests that 
proactive adaptability and loose coupling between organisations and environment allows 
structural variation and renders organisations less vulnerable to homogenising forces exerted by 
the environment. Child (1972) amongst others (e. g. Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985; Jemison, 1981, 
Khandwalla, 1977; Provan, 1989) has argued that organisations are not always passive recipients 
of environmental influence but also have the power to reshape the environment. Further, choice 
situation is posited to influence the number and form of strategic options, making different 
situations conducive to different strategies (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). 
2.2.2.3 Strategy formation 
The debate on planning and learning schools of strategy process research has revealed that 
strategy formation is much more complex than these two extremes represent. Not surprisingly, 
other modes of strategy formation have been suggested, summarised and integrated by Hart 
(1992) into five distinct strategy making postures, and narrated by Mintzberg (1990) into ten 
schools of thought (see table 2.1). Particularly the prolific output of Mintzberg has set out to 
classify the main strands of strategy formation, including critical thought (Mintzberg, 1973; 1978; 
1985; Mintzberg & Waters, 198; 1998). This work has been invaluable in stimulating thought, 
and can particularly be seen as a guide to the key authors in the field. Some of the strategy models 
described and classified by Mintzberg have a weaker claim to the title of `schools' than others, 
however, this body of work has clothed much of the field with a semblance of order. Table 2.1 
displays these schools and concepts of strategy, and a selection of its key authors. 
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Table 2-1: Schools of Strategy3 
School 
Design 
Strategy Formation as: 
Process of Conception 
Key Authors 
Learned et al. (1959) 
Planning Formal Process Ansoff (1987); Steiner (1969 ) 
Positioning Analytical Process Hatten and Schendel (1976) 
Entrepreneurial Visionary Process Schumpeter(1934) 
Cognitive Mental Process Polanyi and Prosch (1975) 
Learning Emergent Process Lindblom (1959), Cyert and March (1963) 
Power Process of Negotiation Cyert and March (1963), Pettigrew (1977) 
Cultural Collective Process Rhenman (1973) 
Environmental Reactive Process Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
Configurational Process of Transformation Miles and Snow (1978) 
Despite this variety of definitions, there has almost always been a common theme, that of a 
deliberate conscious set of guidelines that determines decisions in to the future (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Strategy formation can therefore be described as the process whereby the insights and thoughts of 
key strategists are converted into formulated strategy. Mintzberg's (1994) concept of strategy 
formation as an impenetrable `black box' seems to be key as it captures the notion that the 
processes used to arrive at the total strategy are typically fragmented, evolutionary, and largely 
intuitive (Quinn, 1980). The strategy therefore tends to evolve as internal decisions and external 
events flow together to create a new wide range of consensus for action. This points out that study 
of the process of strategy formulation involves analyses of both discrete and identifiable decision 
events and of the pathways to and outcomes of those decision events, together with the 
connections between successive decisions over time (Pettigrew, 1992). 
Several attempts are made to provide a foundation for exploring strategy development from this 
perspective. Lindberg (1990) for example, makes a distinction between proactive and reactive 
strategies. Abell (1978) discusses the anticipation and response process strategy. Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) draw a line between structured and unstructured processes, while 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) redefine this process as deliberate and emergent. This later 
3 The first three schools are characterised as prescriptive, the next six as descriptive, and the last one as 
integrative. It needs to be stressed that these schools are the perception of, and, in most cases, have been 
labelled by Mintzberg. The exception and premises of each school and examination of some of the authors 
they quote does not alter this fact. Classifying some of these approaches as strategy schools'approaches to 
strategy may be arguable_ 
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approach is most often adapted in the current literature to describe the evolution of strategies as 
the process between the intended strategy and the realised strategy (see figure 2.1). 
The deliberate strategy is described by Mintzberg (1994) as a pattern, that is, consistency in 
behaviour over time. In addition, an intended strategy that is fully realised can be called a 
deliberate strategy. Any strategy that is intended but not realised to any extent is described as an 
unrealised strategy. Mintzberg sees an emergent strategy as 'a realised pattern which was not 
expressly intended. Actions were taken one by one, which converged in time in some sort of 
consistency pattern' (Mintzberg, 1994 p. 25). Important in this context is the recognition that no 
strategy is purely deliberate or purely emergent. From this perspective Mintzberg (among others) 
points out that all real world strategies need to mix this two in one way - to attempt to control 
without stopping the learning process which is vital for firms in order to improve the chosen 
strategy if necessary (Mintzberg, 1994). This has been proposed earlier by Mintzberg and Waters 
(1985) who defined planned strategies on the one end and the imposed strategy on the other. The 
planned strategy consists of the statement of clear articulated intentions, which are formulated in 
as much detail as possible in order to be implemented. However, this strategy (like many others) 
is based on the assumption of a stable environment which is highly volatile. In reality the 
environment in which the firm operates is changing rapidly and external factors can impose 
strategies of an organisation. The distinction between deliberate and emerging strategies aims to 
capture this thought. 
Forms of strategy 
strategy 
`- 
_ý 
ý= 
ýý 
ý__ýý' 
_ý 
%ý 
ýý 
Realised Strategy 
Source Mintzberg 1994 
Figure 2.1: Forms of Strategy 
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2.2.2.4 Criticism of the strategy process approach 
Much of the criticism of the strategy process approach is not about the value of planning and 
control as a means for managing organisational processes, but more if these means are part of the 
strategy formation process (e. g. Quinn, 1980; Wrapp, 1984). It is therefore not surprising that 
scholars tend to adopt very different views of strategy process, and the views they adopt influence 
the questions they ask, the research methods they employ, and the contributions they make. As a 
result we find significant empirical inconsistencies. Some studies (e. g. Eisenhardt, 1989b; Miller 
& Cardinal, 1994; Priem & Rasheed, 1995) found that formal strategy making processes or 
planning are positively associated with firm performance in unstable, turbulent and dynamic 
environments. Other studies concluded formal strategic planning is best suited to stable 
environments (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Mintzberg, 1973) but recommend incrementalism 
for unstable, complex, dynamic environments facing high uncertainty, discontinuity or rapid 
change. 
What this implies is that it remains arguable to what extent explicit plans are needed to articulate 
intended courses of action. In general, planning and control are viewed as valuable for routine 
activities that need to be effectively organised (Mintzberg, 1994). In contrast, incrementalists 
argue that planning is viewed as less suitable for non-routine activities that involve doing new 
things. What particularly stands out in this debate is that much of the criticism relates to the fact 
that strategists rarely have the luxury of using generic solutions to fix clearly recognisable 
strategic problems. Instead it is argued that strategic problems are essentially unique (see for 
example Quinn, 1980), highly complex (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), linked to other 
problems(Abrahamson, 1991), difficult to recognise (Rittel & Webber, 1973), and can be 
interpreted in multiple ways suggesting that there is no correct answer or a limited set of solutions 
(Pettigrew, 1985). Nevertheless, writers from the planning school highlight the very important 
idea that, despite the proliferation of planning techniques, many strategists continue to use the 
analytical tools of scanning the environment for opportunities and threats, assessing corporate 
competence and of the features of the design school method (e. g. Hill & Westbrook, 1997; 
Mintzberg ei al., 1998). 
2.3 Dynamic adaptation process 
The previous section has stressed that the idea of classifying human behaviours into schools of 
strateo` formation may not be as helpful as intended in helping people to deal with an 
increasingly, turbulent and non-linear environment. This points out that the positioning schools as 
,ý 
displayed in table 2.14 are not as distinctive as suggested by Mintzberg (1990) and should be used 
in combination as they are all underpinned by the same principle of intension and emergence 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). Subsequently, it suggests organisations can no longer afford to adapt a 
unidirectional or step-by-step approach to strategy development as suggested in the previous 
section. 
What this refers to are the characteristics of complexity. Mason and Mitroff (1981) refer to 
complexity as the `condition of being tightly woven or twined together' (1981 p. 5) and mention 
characteristics such as interconnectedness, complicatedness, uncertainty, ambiguity, conflict and 
social constraints. These authors observe that much of the complexity with which planners have 
to cope is organised, rather that disorganised. In other words, it seems to be more appropriate to 
see planning as a guiding device that gives pattern and organisation to the whole. 
As strategy making is comprised of many problems and issues, which are highly interrelated, and 
difficult to isolate for separate treatment it appears to be necessary to adapt a more dynamic and 
complex approach to strategy making (Markides, 1999; Volberda, 1998). Figure 2.2 illustrates 
such an approach (see also Feurer et al., 1995). An important addition to this approach is that it 
should be taken into account that managers are only capable to deal with a certain amount of 
complexity. Thus, managers' mental models strongly influence how they interpret the 
environment and formulate alternative strategies (March & Simon, 1958). These mental models 
are necessarily simplifications that managers use to make sense on complex and confusing 
competitive arenas. 
° With the exception of the configurational school which echoes the idea of the adaptive mode of strategy 
forniation. As such, this school is seen as offering to integrate the messages of the other schools. 
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Figure 2.2: Dynamic adaptation process 
There is now a growing cognisance that no single strategy process or single strategic capability 
will lead to a sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1991). Organisations are increasingly 
having to adjust dynamically their characteristics to the requirements of the environment by 
constantly changing their strategies and strategic capabilities (e. g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Mintzberg, 1994). This change in the understanding of strategy 
formulation and implementation is also reflected in the increasing amount of research that is 
directed towards organisation learning (e. g. Garvin, 1993; Senge, 1990), the emergence of new 
organisation structures (Mintzberg et al., 1998), the importance given to the redesign of business 
processes in the context of strategic change (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Day et al., 1997), and the 
role of managerial cognition in this process (Barr et al., 1992; Lant et al., 1992). As such, this 
section represents some of the key arguments of a recent school of thought that aims to develop 
an interdisciplinary view of strategy that captures the interplay between the company, the 
competitors and the larger environment (e. g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; D'Aveni, 1994; Webb & 
Pettigrew, 1999). Before going into detail about dynamic strategy discussion we will outline some 
of the key arguments and premises that underlie this discussion. 
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2.3.1 The complexity of the external environment 
The fundamental assumption of the dynamic approach is based on the argument that most firms 
operate in turbulent environments5 that have been described as `hjperconipetitive' (D'Aveni, 
1994; Volberda, 1998), `high velocity' (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), or shaped by `jolts' (Me` er 
et al., 1990). For example, a simple change in legislation may result in the demand or opportunit} 
for new products or services, which may require the creation of new technology to deliver the 
product or service, and new people skills in area of development, design or delivery (Larsson et 
al., 2001). 
Researchers use (evolutionary) theories to develop an understanding about this chaotic or 
complex environment 6 (Johnson & Burton, 1994; D'Aveni, 1994; Ilinitch et al., 1996). 
Particularly chaos theory has a serious place in management, as it offers a plausible explanation of 
turbulence, and at the same time, a rationale for managing strategically in a turbulent 
environment. Chaos theory refers to the study of non-linear relationships that are interpreted as a 
process rather than a state of becoming rather than being (Gleick, 1987 p. 5). Its importance to the 
dynamics of strategy is described by Mintzberg et al (1998) as `it welcomes instability and seeks 
to create crisis as a means of transcending its limits' (p. 223). 
Another contribution to put the turbulent business world into some perspective is made by 
quantum physicists who brought recognition to the concept of indeterminism (e. g. Rajagopalan et 
al., 1993; Pettigrew, 1992). These authors argue that indeterminism permanently changes the 
perceptions of the nature of life and attitude to being and reality. The universe is seen as a web of 
related events. In organisational terms, this visualises much more relational interactions with all 
elements of the business environment indicating that context, content and process interact 
(Kauffman, 1995). 
A third theory often used to explain turbulent environments is complexity theory. The study of 
complex systems is based on the assumption that there is more to a system than the sum of the 
components and the linkages that compose the system with truly emergent properties that 
irreducible to explanations that take into account only lower level components' properties 
(Cramer, 1993, Kauffman, 1995). A few simple rules guide the interaction between the 
components of a system. First, in a business context, managers should attend to relationships at all 
5 The environment comprises the social, economic, political and legal activities that influence daily business 
operations. 
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levels within their organisations. The second rule is that small changes can have large effects 
(Kauffman, 1995). And third, interesting and unpredictable properties can be expected to emerge 
from a system (Holland, 1993). Complexity theorists argue that managers should allow creativity 
and efficiency to emerge naturally within organisations rather than imposing their own solutions 
on their employees. They can do this by setting some basic ground rules and then encouraging 
interactions or relationships among their employees so that solutions emerge from the bottom up. 
2.3.2 The content, process, context interrelationship 
As previously noted, strategies evolve in response to shifting macro-environmental and 
competitive contexts, so the organisations through which those strategies are to be delivered must 
themselves evolve and change. Researchers often recognised that firms need to align their 
strategies to environmental jolts (see Boyd, 1991 for an extensive review), however, only a 
limited number of studies have investigated the direct impact of environment on strategy decision 
making (Rajagopalan et al., 1993) . Most of the studies considered environmental 
influences only 
implicitly, as part of the context of the decision process. As such, most studies concentrate on 
strategy formulation processes and tend to ignore the implementation aspects of the strategy 
elements of the business environment indicating that context, content and process interact 
(Pettigrew, 1992). 
The recognition of dynamism and the more recent adaptation of chaotic and complex theories into 
the management science has reinforced the case against formal strategic planning. Dynamic 
strategists argue that it is unlikely that an organisation structure developed under one set of 
conditions will be equally effective and appropriate under a different set of conditions (Miller 
1986, Mintzberg 1990). An organisation confronted with turbulent environmental conditions must 
be in a continuous state of aligning itself to its environment. To do so, the organisation must 
demonstrate an understanding of the changing interrelationships of that environment and develop 
a dynamic view of itself and its world (Pettigrew, 1992). 
The lack of the research that represents the interrelationship between content, process and context 
is often asserted to the complexity of multiple issues involved in the implementation process that 
can be attributed to the rapid changes in the business environment and incompatibility between 
skills and competences, organisational structure, and systems and processes in the organisation 
(Senge, 1990). in other words, a common assumption used by researches is that strategy 
`' These authors describe complexity and chaos as nonlinear, aperiodic, and unpredictabile 
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implementation is a straightforward process (Noble, 1999). However, it is now clear that as 
elements of the content tradition are asking more dynamic questions (Porter, 1991) and parts of 
the process tradition are more explicitly linking process themes to the time series analysis of 
strategy content and process (e. g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991), the 
sharp distinction between process and content appears to be more of an analytical hindrance than 
a help. It is therefore often suggested in the analysis of strategic change that there seem to be 
strong advantages to explore simultaneously the links between the context, content and process of 
change together with their interconnections through time (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991). 
2.3.3 Limited rationality 
A third assumption adopted in the dynamic strategy literature is the argument against rational 
thinking. This argument is based on the notion that managers influence organisational change 
through the need to perform different tasks as required by the organisation and their environment 
(Tichy, 1983). In doing so, it is stressed that managers cognition and `mental models' 
significantly impact the way in which information is processed and interpreted (Barr et al., 1992). 
These interpretations of environmental events become the environment to which the organisation 
responds (Daft & Weick, 1984) and the mental framework within which strategic action and 
responses are developed (Weick, 1979). While the ability to identify environmental changes is 
necessary to manage for fit, it is argued that it is not sufficient. It should be accompanied by 
appropriate changes to the strategic choices and direction of the firm, following the models of 
organisational alignment (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). As such this notion is primarily based 
on arguments that can be linked back to behavioural studies of firms and individuals. Given the 
importance of these arguments for this study, we will discuss the studies of sensemaking (Weick, 
1979), and inertia and heuristics (March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982) in great depth 
in section 2.4 and 2.5. 
2.3.4 Moving towards dynamic strategy development 
Strategy researchers began to seek dynamic strategies that would be able to incorporate conditions 
of nonlinearity, ambiguity, and uncertainty in the 1970s (Cohen et al., 1972; Mintzberg, 1979) 
and recently have attacked problems associated with complex dynamic systems (Liebeskind et al., 
1996; Hanssen-Bauer & Snow, 1996). Still, many important research issues are only now being 
articulated. The lack of a well-defined conceptual framework that presents managers with new 
tools and perspectives which accommodate the full dynamic complexity and uncertainty is clearly 
evident (Fowler, 2003). However, there are some notable attempts made to fill this gap. 
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2.3.4.1 Strategic fit 
An early attempt to introduce dynamic complexity to strategy is made by Aldrich (1979) who Xý as 
one of the first theorists who explicitly stated and popularised the concept of 'strategic 
. 
fit' 
between the organisation and its environment. He examined this movement [organisational 
change] under three stages: variation, selection and retention. The general principle was that 
variation generates new material from which environmental selection was made, 'Mille retention 
mechanisms preserved the selected form. Aldrich (1979) pointed out the importance of 
environmental selection relative to intra-organisational factors as a critical difference between his 
model and the more traditional view of strategy formulation. 
Though the literature shows that the question of strategic fit is an important one, it is manifest that 
little empirical evidence is available on how to fit the strategy taking the environmental conditions 
into account. After comprehensively reviewing the literature on strategic fit, Venkatraman (1989) 
concludes that there is a need for the development of appropriate mechanisms to test strategic fit. 
While one might expect such progress to be evident in a more recent study (Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1997) the authors draw the same conclusion and suggest that more research need to be 
done to predict and assess whether an organisations' strategy will fit with changing environmental 
circumstances. The main reason why this call has not been answered yet is according to Zajac and 
Kraatz (2000) related to the fact that there is a tension between the environmental and 
organisational contingencies by searching for a fit between its strategy and environmental 
situation versus the fit between strategy and its unique competencies. Some authors suggest that 
this tension is amplified if one begins to conceptualise the strategic fit in more practical terms 
(e. g. Hamel & Prahalad, 1990), given that the desirability of changing strategy in response to 
changing environments becomes much more uncertain when it moves an organisation away from 
its traditional competencies (Ghemawat, 1991). 
It is evident that strategy researchers who are more interested in strategic fit have tended to 
emphasise process over content issues, which is contrasting the viewpoint that the strategy 
focuses on content (Rajagopalan et al., 1993). For example, Miles and Snow (1994) stop short of 
proposing specifically how the content of an organisation strategy should fit, or should be 
changed to fit, with its environmental context. This seems to be particularly important to 
understand when strategy is put into a marketing context. A similar suggestion is made by 
Thompson (1967) who points out that the importance of micro environmental variation as the 
main driver towards strategy adaptation in different markets. One of the main features that may 
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affect the propensity of adaptation is the competitive environment of a local area. Organisations 
often look to local competitors for cues regarding the appropriateness of potential strategic 
changes (Zajac & Kraatz, 2000). On the other hand, macro environmental factors, i. e. those that 
affect all organisations in all industries, can also affect the desirability of strategic change over 
time. 
2.3.4.2 Interpretative model 
Chaffee (1985) identifies three models of strategy, linear, adaptive and interpretive. She 
distinguishes the adaptive model from the linear model by asserting that the organisation must 
change with the environment rather than dealing with it. A more important statement towards 
dynamism is made with her interpretive strategy, which assumes that reality is socially 
constructed. In addition, strategists are suggested to deal with the environment and not with 
organisational action, but with symbolic actions and communication (Weick, 1979). This 
suggestion echoes the notion of Van Cauwenbergh and Cool (1982) who define the role of top 
management to `secure the survival of the company in an increasingly turbulent environment and 
hence to animate and monitor strategic behaviour at lower levels' (p. 253). Strategy from this 
interpretative model might therefore be defined as strategic Schemas or frames of references that 
allow the organisation and its environment to be understood by organisational stakeholders (Bettis 
& Prahalad, 1995; Chaffee, 1985; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). The most essential question for 
management becomes one of how to develop adequate strategic schemas that enable the firm to 
create or adapt to competitive change (Volberda, 1998). 
2.3.4.3 Strategic intent 
Harrel and Prahalad (1989; 1990; 1994) proposes the concept of `strategic intent' in order to deal 
with environmental dynamics. In complexity theory's terms, strategic intent is decomposition of 
exploration rules into the next level of detail, the linkages to the exploration rules and the 
transition rules that define how it will migrate from its current design and ecosystem to a future 
business design and ecosystem. Simply put, a strategic intent is a company's vision of what it 
wants to achieve in the long term based on imagining the future and creating it (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1994). Underlying many of the concepts they introduce is the fundamental idea of the 
strategy process a purposefully created misfit between where the firm is and where it wants to be. 
With the concept of strategic intent Hamel and Prahalad make an important contribution that 
strategy should be defined to intercept the future. As such it represents one of the key studies that 
emphasises the view that organisational kno\N ledge and learning are important sources of 
sustained performance in turbulent environments (see also for example Nonaka, 1991; Quinn. 
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1992; Nonaka, 1991; Quinn, 1992). However, their statements rest on a shaky foundation of 
foresight which often has been described as an illusion. As it is not possible to escape the View 
that the strategic intent presupposes a reasonably valid predictive view of the future, it appears to 
be appropriate to position strategic intent closer to the entrepreneurial school or even design 
school rather than the dynamic school. 
2.3.4.3.1 Current debates on tools and perspectives 
More recently, practical views have been adopted in order to provide managers with tools and 
perspective that answer questions such as `What kind of strategy can achieve a dynamic 
adaptation? ' (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), or `How can managers develop their peripheral vision 
to sharpen their dynamic view of strategy? ' (Day et al., 1997). The first study of six computer 
firms argues against the notion of pushing for the best possible strategic fit between elements of 
environment, strategy, and organisation. Instead, Brown and Eisenhardt suggest a looser and 
broader coupling between the key elements, resulting in some form of semi-coherent strategic 
direction for the firm. One of the key ideas in this regard is for firms to focus on the present as the 
link between the past and the future. One application of this concept concerns the use of simple 
rules that permit adaptation while establishing bounds that can prevent companies from falling of 
the edge of chaos (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). In other words, the vision of successful firms in 
high-velocity environments must start out quite broadly, thereby allowing it to be shaped in part 
by subsequent events. `Wharton on dynamic competitive strategy' (Day et al., 1997) aims to detail 
this perspective by focussing on themes such as anticipating competitive response and 
understanding how both changes in technology and public policy impacts on both strategy and 
competitive advantage. 
A key feature of these studies is the role of managers as a sensemaker who anticipate the 
behaviour of their competitors based on changes in the market. Strategies will be adopted as a 
result of key individuals recognising opportunities or threats in the firm's environment and 
convincing others in the controlling dominant coalition of the accuracy of their interpretation and 
the appropriateness of the proposed response (McKelvey, 1997). This argument will be issue of 
debate in the next section. 
On the other hand these studies point out that the formulation of a strategic dynamic response is 
significantly constrained as a result of internal and external barriers. In other words, 
implementation depends upon the ability of the dominant coalition to mobilise the required 
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resources. In an event of a change in the environment, the firm that first perceives and interprets 
this change and mobilises the appropriate resources will be the quickest to response. \Vhat limit 
the speed of response will be subject of section 2.5 
2.4 The sensemaking perspective 
Sensemaking is defined as a process in which managers give meaning to events occurring inside 
and outside their organisation by noticing signals of uncertainty and arousal in their environment 
and extract and interpret these to make sense of it in their organisational world (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991). In this context, sensemaking is described by Wieck (1995) as giving meaning 
to ideas, values, beliefs and past experiences held in knowledge structure. Situations' of ambiguity 
and uncertainty serve as a sensemaking stimulant. Individuals search for evidence favouring one 
prospective meaning over others (Wagner & Gooding, 1997). 
A significant role within this process is interpretation which according to Daft and Weick (1984) 
is the process of translating the event in order to develop models for understanding so that a 
conceptual meaning can be schemed among key managers within the firm. In other words, 
sensemaking is accomplished when the actors map words into models and models into words 
(Bauer & Johnson-Laird, 1993). This perspective of sensemaking reveals that it is the translation 
by the actor(s) of the social construct of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). 
The role of interpretation has led to some lack of clarity regarding sensemaking as a theoretical 
process. To illustrate, some researchers (e. g. Silvester et al., 1999; Wagner & Gooding, 1997) use 
sensemaking as an adjective describing an attribution. Others (e. g. Gioia & Thomas, 1996; 
Thomas, 1993) use interpretations as a synonym for sensemaking. While accepting that both 
interpretation and attributional processes are a part of sensemaking, Weick (1995) posits that 
these approaches miss part of the larger picture. For example they fail to specify how the cues to 
which the individual is responding are singled out for attention from an ongoing flow of 
experience. He argues that problems do not present themselves as givens, but rather must be 
constructed from situations that are often puzzling, ambiguous and confusing. This points out that 
people do not always recognise situations as novel and think and act accordingly (Louis, 1980). 
Hence, sensemaking is more about the notion that although situations are progressively clarified, 
the clarification often works in reverse. In other words, rather than the outcome fulfilling some 
7A situation where two or more prospective meanings appear clearly applicable and equally valid 
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prior definition of the situation, it is more that the outcome develops that prior definition' (\Veick. 
1995). From a behavioural point of view this implies that action may precede cognition, and 
cognition is shaped by the action or behaviour. 
2.4.1 The sensemaking process 
To engage in sensemaking is to construct, filter, frame and render the subjective into something 
more tangible. This process is often referred to as the sensemaking process (Weick, 1995). This 
process has been studied from an individual (e. g. Fiske, 1993) and from an organisation 
perspective (e. g. Lant et al., 1992; Weick, 1995). Here we will combine both perspectives in order 
to discuss the role individuals play in the sensemaking processes of organisations. 
Daft and Weick (1984) describe organisations as interpretation systems. This perspective assumes 
that each organisation responds to environmental changes. Understanding the timing and type of 
response the organisation will take to respond to environmental changes is based to what extent 
environmental changes are noticed, interpreted and transferred into actions (Anderson & Paine, 
1975; Dutton & Duncan, 1987). So the central question that the sensemaking process aims to 
answer is when, why and how organisations change. These concepts are modelled by Daft and 
Weick (1984) into three stages and modified by Milliken et al. (1990) who added two stages. 
These stages are similar to Bayster and Ford's (1997) scanning interpretation and classification, 
Cowan's (1986) gestation, categorisation and diagnosis, or Kiesler and Sproull's (1982) noticing, 
interpreting and incorporating stimuli. 
8 The notion that outcomes develop prior definitions of the situation has roots in cognitive dissonance 
theory (Festinger, 1957), which can be described as a negative drive state that occurs whenever an 
individual simultaneously holds two cognitions (i. e. ideas, beliefs or opinions). 
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A model of Organisational Adaptation to Environmental Changes 
Scanning Noticing Interpretation Choosing Learning 
(Data (Some data (Data given (Some (Actions 
collection) capture meaning) meanings taken) 
attention) given 
preference) 
Source: Milliken, Dutton and Dever 1990 
Figure 2.3: A model of organisational adaptation to environmental changes 
Scanning involves the collection of data that provides the insight into relevant changes and events 
in the organisations environment (Daft & Weick, 1984). Noticing aims to emphasise that an 
environmental change or trend is only given attention to when it is perceived by the actors as an 
important issue, so the actors decide to put time and effort into the matter to understand it more 
fully (Milliken et al., 1990). The next stage involves interpretation which involves trying to 
understand the potential impact of the event on the future performance of the organisation. At the 
stage of choosing a common importance is given to the event which is translated into a general 
understanding among the actors and a meaning of significance of the event is formulated. Based 
on this meaning questions are asked how to respond to the environmental change. The final stage 
of learning involves thinking and experimenting with alternative responses to the environmental 
change. 9 
2.4.1.1 Cognitive maps 
When individuals are confronted with ambiguous events, they struggle to make sense of them. 
The meanings that individuals hold have been labelled schemata scripts (Gioia & Manz, 1985), 
cognitive maps (Porac et al., 1989) and schemas (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). The sensemaking 
process both draws upon cognitive maps as a guide for action and more importantly updates these 
9 The actions taken depend on the formulation of the firm of the importance of the event. Hence responses 
might differentiate between no response and major structural changes or resource allocation patterns. 
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schemes in making sense of experience. Cognitive maps are dynamic1° knowledge structures used 
by the organisation to encode and decode incoming information efficiently and are generally 
conceptualised as subjective theories derived from one's experiences about how the world 
operates (Miles & Snow, 1984). Table 2.2 illustrates the seven functions of cognitive maps as 
identified by Harris (Miles & Snow, 1984 p. 310) 
Table 2-2: The seven functions of cognitive maps 
Function 
Structure 
Description 
Provide a structure against which experience is mapped 
Direct Direct information encoding and retrieval from memory 
Accurate Affect the efficiency and speed of information processing 
Guide Guide `filling in the gaps' in the available information 
Template Provide templates for problem solving 
Facilitate Facilitate the evaluation of experience 
Anticipate Facilitate anticipations of the future, goal setting, planning and goal 
execution. 
The elements of the stimuli are imposed on the elements of the cognitive maps, which outlines the 
expectations within certain ranges of acceptability (Miles & Snow, 1984). The seven functions 
also suggest that if information is missing, default values may be inserted (anticipation), allowing 
the perceiver to go beyond the information given. This filling in of information offers a more 
complete perception than would otherwise be possible but increases the potential for making 
incorrect assumptions about the stimulus (Miles & Snow, 1984). 
2.4.1.2 First and second order change 
Within this schema Bartunek and Moch (1987) suggested that cognitive maps are becoming more 
complex over time as they may be expanded and elaborated as organisations incorporate new 
information. The authors labelled this time development as `fist order' change. Furthermore, 
when the information or experience conflicts with the knowledge of an individual's map, it will 
lead to either ignorance of new information or they will aim to cognitively recast to fit this 
information in the existing maps (Bartunek & Moch, 1987). This recasting has been labelled as 
10 The argument that knowledge structures are not static but dynamic and modified by experience is also 
presented by Mintzberg (1994) who notes that, '... real learning takes place at the interface of thought and 
action, as actors reflect on what they, have done.. '(p. 154). Hence, sensemaking about strategy combines 
intentions with realisation. 
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`second order' change. To illustrate, Fiske (Fiske, 1993 p. 182) argued that most people construct 
the meaning of their social environment well enough to enable effective actions; that is, their 
thinking is serving their doing. Within this reasoning there is limitation in accuracy. 
2.4.2 Sensemaking underpinnings in strategy formulation 
According to Weick (1995) special sensemaking occurs when the events become uncertain, and 
are therefore not longer interpretable. When uncertainty as a result of an event is noticed actors 
start to make sense in order to deal with the uncertainty. In other words, strategy formulation is 
essentially the making of sense of events and environmental changes during the conditions of 
uncertainty. Individuals cognitive maps during uncertainty facilitate answering the question 'What 
is happening"', which promotes the categorisation and identification of stimuli [i. e. problem 
identification] (Louis, 1980). It also helps to answer a second question; -What should the 
organisation pay attention to? ', which indicates the search for meaning [i. e. problem definition] 
(Miles & Snow, 1984). Gioia and Poole (1984) suggest that sensemaking in this situation can 
occur both consciously and relatively unconsciously. Unconscious processing requires little 
choice and is usually associated with familiar and routine experiences (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
The degree of conscious processing required is primarily determined by the novelty of the 
experience and the demand for conscious reflective processing (Miles & Snow, 1984). 
Given this viewpoint of strategy formulation, the role of sensemaking in strategy formulation is 
based on four long standing assumptions (e. g. Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; 
Dutton & Jackson, 1987). First, activities of an organisation are determined in part by the 
interpretation of members of the organisation (Daft & Weick, 1984). Secondly, the interpretation 
of members is based upon an information sequence in which they attend to cues in the 
environment, give meaning to them and translate them into actions (e. g. Porac et al., 1989; Gioia 
& Sims, 1986) Thirdly, meaning is seen as a problematic issue, whereby the actors are linking 
between received cues and cognitive structures (Van De Ven & Huber, 1990) . 
Finally, the actors 
are assumed to posses a reflective capability in order to present their interpretations of the event 
(Milliken et al., 1990). 
2.4.3 Collective belief systems: Organisational sensemaking 
Based on sensemaking process we understand sensemaking as an integral part of the strategic 
process. The actions that are undertaken can be the result of either an individual or a group of 
actors that have formulated a strategy to deal with uncertainty. Framing from this point of view 
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refers to the data collection and the interpretation stage of the sensemaking process, which 
involves ideas, values, beliefs and past experiences held in knowledge structure influenced by the 
organisational environment (Weick, 1995). There is an extent to which the actors of the 
organisation see a possibility to analyse this environment, -, ýhich in return influences the effort 
made by these actors to understand this environment (Weick, 1979). 
The fundamental argument in this stream of thought is that individuals, and thus organisations, 
have limited information processing abilities. Once researchers accepted the argument that 
individuals are boundedly rational (Simon, 1955), then information search and the decisions based 
on the limitation of search and cognitive processing became interesting research questions. One 
can no longer assume that organisations in the same environment will behave in the same ýVa` 
(Cyert & March, 1963). This clearly influences the scanning behaviour of firms, which eventually 
will influence the interpretations made and the decisions taken (Lant, 1992). 
This perspective will help to explain the interpretation differences between firms, and therefore 
the discussion will be continued from a broader organisational level, to further explore the role of 
the individual manager in this process. This discussion is being divided into three different 
dimensions to explain the interpretation differences of organisations. Two of these dimensions, 
analysability of the environment and the extent to which organisations intrude into the 
environment to understand it, are explained in more depth by Daft and Weick (1984). The third 
dimension is referring to the internal environment of the organisation that takes into account the 
capability and assets of the firm that might influence the future strategy (Van de Ven, 1992). 
2.4.3.1 Organisational interpretation: analysability of the environment 
As previously argued, differences in interpretation of organisations can be based on their notion 
of environmental change (Cyert & March, 1963). If managers assume that the environment is 
concrete than it is very likely that they will interpret this environment as analysable and therefore 
rational analysis takes place to develop a clear solution (Daft & Weick, 1984). The contrary is 
true when the organisation judges the environmental change as un-analysable. This situation 
occurs when the environment is interpreted as subjective or changing (Van de Ven, 1992). This 
initial viewpoint helps to explain the extent to which the firm intrudes the environment to 
understand it. 
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2.4.3.2 Organisational interpretation: intrusiveness of the environment 
Following the above argument, there emerges a concern for how information from the 
environment is perceived and interpreted by organisations (Child, 1972). The second dimension 
that helps to explain the difference of interpretation is the extent to which the firm actin ely 
searches the environment to find a solution for their uncertainty. From this viewpoint two 
different type of firms can be described; the `active' and the `passive' organisation (Billings & 
Milburn, 1980; Weick, 1979). Although the term `active organisations' is not used by Daft and 
Weick (1984), the authors describe a `test maker' firm as one that actively searches the 
environment to learn and discover the opportunities for the firm. Many techniques are used in this 
respect such as monitoring (Billings & Milburn, 1980), forecasting and manipulation (Durand, 
2003). Daft and Weick (1984) suggest that these firms might develop interpretations significantly 
different than those who behave in a more passive way. This type of organisation only uses the 
information that the environment directly gives to them. No active search is done to find out more 
about this environment and the do not engage in trial and error (Weick, 1979). 
2.4.3.3 Organisational interpretation: Knowledge and resources 
The third dimension takes a more historical developmental perspective, and focuses on previous 
activities, and stages that unfold over the duration of a central subject's existence (Van de Ven, 
1992). From a multinational perspective this can be related to the existence of a global or regional 
market view, which has shaped their market approach in the past. This dimension therefore refers 
to the organisation's resources in terms of capabilities and assets, as a bundle of options for future 
strategic choice. In other words, the options the firm has to respond to changing market conditions 
depend on the existing knowledge and capacities of the firm as well as the available resources and 
how these resources are being used. From this perspective the existing resources are indicating if 
there are possibilities for a firm to respond to an environmental change. 
However, it also indicates that the resources will only be used if environmental change is 
identified by the firm and interpreted as a significant issue. This identification process of the 
individual manager is influenced by its internal environment, which shaped by past and present 
processes and structures that frame the understanding of the group of actors (Weick, 1995). From 
this perspective, the sensemaking issue is interpreted as a prior strategic judgement issue that is 
based on historical structures and processes (Nelson & Winter, 1982). In other words, the 
interpretation of a group of actors about the potential impact of the Euro is significantly linked to 
the previous direction given to Europeanisation by the organisation. This direction is reflected 
into either first or second order structures and'or processes that explain the European 
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commitment. These elements refer to structures and/or processes that are self eý idently linked to 
Europeanisation efforts such as a European Head office or European strategies. Moreover, 
European commitment might also be the result of less tangible issues such as centralisation of 
decisions or control of Head quarters. This issue of heuristics and inertia will be issue of debate in 
section 2.5. 
2.4.4 Current research and criticism of the sensemaking approach 
Although the functionalist perspectives have dominated organisational research, a sensemaking 
perspective has made significant headway (Drazin, 1999). Despite sensemaking processes having 
been cited for their substantial theoretical importance, relatively little empirical research has 
investigated the proposed internal linkages (Milliken, 1990). Sensemakin`T has been criticised for 
its lack of conceptual coherence (Thomas, 1993) and for having an underlying research 
methodology that is invisible, incomprehensible, illegitimate or impractical (Pfeffer 1994). The 
need for a more explicit research has often been called for (Orton, 1997). It is clear that a 
significant research agendas remains but as Van Maanen (1995) pointed out, there is already a 
considerable body of research based in sensemaking. 
Particularly, sensemaking has been used to explain organisational phenomena such as problem 
sensing (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982), strategic management (Thomas, 1993), organisational change 
(Isabella, 1990) and strategic change initiation (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Thomas and McDaniel 
(1990) studied the impact of top management team structure on interpretations. This was one of 
the first studies of managerial interpretations to examine the influence of contextual factors. 
Findings of this study showed that top management teams that were able to process large amounts 
of information were more likely to label strategic issues positively [i. e. opportunities]. Such team 
structures were also related to higher perceptions of control. Taken these two together, findings 
suggest that managers who are able to process information readily felt more in control over their 
environment, and thus, perceived strategic issues as possible opportunities for action, not threats. 
The strength of this study is that it points out that contextual factors play a critical role in 
determining how managers process information and interpret this information. These findings 
were confirmed by Milliken (1990) who studied the impact of environmental context as well as 
organisational context on managerial interpretations. She also suggests a high degree of 
complexity in interpretations. 
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Thomas (1993) were one of the first who aimed to combine some of these issues by in\ esti, ating 
the strategic sensemaking process of scanning, interpretation and action as suggested by Milliken 
(1990) and how these activities are linked to organisational performance. The intention was to 
demonstrate the relationship between cognition and action. Findings demonstrated the complexity 
of linkages between these issues. The distinct contribution of their work is that it builds a 
theoretical meaningful framework form the historical body of thought about cognition and 
organisations. 
Gioia and Thomas (1996) further investigated how top management teams in higher education 
institutions made sense of issues that affect strategic change in order to partly explain the 
complexity as found in previous studies (e. g. Milliken, 1990; Thomas, 1993). It was assumed that 
meaning was essentially a socially constructed phenomenon and the interpretation system was 
treated as a subjective framework of understand. Analysis of the qualitative data suggested that 
there were two dominating contextual influences on how top management teams made sense of 
issues important to the change effort, both of which were internal to the organisation. This led to a 
proposition that the perceptions of image and organisational identity partially mediated the 
relationship between sensemaking context and issue interpretation. 
The above examples of sensemaking provide an indication of key empirical studies in the 
information processing tradition of which some important lessons can be learned. First, the 
extension of individual information processing to information processing in organisational 
settings is a complex process. Second, managerial cognition appears to be influenced by 
contextual factors. Thirdly, information processing capability tends to influence perception of 
control and in turn the way this information is interpreted. And fourth, associations among 
cognition, organisational action and environmental change appear to exist, though the findings so 
far are tentative. This issues are confirmed by Weick (1995 p. 173), who, following a review of 
diverse literature in the area of sensemaking, suggested that the majority of studies shared several 
characteristics such as; Investigators make an effort to preserve action that is situated in context; 
Participants' texts are central.; participants define the work environment; and findings are 
described in terms of patterns rather than hypotheses. 
Despite this consistency, many issues remain unsolved. Particularly the issue of 'how individual 
cognition combines to produce collective cognition in organisations" seems to he of great 
interest (e. g. Niezias k. Glynn, 1993; Lant, 1999). The adaptive sensemaking perspective 
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suggested by Bogner and Barr (2000) is one of the few frameworks that move us to'. tiards studies 
of cognition that highlight the dynamic interaction among actors, as opposed to the static content 
of their minds. Bogner and Barr argue that in hypercompetitive environments the cognitive 
framework developed by managers focuses on process rather than content. That is, managers 
come to know their environments through dynamic interactions with other actors in the context of 
certain events. This collective knowledge generation indicates an understanding of how the 
environment will influence the competitive actions of firms. Although this study is useful in its 
own right, it does not solve the problem how to study the process. Key issues of interest remain 
the way in which the human mind is embedded in and shaped by social context, and the nature of 
collective actions and beliefs (Porac et al., 2002). 
2.5 The discontinuous change perspective 
According to advocates of the dynamic adaptation perspective, it is a common misperception that 
organisations develop from one state to the next, encountering minimal friction. In realty', they 
argue, organisational adaptation to a changing environment is arduous and encounters significant 
resistance (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998, Mintzberg, 1994). Proponents 
of this perspective advocate that people and organisations are both source for a reluctance to 
change. An important argument of this discussion is the existence of heuristic devices, that is, any 
principle or device that contributes to the reduction in the average search of solution (Newell et 
al., 1962 p. 85). These heuristic devices are in the current literature divided into cognitive 
heuristics, and organisational heuristics. The former refers to reductionism and relies on the 
primacy of individuals in cognitive activity, the latter refers to contextualism and relies on the 
primacy of the organisation context within which individuals reside when taking decisions. 
Heuristic devices, whether managerially or structurally located, tend to sediment and dominate 
perceptions of strategic options that inhibit learning (e. g. Argyris & Schön, 1978; Bettis & 
Prahalad, 1995). This can lead to cognitive biases that impair the ability to select optimal choices 
(Barnes, 1984). In this section we will discuss both views in order to explain how the rationality 
of decision makers is systematically influenced. 
2.5.1 Reductionism: cognitive limitations 
Cognitive organisational theorists assume that an individual's behaviour toward external stimuli is 
mediated by his or her cognitive representations of those stimuli. As previously argued in the 
sensemakin`ý section it is suggested that mental models of managers shape their environmental 
scanning proclivities (Daft S: Weick, 1984), implying that this will influence w hat the-, do and do 
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not notice about the environment (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), which will eventually affect their 
interpretations of environmental opportunities and threats (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). Given the 
organisations enactment with its environment (Weick, 1995), the reductionism literature extents 
this argument further by arguing that mental models of organisational participants actively shape 
the environmental space in which organisations exist (e. g. Porac & Rosa, 1996; Porac et al., 
2002). It is argued that this is done by making extensive use of mental shortcuts that simplify the 
problem so that it can be more quickly understood and solved (Porac & Rosa, 1996). In other 
words, cognitive heuristics focus an organisational participant's view of a number of ke` 
variables that are believed to be most important, in order to rapidly resolve an issue. 
This viewpoint has clearly been adapted to research at the interorganisational level as researchers 
continue to recognise and emphasise the critical role of cognitive representations in the dynamics 
of the organisation (e. g. Burnes et al., 2003; Holmqvist, 2003). From a strategy formulation point 
of view there has been an upsurge of interest in cognitive analysis of competitive positioning (e. g. 
Dess & Davis, 1984; Porac & Thomas, 1994; Reger & Huff, 1993). Central to this stream of work 
is the premise that actors, both individually and collectively, form simplified representations of 
their competitive worlds and that these define the boundaries of the competitive arenas in which 
firms compete. According to this body of literature, over time, strategists from rival firms develop 
highly similar mental models of the competitive arena due to the fact that they frequently 
exchange information during the conduct of business transactions. 
According to Krabuanrat and Phelps (1998) these individual causes of cognitive bias can be 
categorised as follows (p. 85); 
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i arge -ý: k, eneri c types of cognitive heuristics 
Function Description 
Simplification Intentionally ignoring aspects of the plc i, i<un III tu i. J"I tL 
cognitive load 
Reference to past Identifying similar past cases and using their decision outcomes as 
cases 
guides 
Imitation Identifying similar decisions taken by other organisations and adopting 
them 
Risk aversion Searching for specified types of risk, carrying out small-scale 
experiments, relating to recent or high profile failure cases 
Satisfying Searching for an acceptable solution rather than the optimal one, only 
generating alternatives if the first possibility is rejected 
Cooperation Pooling knowledge, sharing risk with competitors, customers, suppliers 
2.5.1.1 Resistance to change 
The above discussion of cognitive heuristics points out that individuals focus attention on only a 
few variables and interpret them in a particular way, even when this is not appropriate to the 
problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Another problem that limits the rationality of decision 
makers is rigidity, which refers to the issue that people are not inclined to change their mind 
(Mauer, 1996). 
Resistance to change, arguably a phenomenon on its own within organisational change, has 
received considerable attention since the early 1980s due to the failure of many organisational 
change strategies. Many reasons for change resistance are suggested, and generally focus on 
confusion, immediate criticism, denial, malicious compliance, sabotage, easy agreement, 
deflection, silence and in-your-face criticism (Mauer, 1996 p. 26). Taken from the perspective of 
Dent et al. (1999), these elements can all prove excellent indicators of flaws in the change strategy 
or process being implemented. Managing and recognising resistance is therefore a major 
component of any successful change process. If viewed from as a response to change, and not a 
naturally forming component, resistance can be effectively used as an ongoing assessment of 
change implementation across the whole organisation (Dent & Goldberg, 1999). 
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2.5.2 Contextualism: Organisational heuristics causing cognitive bias 
Organisational heuristics focus on the existence of inertial forces" that are built in firms over time 
(Huff et at, 1992). Historical steps taken by the organisation influence the interpretative schema 
(Bartunek, 1984; Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Daft & Weick, 1984), affecting their enactment- 
selection-retention patterns (Weick, 1979) which are leading to different information processing 
behaviour (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Thomas, 1993). Inertial forces act as managerial and strategic 
heuristics important to the effectiveness of the firm. Heuristics may be from this point of view 
conceptualised as recurrent action patterns which Clark (2000 p. 240) described as patterns that 
contain the history specific and firm specific idiosyncratic elements. 
Although, organisational roles are not determinative of individual behaviour, they are 
nevertheless critical for understanding how individuals embedded within organisations think. As 
Simon (1996) writes, `human learning in the context of an organisation is very misch influenced 
by organisations, has consequences for the organisation, and produces phenomena at the 
organisational level that go beyond anything ii, e could infer simply by observing learning 
processes in isolated individuals' (p. 176). The organisation is a role system of prescribed 
decision premises that tell members how to reason about problems, where to look for information, 
and what sort of techniques to use. 
2.5.2.1 Belief lock-in and Path of (context) dependency 
The basic assertion of the above argument is that strategies can become locked in as firm 
standards, creating a `path of dependency' of initial strategic solutions (David, 1985). This in turn 
might cause inefficiencies that may persist for extended periods of time (Arthur, 1989). It is 
therefore argued that the past does not exist entirely independent of the present, but that it lives on 
in the present, and that historical thoughts, actions and processes may be re-enacted or 
reconstructed by the organisational actor as these create the filter for current perceptions. Thus, 
path dependency implies the notion that firms' decisions and actions open up future choices 
regarding products, markets, and technologies (David, 1985). By making specific investment 
decisions, or by developing specific product or market knowledge, or by establishing a repertoire 
º' The concept of inertia implies the property of elements within the system to naturally maintain their 
current state over time. Hence, state can only be changed incrementally over a period of time, as a result of 
an imbalance bet\\ een the forces acting on particular elements of the system (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). 
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of specific routines, firms and other actors limit and structure the possibilities of future actions 
open to them12 (Cohen et al., 1996; Teece et al., 1997). 
Although the existence and importance of history dependency has been challenged (Liebowitz & 
Margolis, 1995) the concept of path dependence has become firmly established in the literatures 
of technological change and strategy (Teece et al., 1997). It is particularly argued that path of 
dependence leads to inertia as routines avoid organisational actors to find optimal solutions. In 
this context Feldman (2000) underlined that the path of dependency contributes to both stability 
and change, and indeed establishes an important part of the organisational flexibility (see also 
Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002; Volberda, 1998). Empirical findings support the argument that routines 
provide organisational actors with a degree of stability 13 that gives directions to recurring 
activities. However, there is also evidence that routines provide individuals with particular 
cognitive resources and mental maps that will limit the choice of action suggesting that routines 
are context-dependent, embedded and specific, and are difficult to replace (Jarzabkowski and 
Wilson 2002; Karim and Mitchell 2000). 
2.5.3 Internal inertia to change 
The above discussion provides us with the notion that the path of dependency to some extent pre- 
determines the strategic development within an organisation as it influences the actor's perception 
of (Westney, 1990) events14. In this section we wish to extent this argument by reviewing the 
debate on the `inside/out' approach which argues that `strategic choices are directly determined 
by the condition of the structure' (Hall & Saias, 1980 p. 153). 
An important argument of this `inside/out' approach is put forward in the internal inertia 
literature. Internal inertia refers to the organisational tendency to maintain its internal structure 
regardless of other factors or concerns (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). It denotes the inability of an 
organisation to adapt to its environment. Thus, it is suggested that an organisation operating in a 
dynamic and changing environment, whose organisational functions do not correspondingly 
change will experience forces of inertia. The stronger this inertia, the lower the organisational 
ýZ This process is sometimes described as belief lock in (Arthur, 1989) 
13 Technology seems to be one of the drivers of the stability of routines as organisations develop routines 
around the use of existing technologies (David, 1985). Another driver of stability is the connection that 
organisational routines establish between people (Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002). 
14 Hall and Saias (1980) refer to this process as the `outside/in' approach which refers in their view to the 
notion that perceptions are influenced by the structural element of the diagnosis 
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flexibility and the more likely the organisation will experience difficulty to adapt to the changes 
in the environment (Hannan, 1998). 
2.5.3.1 Flexible- and slack resources 
The idea that decisions are characterised by organisational routines or heuristics (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) has been amplified in the RBV literature. As previously argued, the RBV 
recognises the nature of importance of resources and capabilities for the sustainability of the 
competitive advantage(s) of the firm (Teece et al., 1997) as they can yield advantage when they 
are relatively scarce, hard to imitate, and hard to replace (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 
1993). An important relationship made in this context is that firm performance is based on firm 
internal resources (Powell, 1992). This also suggests that the flexibility of current resources and 
the capability15 to apply these resources refers to the firms' ability to respond to environmental 
changes (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Volberda, 1998). 
The concept of flexibility is closely related to that of organisational slack which refers to `the 
difference between potential and actual performance' (Cyert & March, 1963 p. 36). Also slack 
has been more broadly considered as a `cushion of actual or potential resources' (Bourgeois , 
1981). Slack resources are the outcome of the firm's strategic behaviour and can be used for the 
development of new actions (Cyert & March, 1963). In other words, the existence of slack 
resources is a necessary condition for adaptation to environmental changes and firm development. 
2.5.3.2 Resource alteration 
In relation to existing resources it is often argued that the probability of an organisation 
significantly changing a core feature is most likely to be low (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
According to Hannan (1998), organisations have restricted capacity for significantly altering any 
of their core functions. Hannan (1998) indicates that when core functions are established by early 
organisational decisions and resist future change or adaptation to environmental change, fit 
between the organisation and its environment erodes. In essence, the firm uses its historical 
practices to navigate through changes in the environment. Core organisational features include 
forms of authority, core technology, and market strategy (Baum & Amburgey, 2002) can be 
interpreted as a guide for this navigation. What this implies is that internal inertia theory suggests 
that the processes of change create internal re-organisation problems (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
is Firms may start with a similar resource base, but over time they become differentiated in such a way that 
these resources cannot be perfectly imitated by others because of limitations in managerial perceptions. 
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2.5.3.3 Empirical research on internal inertia 
Empirical research in this vein has also stressed that organisations prefer to retain established 
ways of thinking and acting, especially if there is no direct pressure for change. Miller (1994) 
argues in his study of how past performance influences the way a firm evolves, makes decisions, 
and adapts to its environment that firms are likely to (1) exhibit inertia in many aspects of 
structure and strategy-making processes; (2) adopt extreme process orientations; (3) reduce 
intelligence gathering and information processing activity; and demonstrate insularity by failing 
to adapt to changes in the environment. A similar study of Sull (1999) demonstrates that the 
causes of failure of adaptation can be devoted to four inertial forces: (1) strategic frames [the set 
of assumptions that determine how managers view business]; (2) processes [the way things are 
done]; (3) relationships [internal and external]; and values [the set of shared beliefs that 
determine corporate culture]. 
In this literature review we discussed Miller's (1994) second and third issue, and Sull's (1999) 
first and forth issue as part of the sensemaking process. In the following section we will pay 
particular attention to the other suggestions made by Miller and Sull that refer to organisational 
design issues that influence the strategy making processes (Hall & Saias, 1980). 
2.5.4 Key determinants of internal inertia 
The above discussion on contextualism and internal inertia, more particularly highlights the 
double nature of organisational routines: routines do not only represent problem-solving 
procedures, but are at the same time control devices. In other words, routines provide an 
organisation with a certain capability to control, combine, coordinate and integrate, different skills 
and capabilities, and different activities (Chandler, 1962). One can speak here of "combinative 
capabilities" (Kogut & Zander, 1992), "integration capability", or "architectural competencies" 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). Thus, the organisational capability to respond belongs to the 
whole organisational structure, it depends on the coordination patterns existing between 
organisation's members, and notably on the development of common codes (Cohen et al., 1996), 
on common rules and representations, as well as on "theories of action" that are specific to a firm 
(Argyris & Schön, 1996). 
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Since Chandler's (1962) claimed that structure follows strategy. much research has paid attention 
to the causal order between strategy and structure16. In spite of the widespread acceptance of 
Chandlers' statement that structure follows strategy (e. g. Hamilton & Shergill, 1993; Mintzberg, 
1979) there is a parallel body of literature that suggests that there is a major effect from structure 
to strategy (Fredrickson, 1986; Miller, 1994). Particularly organisation theorists argue that 
strategy follows structure due to the constraints imposed by the latter on the strategic decision 
process and management's available options (Bower, 1970; Child, 1972; 1997). This argument 
has been widely adapted in the strategic decision making theory were it is proposed that decision 
makers' cognitions are motivated and constrained by their business environment, organisation 
structures, and resources, as well as their personal experiences and perceptions (Baum & Wally, 
2003). Fredrickson (1986 p. 286) argues that an organisations structure may have important 
deterministic effects on its own, and states that these effects have neither been widely recognised 
nor investigated. 
Based on the limited available literature on the effect of organisational structure on the decision 
making environment, we will extent the debate by exploring the key issues that act as a potential 
barrier to respond as suggested by several authors (e. g. Bower, 1970; Child, 1972; Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988; Fredrickson, 1986; Hall & Saias, 1980) (see figure 2.3). Then again, it is not 
our ambition here to review all the internal inertia issues that might play a role in strategy 
development; instead we wish to focus on three key aspects. We will look at aspects that can be 
related to the way knowledge is disseminated within an organisation, which is closely related to 
the distribution of power [informal structure], and to its hierarchical structure [formal structure]". 
The aspects involved are structural form, coordination and control [management style]. According 
to Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1979 p. 11)the formal and informal structures are intertwined and often 
indistinguishable and should therefore be researched [discussed] in combination. Given the focus 
of this study, these aspects are reviewed from an international, MNE, perspective, which 
particularly draws the attention to the centralisation versus decentralisation debate and the role of 
16 This claim has led an interesting debate with researchers who supported the statement and those who 
have overturned his contention (Bower, 1970; Rumelt, 1974; Mintzberg, 1979). While Chandlers' claim 
was widely accepted since, theoretical arguments have suggested that major changes in the structure are 
unlikely, or are very slow in coming because of inertia (Miller & Friesen, 1980; Mintzberg, 1979; Quinn, 
1980). In a similar argument, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) suggested that over time, strategic processes 
`become routinised, commitment to established practices increases as groups become more rigid in their 
behaviour patterns and decrease both the volume and diversity of information processed (p. 192). 
1' The distinction between formal and informal structure is made by Mintzberg (1979, p. 11) to emphasise 
the differences between the visible part of structure (i. e. the boxes and lines) and the less visible processes 
of coordination and integration 
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subsidiaries within MNE's. In addition, we will briefly review technology as a barrier to strategic 
response. 
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Figure 2.4: Key elements causing internal inertia 
2.5.4.1 Structural form 
Organisations structure has been defined by Khandwalla (1977) as the network of durable and 
formally sanctioned organisational arrangements and relationships' (p. 482). Organisations 
structure provides a way for the organisation to coordinate its activities and establish and pursue 
common goals despite diversity among individual members. As such it reflects the actual 
distribution of responsibilities and authority among the organisations personnel (Fredrickson, 
1986). The flexibility of this distribution18 reveals the efficiency and effectiveness of the firm 
when adapting to other mutual relationships (Volberda, 1998). For example, formalised 
organisation structures are characterised by explicitly articulated and written firm policies, 
organisation charts, strategic plans, and objective setting systems. In highly formalised systems, 
little flexibility exists to determine who may decide or act or even how to decide or act (Volberda, 
1998). 
This implies that the organisational design and its related structure [have the potential to] 
influence the ability of organisations to respond to changes in their environment (e. g. Edstrom & 
47 
Galbraith, 1977; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). This link is also apparent in Bower's (1970) 
comment that when management chooses a particular organisation structure, it is providing not 
only a framework for current operations but also the channels along which strategic information 
will flow... ' (p. 287). Theoretical arguments have linked structural inertia to a variety of 
consequences, including organisational performance (e. g. Dobrev et al., 2003), and the rates of 
failure of organisations (e. g. van Witteloostuijn, 1998). Only few, however, examined the direct 
effects of the existing organisational structure on strategy orientation (Baum & Wally, 2003). An 
important issue here is to what extent design elements permit variety in response. In this context it 
is often assumed that a given structure is capable of executing only a highly constrained set of 
competitive activities (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). 
From an empirical point of view several authors provide evidence of these constrains. Gresov et 
al. (1993), for example, mathematically modelled the effects of structural inertia on the 
organisation's responsiveness to changes in competitive pressures. This model includes fourteen 
design variables, including organisational structure. The outcome suggests that the process 
followed in implementing change can influence not only the perception of change, but also the 
involvement of those affected and the sequencing of change enhancing activities. Similarly, Huff 
et al. (1993) mathematically develop and simulate how organisations renew their strategic 
direction. This model details the nature of this evolutionary process by simulating alternative 
renewal paths and exploring the interaction of the cumulative stress and inertia that naturally 
develop in organisations over time. Findings suggest that the beginning levels structural inertia 
have a long-term bearing on the length of time it persists with its current strategy. 
2.5.4.2 Coordination and control 
Despite the fact that few explicitly study the extent to which and in what way structural design 
elements influence the strategic response constraints, much has been said about how the 
organisational context characterises the managerial perceptions (e. g. Denison & Dutton, 1996; 
Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1992; Meyer, 1982; Thomas, 1993). This organisational information 
processing perspective implicitly posits that increasing the flow of information within and 
between organisations will enhance environmental awareness, which eventually will influence the 
strategic response to change (Kuvaas, 2002). This notion shifts the debate towards the 
19 Often reflected in construction of an organisational form that is made of various parts such as functions, 
units, divisions and so fort. 
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information-processing approach19 (e. g. Egelhoff, 1982) and addresses issues such as information 
availability, information sharing, and the value of information that can be linked to the goodness 
of fit between strategy and structure (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
The conceptual underpinning of this information processing approach has been often used to 
explain elements that influence the information (knowledge) flow in ME's (e. g. Birkinshaw et 
al., 2002; Egelhoff, 1982; Wolf & Egelhoff, 2002). Some key elements of influence mentioned in 
this context are organisational form (Egelhoff, 1988), technological complexity (available 
resources) (Wolf & Egelhoff, 2002), size and age of network (Stopford & Wells, 1972), 
centralisation/autonomy (Hedlund, 1981), and network integration (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). In 
the following discussion we will briefly outline centralisation, network integration, and 
technological resources as potential barriers to strategic response. 
2.5.4.2.1 Centralisation versus autonomy 
Centralisation refers to the concentration of authority and power in a firm (Jung & Avolio, 1999). 
The more centralised, the less widespread is decision making power with regard to policy20 and 
task performance (Covin & Slevin, 1994). Centralisation stresses the fact that knowledge is 
distributed among a large number of individuals, and that the main economic problem is to ensure 
the coordination of individuals holding different and complementary specialised knowledge. In 
other words, concentrated power arrangements tend to prevent imaginative solutions to problems 
since centralised decision making often translates into processes that run counter to the 
requirements of a creative environment (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). This notion is confirmed by 
Zaltman (1986) who found that less formalised organisations could acquire knowledge more 
easily than their more structured competitors. Similarly, Slater and Naiver (1995) emphasise the 
constraining role of centralisation which give responsibility to individuals with hierarchical power 
rather than to the experts in a particular field. On the other hand, reductions in centralisation have 
been associated with growing uncertainty (Davis & Morris, 1991), or as Caruana et al. (1998) 
report, environmental turbulence can lead to more formalisation in decision making. 
The concept of centralisation has received much attention in the MNE context with a particular 
interest in the location of decision-making since the early seventies (Picard, 1977). As such, most 
19 The information processing approach calls for translating strategic conditions and organisational structure 
into information-processing requirements and information processing capacity 
20 Centralisation takes place through formalisation of rules and regulations, as well as organisations effort to 
enforce those rules 
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of the research attention has focused upon the factors inherent to companies and subsidiaries that 
are affecting the level and scope of autonomy granted by the HQ. Within this debate, three 
different stages of interest can be defined. First includes Gates and Egelhoff (1986) attempt to 
reconcile the inconsistent results by retesting the contingency variables related to company size, 
complexity and environmental change previously investigated in the MNE context. The second 
group continues this research and focuses more on the consistency between marketing practices 
and decision making. In this context researchers found a consistent relation between 
standardisation and the centralisation of decision making in MNEs (e. g. Krum & Rau, 1993; 
Shoham, 1995). Also as a result of the emerged research interests into this topic a third group of 
researchers concentrates more on the process mechanisms [i. e. coordination, personnel 
integration, hierarchical control, etc. ] used by MNE to achieve integration of their activities 
across markets (e. g. Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995). 
Particularly with the later view on process mechanisms, international management research has 
increasingly moved towards viewing the MNE as an interorganisational network of 
geographically dispersed and differentiated units (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1990), whose core competence lies in the ability to exploit resources, especially knowledge, more 
efficiently internally than would be possible through external market mechanisms (Zander & 
Kogut, 1995). This view emphasises that MNEs' competitive advantage is fundamentally based 
on how efficiently they share knowledge across units, as managers might face constraints based 
on the information they receive (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991 ; Grant, 1996). 
2.5.4.2.2 Network integration 
In exploring this issue, the potentially significant role of subsidiaries has been increasingly 
acknowledged (e. g. Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Research in this vein has 
explored characteristics of different subsidiary roles (e. g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; 1989; 
Hedlund & Rolander, 1990), as well as some aspects of subsidiary resources (Etemad & Dulude, 
1986; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). A range of barriers to knowledge transfer21 has also been 
uncovered, including motivational factors associated with both the HQ and the subsidiary (Gupta 
and Govindarajan 2000; Szulanski 1996). In this context network integration22 has forcefully been 
21 We refer here to the knowledge that exists in the form of `know-how' (Gupta, 2000) that can be related to 
procedural types of knowledge that largely influences [coordinate] the decision making of network 
members 
22 Prahalad and Doz were the first to use the term `integration' in the international strategic context. From 
their point of view integration refers to `the centralised management of geographically dispersed activities 
on an ongoing basis... in response to pressures to reduce costs and optimise investment' (1987 p. 14-15). In 
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argued to be an important prerequisite for such behaviour to occur (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; 
Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
The degree of network integration that occurs is the result of the NINE of the overall corporate 
strategy and how the function of the subsidiary can be allocated in order to contribute to the MNE 
goals. Retaining control at HQ level increases a MNE's efficiency in implementing corporate 
strategy. In this context, scholars widely agree that retention largely takes place through network 
integration which associates management compensation criteria that balance country and business 
accountability with global contribution (see Doz & Prahalad, 1991) as well as the previous 
discussed implementation of consistency of corporate vision that unites affiliates around a 
common purpose (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). 
A degree of autonomy to local affiliates, on the other hand, expands the flexibility needed to cope 
with unexpected problems or react positively to unexpected opportunities (Doz & Prahalad, 1981; 
1984). The degree of local freedom possessed by any subsidiary may also be a function of the 
influence that HQ can bring to bear, which may depend critically on resource dependency 
relationships and the comparative importance of the subsidiary within the network (Doz & 
Prahalad, 1991; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Martinez & Ricks, 1989). The extent to which network 
integration and centralisation act as a barrier is based on the pressure the change in the business 
environment will have on this internal arrangements (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
2.5.4.3 Technological capabilities 
As mentioned above, a significant element of inertial pressure is the dependency of subsidiaries 
on technological capabilities. These capabilities may be defined as: `the ability to design and 
develop new products and processes and to operate facilities effectively' (Dosi et al., 1992). 
Building on from this definition, Volberda (1998) separates technological capability into 
hardware [i. e. machinery, manufacturing] and software [i. e. knowledge, skills, techniques]. 
Dependency therefore refers to the control of these capabilities by others, including the ability to 
configure existing capabilities. The extent to which technological capabilities act as an inertial 
device is therefore related to the choice of process or the mode23 of production available. 
the context of internal inertia within multinationals it seems important to also take into account that 
integration also refers to the extent to which firms combine dispersed or non-dispersed activities that 
operate at an international level. 
23 Some indicators that influence the mode (i. e. mass production versus single country production) of 
production are: throughput volume, variability of production capacity, the range of raw material/data used, 
the range of products produced (often referred to as technological complexity) 
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The choice process from this point of few refers to the way in which the organisation chooses the 
development, acquisition, and application of technology within the multinational. To achieve this 
process of technology transfer, the identification and the application of appropriate transfer 
mechanisms must be invoked. This process does not only refer to the technological capability, but 
also to the decision to apply that technology locally to satisfy the needs. It are often these needs 
that lead to change of imported technology, creation of new technology or the development of 
indigenous technology. One of the issues influencing the choice of technological adaptation is the 
available production set in terms of capacity, technology, and raw materials (Graustrand et al., 
1989). In other words, the possibilities for combining technologies in order to standardise 
products limits or expands the strategic choice (and control) of firms. This notion is confirmed 
empirically by Jaffe (1989) who found that the extent to which market opportunities can be 
utilised varies systematically due to technological limitations. 
The above discussion points out that technological and managerial capability are closely related. 
This relationship has often been topic of debate in the innovation literature. There is a general 
consensus among theorists in this field of organisation innovativeness that higher degrees of 
centralisation influence innovation in a negative way because together they concentrate decision 
making, hindering the ability of members of the organisation to participate in more depth (Webb 
& Pettigrew, 1999). In other words, a continued dependence on joint development may deter 
managers from developing their own firm capabilities, allowing local competitors to develop 
more appropriate competitive skills (Hamel et al., 1989). Damanpour (1991) confirms this 
negative relationship; however, he also argues that the implementation of innovation requires a 
higher degree of centralisation than the initiation phase. Indeed, firms [subsidiaries] may become 
reliant on certain types of governance that may not always be well-suited to their needs. It seems 
therefore not surprising that Hayes et al (1988) argue that it is impossible for companies to 
implement advanced manufacturing technologies successfully without reshaping other 
organisational components. In a similar context Yasai-Ardekani (1997) noted that new 
technologies demand skills to perform new tasks, which significantly influences relationship 
structures. 
Despite substantial empirical research on effects of technology on organisational structure (see for 
example Miller et c71., 1991 for a comprehensive review) there is a paucity of research on the 
effects of technology on strategic orientation (see for example Capon et al., 1987 " for an 
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exception). Empirically, attention is primarily paid to inflexibility of technologies (e. g. Yasai- 
Ardekani, 1989; Yasai-Ardekani & Nystrom, 1996). Such technologies are less adaptable to 
changing market condition and are also severely constrained by disruption in supplies of critical 
inputs. These authors suggest that the great vulnerability of organisations with inflexible 
technologies to environmentally induced disruptions the broader and more intense monitoring of 
environments will be applied. This implies that, in the short run, firms with inflexible 
technologies are expected to scan their environments more broadly to evaluate the impact of 
environmental changes and resource commitments on the organisations future operations (Yasai- 
Ardekani & Haug, 1997; Yasai-Ardekani & Nystrom, 1996). 
2.6 Theoretical Themes and Researchable Questions 
The above analysis has scrutinised the literature on strategy development and sensemaking- 
related activities, and has examined other contributing insights. In this section, the key issues 
raised in each part of the discussion are summarised and synthesised in order to identify 
theoretical gaps. This provides the link to the three research questions we introduced earlier in this 
chapter as those being key questions to be explored in this thesis. However, it must be stressed 
that not all theoretical gaps can be handled in a single study. Indeed, not all theoretical gaps are 
researchable. Therefore, the emphasis here is to on providing the reader with the theoretical gaps 
this thesis explores as well as presenting its relevant sub-questions of broad conceptual 
significance. 
2.6.1 Strategic adaptation process 
A fundamental normative prescription through almost all of the strategy adaptation literature is 
that managers must continually monitor the environment and make strategic decisions that keep 
firms aligned with new opportunities and threats in the environment (e. g. Miles & Snow, 1978; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Quinn, 1980). The understanding of the traditional approach in which strategy 
adaptation processes are studied served as the first step in investigating the elements of this 
process and the different perspective in which these elements can be affected. Through the review 
of these dimensions several critical themes became apparent that question the depth and 
comprehension of the traditional approach. It is particularly argued that the competitive landscape 
faced by firms is far more complex and uncertain. As a result, traditional approaches to strategy 
have collapsed because of their assumptions of stability (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; D'Aveni, 
1994). These inadequacies of static views of strategy are increasingly being recognised in both 
content and process traditions which clearly reflect in the growing amount of dynamic oriented 
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research in these areas (e. g. Garvin, 1993; Mintzberg et al., 1998; Teece et al., 1997). 
Nevertheless, conceptual work that takes a dynamic view is notably hindered by the sharp 
distinction between process and content of the past, as researchers have tended to emphasise the 
dynamics of one element rather than the interrelationship between them. 
It is only recent that important research issues are being articulated that aim to understand the 
dynamic interrelationship between content, process and context issues in more detail (e. g. Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1997; Day et al., 1997; Fowler, 2003). This research on dynamic adaptation of 
strategy claims that managers should have a complex and sophisticated view of competition in 
order to avoid oversimplification or ignorance of potential threats or opportunities. In addition, 
this stream of research proposes several tools and perspectives that aim to help them to develop 
strategies in this dynamic environment. 
Despite the fact that these studies clearly adopted the underlying dynamic arguments of 
environmental complexity, content, process and context interrelationship and limited rationality of 
individuals, it remains questionable to what extent findings are generalisable and indeed provide 
the necessary tools. The common limitation is that the foundations are based on the researchers' 
conceptual understanding of the dynamic environment, rather than the current dynamic views of 
managers. This lead to the first research question: 
Research question 1: How do firms adapt to a change in market conditions? 
The fact that the foundations on which the statements rest are relatively weak is primarily due to a 
number of methodological limitations. In particular, current empirical research on strategy 
dynamics has not been able to trace and observe one particular strategic pattern within a complex 
organisation that provides them with a clear insight how managers develop a dynamic view. 
Although some attempts are made to link strategic change to interpretation (Barr, 1998; Thomas, 
1993)) no study thus far has focused on the development of the interpretation of one strategic 
pattern in real time. It will be this theme that will be the focus of our empirical research. This 
leads to interesting sub questions such as: 
" How do managers' interpretations about a change in market conditions evolve over time? 
or; 
0 flow do strategies emerge over time? 
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2.6.2 The sensemaking perspective 
Tichy's (1983) notion that managers influence organisational change shows that organisational 
response patterns to changing market conditions can be linked back to the interpretation and 
consensus of individuals. Section 2.4 concentrated on this cognitive process. In summarising 
previous work, Weick (1995) argues that problems do not present themselves as givens. This 
indicates that managers will only interpret what they know and act accordingly (Louis, 1980). The 
sensemaking process (Daft & Weick, 1984) not only discusses when and why managers respond 
to environmental changes, but also examines how managers respond through interpretation, 
choice and learning (Milliken et al., 1990). 
From a strategic formulation point of view, the sensemaking process discusses problem 
identification [the manager notification of what is happening] and problem definition [the 
meaning given to that what is identified] (Miles & Snow, 1984). Problem definition is seen as a 
complicated issue whereby individuals make connections between what they know and how to 
deal with it (Van De Ven & Huber, 1990). It is argued that individuals have limited capability to 
process information (Simon, 1955) and make sense of it (Weick, 1979), which influences the ýýay 
firms behave in response to a change in market conditions (Cyert & March, 1963). 
Despite the increasing attention recently given to interpretation processes (e. g. Barr et al., 1992, 
Barr, 1998; Isabella, 1990), much is still to be learned about the relationship between 
interpretation and environmental shifts. In particular, the way interpretations change over time as 
the event unfolds and creates new realities of understanding that ultimately lead to the generation 
of new programmes of action in organisations. Empirical research thus far has been cited for its 
lack of conceptual coherence, but more importantly for having a research methodology that is 
invisible due to the nature of cognitive elements such as noticing, intention, beliefs, anticipation. 
In addition, only a few studies (see Bogner & Barr, 2000 for a notable exception) focus on the 
sensemaking process as a whole. Several research questions emerge from this discussion. The key 
question is: 
Research question 2: How do managers develop an interpretation about 
a change in market conditions? 
This question can be further divided into sub questions that address the process of sensemaking in 
particular such as: 
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" To what extent and in which ways do managers anticipate the impact of a change in 
market conditions? or; 
" To what extent do changes in interpretation about the impact of changing market 
conditions lead to changes in strategic response? 
2.6.3 The discontinuous change perspective 
Section 2.5 examined the existing literature on heuristic devices that sediment and dominate 
perceptions of managers (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). In this section we presented arguments of the 
reductionism literature and the contextualism literature to explain the current debate on 
managerial and structural barriers that are limiting strategic choice. From a cognitive point of 
view it is argued that the individuals' behaviour towards external stimuli is mediated by the 
cognitive representation of those stimuli (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). The reductionism argument 
adds that individuals have a simplified representation of the organisational world that sets 
boundaries to what they understand. While this simplification is essential for individuals to 
resolve complex problems (Porac & Rosa, 1996; Porac et al., 2002), it also makes them resistant 
to change these boundaries (Mauer, 1996). 
From a structural point of view the debate of organisational heuristics focuses around the 
existence of inertial forces (Ginsberg, 1988; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). It is argued that these 
forces lock in managers directions of thought as historical steps taken by firms create a `path of 
dependency' (David, 1985). This path of dependency to some extent restricts managers from 
finding optimal solutions as well as it controls the choice of strategic solutions the managers have 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Hannan (1998) elaborates these arguments by arguing that inertia 
influences flexibility of response which makes it more difficult for some firms to adapt to changes 
in the environment. An in-depth review on what elements of the organisational design might be 
potential barriers that limit strategic choice, revealed that organisational structure, coordination, 
integration and technology are amongst the key elements. 
The choice of strategy appears to depend partly upon the size of the gap identified between 
current and future position [i. e. threats and opportunities identified] (research question 2) and 
partly on the strengths and weaknesses of the company. This debate leads to the following key 
question and sub questions: 
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Research question 3: What are the key barriers or enhancements to the ability 
or likelihood of strategic change? 
" To what extent and in which ways do managers reveal resistance to change there current 
strategy in order to adapt to a change in the market conditions? 
" To what extent and in which ways do managers reveal limitations in strategic choice due 
to internal barriers? 
After illustrating all research questions which are vital to the examination of strategic adaptation 
to a change in market conditions, the following chapter outlines various issues related to how the 
proposed research questions can be answered from an empirical point of view. 
;ý 
Chapter Three: 
Methodology 
Three philosophical and methodological issues are central to any research study; why to research? 
What to research? And how to research? (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The first question has been 
addressed in the previous two chapters. The research questions as proposed in the final section of 
chapter two has briefly outlined what we are going to research. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present the scope and context in which these questions are being studied, as well as detailing how 
the research has been carried out. Following these two objectives, the chapter is divided into two 
parts that address these questions separately. The first part will outline the methodological 
framework that guided this research. In this section we will first present a graphical overview of 
the methodological framework. The purpose of the analytical framework is to provide an early 
classification of constructs scope and context of the research which we use throughout the chapter 
as a point of reference. After that the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of this 
framework will be portrayed. This will be followed by the research strategy, which will outline a 
multilevel approach, its units of analysis, and a selection of qualitative strategies and methods 
under guidance of the contextualist approach. The second part of the chapter will demonstrate 
how this strategy is utilised by presenting the data collection methods and the analysis methods 
that helped to fulfil the research objectives. The combination of both parts will provide an overall 
understanding of the methodology and will discuss its application to the research findings as 
presented in chapter five and six. 
3.1 The scope of the research 
The focus of the present study is on the perceived and challenged impact of the Euro on 
continuity or change in complex organisations over time. The impact is being studied from a 
perspective where transformation of the firm is seen as a context dependent process, with 
outcomes emerging not merely as a product of bounded rational debates, but also shaped by the 
interest, commitment, and perception of organisational members who interpret the gross changes 
in the environment based on individual, organisational and business environmental stimuli. With 
such a focus in mind Nie highlight one particular unfolding pattern of the outer context, and aim to 
is 
explain; what actors understand about this pattern; how this understanding is influenced by 
established processual patterns; and what actions are taken as a result of both issues. Thus, from 
an analytical point of view we are particularly interested in two aspects of development: 
managerial sensemaking and strategic response [actions]. What this indicates is that we adopted a 
design that aims to gather and analyse data at multiple levels, whilst focussing on the manager as 
the primary unit of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989a) which is embedded in the second unit of analysis, 
the context of organisations. The integration and interplay of both processes can be seen as the 
third level of analysis. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of how this process is studied. This 
framework and its implementation will be discussed in great depth in this chapter. 
Figure 3.1: Simplified strategic adaptation and sensemaking process 
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3.2 Philosophical underpinnings 
Debates on the nature of social science and the inquiry methods are originated from the way in 
which the social reality is perceived and understood (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). These 
principles combine beliefs about ontology [i. e. what is the nature of reality? ], epistemology [i. e. 
what is the relationship between the inquirer and the known? ] and methodology [i. e. how do we 
gain knowledge? ]. The combination of these three beliefs might be termed a 'paradigm' or 
interpretative framework (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) that guides the researchers' feelings about the 
world and how it should be understood and studied (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In this section we 
will briefly outline the concepts of ontology, epistemology and methodology and explain the 
interpretive paradigm that structures this study. 
3.2.1 Interpretative framework 
Two contrasting schools of thought that address the fundamental philosophical questions of 
ontological and epistemological assumptions are labelled as 'objective' or positivist approaches 
and the alleged `subjective' or interpretive approaches" (Lee, 2000). In responding to social 
reality positivists argue that the world is natural, ordered and independent from the actors and 
social activities, and universality can therefore be observed and measured (Blaikie, 1993). In 
contrast, the interpretivist argues that the world is social and constructed by its actors, whom are 
continuously involved in `interpreting their world (social situations), other people's behaviour, 
their own behaviour and natural and humanly created objects.... [lt is further argued that] they 
develop meanings for their activities together, and they have ideas about what is relevant for 
making sense of these activities' (Blaikie, 1993 p. 36). This implies that the main goal of the 
interpretivist is to investigate the ways in which people create or discover meaning for 
themselves, try to make sense of the actions of others, and together negotiate sensible social 
relations. 
The main premise of this research is to find meaning in action, by investigating what actors do, 
and why actors do what they do. We therefore assume that knowledge of reality is gained through 
social constructs such as consciousness, shared meanings, documents, and other artefacts. We 
focus on the complexity of human sensemaking as the situation emerges. In other words, wwe 
attempt to understand the impact of the Euro through the meaning that people assign to this 
impact, and the actions they take as a result of this meaning (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Thus, 
24 Subjective approaches are variousl,, described as naturalistic, qualitative, phenomenological, constructive 
or most rccentl' interpretative. 
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an interpretivist perspective guides the research questions asked and the research strateý^} 
adopted. 
3.2.2 Ontological standpoints 
This process of interpretation or understanding is differentially represented in the literature, and 
indeed underlies some important differences of interpretivist scholars. We view interpretivism as 
a grounded and detailed study of the world of everyday life. Essentially it seeks to threat practical 
activities, practical sociological reasoning as topics of study, with a specific attention to an 
extraordinary event [i. e. a change in market conditions]. This form of interpret ivism is often 
referred to as phenomenology, phenomenological sociology, or ethnomethodology (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 1983). Indeed we adopt a multiple approach perspective rather than a single 
approach that represents the interpretive paradigm as this will narrow the view to reflect the multi 
faced nature of organisational reality (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Consequently, the overall 
ontological basis that guides this study is based on the emergent perspective which sees social 
reality as subjective, ill-structured, complex, anomaly-filled, and socially constructed. This stance 
is consistent with ontological assumptions of nominalism (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Thus, social 
reality is the context that sets the conditions in which actors define meaning. 
3.2.3 Epistemological underpinnings 
With this viewpoint on social reality we adopt a social construction perspective that meanings 
emerge through the verbal and social interaction of actors with its environment (Giddens, 1979). 
The main epistemological concern is to analyse and understand such meanings (Weick, 1979). 
Guba and Lincoln (1989) point out in this context that `constructions come about by virtue of the 
I. n1c'ruction of the knower with the already known and the still-knowable or to-be-known' (p. 143). 
The study therefore moves beyond the 'one-sided' view of actors' experiences, by also seeking to 
understand the (organisational) rules that guide the actors in their interpretations. In doing so, wwe 
adapt three epistemological guidelines that underlie the researchers' view how meaning emerges 
(see also figure 3.1). 
3.2.3.1 Interpretation is path-dependent 
This takes into account that actors are located in a specific intra-organisational environment that is 
characterised through its past, present and future relationship as well as its socio-economic, and 
its socio-cultural, and market environment in which the organisation operates that further guide 
these actors in their behaviour. This actor's environment influences and orients the interpretative 
schema (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995), which eventually affects their enactment-selection-retention 
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patterns as actors are only aware of specific [guided] sets of information. It would theref rc be 
inadequate to solely investigate the actors' interpretation without taking into account the factors 
that guide this behaviour. 
3.2.3.2 Interpretation is the product of cognitive representation 
Similarly, this research also notes that the actor's behaviour towards external stimuli is 
significantly influenced by the actor's cognitive representation of those stimuli. This implies that 
mental models of actors actively shape the environmental space in which organisations exist 
(Porac & Rosa, 1996). This research aligns with the perspective that when actors are responding 
to external stimuli they will do so in a distilled fashion, based on their own experiences and 
interpretation. Thus, this cognitive effect takes into account that actors use mental shortcuts to 
simplify problems to quickly understand and solve the problem. 
3.2.3.3 Interpretation is a necessary simplification of reality 
This same assumption also recognises that the role of organisational members [typically 
managers] is to determine actions in uncertain circumstances aiming to create order out of chaos, 
which implies that actors design and implement strategies that can initiate changes in the 
environment. Indeed, this study concurs with the statement that the organisational behaviour in 
response to changes in the environment is the result of a combined interplay between 
[organisational] context and managerial interpretation and action. 
3.2.3.4 Epistemological stance 
In this research we argue that each of these epistemological guidelines plays some part in 
influencing the thinking and acting of actors that underlies the strategies which are deployed 
ultimately when responding to significant changes in the business environment [i. e. the impact of 
the Euro]. In other words, interpretation according to these guidelines derives both from the outer 
context, the organisational context and the individual representation of those two. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the interplay of these epistemological issues. 
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Figure 3.2: Simplified epistemological stance of contexts of interpretation 
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Given that the main purpose of this study is to understand the dynamic interaction between the 
internal processes of a firm and a significant shift in market conditions as a result of the 
introduction of the Euro, the epistemological challenge is to find ways that capture the 
perceptions and interpretations of organisational members that further explain the (elements of) 
complexity of this cognition - action relationship. Our epistemological stance implies a method of 
inquiry that is concerned with the interaction of social actors with their environment (see for 
example Giddens, 1979 `structuration' theory), as well as the resulting interpretation of actors on 
action and movement (see for example Sztompka, 1991 `social becoming' theory). Critically, this 
can (only) be elicited and refined through interaction between researcher and actor utilising 
qualitative methods as actors perceptions can not be considered as `object', nor can their 
perceptions be simply `acquired' (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In other words, actors' behaviour 
does not consist simply of fixed responses or even of learned responses to stimuli, but involves 
interpretation of those stimuli in order to construct responses. 
3.3 Theoretical underpinnings: Contextualism as a method 
The above philosophical underpinnings provide insight into the assumptions this study makes 
about the nature of the social world. However such set of assumptions, is not sufficient for 
spelling out the way this social world is organised. To analyse this social world we draw on the 
broad statements of the contextualist framework as philosophically proposed by Pepper (1942), 
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interpreted by Payne" (1982), and theoretically and empirically developed from an strategy and 
organisational behaviour point of view by Pettigrew (1985b; 1985a; 1987; 1990; 1992; 2001). 
In his book `World Hypotheses' Pepper describes four different approaches how knowledge can 
be obtained. The central notion of these hypotheses is that knowledge is gained through a 
continuous process of cognitive refinement26 in order to improve the claims made based on 
common-sense (Payne, 1982). The `world hypothesis' of contextualism is according to Pepper 
concerned with an event in its setting. He argues that every additional (environmental) event 
alters the character of an already established pattern. These arguments are based on the notion that 
contextualism is synthetic as the object of study is a pattern of historical events rather than 
discrete facts, and disperse because there is no systematic connection through lawful relationships 
(Tsoukas, 1994). 
The overall strength of the contextualist approach is that it draws the attention to antecedent 
conditions that force the researcher to explore the deep structures in which the event is analysed. 
This will eventually help to understand how and why the present and emerging future is shaped in 
the way it is. As such this theory of method provides a holistic and multifaceted treatment of the 
phenomena studied. Contextualism not only attempts to identify the impact of the environment on 
the firm, but also takes into account the existing intra-organisational features that might influence 
the way in which the firm will respond to this impact (Pettigrew, 1990). In doing so, it recognises 
both the complexity of the environment the firm is operating in as well as the dynamic role the 
firm plays in this environment. There it assumes that firms are embedded in an environment that 
constrains and shapes their actions (Pettigrew, 1990), it also points out that there is space to act 
and react to environmental pressure. In other words, organisational actors are seen as being 
capable of simplifying the inner and outer context in order to reconfigure the existing pattern in 
order to propose different strategic options. Contextualism can therefore be viewed as providing 
the bridge between interpretation and determination of action (see figure 3.1). 
3.3.1 Broad statements on contextualism as a form of inquiry 
In a series of articles Pettigrew (1985b; 1985a; 1987; 1990; 1992; 2001) proposes some key 
points to emphasise when dealing with the practical process implications of using contextualism 
25 Payne clarified the epistemological base of contextualism, by pointing out the strengths and weaknesses 
of this approach. He also argues for the use of contextualism in organisational psychology. 
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as the method of inquiry. First, the study should explore the continuous interplay between the 
context of change, the process of change, and the content of change on the evolution and 
development of strategies within firms. This refers to the importance of focus on 'changing' 
rather than `change' which challenges the researcher to `(1) [to] attempt to catch reality in f ight 
and (2) to study long-term processes in their context in order to evaluate embeddedness to a 
principle of method' (Pettigrew et al., 2001 p. 698). Second, it should be taken into account that 
there is a sequential interconnectedness among phenomena in historical, present and future time 
(Clark, 2000; Pettigrew, 1990). This highlights the importance in understanding and revealing the 
structures historical steps have created. This also points out that special attention should be paid to 
`how context is a product of action and visa versa' (Pettigrew, 1990 p. 269). Finally, 
contextualism research aims to provide a holistic analysis by focussing on explanation of change 
such as continuity and change, patterns and idiosyncrasies, and the role of contexts and structures. 
3.3.2 Limitations of the contextualism method 
The contextualist view is representing a method that works from the present event outward. This 
implies that claims can be made about the impact of the present event on the existing patterns, 
which enables to highlight the uniqueness of the change impact and it further aids the 
understanding of its change impact. This explanation is neither linear nor singular, and is 
therefore bound to be a holistic and in-depth picture of an event in a particular context. This, to 
some extent, limits the generalisability. Researchers adapting a contextualist approach recognise 
and accept these boundaries and therefore do not aim to provide a simple and singular theory of 
change. They do, however, aim to provide a clear picture of how and why organisations change. 
Contextualists therefore do not seek to explain the underlying mechanisms that shaped the intra- 
organisational context prior to the event, but instead focus on exploring what impact these 
structures have on the adaptation of an event. 
3.4 Research Strategy: Contextualism as a Mode of Analysis 
The important recognition that change is embedded into interconnected levels of context. 
proposes to study change in the context of levels of analysis. The first analytical question that 
arises is how many levels of context analysis should be addressed. The second analytical question 
is which processes should be included or excluded. The combination of these analytical issues 
'`' Pepper explains this refinement process from a `multiplicative corroboration' perspective, that is, a 
process of , atherin, 
inter-subjective confirmation, and from a `structural corroboration' perspective, that 
is, a comparison bet\\ een structured theories and empirical data. 
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reveals what types of questions can be answered (Pettigrew et al., 2001). The second sug`^estion 
made in the broad statements that history creates a path of dependency that guides and constrains 
actors in their determination for action, points out that time should be captured27 both in a 
retrospective and a real time analysis to reveal the extent to which this path plays a role. 
Moreover, the context action relationship calls for a performance outcome into the research 
design (Pettigrew et al., 2001). Doing so provides the researcher with two additional advantages. 
First, performance outcome provides a focal point. Second, performance outcome allows to 
explore variation over time. 
In this research strategy section we will further explain what analytical choices this study made 
and how this study dealt with the complexities of the contextualist approach. 
3.4.1 The multilevel approach 
Pettigrew (1985b; 1990) proposes to adapt a longitudinal approach [horizontal analysis] based on 
multiple levels of analysis [vertical analysis], where the interconnections between those levels of 
analysis through time explain the holism that is achieved. The multiple levels of analysis attempt 
to explain the interdependencies between inner and outer context28 of the firm. While the 
horizontal level refers to the processual [path of dependency] established patterns created over 
time. As such, Pettigrew investigates three levels of analysis and their interconnections between 
the group level, firm level, and business environmental level. 
While we also adapt a multilevel and processual approach that investigates the context 
dependency of multinational firms responding to the perceived impact of the Euro, our study 
fundamentally differs in the way we define and emphasise the `outer context' to explain the 
overall pattern of continuity and change. For Pettigrew much of the outer context level of analysis 
reveals the `how and why' of strategic change as it acts as a vital component that explains the 
origins of organisational change. More specifically, the interconnections between the 
understanding and tactical skill to analyse and respond to the outer context, as well as the 
controlling force of established processual patterns are used by Pettigrew to explain and explore 
continuity and change over time. He therefore describes the outer context level of analysis as 'the 
27 This argues against `single-snapshot' methods (Pettigrew 1990) which are seen as inadequate as they 
represent accidental or transitory images of the situation. 
28 'Outer context includes the economic, social, political, and sectoral environment in which the firm is 
located Inner context refers to features of the structural, cultural, and political environment through which 
ideas proceed. ' (Pettigrew, 1990 p. 268) 
66 
one most novel to the analysis of organisational change and analysis, and the one most di ficult 
empirically and theoretically to handle' (Pettigrew, 1985 p. 48). 
The significant difference with Pettigrew's approach is that with the focus on the impact of the 
Euro on continuity and change of MNE's in two industries over time we have defined the origin 
of change or continuity beforehand. While this does not significantly change the assumptions we 
have about contextualism, it does change the relationship with the chosen method. In other words, 
as elaborated previously, the research topic significantly influences the epistemological base of 
the study, the research questions asked, and the way the change and continuity process is studied. 
Simply stated, in this study we highlight one particular unfolding pattern of the outer context, and 
aim to explain; what actors understand about this pattern; how this understanding is influenced by 
established processual patterns; and what actions are taken as a result of both issues. In addition, 
we examine this process over time to find out how both understanding and response evolve. These 
levels of analysis and their elements are defined more explicitly bellow. 
3.4.2 The levels of analysis 
The focal point of analysis of this study is threefold (see figure 3.3). First, it aims to describe and 
explain viewpoints of organisational actors of various firms in the Consumer Electronic (CE) 
industry and the fast moving consumer good industry (FMCG) about the impact the single 
currency had on facilitating or inhibiting the need for strategic change before (T°) and after the 
Euro (T') was introduced on a consumer level (see figure 3.4 for time definition). Second, this 
study aims to explore to what extent current and historical organisational processes stimulate or 
bound the sensemaking of organisational actors when defining the need for strategic change 
before and after the Euro was introduced on a consumer level. And third, this study aims to 
examine the interdependencies between the first two issues by investigating what deliberate 
actions are indeed undertaken by these firms to deal with the Euro on a consumer's level before 
and after it was introduced; why in particular these actions are taken by these companies; and how 
these strategic response patterns (and their interpretations) changes over time. 
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Figure 3.3: Focal points of analysis 
Simply put, within this analysis, strong emphasis is given to two aspects of development; 
sensemaking and actions. Actions in this study refer to the outcome of sensemaking. The view 
taken here is that the context, in which both patterns develop, is shaped and constrained either in 
terms of direction or the extent to which they can be altered by established processual and 
structural patterns. What we are interested in is the evolvement of both patterns over time. In 
other words, the frame of reference used to explain variation is time. In doing so, we examine 
both aspects and their interconnectedness in six phases. These phases are presented in table 3.1 
(see also figure 3.1). 
Table 3-1: Six Phases of ana 
1. Analysis of established processual 
patterns 
2. Analysis of sensernaking dependency 
3. Analysis of intended strategy and 
actions 
4. Analysis of impact perception 
5. Analysis of realised strategy 
6. Analysis of new intentions and actions 
In the following section we will discuss how sensemaking and actions will be analysed in this 
study. Before doing so we shape the context in which both aspects are discussed. We will pay 
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particular importance to context dependency in terms historical inertial forces that are created 
within firms over time. But first we will explain the importance of time in this study 
3.4.2.1 Time 
We address time from an objective perspective which refers to a chronological frame of reference, 
and from a subjective perspective which refers to time as a social construct that explains temporal 
meaning that is given to issues over time. From an objective point of view, it is often argued that 
time sets an important frame of reference of what changes are seen and how these changes are 
explained (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Huberman & Miles, 1994; Pettigrew, 1985). This addresses the 
important question when a process begins and ends. An appropriate way to find out when the 
process begins seems to be through studies over time (typically longitudinal) that go back as far as 
possible in time to detangle the origins of the process. To answer how change emerges and 
develops over time Huber and Van de Ven note that `one must explain an observed sequence of 
events in terms of underlying generative mechanisms or laws that cause event to happen and the 
particular circumstances or contingencies that exist when these mechanisms operate' (Huber & 
Van de Ven, 1995 p. vii-viii). However, the disadvantage of longitudinal qualitative data are 
intimidating in that it is often complicated and time consuming to define the origins of the 
process, which also holds for the `end' of the process as there is no closure of analysis. 
With the focus on the impact of the Euro we concentrate on an episode or particular pattern of the 
continuous change process. Focussing on an episode of change has the advantage that the 
difficulties faced when doing longitudinal research on continuous change can to some extent be 
tackled. This is particularly the case with the Euro that in terms of chronological time is 
characterised by an official timetable. The key advantage is that the moment when change was 
initiated is clearly traceable. This sets a framework which focuses on a major breakpoint 
(Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) which indicates the beginning of a period of continuity or change. 
The breakpoint of time we adapt in this study is the introduction of the Euro at a consumer's level 
which took place on the I of January 200229. An advantage of this breakpoint is that it was 
compulsory for firms operating in the Eurozone to deal with all internal and external transactions 
in Euro's after the 31 of December 2001. Given the compulsory element we could be sure that the 
Euro was at least an 'issue' for Eurozone based companies. We further assumed that firms 
29 1 January 2002: Euro becomes the official leading currency in 11 member states. 12 billion euro notes 
and 76 billion coins are made available. Contracts, checks, and transfers were officially denominated in 
Gurus. 
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operating in the Eurozone started to anticipate and respond to the potential impact of the Euro on 
the business environment during the changeover process. Other compulsory dates such as 
February 2001 [firms operating in the Eurozone were obliged to accept the Euro as an invoice 
currency] and July 2001 [firms were obliged to price in the national and Euro currency both at a 
business as on a consumer level] contribute to the validity of this assumption. This preparation for 
the changeover to the Euro, could start earliest in 1992 after the Maastricht treaty was signed by 
the member states, and latest in 2001 short before the first compulsory element of Euro invoicing. 
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Figure 3.4: The Euro changeover scenario 
The introduction of the Euro at a consumer's level as a breakpoint also serves as point of 
reference to explain how the event unfolds over time. It is through time that we can begin to grasp 
the nature of the impact of the Euro, the mechanisms and strategies used by individuals to 
generate and manage the impact, and the ways in which the pattern of impact is 
unfolding. Indeed, it is only through time that we can gain a better appreciation of how the 
interpretation of impact evolves, how the firm aims to align to its interpreted environment, and to 
what extent they succeed in doing so. It is this need to take account of the dynamic nature of the 
firm's response to the impact of the Euro that leads to the development of the proposed time 
phase research methodology. The aim, as Pettigrew (1985b) suggests, is to capture a `movie' 
rather than simply a 'snapshot' of the impact. 
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From a subjective time perspective, current longitudinal studies that addressed change often face 
complications of subjectivity of actor's interpretations of historical issues, as the actors are biased 
by current developments that can lead to contradictory accounts. Such revealed pluralism can 
trigger discussion and question the validity of the study. The topic studied and the definition of 
breakpoint in time to some extent helps us to overcome these problems as it provides us with a 
frame of reference that minimises problematic issues such as `meaning' differences. This 
subjective time perception determines the temporal meaning attributed to the event within a 
sociological system, which, in turn, affects the individual behaviour. 
This study adapts a dual time frame that deals with the impact of the Euro in real-time (see figure 
3.5). This has the advantage that respondents are not biased in their view as they address the issue 
before it actually takes place. We therefore claim that we can capture `true' intention and 
anticipation using this method. Moreover, the subjective perceptions of time in combination with 
path dependency (see next section) are used to analyse how interpretations and actions evolve 
over time, whereby it is assumed that it are these interpretations to which firms adapt (Weick, 
1979). lt particularly emphasises how and why firms differ in their timing in their response, as it 
allows us to explain what internal capabilities or resources can be attributed to the timing 
difference. In doing so it links temporal assumptions (sensernaking) with strategic choice 
(actions). 
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3.4.2.2 Path of dependency 
As previously elaborated the history of the firm creates a path of dependency that guides actors in 
their interpretation and constrains them in their determination for action. We defined this path in 
the literature review as being the result of inertial forces that are created over time. These inertial 
forces act as managerial and strategic heuristics that to some extent will characterise the current 
action pattern as they provide deeper pathways that might structure underlying logic of future 
actions. In other words, decisions and actions of the past establish a repertoire of specific routines 
that structure actions of the present. 
With the focus on actions we proposed a link between the external event and the actions assuming 
that firms actively need to adapt to the market environmental changes. The compulsory character 
of the adaptation of Euro strengthens the argument, as firms are obliged to make at least technical 
adjustments to make the company `Euro proof. In terms of strategic response we need to analyse 
what issues and factors of the past interact with the way the impact of the Euro is approached and 
dealt with. This will help us to understand the development of the determinants of MNE's 
response to the impact of the Euro. 
Given the European character of the phenomenon studied, and the particular focus on MNEs 
operating in the Euro-zone, it seems reasonable to suggest that MNEs will respond based on the 
extent to which the impact of the Euro will reinforce historical steps taken in response to previous 
European [or global] market developments. From a European perspective the MNE might have 
experienced pressure to integrate at a European level as a result of, for example, the definition of 
European customers, increase of European competitors, and pressures for cost reduction. On the 
other hand MNE might have experienced pressure to increase local responsiveness as a result of, 
for example, differences in customer needs, differences in market structure and the presence of 
local substitute products. 
Thus, the key question we aim to answer with the path of dependency is what market differences 
and market similarities are identified by the firm in the past to approach the European market 
from a local or a global perspective. The answer will explain the extent to which the MNE have 
implemented actions in the past that reveal if the MNE has been adapting a more European 
strategy or a more localised strategy prior to the introduction of the Euro on a consumer level. As 
such, this study is interested in the antecedent conditions that shape the organisational context and 
foram and nature the way MNEs respond to the introduction of the Euro over time. 
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Particular features of the organisational context that are of interest are those that reveal 
coordination at a European or local level. This coordination is explained through capabilities arid 
available resources. We view coordination capabilities as the ability to control and integrate 
different skills at multiple levels in the organisation across the Euro-zone countries. Insight into 
coordination capabilities reveals the way knowledge is disseminated and structured within an 
organisation. As such, coordination is explored through the existence of formal and informal 
structures such as organisational design issues and distribution of power. The current resources of 
the firm [i. e. technology, production, machine capacity, international experience, research and 
development, standardisation] then further explain the extent to which coordination has effect, 
and indeed controls how far, how fast and in what form and direction strategic responses to the 
Euro are developed. 
However, this study also acknowledges that the speed and form of development might be 
significantly limited by business environmental contextual issues such as set rules and legislations 
that are country or industry dependent and therefore bound the type of response that can take 
place. Although this is not a key issue of examination, we would label this under the path of 
dependency. This implies that from an analytical point of view issues that might arise as `industry 
context dependent' are treated as bounding response choices as it is assumed that these are 
difficult to be altered by established processual and structural patterns. 
3.4.2.3 Sensemaking 
In this section we describe a model of the interpretive system of organisational actors that are 
involved in the strategic adaptation process of the Euro. Through this model we aim to understand 
how actors are making sense of the Euro and how they frame the potential impact over time. More 
specifically, we try to distinguish between what actors reveal about the impact of the Euro before 
and after it is introduced; how is this understanding influenced by established processual patterns; 
and how does this sensemaking evolve over time. These questions are shaped and set in the 
context of time and path of dependency as elaborated in section 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2 respectively. 
This implies that we are aiming to define two sets of path dependent temporal meaning that 
represent the sensemaking of actors about the impact of the Euro at two points in time, in order to 
explain how and why they change overtime. 
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To develop our model of interpretive system, we draw closely from several earlier efforts that link 
cognition with firm behaviour. We particularly use Daft and Weick (1984) and Milliken et al. 
(1990) attempts to explain this relationship. These models all share common features: actors and 
their frame of reference; a process that involves some sort of scanning, noticing, interpreting, 
deciding and acting; an information environment with particular stimuli that are perceived and 
interpreted by the actors; and, often, a series of feedback loops that link actions to changes in the 
environment. In this sense, the model as outlined in figure 3.6 does not differ significantly from 
those models already proposed, though it has been tailored to meet the specific needs associated 
with the impact of the Euro. We will briefly discuss the elements of the interpretive system part of 
the model and their role in this study. 
Euro Sensemaking model 
Outer inner context Interpretative System Learning 
Context 
Indi vi dual 
Cognitive jI Scanning, L Interpret Simplify Decide, 
represe esentation Noticing II'ºI II Act 
of stimuli 
Figure 3.6: The Euro sensemaking model 
The first stage of the interpretive system - scanning - is fundamentally about data collection 
which involves what is looked at and attended to as a result of the representation of cognitive 
stimuli. In other words, stimuli representation significantly influences implicitly or explicitly the 
scanning behaviour of the individual and will eventually influence what is noticed. The second 
stage - interpretation - is where meaning is attributed to the environmental data. This 
involves an 
analysis at an individual level. The third stage -simplification - might be on an individual level 
but is typically a stage which involves a process of achieving a collective view about the solution. 
This \ý ill ultimately lead to a choice of action - stage four. 
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Otgari s ati on al 
The information environment compromises all of the commonly cited factors of the business 
environment such as competitors, government policy and regulation, and so fort. Although this 
plays a significant role in the decision making process, we here draw special attention to the 
impact of the Euro as part of the outer context of the organisation. We argue that this process in 
embedded in a context from which it cannot be separated. However, it is important to note that 
despite this context dependency, this information environment does not transmit clear and easily 
recognised signals to individuals. Indeed, it is this very uncertainty that invites an explanation in 
cognitive framing. Within such uncertainty it is assumed that organisational actors are not 
following a highly unified and clear cut normative system. Rather it is expected that they 
construct meaning and definition to the path in which they negotiate how and what actions are 
implemented. They will do so time after time, which recognises that the interpretive process is not 
just a linear, one time event, but is looping and iterative. 
With this model we analyse two interpretative temporal processes; before and after the 
introduction of the Euro. In doing so we first seek to add to the limited literature on interpretation 
development as it occurs before the event takes place. The key question we aim to answer in this 
respect is to what extent and in which ways do managers anticipate the impact of the EUro? Tile 
interplay between plausible cause interpretation and initial choice how to act will detail the 
perceived impact of the Euro after its introduction. Thus the key question after the introduction of 
the Euro is to what extent and in which ways is the Euro a stimulus for strategic change? After 
both interpretative temporal processes are defined we can compare both sets to explain the way 
they evolve overtime. 
3.4.2.4 Actions 
With the actions level of analysis we aim to capture the actual organisational response to the 
evolutionary and unfolding pattern of the impact of the Euro that appears overtime. This category 
provides a more in-depth understanding of the macro dimensions of strategy, referring to the 
actual changes and transformations by organisations. From this perspective we aim to raise a 
number of important questions concerning the emergence and development of the Euro strategy 
over time. In doing so, the key questions we address are; what deliberate actions are undertaken 
before the introduction of the Euro; what deliberate actions are undertaken after the introduction 
of the Euro; and third, how do these response patterns change overtime. We refer to action as the 
actual steps undertaken by the organisation as a result of the outcome of sensemaking (see figure 
7: 
3.6) which automatically implies that these questions are shaped and set in the context of time and 
path of dependency as elaborated in section 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2 respectively 
With this approach we draw on Mintzberg's and Waters' (1985) model of 'types of strategies' as 
elaborated in the literature review section 2.2.2.33°. With this model these authors argue that 
strategy should be viewed as formation rather than formulation and implementation (see also 
Mintzberg, 1978) indicating that strategy compromises both decisions and actions. This model 
helps us to define three important stages in the strategy formation process that can be linked to the 
evolution of the Euro strategy process. The first stage - intended strategy - refers to the outcome 
of managerial intentions what deliberate 31 actions to take in response to the interpreted impact of 
the Euro prior to its introduction. The second stage - realised strategy - refers to the outcome of 
managerial interpretations of what issues have emerged between T° and T', which reveals the rate 
of success of the intended strategy. Finally, the third stage - reformulation of intention - refers to 
the outcome of managerial intentions what deliberate actions to take in response to the interpreted 
impact of the Euro after its introduction. 
By adapting this model we see the strategy formation process not purely as a rational process that 
is based on the assumption that strategy can be the result of either planning or learning. Instead, 
strategy formulation is understood as a continuous interaction of emergent learning alongside 
deliberate planning which implies that strategy is formed in a complex process involving a 
combination of deliberate and emergent actions. Therefore the conception of a novel strategy is 
interpreted as a creative process, for which there are no formal techniques. However, to plan these 
strategies throughout complex organisations requires some type of guidance to ensure that 
intentions can be transferred into actions. 
With this model we can analyse two deliberate action processes; before and after the introduction 
of the Euro. The interplay between the intended strategy and the realised strategy will detail the 
30 The deliberate strategy is described by Mintzberg (1994) as a pattern, that is, consistency in behaviour 
over time. In addition, an intended strategy that is fully realised can be called a deliberate strategy. Any 
strategy that is intended but not realised to any extent is described as an unrealised strategy. Mintzberg sees 
an emergent strategy as `a realised pattern which was not expressly intended. Actions were taken one by 
one, which converged in time in some sort of consistency pattern' (Mintzberg, 1994 p. 25). Important in this 
context is the recognition of Mintzberg that no strategy is purely deliberate or purely emergent. He points 
out that all real world strategies need to mix this two in one way - to attempt to control without stopping the 
learning process which is vital for firms in order to improve the chosen strategy if necessary (Mintzberg. 
1994). 
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perceived impact of the Euro after its introduction. With the definition of both response patterns 
we can compare both patterns to explain the way they evolve overtime. 
3.4.3 Critical Incident Methodology as a frame of reference 
To date, the complexity of understanding dynamics of change across time and space has often 
been interconnected with its methodological invisibility. Arguably the most challengim-, element 
of change studies is to identify patterns in the process of changing that are explaining the firms' 
behaviour. It is therefore often argued that change studies require a longitudinal study in order to 
observe all the sequences of individual and collective events, action, and activities that unfold 
over time in context to find out what are the key causes that explain the change. The significant 
difference between traditional change studies and this study lies in the prior identification of the 
potential cause of change (the Euro), in order to find out the trajectories of change in terms of 
changing context and the resultant complexities and ambiguities of human interpretation and 
action. In other words, this attribute-oriented approach reflects the perceptions and interaction of 
organisational actors with their environment. 
The use of interaction incidents to understand the critical and complex perceptions and behaviour 
of individuals is often referred to as the critical incident technique32 (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954). In 
management studies, CIT and variants33 have frequently been applied in service research (e. g. 
Edvardsson & Roos, 2001; Roos et al., 2004; Roos, 1996; Stauss & Weinlich, 1997) to identify 
and understand critical parameters from the eyes of the actor and to reflect the consequences of 
this criticality on the [customer] relationship behaviour. In this study we adapt elements of the 
switching path analysis technique [SPAT] as suggested by Roos (1996; 1999; Edvardsson & 
Roos, 2001) in order to understand the critical behaviour of organisational actors with their 
environment over time. 
3.4.3.1 The switching path analysis technique (SPAT) 
SPAT is defined as a method that is based not only on critical incidents but also on the criticality 
of the incident. This criticality is viewed as the way in which judgements of actors of the 
consequences of the incident affects the behaviour of the actors responding to the incident. In 
31 The term deliberate is preferred to planning, as intentions are no always expressed in the form written 
tans, similarly we use the term emergent instead of incrementalism 
` Flanagan described CIT as `a set of procedures for collecting direct observations of human behaviour in 
such a tit my as to facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical problems and developing broad 
psychological principals' (1954, p. 327 
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service research, SPAT is used to describe the switching path from a deliberate switching decision 
to a change of service provider (see Roos, 1999; 2001). In other words, the dynamics of the 
critical incidents are being traced through the actual behaviour. What this implies is that previous 
studies adapting SPAT also aim to explain what is causing the actual behaviour. Unlike previous 
studies using SPAT, the rationale of this study focuses around a fixed critical incident which is 
being studied in realtime. 
Accordingly, the impact the Euro has on the organisation according to the respondent [the 
switching path] is triggered by the reconfiguration of stimuli by the individual [the trigger], who 
link the Euro [the switching determinant] to the organisation environment in order to decide if 
change is necessary [switching process]. This initiating factor affects the entire switching path. Or 
as Roos (1999) puts it `.... it becomes clear through understanding the nature of the catalytic 
switching path that the trigger makes the respondent sensitive to the switching determinant, which 
gives the path energy and direction' (p. 71). SPAT as a technique is not interested in determining 
the configuration in terms of explicit actions. Instead it searches for dynamism of the switching 
path, that is, the change over time connected to the trigger. In other words, the respondent 
expresses the determinants that are in his/her perception connected to the trigger in a particular 
configuration. This provides an answer to if and when a switching path starts and where it goes 
[the switching process]. It is not the switching determinant that is the device factor, it is the 
trigger, which gives energy and direction. Figure 3.7 outlines the changing nature of the switching 
path as it is adapted in this study. 
33 For example the sequential incident technique (Strauss and Weinlich 1997) or the criticality critical 
incident technique (Edvardsson and Roos 2001) 
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Switching path analysis technique 
bitroducim T' 
- Time 
------------------------ Trigger: Reconfiguration of stimuli ---------------------------- 
Switching determinant: 
Euro 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
L 
Swritching Path: Perceived impact 
-- The Switching process: strategic change 
Figure 3.7: Switching Path Analysis Technique (SPAT) 
3.4.3.2 The advantages of SPAT 
SPAT bridges a number of development gaps that ýý ere present between existing critical incident 
techniques. The advantage of SPAT is that this technique puts emphasis on the consequence 
consideration of critical incidents in the time span when the incident is actually occurring 
(Edvardsson & Roos, 2001). The use of SPAT as a research tool for describing and analysing the 
impact of the Euro offers the following advantages: 
" The focus is on information stored within or related to the Euro; 
" The respondent determines the criteria for describing this relationship; 
" Time is used as a process to partly explain this relationship; 
" The respondent relates his or her actual behaviour. 
Particularly the last issue provides an opportunity to determine whether the impact of the Euro 
was in fact critical for the organisation, that is, it caused a switch in strategy. In comparison to 
CIT, SPAT adopts a relationship view that focuses on the actual behaviour that is set in the 
context of the firm. The focus on one particular critical incident in realtime to some extent 
overcomes the most significant disadvantage of SPAT which is the difficulty to find `appropriate' 
respondents with an unbiased view. 
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3.4.4 Reflexive interpretation model 
As specified with the switching path analysis technique, what we aim to capture are plausible and 
coherent explanations through organisational actors' interpretations. A key concern in research 
attempting to examine cognitive processes is measurement. Given the researcher's inability to 
measure the process directly, alternative material such as written or verbal statements are used as 
indirect reflections (Barr et al., 1992; Isabella, 1990). In this study we adopted elements of the 
interpretative reflexive model as suggested by Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) to examine the 
organisational actors' interpretations. 
By a reflective (reflexivity) approach Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) mean that 'due attention is 
paid to interpretive, political and rhetorical nature of empirical research.... Reflection is thus 
above all a question of recognising fully the notoriously ambivalent relation of researcher's text 
to the realities studied' (foreword). With reflection Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) refer to 
`interpreting one 's own interpretations, looking at one 's own perspectives from other 
perspectives, and turning a self-critical eye onto one 's own authority as interpreter and author' 
(foreword). This definition of reflective research points out that there are four characteristics: 
interaction with empirical material, interpretations [underlying meanings], critical interpretation 
of perceptions [both researcher and researched], and reflection [comparison with literature]. The 
interaction between these different levels of interpretation is shown in figure 3.8. 
Levels of Interpretation 
Empirical materiall 
Construction of data 
Interpretation 
Critical interpretation 
Reflection 
Partiv 9Aaotetl 1Yom ANesson 
Possible reflective themes 
Multiplicityi n interpretation and consideration of 
pluralism [i. e. dommantvie%j in looking at 
different aspects, Surprise potential in empirical 
material. 
Data confirming interpretation Consideration of 
why certain interpretations dominate. 
Self reflection on elements of dominance, in the 
researchers line of interpretation and critical 
reflection based on literature. Openness to other 
representations and conclusions 
0 
Figure 3.8: Interaction between different levels of interpretation 
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What we aim to explore with this version of Alvesson's and Sköldberg's model of reflexive 
interpretation is that interpretation is a complex process that theoretically can be build up from 
several levels; however, it is the relationship and interaction between these levels where the 
reflexivity occurs. To simplify this issue from a methodological point of view we distinguish two 
phases that together build up reflexive interpretation. 
The first phase, the construction of data, is where the actual picture of empirical data is being 
created. This phase is distinct from the next phase in the way that it only contains low abstract 
levels of interpretation as many issues are still unclear. Hence, during this phase the aim is to 
construct a coherent set of data that can be compared with current theories or frames of reference 
in a guided and systematic way. As such the data construction will guide the researcher to a 
repertoire of references to compare the data with. This implies that choice of reference depends on 
the empirical material itself. It is therefore important that certain, unexpected, empirical data is 
verified during data collection and cross checked by using multiple sources of information. This 
verification process will be further elaborated in sections 3.7 and 3.8. 
From a reflexive interpretation point of view it is important to recognise that it is the actor's 
reconfiguration of organisational and business environment conditions that will result in the 
intellectual involvement leading to the way in which interaction takes place. This implies that 
verbal statements include a reflection of the actor that ponders upon premises of thought, 
experience, observation and expression of the actor in question. It is therefore important that these 
perceptions are understood in terms of their relationship to the context in which they occur. Or as 
Pettigrew puts it `In a complex, dynamic, and internationally conscious world a search for 
general patterns of change requires even more focus on temporal and spatial context' (Pettigrew 
et al., 2001 p. 697). This implies that sufficient attention needs to be given to the environmental 
context, without letting any of the contextual settings dominate defining the data collection. Thus, 
the focus of the research is narrowed and sharpened during the course of data collection. 
Similarly, theoretical ideas that frame descriptions are developed as the research proceeds. Yet, it 
should be noted that these descriptions are structured around the general interest in "Hoyt, 
managers of multinational firms perceive and respond to the impact of the Euro over time? " 
The main point of analysis at the second phase lies in the principle of reflection and interpretation 
as an interactive movement function. The interaction between different levels of interpretation 
implies that there should be a continuous back and forth comparison of interpretation and 
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interplay between empirical material and text [literature] to search for the underlying meanings. 
This is particularly important as measuring an interpretation shift over time requires an approach 
that invites participants to react critically to researchers' accounts. In addition, this better reflects 
the mutual process in portraying the interpretation shift. One of the main advantages of using this 
approach is that it allows us to think around possible properties of the categories. In other words, 
by continuously shifting the data around in our minds in a number of possible ways by 
continuously comparing it with the existing relevant literature, we can find ways to enrich the 
category itself. The various properties then specify how the different categories are interlinked in 
the relevant literature (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). 
3.5 The Case Study Method 
`A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected to the initial questions of study 
(Yin, 1994 p. 18). More specifically, it is concerned with defining the appropriate process for 
collecting, analysing, and interpreting data. From this point of view, a case stuck. design is not a 
method as such but rather a strategy to conduct the research. The specific objectives of the 
research, the nature of the research topic, the research questions asked, and the characteristics of 
the research areas must be taken into account when forming this strategy (Golden-Biddle & 
Locke, 1997). In addition, the scope of the research, the availability of resources, the strengths 
and weaknesses of the researcher in terms of research skills, and time constraints also influence 
the choice and formulation of the case study design (Yin, 2003). 
Given the many characteristics of choice, case studies have been associated with both qualitative 
and quantitative research. In this context Bryman and Burgess (1999) note that the case study 
represents one of the most common frameworks or research designs for the conduct of qualitative 
research. This is not to suggest, however, that the two should be regarded as more or less 
synonymous' (p. xiv). For example, Klein and Myers (1999) cite examples of case studies that are 
consistent with the conventions of positivism (see also for example Yin, 2003; Yin, 1994). While, 
Stake (1995) identifies numerous examples that deploy case study design for the purpose of 
qualitative research (see also for example Eisenhardt, 1989a; 1991; Silverman, 1997). From these 
arguments, it is clear that a case study as a research design can be conducted as part of both 
qualitative and quantitative research. In this analysis, the use of case studies stems from an 
interpretative, and more specifically a contextualist perspective, linked to an in-depth, multifaced 
investwation, using qualitative research methods. This definition is intentionally broad, and ýýill 
be discussed in great depth in the rest of this chapter. 
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3.5.1 The advantages and disadvantages of the Case study approach 
Eisenhardt (1989a) and Yin (1994; 2003) both subscribe to the idea that the case study contributes 
uniquely to our understanding of individual, organisational, social and political phenomena. As 
Yin puts it `in all of these situations, the distinctive need for case studies arises out ooffthe desire 
to understand complex social phenomena' (1994 p. 3). In other words, case studies are the 
preferred strategy to study a `how' and `why' question, when the researcher has little control over 
the event, and aims to focus on contemporary events (Yin, 1994). 
Taking this into account, the immediate advantages of a case study are fourfold. First, it can 
furnish the dimensions of time and history to the study of social phenomena, thereby enabling the 
investigator to examine continuity and change in lifeworld patterns (Pettigrew, 1990). Secondly, 
case studies generate insightful stories that permit a better understanding of organisational 
complexity of social meanings and social actions (Van Maanen, 1979) from an insider's 
perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Thirdly, it provides information from a number of sources and 
over a period of time, thus permitting a more holistic study and in particular to explore a 
`previously little-studied area' (Lee, 2000). Fourthly, a case study encourages and facilitates 
theoretical innovation (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). However, case studies also have certain 
disadvantages. In particular, there are limitations in terms of the generalisability of the outcome 
and the validity of the findings (Yin, 1994). These issues, and the proposed solution of 
triangulation to enhance validity, are dealt with more fully below. 
3.5.2 Issues of generisability 
Pettigrew notes in this context that it is not the purpose of contextualist research to `projecting 
generalisability as the sole outcome of the research, it is important to counterbalance that with 
the contextualist's desire for descriptive understanding' (1985b p. 70). Based on this perspective 
we can make two points regarding the issue of generalisability in this study. First, a case study 
aims to develop rich contextual data (Bryman & Burgess, 1999). This is reflected in the 
idiographic approach, as also suggested by Pettigrew, which emphasises the understanding of 
unique aspects of particular phenomena from an individual-centred viewpoint within a natural 
environment context. And second, with the proposed research objectives and the nature of 
research questions, it is commonly agreed that case studies are useful in leading to general 
theoretical principles wvhich can then form the theoretical basis for quantitative testing that further 
enables generalisation (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2003). 
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3.5.3 Issues of Validity and reliability 
The major concern with validity of case studies is `whether the evidence which the research offers 
can bear the weight of the interpretation that is put on it' (Sapsford & Jupp, 1996 p. 1). Thus, to 
be valid, emphasis needs to be put on the fact that case research must be carried out with care and 
rigor. Due to the complexity of its subject matter, case research cannot be judged by the scientific 
criteria associated with experimental designs, but must be gauged by a broader view of science 
(Schneider, 1998). The chief question for the validity of case research is its plausibility. From this 
point of view several issues are raised that link the data plausibility to theory; the theory plausibly 
to generalisability; and is the conclusion plausibly to the difficulty to confirm ability. From this 
point of view, distinction is often made between four types of validity that are linked to the 
different stages of research": construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability 
(e. g. Kidder & Judd, 1986; Yin, 1994; 2003). The way investigators deal with this issue is 
explained in the next section of triangulation and summarised in table 3.2. We use these 
constructs of validity as an important element of case study design. 
i anie s-L: u. ase stu uy tactics for lour oeslgn tests 
Tests Case study tactic Phase 
tactic occurs 
Construct validity " use multiple sources of Data collection 
evidence Data collection 
" establish chain of evidence Composition 
" have case study report 
Internal validity " do pattern-matching Data analysis 
" do explanation-building Data analysis 
" do time-series analysis Data analysis 
External validity " use replication logic in Research design 
multiple case studies 
Reliability use case study protocol Data collection 
" develop case study data base Data collection 
(Source: Yin 2003, p. 34) 
3.5.4 Issues of Triangulation 
Triangulation is a process designed to enhance the validity and reliability of a case study (1970). 
lt involves the use of multiple data collection methods to obtain various sources of evidence as a 
means of increasing the trustworthiness of the data (Blaikie, 1993). To achieve this Denzin (1978) 
14 For example, construct validity and reliability become the major concern during the data collection 
processes, internal validity is the key during the data analysis stage, and external validity is crucial to the 
research design. 
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proposed four types of triangulation: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory 
triangulation, and methodological triangulation. 
With these types Denzin (1989) argues that data triangulation involves using diverse sources of 
data [methodological triangulation], so that one seeks out instances of a phenomenon in several 
different settings, at different points in time or space [data triangulation]. As such, triangulation 
is a creative approach that engages a continuing discussion of points of difference and similarity 
[investigator triangulation] that aims to maximise the depth and breadth of data collection and 
analysis and reduces the personal biases [theory triangulation]. Although it is argued that 
triangulation enables a more comprehensive understanding of the studied phenomenon, it is also 
acknowledged that this technique does not resolve the contradictions created by different sources 
of data. In response to this concern, Stake (Stake, 2000) points out that no observations or 
interpretations are perfectly repeatable, triangulation serves also to clarify meaning by 
identifying different ways the phenomenon is seen' (p. 443-444). 
3.6 The case study design 
In determining the appropriate use of the case study method several conditions are proposed by 
several authors. In doing so not many authors focus on the process of the case study approach but 
instead go into detail about aspects of this process. For example, Glaser and Stauss (1967) 
detailed a comparative method for developing grounded theory, Yin (1994; 2003) described the 
design of case study research and Miles and Huberman (1994) propose several procedures to 
analyse qualitative data. Yet this has resulted in confusion about how qualitative data and case 
study research are linked. As a result, Eisenhardt's study (1989a) aims to present clear guidelines 
that outline the case study process, by presenting a methodological framework for using case 
studies to build theories. 
Although we will extensively make use of case study tools and guidelines as particularly 
suggested by Yin (1994; 2003), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Pettigrew (1985b; 1990; 2001), the research design itself is largely influenced and guided by 
Eisenhardts' (1989a) view of using the case study for theory building 35 to obtain a holistic view 
on the phenomenon studied. This adaptation provides us with a design that aims to gather 
contextual data at multiple analytical levels, whilst maintaining a focus on the phenomenon under 
35 This can follow the classic distinction made by Glaser and Strauss (1967) between substantive theory and 
formal theon as described in their book in chapter 7 
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investigation. Table 3.4 outlines the research design processes, conditions, and core resources in 
more detail. It should be noted that Eisenhardt's framework goes beyond the several steps of case 
study design as suggested in table 3.3. Additional steps in relation to case study description, 
analysis, discussion and theory building are also suggested (Eisenhardt, 1989a; 1991). We will 
briefly outline the key features of Eisenhardt's framework, and its implications bellow. 
i awe cas e stuuy uesign processes and con ditions 
Process Condition Core source Core section 
Developing a Literature review Glaser 1978, 
level of Eisenhardt 1989 
theoretical 
sensitivity 
Develop and Clarified precisely the nature of Eisenhardt 1989, 2.6.3.1-3.4 
clarify question, objectives, scope, and focus Yin 1994,2003 
Research of the study including levels and unit 
questions and of analysis 
objectives 
Setup the case Define the focus, the type of Eisenhardt 1989, 3.6 -3.7 
study protocol organisation that should be Pettigrew 1990 
approached, and the data that should 
be gathered 
Define the case Specification of sector, firm and Eisenhardt 1989, 3.7.2-3.7.3 
selection individual participant choices Pettigrew 1990 
Gaining and Gained approval for access and Yin 1994,2003 3.7.4 
maintaining support from relevant organisational 
access actors 
Crafting Data collection method including all Yin 1994,2003 3.8 
instruments for sources of potential data availability, 
data collection interview protocol, data management 
Stages of data Dual time phase study, stages of data Pettigrew 1985a 3.9 
collection collection 
Data reduction Systematic coding using principles of Eisenhardt 1989, 3.10.1 - 3.10.2 
comparison, emergence of themes Glaser and Strauss 
1967 
Data analysis Within case analysis, across case Eisenhardt 1989, 3.10.3 
analysis, pattern matching, theoretical Miles and Huberman 
saturation and coding, comparison of 1994, Alvesson and 
data against frame of reference Sköldberg 2000 
Analytical Comparison of the emergent concepts, Alvesson and 3.10.4 
induction theory with the extant literature. Sköldberg (2000), 
Eisenhardt (1989), 
Manning (1982) 
3.6.1 The Eisenhardt framework 
The framework proposed by Eisenhardt (1989a) requires clear research questions, a method of 
selecting cases in a purposeful way, using semi-structured protocols, developing a Gestalt model 
in the first instance based on literature. This Gestalt model is the result of an extensive literature 
review searching for theoretical constructs. These constructs are being studied by typical case 
86 
' ý. 
study related data collection methods. A way to analyse the variance of a particular construct, the 
collected data will be based on a more than one point criteria template, analysing cases against 
this template both on a within case and across case basis. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that the 
findings should be compared with the literature and new hypothesis [propositions] should be 
developed before closing with the formulation of new theories. 
Although it is arbitrary whether Eisenhardts' framework should be only used in its own right [see 
for example Dyer & Wilkins (1991) who critique Eisenhardts' approach by focussing on the nc'cd 
for methodological rigor, and the appropriateness of multiple case studies to build theory] it 
clearly has several aspects that are helpful to structure this study. Using the eight steps as 
suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) offers clear guidelines that can be followed to make sure that 
consistency is accomplished. This is particularly helpful when structuring elements of the case 
study such as the case study description and the data analysis. 
In relation to the case study description and data analysis, Eisenhardt (1989) notes that '... within 
case analysis typically involves detailed case study ivrite ups for each site. These tii, rite-ups at-c 
often simply descriptions, but they are central to the generation of insight... ' (p 540). In particular 
the last argument seems to be of significant importance. Insight is according to Eisenhardt the 
result of describing the cases, continuously backing the research questions and constructs as found 
in the literature and developed in the protocol, doing so, will be of important value when 
searching for cross-case patterns. This process links to Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) viewpoints 
of reflexivity who argue that it is important to continuously make a comparison between 
theoretical constructs, data and frames of reference. 
3.7 The field work design: Shaping the case study protocol 
Following on from how the philosophical stance, the contextualism approach, and the research 
orientation influence the research design and the choice of a case study approach, this section 
highlights various processes through which the proposed objectives have been achieved. Drawing 
on current methodological literature, especially the work of Eisenhardt (1989), Pettigrew (1990), 
Stake (1995) and Yin (2003), a number of issues that outline the fieldwork preparation phase that 
shape the case study protocol require attention: the use of multiple case studies, theoretical 
sampling, selecting cases, and issues of access. 
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As such, we view the case study protocol not merely as a written plan, but also a reminder for the 
researcher about the rules and procedures, and a tool to enhance the reliability of a case stud, 
(Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). Gummesson (1991) explains that a case study protocol should explicitl\ 
express how and why different sources of data are collected. In accordance «ith Yin (1984) a case 
study protocol containing an overview, procedures, research questions and a guide for the case 
study report was prepared for the case studies to be undertaken. As pointed out in table 3.4 the 
focus of this case study protocol is drawn from the review of literature and the contextualist 
theory as discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. In the following section we will 
further discuss the final research protocol for this study which has been used to enhance the 
richness of the data. The three sections after that will discuss the instruments used, the data 
collection phase and the data analysis phase respectively. 
3.7.1 The use of multiple case studies 
Methodological guidelines for case selection differ between single and multiple case designs. 
Although it is argued that the single case study approach is sometimes more suitable than the 
multiple case study approach (e. g. Dyer & Wilkins, 1991), Eisenhardt (1989) and Tsoukas (1989) 
remind us that indepth analysis of a single system does not preclude arriving at valid explanations 
and relevant conclusions, though they may be subject to concerns about external validity. Thus, 
the direct advantages of multiple over single case designs is that a multiple case design provides 
an opportunity to achieve replication of findings which allows for comparison, which, in turn, 
permit greater latitude for theoretical generalisability. This makes multiple case studies more 
suitable to create or alter theory because it allows identifying patterns of similarity and differences 
across cases, which ensures an opportunity for comparing findings that together enriches the 
theoretical picture. 
However, it should be noted that with the research questions formulated and the adaptation of the 
contextualist approach, this study puts the emphasis on the features of the phenomenon under 
investigation in their context, and less so on proposing generalisations. Given this objective we 
thus concentrate on advanced conceptual and thematic generalisations. In doing so we follow the 
arguments of Glaser and Strauss (1967), Gummeson (1991) and Pettigrew (1990,2001) who point 
out that the objective of social research is to explore phenomena in their context. 
What this implies is that we are not seeking for literal replication, that is, choosing cases that have 
similar setting and are expected to achieve similar results and thus propose sweeping 
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generalisation (Yin, 2003). Instead, we search for theoretical replication by examining different 
settings where we expect different outcomes as we are interested in the way variability in context 
influences the constancy in process or outcome (Pettigrew, 1990). Hence, the replication logic 
itself does not provide the methodological guideline for multiple case selection, it is the sampling 
strategy (Patton, 1987) that sets the similar or contrasting objectives. The next section will 
synthesize the sampling criteria that aided the case selection. 
3.7.2 Theoretical sampling criteria 
Miles and Huberman (1994) state that sampling has two key purposes; (1) creating a sample 
frame to help uncover the basic processes that underpin the study and (2) setting clear boundaries 
how the research questions will be studied. This implies that the quality of the multiple case study 
design is based on the appropriateness of fit between the purpose of the research and the 
phenomenon of inquiry. To satisfy this fit, it was necessary to build a set of indicators that could 
identify the way the proposed research questions could be studied in practice. These indicators 
can be termed as theoretical sampling criteria (Yin 2003) as the cases are selected for theoretical 
and not statistical means (Glaser & Stauss 1967). This suggests that the selection of case study 
site must primarily emphasise theoretical relevance in relation to the chosen research purposes 
and questions (Eisenhardt 1989). This has two principle aims; (1) to ensure that all the key 
constituencies of relevance to the subject mater are covered; and (2) to ensure that, some diversity 
is included within each of the key criteria so that the impact of the characteristic concerned can be 
explored. 
In this thesis work, one overriding factor in criteria setting emerged, this being cases that could 
yield a situation where the process of interest - the perception and response to the impact of the 
Euro over time - would be as `transparently' observable as possible (Patton, 2002; Pettigrew, 
1990). In this instance, similarity for a range of parameters was desirable in order to increase the 
likelihood of meaningful cross-case patterns emerging, and to ensure that the impact of the Euro 
could be investigated within a specified context. Hence, consistency for a range of similar 
parameters drove the initial selection. The following three key parameters drove the commonality 
of this study; 
0 The sample firms had to have a significant commitment to all Eurozone countries to 
provide the comparability of marketing aspects in this zone as well as the international 
experience, the importance of the Eurozone, and the existence of a European strategic 
posture; 
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" The sample firms had to operate in the consumer market to increase the importance of the 
introduction of the Euro at a consumers' level; 
0 The sample firms needed to sell tangible products that were purposefully standardised or 
differentiated in the Eurozone countries. 
Besides being transparently observable, we followed Pettigrew's (1990) and Eisenhardt's (1989) 
advice to conduct comparative case studies of polar types. This allows us to reflect the opposite 
extremes of the phenomena studied. While the first argument of 'being transparently observable' 
controls the possible sources of variation to some extent by looking at a `homogeneous' sample 
(Patton 2002) setting the context in which the impact of the Euro is studied, the second argument 
of polar types advocates that we do so from two theoretical extremes (not exceptions) 
perspectives. This implies that there is a deliberate strategy to include issues of variation that will 
allow us to identify central themes that cut across the variety of cases. 
3.7.3 Case site selection 
On the basis of the discussed criteria for finding the case, the selection was conducted through 
serious consideration on firm and sector level. It is essential to point out that clearly the selection 
of the case through criteria related to all the above mentioned indicators represented a very 
difficult task. In this study, the selection of the case was conducted through applying first the type 
of firm level criteria, i. e. commitment to all Eurozone countries. From this point of view we 
decided to focus on MNEs that were well established on a global level, and therefore share 
characteristics such as having operations, subsidiaries, or investments in a large number of 
countries worldwide in which they are selling similar type of products that are new and/or 
technically complex. 
With the selection of polar types we focussed on industries that were predominately selling 
standardised or differentiated products. The rationale for this choice was based on the well 
established argument of the expected increase in price transparency in the Eurozone after the 
introduction of the Euro (e. g. Verdin & Van Heck, 1999; van Everdingen & Bamossy, 2000). 
From this point of view we linked price transparency to the comparability of products across 
countries as a source of impact. In other words, we expected that the impact of the Euro could be 
linked to high and low experience levels (Pettigrew 1990), whereby high experience levels were 
associated with a higher impact potential of price transparency on the strategy of the 
multinational. Whilst we could have chosen to compare global products with local products 
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within one industry to investigate this proposition, we wanted to ensure that the results were not 
particular to a specific company or industry (see for example Barr, 1998; Bartunek, 1984; and 
Isabella, 1990). Thus, we decided to compare two industries that would characterise the polar 
extremes. 
The selection of FMCG versus durable consumer goods was deemed to be an appropriate to 
investigate variation as it is often used to compare and contrast between standardised and 
differentiated products (e. g. Shoham, 1995). For this study it was particularly important that the 
differences between the firms and industries would outline on many potential impact aspects such 
as technology, price sensitivity, consumer awareness, product diversity and legislation. With this 
in mind, four MNE's in the food industry and four MNE's in the CE industry were selected. 
The choice of four companies per industry was based on two additional criteria that aimed to 
further improve the comparability of the cases and increase the variation of the case design as a 
whole. First, based on the debate on internal inertia on change (chapter 2) we wished to explicitly 
include the key determinants causing internal inertia in the case study design. We expected that 
differences in structural form and coordination and control of decision making would significantly 
influence the way the impact of the Euro was perceived and challenged. We therefore made a 
selection of two EHQ and two subsidiaries within each industry to would allow us to obtain a 
multi level of analysis both within the industry as across the industries. Second, an additional 
selection criterion was based on nationality as financial dependency upon the Euro was expected 
to lead to an additional role for Eurozone based HQ. In addition, we did not expect that the origin 
of the subsidiary would play a significant role, other than it would lead to an additional role of the 
HQ. Thus, to add this element to our design we made sure that one of the two HQ within both 
industries was from one of the eleven Eurozone member countries. Based on these selection 
criteria we came up with the case study design as presented in table 3.4. 
Table 3-4: Profile of the case study design 
Food Industry Consumer Electronics Industry 
f Icadquarters Subsidiary Headquarters Subsidiary 
Eurozone I NINE 0,1 or 2 MNE I MNE 0,1 or 2 MNE 
nationality 
Non-Eurozone I MNE 0,1 or 2 MNE I MNE 0,1 or 2 MNE 
nationality 
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3.7.4 Gaining and maintaining Access 
Negotiating access plays a key part at the early stages of the research. The way in which access is 
negotiated on the ground will eventually determine the criticality of success of the study (Bryman, 
2001). Accordingly, much attention has been devoted to establishing the short list of potential 
case study sites (see table 3.5). The short listed companies were primarily based in the 
Netherlands. However, the complexity of finding Multinational Enterprise with EHQ in the 
Netherlands forced us to add some Belgium and Germany based HQ to improve the probability of 
access to this type of case study site. The selection of these multinationals was the result of a 
Euromonitor database search (conducted November 2000) that provided information regarding 
turnover, number of employees and the countries where the multinational hosted subsidiaries. 
Additional information regarding origin and EHQ location was based on a search on the related 
multinational website. Initially an email was sent to the 44 multinationals, in order to find out the 
possibilities of conducting a case study. As a follow up, a letter was sent to the CEO or TMT 
members, requesting their participation. 
Table 3-5: Contacted Companies 
Consumer Electronics Industry 
Headquarters Subsidiary 
111 Industry 
Headquarters Subsidiary 
Eurozone Philips Bang & Olufsen; Dumeco; Grolsch; Koninklijke Van 
nationality Grundig Heineken; Mars; Melle; 
Nutricia Dairy & Koninklijke 
Drinks Group; Wessanen; Cargill 
Royal Numico; Holding 
Unilever 
Non-Eurozone Akai; Hewlett- Canon; Compaq; McCain Foods; Granaria Holding; 
nationality Packard; JVC; Denon; Ericsson; Sara Lee Hero Nederland; 
Kenwood; Murata Nokia; Household and Kraft foods 
Electronics; Panasonic; Bodycare Holland; Nestle; 
Pioneer(Belgium); Samsung; Sharp; (Germany); Sara Maple Leaf 
Sony; Toshiba; Siemens; Pioneer Lee/Douwe Holland; Proctor 
Sharp (Germany) Egberts; and Gamble 
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi 
The second wave of accessing commenced soon after rejections or two weeks after no response 
was received from the first wave. With a slight shift in focus, marketing and management 
departments, and Euro project team members were targeted. Instead of writing to all 
multinationals, phone calls were made to find the appropriate contact and discuss access in 
person. The largest multinationals in terms of turnover and employees were contact first. Calling 
the potential case site offered the advantage that the objectives of the research could be explained 
in more detail, and access could be negotiated. In addition, the spokesperson was also helpful in 
setting up introductions with their counter parts in the same or other departments. The topic being, 
the Euro, the spokesperson could often direct the researcher to (additional) Euro project team 
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members. The research question necessitated the need to pre-specify additional informants if the 
Euro project team members were not related to management functions. These included, only top 
management team level managers as they could provide the information in relation to the 
perceived and challenged strategic impact of the Euro 
The additional informants were contacted short after the first telephone contact with the case site. 
Based on the success rate, the researcher preferred to speak to the informant directly to discuss the 
purpose and objectives of research, and also to make sure that the informant could provide the 
requested data. If the informant was difficult to get in touch with, the researcher chose to 
communicate firstly by email, fax or letter, prior to making a second attempt to contact the 
informant by phone. 
The researcher also confirmed all appointments by letter or fax. This confirmation provided the 
informants with additional information about the study to be obtained. This was useful from an 
ethical point of view (Pettigrew, 1997) as it confirmed the real aim of the research. A short period 
after the letters were sent the informant was contacted for a last time to confirm his/her 
participation in the study. During this contact informants were made aware of formal issues in 
relation to the data collection. Any concern about the sensitivity of the information to be collected 
and the estimated demands the data collection would put on their time was discussed. 
During the course of time, several companies that were short listed for sample selection did not 
provide consent to participate. Some companies initially expressed interest in participating, 
however, changed their interest over time due to developments in their business environment. For 
example, Numico, Dumeco, and Cargill Holding restrained their co-operation due to the foot and 
mouth virus that was found at Dutch cattle in February 2001. At another company, Ericsson, the 
negotiations were at a far more advanced stage prior to being cancelled. A research contract was 
signed, documentation related to the company's background and the specific project was 
collected, and interview questions were developed. However, Ericsson initiated redundancies and 
an announcement to cut 8,000 jobs was made in the middle of February. The case study 
eventually had to be abandoned as several Euro project team members were made redundant. 
In January/February 2001 a research agreement was concluded with nine companies (see table 
ý. 6). Despite the fact that all nine selected companies matched the previous outlined sample 
criteria, it was decided to exclude Mitsubishi from the case study design and instead use this 
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company as a pilot study site' 6. Following the concept of theoretical sampling the eight sites were 
selected for their similarities and differences (Haberman & Miles, 1994: Orlikowwski. 1993). In 
terms of similarities the rationale behind the selection of the companies was twofold. First, in 
terms of design scope, the selected companies each fulfilled a specific function in the case stud" 
design. Second, unlike some other cases that were included in the short list, the selected 
companies were producing comparable products within each industry. 
Table 3-6: Selected Case,, 
Company Division Origin Function )c,... I Turnover" 
Philips Dutch EI IQ Consumer 
2003 
I04.13R 
mil S 2003 
Electronics, 
Semi Conductors, 
Lightning, 
Medical systems 
Sharp CL; Japanese Subsidiary Consumer 46,6 3)3 16.714.8 
Electronics. 
Semi Con ductors 
Pioneer CI: Japanese Subsidiary Consumer 34,656 5,935.6 
Electronics 
Kenwood C}; Japanese EI IQ Consumer 4,877 1,882 2 
Electronics 
Nutricia Food Dutch El IQ Food and Dairy 29.084 4,156.8 
Hero Food Swiss/Genpan Subsidiary Food and Dairy 3.587 1,791.2 
McCain Food Canadian EI IQ Frozen Food 20.000 4,749.4 
Nestle Food Swiss Subsidiary Food and Dairv 254,199 70.823.1 
Pilot stud y 
Mitsubishi CI. /I ood Japanese EIIQ Consumer 6.307 I'_. 273 2 
Electronics: 
Food and Dairy 
3.8 Instruments for Data Collection 
The following discussion concentrates on the theoretical issues related to the tools used for the 
fieldwork. These include the choice of interview structure, the formulation and piloting of 
interview questions, the selection of interviewees, group discussion, and document analysis. The 
combination of multiple data sources and perspectives enhanced triangulation (Pettigrew, 1990). 
3.8.1 The Interview method 
The different traditions of qualitative research have resulted in a diversity of perspectives on in- 
depth interviewing. In particular there are debates about how knowledge should be constructed in 
J6 This choice was based on the cooperate function of Mitsubishi in the Netherlands. The European 
Headquarters of Mitsubishi controlled three European divisions: Electronics, Cars, and FMCG. The FMCG 
division was specialised in the import and export of European and Japanese food products. A comparison of 
both Electronics and Food industry could be made on a broad scale 
3' Soin-ce: http: //Nvwwv. hoovers. com/free/ 
Source: http: //www. hoovers. com/free/ 
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the interview (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), and about how active or passive the interviewer should be 
(Denzin, 1989). This debate resulted in various types of interview that can be positioned on a 
continuum according to the degree of structure and the nature of interview questions (Brenner et 
al., 1985). On one side of the continuum, interviews based on predetermined questions and 
standardised schedules are commonly termed structured interviews or questionnaires. The other 
side of the continuum represents unstructured interviews in which interviewers have a general 
area of interest and the interviewing process is determined by the flow of conversation (Wengraf, 
2001). The middle ground of this continuum consists of semi-structured interviews that contain a 
clearly defined purpose with some degree of flexibility in the wording and ordering of questions 
(Wengraf, 2001). 
In this study, the main aim is to understand how the impact of the Euro is perceived and 
challenged by unveiling how the respondents construct, categorise, interpret and respond to the 
impact over time. To gain insight in this process we deemed it appropriate to adapt an in-depth 
interviews technique that was based on a semi-structured foundation with open-ended questions. 
This approach yields the important advantage of flexibility to permit topics to be covered and 
allow responses to be fully probed and explored (Yin, 2003). Semi structured interviews also 
increase the interactive nature between the researcher and interviewee, and therefore makes it 
more likely that the respondent will talk freely and provide the researcher with the desired insight 
(Wengraf 2001). This argument can even be explored further during the interview as different 
techniques to achieve depth of answer in terms of exploration and explanation can be obtained 
(Yin, 2003) that further underpin previous reasons, opinions, beliefs, or meanings given to 
subjects (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). 
3.8.1.1 Formulation of Questions 
The adapted flexible design of interviewing implies that the design takes shape gradually over 
time as the researcher combines meaning with data. As Rubin and Rubin (1995) point out: 
`Concerns that appear important at the beginning of the research may seem less vital later, and 
points that seemed unimportant when the study began may turn out to be valuable' (p. 43). In 
other words, the advantage and disadvantage of a semi structured interview is that questions are 
changed and refined as the data collection proceeds. In this research the early stages of 
interviewing we concentrated on gathering preliminary themes and additional ideas. The early 
interview schedule was based on an examination of the project background for each case study 
and the gathering of relevant knowledge of the business sectors concerned. 
Particularly 
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information from archival records and documentation was used as this provided a broad coverage 
over a longer time span. This helped to articulate critical issues for inquiry at the earliest possible 
stage while the formulation of appropriate interview questions could only be enhanced through 
experience. The testing of the interview guide in the pilot case setting resulted in important 
adjustments. Predominantly we could alter the question in order to minimise misinterpretation. As 
a result the early interviews guide as outlined in broad terms in figure 3.9 did not change 
significantly in structure over time. However, at a later stage we concentrated on limiting the 
number of themes to be explored, by emphasising on underlying building blocks, and concepts 
that further enhanced testing of our understanding of those themes. Most essentially the sequence 
and wording of the questions changed over time. While the interview guide provided the template 
for the interviews, it should be noted that these were tailored to correspond the respondent and 
organisation. 
Introduction: outline of objectives of the study 
surface level questions aimed to find out background and 
contextual information 
Core part of the interview - more in-depth questioning that can be 
characterised with a move from circumstantial to 
attitudinal/explanatory questions 
Winding down - Questions looking to the future 
I 
Clarification and summary both by respondent and researcher to 
ensure the validity of the data obtained 
Figure 3.9: Interview structure guide 
It was found important to ensure that throughout the interview the objectives of the study were 
clarified to the participants over and over again. In other words, we continuously verified that the 
understanding of the informant about the subject in question would mesh up with the interest of 
this study. Several questions were repeated in a different context to verify important themes and 
to ensure validation. In addition, the questions itself were kept short and easy to understand. The 
questions were non leading and open ended to encourage the respondent to elaborate and to be 
descriptive. 
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3.8.1.2 Selection of Interviewees 
As pointed out in the previous section, semi structured interviews allow reformulation of 
questions. In terms of interviewee selection a new line of inquiry might imply that different 
people needed to be talked to. In our design we therefore followed a semi structured approach in 
terms of interviewee selection. Several interviewees were selected before data collection took 
place, while others were added during collection. We believed that this would allow exploration 
of new topics while some the consistency in type of respondents would keep the research 
organised and focused. From this point of view, it was anticipated that structural processes in 
relation to the Euro influenced several departments within the firm. The degree of priority and 
importance given to the Euro could therefore be based on the level of commitment of each 
department. This led to different roles and responsibilities of the various Euro groups in the 
project organisations across the firms. Although the primer focus was on strategic processes at the 
top of the organisation regarding the perceived and challenged impact of the Euro prior to its 
introduction, we also found it important to take into account how these strategic decisions and 
allocations flew out of activities taking place at other levels of the organisation. In other words, 
pluralism in the selection of the interviewees (Pettigrew, 1990) was considered important as 
different people from different layers within the organisation could offer different insights into the 
perceived and challenged impact of the Euro. Accordingly, in addition to at least three key 
managers dealing with strategic issues in relation to the Euro, we also aimed to interview financial 
managers and IT managers in depth during the first period of data collection. 
The same method was used during the second data collection which took place in October 2002. 
However, there was a slight shift in focus as the impact of the Euro after its introduction moved 
away from the initial anticipated impact on financial, accounting, and IT systems. Hence, the 
focus of the second data set was purely on the impact from a strategic point of view. Accordingly, 
we focussed on TMT member and strategic (often marketing) managers to find out how these 
managers perceived and challenged the impact of the Euro after it was introduced. Ideally we 
spoke to the same managers we interviewed in the first round, however, for several reasons this 
could not always be made possible. In that case we replaced the respondent with a manager in 
similar position. In addition to these interviewees, we deemed it appropriate to add at least one 
other interviewee (TMT) per firm to increase the validity. 
Despite the pluralistic approach adopted in this study (see also section 3.8 for more details), we 
were aware that a significant difference in organisational characteristics in combination with the 
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financial dependency and importance given to the single currency would indeed result in a firm 
specific adaptation process that was characterised by a different `Euro project team79 formation. 
To avoid bias we aimed to replace respondents with similar informants even if they were not an 
`active member' of a Euro team as such. Although this has resulted in slight differences in 
selection of respondents (see table 3.7), we believe that those interviews conducted led to 
theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as we were able to obtain multiple perspectives 
about the Euro adaptation process from different departments of the organisation. 
3.8.2 Group Discussion 
Group discussion4° involves a data collection method that is in some important respects very 
different from in-depth interviewing (Morgan, 1997). In this study we used focus groups of 
typically three participants in which each participant presented their own view about the impact of 
the Euro, and listened and reflected on the views presented by other participants. The participants 
that joined this group discussion were those that were interviewed separately before the group 
discussion took place. The key advantage of this method was that previous (individual participant) 
data could be validated and new data could be generated through the interaction between group 
participants, who ask questions, seek clarification and comment on what they have heard. The 
role of the researcher was to guide the discussion and make sure that all participants would 
participate; however, as Krueger and Casey argue (2000) this role was often `taken over' by the 
group participants which put the researcher in the positioning of listening in. This resulted in an 
arising spontaneity that particularly revealed more from the participants' frame of reference. Only 
when some participants did not get the change to contribute as (often) one participant was 
dominating the discussion, the researcher adopted a slightly different role whereby the dominating 
participant was restrained in order to shift attention. In addition, the aim of the researcher was to 
create a reflective environment by encouraging in-depth exploration of emerging issues. 
3.8.3 Documentary Data 
In addition to group discussion and interviewing, another source of data used in this study is 
documentation, including letters, written reports, administrative documents, newspapers, internet 
and other relevant studies (Yin, 2003). Yin (1994) suggests that documentation is important to 
`corroborate and augment evidence from other sources' (p. 81). In this study, letters, written 
reports, memo's, administrative documents, annual reports, and the internet were used either for 
19 i. e. those responsible for a smooth changeover to the Euro from a strategic, financial, technical point of 
view 
J0 The phrase group discussion is used as being synonymous with focus group 
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its substantive contents which would assist preparation of interview or to illuminate deeper 
meanings to verify and validate previous collected data. However, it is often noted that 
documentary data have their weaknesses and should therefore be treated with caution due to its 
potential selectivity of the facts provided (e. g. Pettigrew, 1990; Stake 1995). Taken this into 
account, documentary data was useful to; 
0 establish familiarity with the organisation; 
0 Provide a provisional list of key people to interview; 
" Enable the construction of a preliminary chronology of changes that occurred in the past 
and raised issues to discuss during interviews; 
" Provide corroboratory evidence about the phenomena studied, confirming and replicating 
data from the interviews or group discussion; 
" Provide information to construct synergetic views. 
To obtain access to the different data sources, the researcher firstly asked the interviewee if there 
were any important documents in relation to the discussed issues after the interview took place. In 
addition, this question was also repeated after the focus group discussion. Further archived 
material was obtained after permission was granted by the responsible people. Furthermore, with 
the exception of Pioneer and McCain the researcher was also granted access to the intranet to 
obtain particular reports and copies of speeches. 
3.9 Data collection process 
The previous discussion concentrated on the theoretical issues related to the tools used for the 
fieldwork. This section will focus on the practical aspects of the data collection process. Given the 
nature of qualitative research it should be noted that the writing up of the fieldwork experience 
can only be a highlight of some of the significant elements of this journey. 
3.9.1 Preparation and protocol test 
Before the data collection itself was conducted, it was important to become acquainted with the 
CE sector and the food and dairy sector as well as the organisations itself. This desk research 
involved a review of historic and current reports, internet based information and other public 
available information such as newspapers and magazines. This sort of preparation was not 
designed to pre-empt what would come up in the interview or focus group discussion, instead it 
was perceived as helpful for the researcher to begin thinking about the sort of direction the 
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interview or group might take. This preparation to some extent shaped the case studs protocol as 
one research guide was designed for each industry. 
3.9.1.1 Pilot Case Study 
As Rubin and Rubin (1995) point out there is a limit to the extent to which researchers can 
prepare an interview, without actually testing it in practice. For previous mentioned reasons a 
pilot study was conducted at Mitsubishi in February 2001. Conducting a pilot case study was an 
important part of the research design. The immediate advantages were fivefold. First, it served as 
an effective approach to assess the appropriateness of the case study protocol. Second, it helped to 
determine whether the interview questions suit the research objectives. Third, it provided a tool to 
identify and define topic areas that were previously unclear or unknown to the researcher. 
Fourthly, it helped to redefine questions definitions as certain concepts were misinterpreted by the 
respondents. And finally, it helped the researcher to develop a hands-on research skills and 
experience. 
Particularly the later issue shows how the previous issues are integrated as the pilot study 
provided an excellent opportunity for the researcher to develop and improve his formulation of 
interview questions, interview techniques, questioning sequence, as well as his observation and 
writing skills during the interview and of managing data after the interview. These skills could not 
have been developed without the real time experience of the pilot study. 
Among many issues the key issue the pilot study revealed was that the researcher needed to be 
more critical about the unit of analysis. It was found, for example, that the impact of the Euro was 
often associated with pricing strategies of products. While many initial questions were about 
general impact perceptions, the respondent put these questions often into a product-market 
relationship perspective. A clear distinction needed to be made in product types [i. e. standardised 
versus differentiated] and buyer groups [i. e. business to business and consumer products]. This 
observation led to some significant changes in the interview design. The new interview schedule 
was drafted and pre-tested through a focus group interview, to obtain further clarity, and to make 
sure the questions were addressed accurately. 
Another vital lesson learned during the pilot study was the importance of trust building in relation 
to the process of data collection. Based on the type of information the study aimed to gather it was 
important that this information was obtained in interviews with individuals that felt comfortable 
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to discuss these issues openly and in-depth. This pointed out that the research ethics about ho« to 
acquire and disseminate trustworthy information in ways that they cause no harm to those being 
question needed to be taken care of prior to interviewing. The researcher chose to develop a case 
study protocol that was written in non-academic language that would be presented to the 
interviewee to avoid deception and to ensure the purpose of the study obtained. This document 
also contained asking permission to tape record the meetings. It was found that such an agreement 
between the researcher and the interviewee particularly helped to increase trust building as it 
reassured all information providers that what they said would be treated in the strictest 
confidence. 
3.9.2 Time frame and details of data collection: TO and T1 
For distinctive reasons as mentioned in section 3.4 and particularly elaborated in section 3.4.2.1, 
the data collection was conducted over a time period of two years, involving preparatory 
fieldwork and two main empirical research stages (see figure 3.4). The timeframe was guided by 
pragmatic considerations in order to clarify the beginning and end of data collection. As explained 
earlier, our timeframe focussed on one major breakpoint (Pettigrew, 1990), the introduction of the 
Euro at a consumer level. The data collection stages were designed around this breakpoint. From 
February 2001 to August 2001(T°), semi-structured interviews, focus groups and documentations 
were used to investigate the anticipated impact of the Euro before its introduction. The time 
spread was chosen to make sure that the Euro was an issue of importance, given its compulsory 
introduction date of changeover in July 2001 (see figure 3.3. ). The follow up took place 10 
months after the introduction of the Euro in October 2002 (T') to find out how the impact was 
perceived and if the interpretations and challenges changed over time. 
A systematic phase wise approach was followed for data collection, following the models of 
sensemaking and strategy formation as explained in section 3.4.2.3 and 3.4.2.4 respectively and 
integrated in figure 3.1. Following the argument that there is a sequential interconnectedness 
among phenomena in historical, present and future time (Clark, 2000; Pettigrew 1990) the first 
phase concentrated on obtaining an understanding of the organisational structure, the style of 
management and the companies' business environment. As such, this phase was seeking insight in 
broad topics of relevance that funnelled towards more specific and concrete data. The research 
was conducted in iterative way across various levels within the organisation. The researcher 
scheduled the interviews based on availability of the respondent which implied that in a non 
chronological order the various case study sites were visited to complete the first phase. In total 
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sixteen interviews were conducted with marketing managers and/or relevant senior managers (see 
table 3.8). Additional data sources in terms of documentary were drawn upon to triangulate and 
accrue further information to that derived from the interviews. 
Table 3-7: Interview overview T° + T' 
Manager MM TMT IT FM SM/MM TMT TNIT%, 111 
Philips 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 12 
Sharp n/a 2 1 1 1 3 3 11 
Pioneer 1 I n/a 1 2 2 3 10 
Kenwood n/a 2 1 1 1 3 3 11 
Nutricia I I 1 1 2 2 3 Il 
Hero I I n/a 1 2 2 3 10 
McCain I I I n/a 1 3 3 10 
Nestle I I 1 1 2 3 3 12 
Total 6 10 6 7 13 21 24 87 
The second phase of fieldwork was conducted as soon as the first phase finished, which implied 
that there was an overlap of phases across the sites for a short period of time. The second phase 
concentrated on the implementation process of the Euro from a technical, financial and sales 
perspective. The main sources of data were managers that were member of the company `Euro 
project team'. In subsidiaries these teams often existed out of two or three people, who were 
concerned with the implementation of the Euro at the targeted levels. In the HQ, particularly in 
the Eurozone originated HQ, these project teams were larger in size. In total we conducted twenty 
five interviews with Finance, IT, and Marketing managers (table 3.7). Although the interview 
format varied per participant, three broad areas could be covered using the same guidelines. These 
areas were related to changes in financial management system and its importance to change 
initiatives, changes in the IT and its role in change initiatives, and the commercial implementation 
process of the Euro. 
At the end of phase two, summaries of case reports were written in Dutch describing, the facts 
obtained in the first two phases regarding the organisational and business environment context 
and the company facts regarding the `technical' changeover process towards the Euro. Also 
highlighted were the first decisions the company made to deal with the strategic impact of the 
Euro. This section could typically be described as the perceived and challenged impact of the 
Euro on pricing strategy. This case reports were presented to key informants to validate and verify 
41 MM=Marketing Manager TMT= Top Management Team IT=Information Technology Manager FM= 
Financial manager SM= Sales Manager (often marketing manager) 
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the information obtained. Some specific elements of this report, i. e. the impact of the Euro on the 
IT system of the company, were emailed to the responsible informant to check for correctness. 
In the third phase we focussed on if and how strategic change took place as a result of the 
introduction of the Euro at a consumers' level. The primer aim was to find an explanation for 
continuity or change through the eyes of senior managers of the company. In total eighteen senior 
managers were interviewed (see table 3.7). These were the same senior managers interviewed in 
phase one plus at least one additional senior manager. The interview guide, although slightly 
different per participant/company, was characterised by two stages. The first stage aimed to 
explore the strategic perception by looking at issues that were related to anticipation of the impact 
of the Euro, and the identification of strategic options how to respond. The second stage was more 
concerned with the actual strategic steps the organisation had undertaken prior to the introduction 
of the Euro and why the firms have taken the steps they did. After these interviews were 
conducted we invited two or three senior managers and one or two middle managers to participate 
in a group discussion as described in section 3.8.2. The repeated cycles of data collection within 
each company in T° took an average of four to seven months. 
The fourth and final phase took place after the Euro was introduced at a consumers' level. We 
followed an iterative approach, that is, major themes were identified based on the To data 
collection and were used as a guide for the T' data collection so that they could be modified or 
built upon (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The purpose of this phase was similar to phase three. In 
other words, the primer focus was to find out what senior managers revealed about the perceived 
impact of the Euro after it was introduced and if, how, and to what extent this perception 
influenced the strategy of the firm; based on which additional steps were (going to be) taken in 
response to the identified market changes. In total 24 senior managers were interviewed 
individually (see table 3.7) and simultaneously as participants of the group discussion in October 
2002. 
3.9.3 Data Transcription 
The interviews and focus group discussion were recorded through written notes and tape 
recording. Two steps were undertaken to improve the possibility to tape record the interview. 
First, detailed information was sent to the respondents before the interview explaining the nature 
of the research and the academic purpose of the interview. Second, a confidentiality report was set 
up and presented by the researcher before the interview started to guarantee the purpose and 
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trustworthiness of the study. Only two marketing managers out of the total of 56 people" were 
reluctant to be tape recorded. Written notes were made during those meetings. This did not further 
affect the focus group as both managers did not participate in these discussions. 
Prior to descriptive analysis and coding [see next section] two features of qualitative data 
management were undertaken. First, the interviews were transcribed and translated into English 
by the researcher himself. This guaranteed the correctness of the translation, avoiding potential 
linguistic biases and making sure that the essence of the meaning and the spirit of the interview 
were not lost. Second, the substantive content of the interviewee's account were described by the 
researcher and were given meaning short after the interview was conducted to ensure that detail of 
meanings were understood over time. 
3.10 Data Analysis 
With the detailed contents of the analysis being outlined in section 3.4, the purpose of this section 
is to detail how the data was analysed by explaining the techniques obtained. Following Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) argument that analysing data is an interactive operation that starts from the 
moment data were collected and organised, we continue here the previous discussion on data 
management by explaining in more detail how the data was categorised, displayed, interpreted, 
and analysed at iterative stages with built in validation. In this context Eisenhardt (1989) notes 
that `a striking feature of research to build theory from case studies is the frequent overlap of 
data analysis with data collection.... most [researchers] maintain this overlap' (p. 538). We 
believed that the suggested overlap was an important feature and should therefore explicitly be 
included in the case study protocol as it could be important source of data verification. The 
following table outlines the framework adopted in this study to analyse the data. 
42 9 senior managers were interviewed 3 times in phase 1,3 and 4,7 senior managers were interviewed 
tww ice in phase 3 and 4,6 marketing managers were interviewed twice in phase I and 3. The other 34 
managers were interviewed once. 
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t aale . i-n: va ta analysis m ouci 
Data Major theme The data collected from Data reduction Strauss and 
management definition various sources was Corbin (1990), 
categorised and Pettigrew (1990) 
analysed based on open 
coding 
Data display Writing up Analytical chronologies Allow the unique Pettigrew (1990), 
analytical using suitable patterns of each Stake (1995), Yin 
narratives categories for different case to emerge (2003) 
companies 
Data coding coding The data collected from Optimise the Strauss and 
and pattern various sources was identified themes Corbin (1990), 
matching categorised and Pettigrew (1990) 
analysed based on axial 
coding and selective 
coding 
Compare Look for group Verifying that the Bourgeouis and 
patterns of similarities and inter- emergent Eisenhardt 
similarities group differences relationships (1988), 
and between constructs Eisenhardt (1989) 
differences fit with the Miles and 
evidence in each Huberman (1994) 
case. 
Analytical Pattern Comparison of the looking for Alvesson and 
induction verification emergent concepts, similarities and Sköldberg (2000), 
theory with the extant differences Eisenhardt 
literature. (1989), Manning 
(1982) 
3.10.1 Data management 
During the data collection process the researcher decided to store the mass of unwieldy tangled 
data of notes transcriptions and documents based on the previous described data collection phases 
per company. The data was labelled short after it was collected following broad themes as 
identified in the semi structured interview. Emerging themes were similarly recorded. These 
themes were kept as close as possible to the respondents own language and understanding. As the 
fieldwork progressed a list of themes and a concept that appeared to be important were listed in a 
case journal (Yin, 2003) which was used at a later stage to construct a more manageable index 
through clustering the data into various sub-categories and categories using the process of open 
coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This index provided synthesised data that could be used for data 
display (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
I (): 
3.10.2 Data Display 
Following Pettigrew (1990) and Eisenhardt (1989), we broke down the data display into two 
overlapping phases. The early case write up started with a broad definition of the problem in the 
context of the organisation. This definition was further sharpened through analysis of relevant 
literature and discussions with practitioners and academics. Based on these developments ýý e 
wrote the chronological case (Pettigrew, 1990). In the next phase we focussed on the strategic 
concerns and perspectives of the organisations involved in relation to the perceived and 
challenged impact of the Euro in T° and T' in order to write the diagnostic case (Pettigrew, 1990). 
Writing the diagnostic, descriptive and issue organised case studies of each firm appeared a 
helpful tool to generate insights. The purpose of the data display as presented above was to 
provide a case study that featured `analytic abstractions for purposes of presenting theory' 
(Strauss, 1987 p. 218). In other words, the narratives presented were structured similarly based on 
analytical dimensions of inquiry 43 . 
Each dimension was aimed at further developing the 
understanding the key question: what is the perceived and challenged impact of the Euro. There 
were two main reasons to present abstractions rather than full `stories'. First it aimed to clarify 
sequences across context and levels analysis. Second it presented the linkages between the levels 
of analysis from a practical point of view. Thus, the narratives aimed to reproduce the 
perspectives of managers in relation to the unfolding impact of the Euro, whereby various levels 
of interpretation and reflection are given ample space in order to secure the importance of the 
reflection. In doing so we followed Pettigrew's (1990) suggestion to move the writing 'beyond the 
analytical chronologies' (p. 280). 
In addition, it should be noted that due to space constraints of PhD research, the researcher was 
forced to concentrate upon well chosen empirical material that represented the view of the 
manager and organisation in relation to the impact of the Euro. This implies that the rest of the 
empirical material is used for development of the researcher's own understanding aiming to 
increase the quality of the interpretation of the focused material. 
3.10.3 Data coding and pattern matching 
In order to define relationships between the categories and subcategories within and across the 
cases we used causal network diagrams (Eden, 1988; 1992; Eden & Spender, 1998) and matrices 
as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). The first technique helped to `gradually elaborate 
in the course of piecing together discrete bits of data' (Miles & Huberman 1994, p. 152). The 
These analytical dimensions are proposed in the theoretical framework as presented in table 3.1. 
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diagrams obtained graphical representation of individuals understanding of a particular issue or 
problem [i. e. the impact of the Euro]. This significantly helped to manage and structure the 
content of respondents thinking about the Euro-impact decision making process. While this 
technique can be applied in numerous ways (e. g. Eden, 1992; Fiol & Huff, 1992; Hodgkinson et 
al., 2004), we applied the technique as explained in figure 3.10. 
Causal mapping procedures 
Identify the concept, key 
element 
Fl- 
Identify relationship the 
respondent made with other 
concepts and the nature of 
this relationship 
Clarification of concepts and 
relationships by respondent 
Based on the semi structured interview 
Check and confirm the concepts, by 
looking at the relationships the 
respondent made to the concept 
during the interview 
Clarification could be sougtY through 
comparison of T° vs. T' Interviews as 
well as v. ýhdat on by the respondent 
after the interview (i. e. email, rax, 
letter, phone) 
Figure 3.10: Causal mapping procedures 
In a deductive" way we could go around individuals cognitive cause maps to discover recurrent 
phenomena in the stream of data and find out how the respondent made relationships between the 
cause and effect and visa versa. This indicated a set of procedures by which data was reassembled 
in new ways in order to make connections between the initial categories and sub categories found 
with open coding. Corbin and Strauss refer to this process as axial coding (1990). This iterative 
approach of comparing causal maps within the case generated a new set of patterns. These 
patterns could be used to make relationships within the case in terms of how they influence each 
other, appear together, or happen first. 
In contrast to the previous approach that emphasised the integration of patterns, with the use of 
matrices ýNe aimed to find a balance between the similarities and differences between the research 
sites, as well as to deepen our understanding and explanation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Using 
matrix displays allowed us to compare and contrast the concepts and patterns of behaviour 
generated from the within case analysis across the sites. We did so by comparing constructs, 
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categories, effects, relationships and so fort. For example, one of the matrix techniques adopted is 
referred to by Miles and Haberman as an `effect matrix' (1994, p. 137). This type of matrix 
focuses on outcomes (effects) whereby the causes of this outcome are being compared and 
contrasted. We used a Likert type of scale from Ito 545 to signify the firms' position in relation to 
a particular construct (Likert, 1932). Table 3.9 provides an example of the effect matrix as used in 
this study. 
Table 3-9: Matrix encoding example 
C 1C 2C 3C 4C 5C 
6C 
ase ase ase ase ase ase ase 7 Case 8 
European posit on 
Product 
standardisation 
5 4 4 3 2 1 2 3 
Promotion 
standardisation 
4 5 3 4 3 2 3 4 
Network 
integration 
4 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 
3.10.4 Analytical induction and triangulation 
In this study we used four levels of triangulation. Firstly, using multiple informants at different 
levels within the organisation provided us with different sources of information that could be 
juxtaposed and compared. The second level of triangulation is a direct result of the multiple data 
collection instruments that were applied. The third level is the case study design which allowed 
comparison and contrast of an opposite outcome across the cases. In the line with Eisenhardt 
(1989) and Pettigrew (1990) a similar set of case parameters were considered to offer promise of 
markedly contrasting case detail for this study. The fourth level, and arguably the most important 
level, is the cause and effect dimension that derived from the ability to move back and forth 
between two timeframes, formulating theory in the T° setting and the immediately placing the 
embryonic ideas in context in T' for (dis)confirmation. 
To further enhance this later argument, we adopted an approach that involves repeated boing back 
and forth between data collection and existing theory as elaborated in section 3.4.4. This process 
can be termed analytical induction (Manning, 1982), that is, a process which requires that a 
theoretical explanation (revisiting the literature) of a phenomenon is constructed inductively from 
the first case or cases examined. The researcher then sought for negative cases to test and expand 
44 The researcher used orienting constructs from the literature in his semi structured interviews, which were 
compared and contrasted here. 
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kki. 
upon this theoretical explanation: a deductive procedure. By a series of case studies and iterations 
of the theory, a theoretical explanation was eventually reached ý, ýhich accounts for all cases 
examined. The purpose of this comparison reflect the argument of Eisenhardt (1989) that 'the 
juxtaposition of conflicting results forces researchers into a more creative, framebreaking mode 
of thinking than they might otherwise be able to achieve' (p. 544). 
3.11 Conclusions 
This chapter has elaborated upon fundamentals of the study by presenting the scope and context 
in which the research questions are being studied, as well as detailing how the research has been 
carried out. We divided the chapter in two parts. In the first part we detailed the scope and 
strategy of this research. We started this part with the methodological framework to provide a 
frame of reference in terms of constructs and scope of the research. The following discussion of 
the philosophical stance then further explained the interpretive underpinnings of this framework. 
It was particularly argued that actors' behaviour does not consist simply of fixed responses, but 
involves interplay between the outer context, the organisational context and the interpretation of 
the individual of both contexts that significantly influence the response constructed. Based on the 
influence of intra-organisational features on the organisational response to environmental 
changes, we stressed the importance of adapting broad statements of the contextualist approach as 
this approach draws the attention to antecedent conditions at multiple levels that shape the 
meaning and actions of individuals. We elaborated how this adaptation influenced the selection of 
research design as well as the methods employed. More specifically, we first explained the role of 
the outer context in this study. 
Second, we discussed what levels of analysis were going to be analysed. Particular attention has 
been paid to the role of path of dependency in this study, and way in which we address the issue 
of time. After that we presented and explained the model of sensemaking, followed by the model 
of strategic action development. In the final two sections of the research strategy we detailed the 
techniques used to integrate the two levels of analysis which revealed how «e researched the 
changing pattern of strategic outcome and how this study explored the unfolding contextual 
pattern of individual interpretations. 
The second part of the chapter focussed on how the research has been carried out. The work of 
constructualists, namely Pettigrew (1985b; 1985a; 1987; 1990; 1992; 2001) and case study 
45 1 is referring to the lowest score, 5 indicates the highest score. 
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theorists, in particular Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994,2003), greatly influenced the research 
design and objectives of this study. Following the aim to understand the managerial perception 
and strategic response to the impact of the Euro over time, the objective was to gather contextual 
data at multiple levels in a longitudinal study. Accordingly we justified the use of a dual phase 
realtime study that aimed to collect triangulated data at multiple case sites. While case selection 
was based upon theoretical sampling criteria, the selected sites also concurred with pragmatic 
considerations and negotiation of access. With the chosen instruments for data collection, the 
research design and data analysis we pursued with triangulation at four different levels in order to 
enhance the thoroughness, and validity, of information obtained. This strategy of triangulation 
sought stronger substation of theoretical constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) and contributed 
to confidence in the study results. 
The following chapter highlights the data collected from the research sites. Chapter five and six 
will present the analytical account of the presented research design. 
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Chapter our A: 
Case descriptions CE 
Industry 
Case 1: Philips Consumer Electronics Europe 
Organisational background 
The foundations for what was to become one of world's biggest electronics ýýere laid in 
Eindhoven, the Netherlands, 1891. The company initially concentrated on manufacturing 
incandescent lamps and other electrical products. Developments in new lighting technologies 
were the first signs of Philips as a manufacturer of product innovations, marking the beginning of 
the diversification of its product-line. Since then Philips made major contributions in the 
development of the recording, transmission and reproduction of television pictures, home audio, 
house hold products and many other consumer electronics. Today, Philips is one of the world's 
biggest electronics companies and Europe's largest, with sales of ¬32.3 billion in 2001. It is a 
global leader in colour television sets, lighting, electric shavers, medical diagnostic imaging and 
patient monitoring, and one-chip TV products. Its 184,000 employees in more than 60 countries 
are active in the areas of lighting, consumer electronics, domestic appliances, components, 
semiconductors, and medical systems. 
European company structure and performance 
Since its foundation the concentration of its main activities are grounded in Europe. Not only are 
most of the HQ of each Philips division based in the Netherlands, also most production and R&D 
is still completed in European countries. 
When taking a closer look at how Philips is operating as a company, one of the first things 
i"ou will notice is that we have many European values. This is reflected in our product 
development, the market introduction of these products.... it is not that i"ou will notice this 
when you are European, but as soon as you go to our subsidiaries in Asia or the C 'S then they 
will tell that we are definitely a European company.... 
For a long time the European market has been the most important market in financial terms. 
Today this market still counts for more than 40 percent of the total turnover. About 60 percent of 
the Consumer Electronics sales are made in Germany, France and the UK alone. 30 percent of the 
remaining European turnover is realised in other EU countries. Overall, Philips has set up a 
European network with subsidiaries in every European country capable to deal v ith distribution, 
sales and marketing on a regional level. While production activities over the years moved from 
the Western producing countries towards the Eastern European countries, it is manifest that a 
significant proportion of products are still produced in Holland. Nevertheless; 
'The importance of factories in Poland and Hungaryfor example, changed over the past / lww 
years, resulting in massive factories for export to the European Union. These decisions were 
made by the management in the eighties in order to stay competitive in the market. Producing 
in the so called 'low cost' countries influences different issues such as lower production costs 
and lower costs of manufacturing. ' 
Recent structure changes at Royal Philips 
This program to consolidate manufacturing to reflect the changing industry needs totally changed 
Philips CE industrial strategy. From a highly localised strategy with more than 100 stand alone 
subsidiaries all over the world, Philips moved to a globalised structure with a total of `only' 14 
stand alone subsidiaries. Till the late eighties, Eindhoven (the Netherlands) was Philips home base 
for all the HQ of all the product divisions. Due to the world globalisation and the role Philips 
wants to play in this world, the business structure of Philips significantly changed in the nineties. 
From 1996-2000, the total number of divisions was reduced from 14 to 6 divisions. This is either 
done through reorganisation and combining divisions or selling divisions that were not related to 
the core business of Royal Philips electronics. 
The CE division structure 
The CE division is the largest division of Royal Philips Electronics, since the company 
restructuring programme in 2000. CE is nowadays a combination of home audio, video, car 
electronics, communications and household products. The restructuring had a significant impact 
on the structure of this division, especially for subsidiaries that act as stand alone profit 
companies, with many national employees. Marketing and strategy plans are now set up and 
controlled by the division HQ. The management of the company is entrusted to the Board of 
Management of the CE division, which is under supervision of the Supervisory Board of Royal 
Philips Electronics. Overall decisions need to be approved by the management committee, 
consisting members on the Board of Management, which are made up of particular Chairmen 
within each product division and other key officers. This Committee is the highest consultative 
112 
body within Philips. They are there to ensure that continuity exists across Philips business base 
while issues, practices and policies are implemented and shared 
'In practice, it does not matter where the product division is based, because it is each 
subsidiary who is making their own decisions, controlled and influenced by the product 
division, who has set the overall goals and strategies. ' 
From this coordinated decentralised policy a move is being made towards more control from the 
HQ level. This starts with the close cooperation of country managers ýý ith European departments 
[i. e. marketing] and their specific managers [i. e. brand managers]. Besides more emphasis is 
being put on introducing measurable issues (targets/goals) within the marketing policy to alloýý 
the top management to develop a strategy (emphasising on process standardisation) «hich can be 
carried out by the subsidiaries and controlled by the EQ/HQ. Within this simplified organisation 
structure, the origin of the company still plays a dominant role. The main HQ and the HQ of the 
CE division moved from Eindhoven to Amsterdam. Moreover, the Netherlands still hosts 10.200 
employees in CE alone (annual report, 2002) in more than 30 HQ, subsidiaries and factories. 
Role in the industry and core business 
Philips CE is one of the world's top three companies in this sector and sells electronic products to 
more than 60 million consumers all over the world. This makes Philips CE market leader in the 
overall TV sector and the digital recording sector. R&D is therefore very important for Philips CE 
in order to market new product inventions and protect these with patents. Within the total product 
line of Philips CE, the TV products are the most important in terms of turnover and market share. 
Not only is Philips one of worlds largest manufacturers of colour television and equivalents, they 
are also the leader in the technological development of wide-screen television and flat display 
TV's. 
Current management approach in Europe 
Philips aim is to have a global strategy which combines the technical core competences with the 
consumer understanding to deliver better experiences to their customers. This global approach is 
based on the brand philosophy and brand experience as expressed in the Philips brand promise: 
'Enhancing the quality of daily life: Meaningful innovations, intuitive solutions, inspiring 
design... ' 
Philips is continuously trying to find ways to improve their global business. In doing so, global 
strategies are based on three profit drivers; customer competence, operational excellence, and 
product leadership. 
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'In a very complex environment we aim to improve our profitability, this has been our aim the 
past few years and we have been very successful so far. CE is one third of the total turnover 
and only eight percent of our invested capital... What you see in this industry is that 
everybody is experiencing the same problems, which almost forces each player to focus on 
operational excellence in order not to remain profitable. As a result the inventions made in 
the industry are on a comparable level, and there are relatively few unique selling points in 
the business... ' 
In practice, the successful execution of the global strategy at a local level often depends on 
whether the subsidiary meets the monthly sales figures as set by the HQ. If not, then the focus will 
be first on meeting these figures whereby global set marketing issues such as pricing are being 
ignored, limiting the consistency of this strategy. 
`I think that we are sales representative driven... not market or marketing driven but sales 
driven. For Philips CE and all its product divisions it is important that they meet the budget 
demands at the end of each month. This is our driver, so what you see is a local 
implementation of a global strategy which shows too much variation..... ' 
Current marketing approach in Europe 
Product positioning 
Global Consumer & Market Intelligence (GCMI) has first set an internal picture to: 
`... communicate in exactly the same way, so that if three business managers are together and 
they are talking about lifestyle or how people make choices about what money to spend and 
where, than there must be a common terminology and understanding. ' 
Philips aims to do so by using a segmentation strategy46 based on perception (selectives, 
innovators, classics, basics and plugged ins). 
'By looking at values and consumer perceptions, we aim to segment the world market into 
global segments.... it helps to understand where the commonalties are on human basis in 
order to segment efficiently. ' 
Marketing mix standardisation 
The global aim is develop a consistent brand that is similar in all countries, both in terms of 
appearance as well as image. This global approach has led to some significant product portfolio 
changes in recent years. It was only ten years ago Philips was selling products under fourteen 
different brand names including Grundig, Bang & Olufson, and Aristona. Today all products are 
sold under the Philips brand name. While this introduces a level of consistency, management is 
facing additional problems in relation to coherency. To tackle these problems, the objective is to 
minimise country any potential differences that might be there. From a practical point of view this 
46 Instead of focussing on consumer differences in terms of culture, habits, income etc., Philips 
segmentation focuses on consumer experiences and knowledge. Experiences are being sought in the 
relationship between brand, features, attributes and benefits (functional and emotional). Based on this 
consumer experience the brand-name Philips is viewed in different ways. These experiences are combined 
with the reason why, how and where the product is going to be used, in other words, what need the product 
is fulfilling. 
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is most clearly evident at a marketing level. Globalisation from this point of view is associated 
with standardisation of marketing mix elements. Philips succeeds to standardise most products to 
the highest degree, however, in exceptional cases products need to be adjusted to country specific 
codes. The same applies to promotion however; 
`... information is still translated. Also small local differences exist because not all promotion 
procedures are standardised and local personal give their own interpretation to certain 
rules; However, as a premium brand, we expect to earn a bit more than most competitive 
products by doing a better job of exceeding consumer needs and delighting them with exciting 
designs'. 
Even though Philips sells her products under the same name, management does make a quality 
and R&D distinction within their portfolio. 
This means that the Philips brand is found at many types of retailers, but not all products 
are marketed through all retailers. Placement represents a leading indicator of the success 
of 'our go-to-market strategy'. 
Products with an added value and a clear competitive advantage are sold by different distribution 
channels than products which do not have any extra value. In practice this often implies that more 
advanced product types are sold via specialists, while other products are sold via large retailers or 
hypermarkets. The extent to which this is happening depends on the possibilities within each 
country causing a difference of programme standardisation. 
'... while European distribution is focussing on the national level, it should be pointed out that 
more European retailers selling formula, franchising, spread throughout European countries 
including, Germany, France, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain appear and therefore 
distribution programme standardisation possibilities are growing.... We aim to level the 
European prices to the highest extent. In doing so we follow our main competitors (Sony, 
Samsung) who most often are capable to sell at a higher price in some countries than we can. 
By systematically raising the prices for these products, we hope that our prices are levelled 
with only the unavoidable differences (i. e. VAT) in the near future. ' 
Expected impact of the Euro 
From the start, Philips approached the Euro as a business opportunity. Although, Philips was 
aware that pitfalls in relation to some business elements needed to be overcome, the concentration 
of response was on a strategic level since the mid nineties. From the overall business point of 
view the Euro was interpreted as `the pioneer of harmonisation' and `the tangible converter of 
globalisation'. Indeed, most of Philips' business managers saw great opportunities and were keen 
on the early start as they related an early implementation with a first mover advantage. In other 
words, the time aspect related to the Euro therefore played an important role. First mover 
advantage could solve problems such as adaptation time of the Euro, scarcity of IT specialists, 
and costs of the changeover process. One of the Euro project group team members described his 
expectation as follows: 
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'Once the Euro is in place, the resulting price transparency will dramatically change the way 
companies do business, especially in the retail sector. Right now, the different currencies 
make it hard to compare prices - and there is the cost of currency conversions to consider 
too. But in the future, a consumer will be able to compare Euro prices across Europe - and 
make his purchases accordingly. It all means that the consequences of the Euro have to be 
carefully worked out and prepared for - latecomers could miss the boat. ' 
This impact expectation of this member reflects overall expectations of the firm, which could be 
grouped into two strategic elements; the impact on the business environment and the impact on 
pricing strategy in particular. Both elements were driven by the expected impact of price- 
transparency in particular. 
Foreseen Impact on business environment 
`the Euro will eliminate foreign exchange risks within the Euro-cone and therefore reduces 
costs of cross-border transactions. This will improve the openness of the European Single 
Market as a whole, because the Euro will bring price-transparency throughout the European 
Union.... the Euro will allow companies in different countries to `speak' the same financial 
language and will therefore facilitate trade between the Member States participating in 
Economic and Monetary Union. ' 
These assumptions had shaped the approach taken to the Euro preparing for its potential impact 
within any division including exports, imports, direct investments and alliances. Most importantly 
was the assumption that the Euro would serve as a catalyst for companies already active in the 
European market, resulting in an acceleration of trends towards market globalisation. Moreover, 
there were a number of other things that underpinned Philips' determination to be an early adopter 
of the Euro. The strong belief in the long-term benefits of EMU was one of them. This had 
everything to do with a concern about Europe's long-term competitiveness without the Euro. 
Philips firmly believed that the tight monetary policy required by the Euro would create a better 
investment climate in Europe, resulting in growth and jobs (Source: Mondial February 1998). 
Foreseen Impact on pricing 
Form a strategic marketing point of view, response expectations concentrated on practical 
consequences of conversion from a national currency to the Euro. 
'Selling a product for NLG 2.99 or for 1.35 Euros makes quite a difference from a 
psychological point of view. Leading on from this, what if the conversion gave a price that 
was in between two price points? Rounding up to 1.36 Euros or down to 1.35 Euros could 
produce substantially different results when multiplied over millions of sales. ' 
A comparison of a net-selling price of the same Philips TV in 7 countries in the Euro-zone 
illustrates this argument: 
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i ante 4-i: H pric e comparison of t'hilips tel evisions in /L uropean countr ies 
Delta Delta 
Currency Going- Price- In Euro In % 
point 
Germum, 999. - 512.31 499.99 -12.32 -2 4" 
France 3,490 533.64 499.99 -33.65 -6. 
Spain 84,990 512.61 499.99 -12.62 -2.5% 
The Netherlands 1,099 499.55 499.99 +0.44 +0.1% 
Italy 96,900 502.23 499.99 -2.24 -0.5% 
Belgium 19,900 495.15 499.99 +4.84 +1.0% 
Austria 6,990 509.85 499.99 -9.86 -1.9% 
Source: Philips Corporate Treasury 2001 
Strategic Intention 
the Euro will raise the question to explain and justify price differences within the Eiiro---one. 
... the 
differences in value added taxes across Europe. Even if a product had a pan-European 
price, it would still be cheaper in Germany or Spain, for instance, once V. A. T. is added. This 
is not a uniquely European problem, there are also differences in state taxes in the U. S. But 
there, products can be sold before tax, which is not allowed in Europe. ' 
To overcome these problems, a European Single Currency Platform Group (ESCP) was 
established in 1995, attended by a selected number of business representatives. In 1996 a national 
sub-working groups were set up in every EMU member country, with a separate group for 
Finance and Accounting in order to deal with the first technical problems. In 1997 the ESCP was 
transformed into a large Steering Committee with about 30 senior managers, empowered to take 
corporate decisions. Finally, one project director was appointed, and sub-working groups were 
established in the product divisions. In total more than 200 people were involved with the 
implementation process of the Euro. 
Implementation of the Euro 
In general the technical issues related to the changeover process focused on the implementation in 
software related issues. 
'Although it sounds relatively easy to add an additional currency to the software 
programme, in practice it is labour intensive to go through an enormous software system line 
by line. Especially when taking into account that all participating countries (currencies) were 
known by summer 1998, which left a small window to start all the adaptations. ' 
Regarding the administration, January 1999 was the date to changeover the inter-company 
transactions into Euro's. To realise this, not only software systems in the EMU countries needed 
to be changed, any other transaction, including salary specifications were fully Euro prepared for 
January 1999. Invoicing problems were more complicated at first sight. Rounding differences 
from the national currency towards the Euro and back were causing problems in the infrastructure 
of the invoicing system. This asked for a more flexible system to either produce a Euro invoice or 
one in the national currency with the total amount converted into Euro's. 
Strategic Evaluation 
The main strategic aim of Philips was to position each product similarly in the European market. '- 
The marketing strategy is not yet an extension of this business strategy. The main reason for this 
is that in many product groups Philips has not yet found the ideal connection with the consumer 
experiences. So far, all tools were implemented to developed products focussed more on 
consumer orientation. 
It is iinpowunt for us that we are sticking to our objecto achieve gi otii th through 
lechnologv. The adverse market conditions should make us more determined to do what 's 
necessarv to develop a surcce. s. slul technology business.... toduy''s high tech markets are no 
longer characterized by high growth. When we set this objective, we'd seen years of booming 
technology markets und like many other companies, our expectations led us to make high 
growth our ambition. Now realism has to reign. As long as high growth is out of our 
immediate reach, we need to he a consistent/v high performing compam'_ That's the basis for 
profitable, sustainable growth. The priority is to have good, solid and consistent execution in 
the way, we run our businesses... it is our vision that this objective can he accomplished by 
combining consumer need with technological development. ' 
Strategic (re) positioning 
Consumer Electronics Context 
Starting Points Insights Strategic 
Consumer 
Less time, higher demands 
- Individualization 
- Integration 
- Interactivity 
- Intuitive 
Environment 
" Product USPs don't last 
" Convergence IT-CE 
" Increasing retail power 
" Clutter in communication 
" Speed & Uncertainties 
People want experiences, 
not boxes 
Only technologies that 
determine how people 
interact with CE solutions 
are discriminating 
Different business models 
for high-end vs. mainstrea 
Brand more important 
in high-end 
-build consumer franchise 
-balance push-pull 
Product marketing 
based on experience 
and leadership in D, S 
Consistent, global 
identity, attractive for 
high-value consumers 
Become the brand 
they think of first 
1 
Higher Quartiles 
High value consumers 
2 
Business Objectives -Marketshare growth 
1. Grow to Top 2 positions -Brand-Index increase 
2. Increase Profitability -New business t innovatio 
Bv: r,.. ,, 3l ,, " ,`zi, ', ,,;. L F. cQ 1i 17 
Figure 4.1: Philips' experience approach 
47 based on the customer intimacy/product leadership strategy as elaborated previously 
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The so called `experience strategic approach' aims to result in improving the current strategic 
positioning of the Philips brand and product with a more focussed product range. Therefore, the 
product range is aligned to the central themes of `home entertainment', `Personal expression', and 
`Productivity Solutions'. Product standardisation and similar product ranges have the objective of 
levelling the image perception of the global brand throughout Europe. In order to realise this, 
Philips aims to standardise the marketing processes to a higher level. The operational processes 
have already been standardised for a considerable time, however, strategic processes are not. The 
main reason of not yet doing so is due to the large size of the organisation which demands the use 
of many official procedures to maintain consistency. 
`We are proud of the close cooperation that now exists between Philips Electronics globally 
and Philips Consumer Electronics here in European countries. It is this cooperation that has 
enabled us to take a leadership position in many areas here in Europe. And we are working 
hard to take it to the next level..... Aim is to standardise the processes in such a way that the 
marketing approach throughout Europe is identical' 
Monitoring the Internal Environment 
The Euro has also since its introduction been used as an internal benchmarking tool, as it allows 
subsidiaries to compare strategies to a higher extent which contributes to the learning process why 
one subsidiary is more successful than the other `as market circumstances are easier to being put 
in perspective. ' 
`It also enables us to learn more about competitive behaviour.... In a relatively short period of 
time, we have accomplished quite a bit. And while I am very optimistic about Philips her 
future in Consumer Electronics, I recognize there are serious economic, product lifecycle, 
distribution, marketing and cost pressures facing our industry today. So, we have much more 
work to do. ' 
Degree of success of strategy 
Based on the three strategic profit drivers; customer intimacy, product leader and operational 
excellence, it is evident that many players in this market including Philips concentrated on the 
latter. According to TMT managers, the main reason to do so is the result of the lack of focus 
given on product innovation. Given this situation, present Philips CE strategy will focus more on 
the consumer by producing products that fulfil the needs of the European consumer. 
`When you put it all together, Philips is gaining momentum. Our industry and community 
efforts, as well as our products, embody our keen understanding of both technology and 
consumer insights... the single most important task for everyone in Philips is solid execution. 
The future will see us continuing to work determinedly at transforming Philips into a high 
performing company geared towards growth. So everyone should be focused on the common 
goals. I am optimistic. When talking to people across Philips -from the people I meet at town 
meetings right through to the Supervisory Board -I see that our employees recognize the 
need for change and want to fully embrace and contribute to our vision - and that's what we 
need most of all. ' 
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Changes in European market view 
Philips stresses that numerous external factors have `a significant impact on the strategic 
process'. The Euro is interpreted as one of those factors, that reinforces the European picture. 
At least as important as the Euro is the fact that retail channels are becoming clearer in 
recent years. Some years ago hypermarkets where aiming to cover the complete product 
portfolio CE manufacturers where producing. Nowadays they cleared their policy and onh" 
offer the products they think are essential given their strategy. This has been a European 
trend which makes the market clear and opens similar distribution possibilities in every Euro 
country. ' 
Strategic Reformulation 
To deal with these perceived market changes the company has chosen to amplify the fact that 
Europe is seen as one market. In doing so, Philips has made significant changes in their European 
strategy. In practice, this implies that subsidiaries in Europe are following additional [more strict] 
guidelines which are developed in great detail by the responsible European managers. Although 
on the one hand this advocates centralisation of decision making it is being stressed that in 
practice the strategy is more flexible than suggested above. The following statement confirms this 
flexibility: 
Our strategy is like a strong elastic band. You can not jump out, however, if the 
circumstances demand a market response, it is been made possible to do so. We have done 
something wrong if a strategy is that frigid that you can not even do any promotional 
activities by yourself [referring to subsidiaries]. ' 
Planned articulation of strategic changes 
The role of the Euro in this context is that it has been used by Philips to harmonise the product 
portfolio on a European level, and to harmonise the accompanied marketing mix elements in a 
similar way across Europe. For example, in the year 2000 Philips had 48 different types of irons 
in the European market. With the introduction of the Euro Philips reduced the differentiation to 22 
models to lower the costs, and enlarging the differentiation between the existing products, based 
on the expectation that the Euro would force Philips on the longer term to harmonise the prices. 
Similar strategies are used to change the product portfolio in Europe. 
'.. we have increased placements our premium product categories. We have dramatically 
increased placements in our high-end, digital direct-view and projection televisions, as well 
as in our Flat TV line that includes both plasma and LCD screens. As a result, we have 
increased our key brand and product exposure to upscale consumers. This gives us a strong 
foundation to build upon in this coming year. ' 
The European developments in combination with the industry changes strongly influenced Philips 
to act more globally. Current product strategies that are aligned to the local market are going to be 
replaced by global strategies in the near future. Steps already undertaken in this direction include 
a lo\\ cº- degrcc of product customisation, a more centralised control of decision making, and 
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focussing on consumer experiences in the generic segmentation schema to overcome country 
differences. While lately the attention focused on cost advantages and coordination of activities, 
the current steps are more related to customer orientation and satisfying their needs based on 
innovation and faster global R&D. 
`Last year, the theme at the Philips Leadership Group meeting was `Focusing on the 
Fundamentals'. This has been developed into a number of building blocks that are essential 
for the successful trans brmation of our companv. These are: a strong balance sheet, a mo rc 
effective organization, ongoing portfolio management, product and technology momentum, 
and customer intimacy. Now, though from our point of view, we made good progress irr 
transforming ourselves into a company that is establishing a platform for profitable growth, 
we definitely need to strengthen and accelerate the process in the f uture. Our top priorirl is 
to get our execution right and improve our performance throughout the entire comp rn-. ' 
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Case 2: Sharp Consumer Electronics Benelux B. V. 
Organisational background 
Sharp is an integrated electronics company with business ranging from consumer appliances and 
electronics, to information systems and electronic components. Founded in Japan in 1912 by 
Tokuji Hayakawa, Sharp is nowadays one of the largest Japanese Electronic producers with a 
total turnover of $16.4 billion in 2002 (Annual report 2002). The largest source of turnover has 
been the CE division of the company with an estimated turnover of 65% of the total (TV, Audio 
systems and home appliances). 
European company structure 
Sharp has set up an effective network in Western Europe. With subsidiaries in Austria, Benelux, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Sharp is capable to 
control the strategy on a regional level. In addition, there is a EHQ in Germany that supports the 
subsidiaries and acts as the main communication source between Europe and Japan. Sharp has got 
manufacturing bases in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Most of the 
fundamental technological inventions are done in R&D bases in the United Kingdom. Every 
subsidiary operating in the European market can be seen as a stand-alone profit organisation, with 
as many national employees as possible, to maximise the local market knowledge. In general a 
European strategy is set up by EHQ, who determine overall goals. With these goals set there are 
negotiations between the subsidiaries and the EHQ how to achieve these goals. The Japanese HQ 
is agreed to have a more advising role how to approach the European market, however, 
developments show that the importance of EHQ and HQ relationship is growing in order to 
achieve some recent proposed centralisation issues. Despite the availability of production 
facilities in Europe it is manifest that the majority of products are being produced in facilities in 
Japan. This is the result of the availability of more advanced factories in the country of origin. 
`It is for Sharp a priority to make sure that these factories run at their full capacity in order 
to fully benefit from economies of scale. ' 
Role in the industry and core business 
Sharp produces products that fit in the home audio and video segment as well as being a producer 
of household products. Its distinctive role in this industry, is the result of its advanced innovations 
in the Flat panel displays and Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) technology, which makes them 
\\orldwide leader in this segment. 
'This leadership stems from a corporate decision in the early fifties to pursue semiconductor 
technology as rc. v7)nnsi' to corporate concerns that Sharp, as primarily an assembly firm, 
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-' 
would become progressively non-competitive, especially with the advent of digital 
technology'. 
With more than 35 years of `digital' experience, LCD has become the most important invention 
for Sharp. With the upcoming use of the LCD technology in many CE segments such as 
television, communication and monitors, Sharp is improving this technology and applying it to 
alternative product groups such as the computer group and the mobile entertainment group. In 
order to do so, a LCD System Device Development Centre has been established in January 1999. 
The overall improvement of products and new applied inventions in the LCD sector, are the main 
goals to develop Sharps' core business in the future. 
'Main reason for Sharp to focus on high technology products is because they can be used to 
improve the overall picture and image of the company. ' 
It is only recently that product developments shift away from its traditional product portfolio in 
Europe. Consequently, from a financial perspective, the traditional products are still responsible 
for the majority of Sharp's turnover in Europe. More than 60% of the sales in Europe is realised 
by selling microwaves, small (bedroom) televisions and TV-VCR combinations. 
`Sharp is producing and inventing the most diverse high-tech products. All these new 
products are sold on the Japanese Market, positively influencing the image of Sharp. Sharp 
Japan made the choice in the past not to offer these products in most of the European 
markets.... What you see now are image differences in Europe. I think that this gap will close 
when European subsidiaries succeed to align their strategy to the global one. ' 
Management approach in Europe before the Euro 
Sharp Electronics, is aiming to become a `one-of-a-kind' company. This is clearly reflected in the 
company's business philosophy, stating that: 
'We do not seek merely to expand our business volume. Rather we are dedicated to the use of 
our unique, innovative technology to contribute to the culture benefits, and welfare of people 
throughout the world. ' 
Nevertheless, Sharps' strategy in Europe was characterised by its high degree of autonomy and its 
importance of flexibility in order to align this strategy to local market circumstances. Therefore it 
was understandable that each individual country fulfilled a different role often based on its local 
market opportunities. Despite, there were some factors that point out the European vision of Sharp 
before the introduction of the Euro. Most important is according to the respondents the fact that 
Sharp often used the European Market as a test market for their new products. 
'The fact that EHQ is in Germany plays an important role for the available product line in 
Germany. Sharp is capable to compete on a much broader level in this market because of a 
high variety which is the result of product line expansion in this particular market. For this 
reason, in terms of turnover, is Germany the most important market in Europe. ' 
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Within this context, there were limits and differences in available product ranges for the 
subsidiaries. It depended on the product transparency of the market. In other words, how difficult 
was it to compare products, and how rapidly was the technological development in terms of 
product applications going in this market. This was one of the reasons of different local market 
approaches. 
`The Netherlands is one of the most important test markets for any Japanese Consumer 
Electronics producers, because of its size, its population and its degree of competition, which 
is the highest in Europe. ' 
Marketing approach in Europe before the Euro 
Product positioning 
'About four years ago, we changed the Mini Disc market by introducing a portable MD- 
player. By means of advertisements we communicated this to people of 25 years and younger. 
Nowadays, this segment is willing to pay much more for a Sharp product. For this group we 
clearly realised image trading up. ' 
The planned world image upgrading of Sharp was already showing signs of effect in the European 
market. The following two arguments further illustrate the proposed change of strategy that Sharp 
was undergoing in the Benelux at that stage. 
`Only five years ago we were still selling 80% of our products by means of the cash and carry 
retailers. Our products were sold way below the average market price, only to sell more 
volume. This price image is still our main problem. It is only the past two years that both 
retailers and consumers are starting to believe in our product quality. ' 
`... for the future this means building up new relationships with retailers who are more 
suitable for their new brand image with a special focus on the new inventions, in particular 
LCD, in order to improve this image. This might lead to losing customers and market share in 
the low profile products, however, it brings Europe closer to the business philosophy of 
Sharp, which should improve the overall profitability' 
Product and promotion standardisation 
'Unfortunately, there is sometimes a huge difference in quality among the products within a 
specific product-group. Most of them are not causing any problem,, however, there are a 
couple of product-line's that have a much higher percentage of dropouts than average in the 
market. ' 
These dropouts reflected in the sales potential of the total product-line of Sharp in Europe. 
Retailers became doubtful about the quality, and customers were difficult to convince to buy a 
Sharp product. For management this has been a major issue of concern. The problem was at least 
twofold. Firstly, having technical problems lowered the potential benefit of economies of scale 
resulting product standardisation. Secondly, problems with standardisation had a negative impact 
on the future plans of Sharp. 
'Despite we are not having these problems with more expensive products such as LCD, it will 
still be more complicated to convince the market channels that our products are of superior 
technical quality. This means that producing a distinguishing product does not necessarily 
give you the competitive advantage one might expect.... ' 
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For some products like LCD, mass production was not yet possible because of its complex 
technology. Sharp only had one factory at the time that was able to deal ,` ith the production of 
LCD technology at a larger scale. Moreover, there were European technological requirements that 
lowered the degree of standardisation which often led to quality differences and differences in 
costs of production. This also affected the consistency of the brand as Sharp CE Europe was onl\ 
producing under the world-wide global brand name Sharp. 
`Having a global brand name has got advantages and disadvantages. Sharp is expcrrcrtciu 
the advantages of economies of scale and global branding, however, at the moment Sharp is 
also having problems with the European Image and production quality differences... ' 
Price standardisation 
The earlier mentioned local approach by subsidiaries most clearly reflected in issues such as 
pricing strategy. Despite that the minimum going price was set by the EHQ, the final price was 
the result of negotiations between the subsidiary and the retailer or buying centres. This open 
policy used by Sharp to calculate prices for new products, obviously resulted in significant price 
differences across the European countries, which is illustrated in the following example; 
'We know that there is a margin difference of more than 15% between our LCD television 
and the same television sold in Spain. It is nowadays not too complicated to buy these types of 
products via the Internet, so from our perspective it is important to get this on the same, 
European, level. ' 
Opportunities to Europeanise approach 
Europeanising the strategy in Europe has long been a challenge for the company. It has been 
acknowledged from different perspectives that Europeanising was `not an option but a must. 
Several examples illustrated this argument; 
'Sharp is experiencing strong market changes that influenced their European market 
positioning. Market globalisation is clearly evident with issues such as the upcoming global 
retailers and European buying centres which confirm the direct impact of globalisation in the 
Consumer Electronics market. These developments ask for closer co-operation among the 
Sharp subsidiaries in Europe, to supply the different European regions. ' 
And there was a; 
pressure towards more European thinking and acting and I clearly see difficulties to fulfil 
all the needs of these pan-European retailers based on our differences of approach in 
Europe. ' 
Expected impact of the Euro 
Foreseen changes in market environment 
What happens if the competition is getting stronger, than the price is becoming more 
important. This is not the same for every European market based on the consumer needs and 
the local competition ' 
i-I; 
Sharp is expecting several market changes as a consequence of the introduction of the Euro on a 
Consumer level. Price transparency is an important issue, especially for standardised products. 
Since January 1999 this has been the focus of Sharp EHQ, based on the expectation that prices are 
easier to compare. Therefore, the going prices that are proposed on a European level for new 
products become more important. The overall aim is to close the gap in the bandwidth to a 
maximum of 7 percent. 
`The fact that Sharp has set a bandwidth of 7 percent is based on two different phenomena. 
First, the laws are not yet harmonised on a European level, which is causing price 
differences. In addition, national governments still control going price elements such as VA T 
and import duties. Second, the market oriented pricing behaviour Sharp has been following 
over the years is based on the different market positions Sharp is having for their 
standardised products within Europe. ' 
Strategic Intention 
Sharp takes an abstaining position related to the Euro. Expectations about the Euro in general are 
low, and assumptions related to the effect of the Euro in terms of marketing possibilities are 
nearly there. This position is reflected in their Euro strategy. 
`On a short term, we do not expect that the Euro will have the same strong position as the 
Deutsche Mark or the Dutch guilder. For this reason we will wait and see. ' 
For this reason the Euro has become leading currency from April 2001, for products which are 
introduced after this date. In addition, other products (introduced before April 2001) will not 
undergo any unnecessary price changes, unless the market is changing rapidly. Taking this into 
account, Sharp will not respond on the Single Currency unless the market is doing so. 
`The Euro is only important as soon as it becomes a stronger currency than it is at the 
moment. However, we do not foresee that to happen before it is introduced on the consumer 
level.... ' 
Implementation of the Euro 
The Head Quarters in Japan have set up the technical preparations for the turnover to the Euro in 
April 2000. Subsidiaries in Europe were instructed how this changeover will effect the financial 
system. Each individual subsidiary needed to prepare their financial administration for the Euro, 
so the changeover process could go as smooth as possible. Meeting the deadline to make these 
adjustments was particularly important as Sharp uses an intranet computer system that forces 
them to make changes at the same time in order to affect the subsidiaries once. A considerable 
delay was caused as some subsidiaries experienced problems in their calculations, which 
influenced the whole process. Finally the turnover to the Euro as the internal reporting unit was 
realised in April 2001. 
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Strategic Evaluation 
Although finding the correct strategy has been of concern over the past few years, recently the 
changing European market environment has made the notion of the European market more 
compulsory. 
Being a `one of a kind' producer is something which is becoming even more important since 
the introduction of the Euro. 
From this perspective, it is essential for Sharp that they can follow the latest technology, develop 
a competitive advantage and become an important player in these segments on a European level. 
'The impact of Europeanisation is more significant then we anticipated in advance. We 
believe that the Euro boosted its significance enormously, wtwhich makes it extremely 
important to respond now. ' 
Another key element evident since the introduction of the Euro is the European thinking process 
of other members of the market channel. This difference in development is becoming a more 
important issue, given the presence European retailers who aim to fully benefit from the European 
developments, by comparing marketing (often price) related issues across the European countries. 
Besides, a difference in positioning is according to Sharp Benelux inevitably leading to different 
perceptions that have a significant impact on the negotiating position of Sharp when discussing 
European issues with those retailers. 
The Euro has a significant role in bringing Europe closer together. In particular the 
transparency forces us to think more European than iv e used to do. What we experience, as 
far as we are not acting European, our customers are. ' 
In addition, the changing retailers' structure is also an important trend that is having an impact on 
product standardisation. The power of this type of pan European distributors, and the number of 
products they order is in such a large quantity that standardisation of marketing mix elements is 
becoming even more desirable. 
'First it is important that we standardise our products on a product level. Only for new 
technologies such as LCD Television we can make afresh start. That is why we tit'rll start a 
European campaign to promote this standardised product. ' 
Strategic (re) positioning 
In terms of promotion and product standardisation Europe is on a comparable level. The opposite 
is true for distribution, and consequently pricing. The complexity of changing image by upgrading 
the product line is clearly difficult from a distribution perspective. The problem is twofold; on the 
one hand there are enormous distribution channel differences in Europe both in quality as \\ell as 
in quantity that reduce the possibilities consistent with Sharps' positioning. While on the other, 
some subsidiaries are not willing (or capable) to distance from the `traditional' approach by 
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focussing on the new types of retailers to sell the Sharp products in a specific country. Instead 
these countries try to sell the upgraded products via the existing channels, which is often 
contradicting the European product positioning. 
'/n the Netherlands we sold the first LCD televisions at a high price to the retailers to open 
some possibilities for the future. In France they sold the same television for 20% less during 
its introduction. This does not only lead to parallel import but it is also makes your product 
positioning implausible to the consumer on a European level.... We have the possibility in the 
Netherlands to follow the European positioning. The opposite is true in for example Belgium 
or France. 80% of our turnover depends on hypermarkets in those countries. We only 
convinced some retailers to adopt the new product line. Still we need to sell our new products 
in these countries as well. It therefore seems unavoidable to sell some products via 
hypermarkets. In principle it is no problem as long as this is happening in a dosed way. This 
is where we need to improve in order to avoid image inconsistency and price disturbances. ' 
Degree of success of strategy 
The Euro has played an important role in the present market context. Although the Euro itself is 
not directly interpreted as a driver toward strategic change, its transparency indirectly influenced 
actions of their European customers which asked for European response. 
'The European game has just started. We expect that the influence the Euro (and 
transparency) will be much bigger than we experienced so far.... all the technical issues are 
solved, and we already see that European market is arising.... there are suddenly more 
European customers, or local customers that look across the border... you talk and think in 
Euro's, so does your customer. The Euro is stimulating European business, and for sure it 
will lead to serious market changes. I hope we are too late to respond on these changes..... ' 
Changes in European market view 
Market changes have a clear impact on Sharps' European viewpoints. Suddenly there is more 
pressure to think and act European. In order to respond to this development the Japanese HQ 
stresses that the strategy of the region Europe need to be more in the line of the global strategy 
(and products) of Sharp. Several steps are therefore undertaken, and others take more time. In 
particular, limiting the strategic flexibility of subsidiaries and introducing a more European 
strategy asks for a strong integrated European network that is much less autonomic and more 
centralised with clear guidelines that should be implemented in each country. 
'In the past we aimed to have a strategy that would be as flexible as possible. From a very 
autonomic background we tit'ere enabled to take quick marketing decisions. This is sometimes 
indeed useful, however, we experience that a particular local approach is withholding its for 
growing at the same speed as the market developments. On a long term, this will harm our 
overall competitive position, it'hat we obviously aim to avoid. ' 
Strategic Reformulation 
In order to close the existing gap between the European subsidiaries identities, Sharp needs to find 
a N\ ay to upgrade their product image from a European perspective. There are some regions in 
Europe which haue been approached in a similar way [i. e. UK, Italy and the Vethc'rlands] while 
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more obvious regions such as Scandinavia and the Benelux are treated in total different ways. 
According to the general manager of Sharp Benelux, this problem is mainly due to the fact that a 
local approach [i. e. cultural aspects] should be neglected by local manages before the next step 
can be taken on a European level. 
'Sharp is a global company that aims to apply a global strategy. I see that particularly 
Japanese multinationals in this industry have difficulties in doing so in the European market. 
One of the reasons is that Japanese HQ aim to control the situation continuously, while the 
European market request different adjustment that can only be made by the subsidiaries 
acting in this market.... The situation itself is not that bad, however it becomes worse as soon 
as our European customers are developing quicker than us..... ' 
Some issues in relation to the European market perspective are more emphasised than others. 
Most significant perceived issue causing pressure towards European acting are the upcoming 
European retailers and European buying centres. It is interpreted that they have negotiation power 
based on their size which is influencing the going prices and trade-margins. The importance of 
these distribution channels is growing rapidly in Europe. More than 80% of the Sharp products 
are sold via these channels, which clarifies their importance. Taking this into account, Sharp is 
moving towards a more pan-European approach, forced by these market conditions. 
'.... it is often the combination of Market share and image that determines how important the 
product is for a retailer. For this reason he cannot do without the top brands within this 
specific range, even though the other brands might be more interesting in terms of margin. ' 
Impact on network integration 
At the moment, a major problem to approach Europe as one market is the degree of integration 
among the European subsidiaries. As a consequence European subsidiaries are working as stand- 
alone operations working on a country or small regional level rather than as a European group. 
However; 
`this is more the result of the complexity of the European market rather than 
miscommunication or unwillingness among the subsidiaries. Only when we find a strategy to 
approach Europe as one market we can apply it. ' 
The low integration of European subsidiaries is causing ' unnecessary delays to respond to the 
Europeanisation'. For example, the subsidiary in the Netherlands has been actively working on 
improving the product image by systematically declining the market share of commodities, and 
setting up new relationships to sell their products via new distribution channels. The subsidiary in 
Germany, on the other hand, is still focussing on the commodities and 'it looks like they do not 
halve the creativithy (personnel) to act in a different way in the market. For this reason Germany is 
still at the beginning of the process, while the Netherlands is much further... 
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Planned articulation of strategic changes 
A clear move towards a more European approach it is the move towards more centralisation of 
decision making issues in Europe. By doing so, the focus will be on the EHQ, %ý hose aim is to 
find the ideal market approach based on models used by successful subsidiaries (UK, Benelux and 
Italy). Other European countries will be guided to apply this model. The EHQ is fol lo\ý ing 
guidelines from the Japanese HQ, and more emphasis is given to a closer cooperation between 
both, whereby the EHQ will communicate this to subsidiaries and the HQ will also directly 
control the followed procedures of European subsidiaries. 
'The market positioning in two of the three most important counties (Germany and France) is 
still reflecting our old image. This is causing serious problems when you are thinking about a 
European marketing approach. ' 
What you see is that adjustments are made for the high tech products and not for the commodities. 
For commodities counts that subsidiaries are fighting their own battle on a local level, with a 
focus on the marketing mix element price, which according to Sharps philosophy for this product 
group the only way to distinguish your product from that of the competitor. As for high tech 
products the policy is already more European. 
'With our new product line we suddenly have products that are capable of changing our 
brand image. In some cases we even have 50% market share for a particular product 
worldwide, which is explaining its importance to the company. Therefore is extremely 
important from a strategic perspective that these products are positioned in the same way. 
Hence, one European policy is an absolute must for these products. For that reason, control 
and strict policies from a HQ and EHQ level helps to avoid that local decisions on a strategic 
level can not be made........ ' 
The policy is reflected in the contents of the marketing mix. `Our present marketing focus is on 
image improving products such as LCD televisions. 'The respondent in this case is referring to the 
promotion and communication of the new range of Sharp products. This focus on high tech 
products leads to a new and different communication of the Sharp product line. 
Moment to respond to market changes 
Management has clearly chosen to move in a certain direction, however, before the new strategy 
will Cully take effect, a transition period is unavoidable. What is important in this context is the 
fact that the process will take longer for countries where the commodities [i. e. video, portable 
televisions, mrcrotitwuve etc] are still the main source of turnover. 
Case 3 Pioneer Consumer Electronics Benelux 
B. V. 
Organisational background 
Pioneer Electronics is one of worlds' leading companies in the Consumer Electronic 
entertainment sector. Its business ranges from car electronics to audio products and video 
equipment. Since 1938, Pioneer is aiming to have leadership that keeps them on the forefront of 
breaking developments. And with success, ground breaking developments have led to a turnover 
of $5,478,380,000 in 2002 (annual report 2002). The largest product revenue has been the Car 
entertainment sector. The key of its success is based on the firm's commitment to satisfy highly 
demanding local consumers by constantly developing new top quality products. Therefore 
particular focus has always been on improving the R&D facilities that are set up in the three 
major regions - North America, Europe and Asia, in order to accommodate specific consumer's 
needs. Recently, Pioneer has even put more emphasis on this philosophy, which has led to a 
transformation of the corporate identity with new goals and objectives and positioning strategies. 
'For Pioneer doing business is developing a competitive advantage, without an advantage 
there is not that much business to do. We always focus on the local consumer, and try to 
develop products that develop their wishes and demands Our aim is to distinguish ourselves 
in any market we do business in. In our opinion we can base this distinction on superior 
product quality and design. We want to make sure that consumers see us as different which is 
reflected in our new strategy how to approach the market. ' 
European company structure 
Initially, Pioneer products were distributed and sold by the means of independent agencies in 
Europe in the late sixties. In 1970 the foundations of what was going to become the European 
network were laid in Belgium. Nowadays, the European Pioneer network has grown to a stabile 
production, distribution and strategic group, capable of approaching the consumers on a local 
level. Pioneer has subsidiaries not only in the EU and Northern European countries but also in all 
southern European countries and 'leading' Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Russia and Slovenia. What is significant in this context is that Pioneer is one of the few Japanese 
manufacturers that produce most important products for the European market in Europe itself. 
The importance of this approach partly stems from an early viewpoint about the European market, 
which always has been slightly different from the global perspective. Nevertheless, future aims 
include a European strategy with more emphasis on focussing on similarities in this market in 
order to benefit from potential economies of scale. Pioneer has made important steps in this 
direction since 199848. However, developments to achieve this plan have been disappointing. A 
clear bottleneck has always been the traditional organisation structure of the European network. 
'Country borders are still to important in our present organisational structure. We have 
subsidiaries in all Euro-countries, which are individually responsible for the sales and 
marketing within their country. Pioneer Japan (HQ) still approaches these companies as theti" 
are an individual company within the company. ' 
Role in the industry and core business 
The main objectives set in the `Vision 2005' plan were to become leader in the DVD industry-, to 
establish a foundation for Plasma technology; to develop and strengthen a line of network related 
products, and to expand the key device business and develop the key technologies. The new 
objectives in combination with the company's philosophy have changed the core business to 
DVD-related products and plasma displays. According to Pioneer the new vision is 'part of the 
technological development in the Consumer Electronics industry. ' The annual report of 2001 shows that 
significant growth of Pioneers' market share is evident in Europe, however, overall sales figures 
are still depended upon the Car-Audio products. In 2002 Car Electronics Product Group sales 
amounted ¥244,878 million, which is almost 39 percent of the total sales. 
'The Car Audio sector only represents 9 percent of the total consumer electronics market. So 
in 9 percent of the market we are doing very well, however, as soon as we have a home audio 
product that increases rapidly in sales, than suddenly the home audio sector is three to five 
times bigger than Car Audio. Given this market potential, out aim is to improve our share in 
the Digital home audio and video market. ' 
Management approach in Europe before the Euro 
The revised strategy in 1998 was aimed to have a significant impact on the global approach of the 
company. However, the implementation of this strategy was only partly successful, as the strategy 
had `a certain continental element next to its global viewpoints'. This was most clearly shown by 
the difference in product type and group availability across Europe that still existed in 2001. The 
previous approach of Pioneer whereby products were especially produced for the European 
market and `global' products were articulated in terms of design and technology to fulfil the 
specific needs of the European (or even local), consumer was still there three years after the 
global' implementation. 
Marketing approach in Europe before the Euro 
Product positioning 
48 see Vision 2005 plan 
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Hence, the success of Pioneers' approach in Europe was still the result of aligning strategies to 
local market conditions. Local segmentation has led to particular product group penetration in 
some countries which might be less important in others. The success rate was not only a result of 
the relationship between the size of the country and the importance in terms of turnover but it was 
also related to the early introduction of different product groups in the seventies. Pioneer targeted 
smaller segments such as the Benelux in past, which at present is one of the important regions for 
Car Audio sales. 
`... there is clearly a relationship between the sales figures and the time there is a Pioneer 
subsidiary in that specific country... Although our product positioning is based on the local 
consumer, the principals of product positioning are similar across Europe. The image 
Pioneer has in the European countries is reflected in the quality of the products. Therefore, 
the aim is to reduce the malfunctioning product percentage to a minimum, to fulfil the 
expectation of the customer by guaranteeing a high quality. Consequently, the process is 
more expensive, which influences the price. This might be negative when looking at the local 
market circumstances, however, Japanese Head Quarters do not permit price competition 
resulting lower quality. ' 
Product and promotion standardisation 
Pioneers' aim was to standardise products in Europe to the highest degree possible. In recent 
years they were increasingly successful to do so. Limitations were often the result of small 
technological adjustments that needed to be made to cope with local requirements. In some 
countries products were sold with certain features which could not be used. Only if the local need 
totally differed from the European need, strategic judgements were made whether to adjust the 
product. Certain adjustments were at the moment of data collection only made in Eastern 
European countries including Russia. 
`Producing on a large standardised scale gives a lot of cost advantages, however, controlling 
the quality of this process costs at least the equal amount. Therefore we do not standardise to 
produce cheap products, but to guarantee the same quality on a European level. ' 
Pioneers' move towards a more pan-European marketing approach was clearly evident in the 
ongoing optimisation of promotional standardisation. Pan-European product campaigns were 
successfully used in the past few years. These campaigns were often supported by global 
advertisements. Nevertheless, small details were still filled in on a local basis, e. g. magazine 
advertisements and translations. 
'What you see in Europe is a similar product positioning in our communication to our 
customers. Most important factor we try to outline is the product quality. We see product 
quality as a combination of product features and product design. Therefore, both issues are 
equally important in the communication of our brand-image' 
Distribution standardisation 
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Following the brand and product positioning of Pioneer aimed to compete on issues such as 
product features, product quality and product image. 
it is sometimes very difficult to follow all the latest developments in the CE sector, 
especially the recent years. Technology is improving so rapidly that you can not expect that 
the consumer is aware of this all. Therefore we believe that communication is the key to sell 
our products'. 
Taking this into account, Pioneer was experiencing serious threats from the fact that specialist 
were disappearing over the years. In addition, it was advocated that specialists were able to 
explain the differences in products, or focus on specific product features to convince the customer 
to buy a Pioneer instead. 
'We wish we could only sell our products via specialists in Europe. It would make things 
much more easier. In some countries the possibilities are there to use this retail channel. 
Nevertheless in most European countries the situation is changing. Specialists are being 
replaced by large retailers and alternative channels such as hypermarkets and department 
stores are becoming more and more important.... ' 
Yet, with the overall reduction of specialists in Europe, Pioneer was focussing on other ways to 
communicate their product features. Moreover, product presentation at a retailer became more 
important than ever, which required investments in in-store promotion in order to present product 
in a prominent way. 
'On a global level we clearly notice a movement from value for money to the importance of 
design.... We have got special developed displays in most of the shops. This type of displays 
meet the highest standards in order to ensure the best sound quality, however they are very 
expensive. Nevertheless, in this way the consumer can become familiar with our product in an 
interactive way, which finally stimulates the sales. ' 
Price standardisation 
Since the early nineties, the Japanese Head Quarters were setting price targets on a European 
level. 
At the moment we advise the going price of our products, however we would like to make 
this advise more compulsory. ' 
In other words, price harmonise either had an impact on the retailers margin, producers margin or 
both, indicating a significant importance of the negotiation power. 
'Despite the fact that product image, design and product features might explain the difference 
in buying behaviour, on a European level the price is still the most important factor of buying 
low and mid range products..... the standards for acceptable levels differ across Europe and 
are just a result of many factors including local competition and distribution availability. ' 
Expected impact of the Euro 
Foreseen changes in market environment 
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The viewpoint adapted in relation to the Euro was similar to most other non-European originated 
players in the European market; wait and see what was going to happen. With this perspective 
Pioneer foresaw some market changes as a direct result of the introduction of the Euro. First of all 
it was expected that the Euro would have a positive impact on price competition which would 
lead to more price competition. The underlying assumption was that the price awareness of both 
retailers and consumers would increase. Pioneer expected that the combination of this issue 
together with market distribution changes might result in an overall change in market approach. 
However, this approach was only based on speculation which limited the actual strategic issues 
that were related to this viewpoint. 
`In the Netherlands we do not have a client who is representing more than 7% of our 
turnover, in other countries the dependency is much higher. ' 
Another issue related to the introduction of the Euro was the expected advantages and or 
disadvantages it might bring in terms of currency risks reduction. Over the past few years the 
yen's depreciation against the U. S. dollar and the Euro had a favourable impact on the business. 
`Despite the fact that there is an exchange gain resulting from the weak yen it is also evident 
that a weak currency has resulted in an overall price rise of more than 15% in the past 3 
years. ' 
Strategic Intention 
Following the foreseen issues, the Euro changeover process was at its early stage primarily 
interpreted as `just another currency'. In relation to this viewpoint, the changeover process was 
perceived as a European process that technically needed to be solved by the European subsidiary 
itself. There was no technical interrelationship between the subsidiaries in terms of its IT systems, 
which made it possible for each subsidiary to deal with the technical changeover process 
individually. The Dutch subsidiary adopted the currency at an early stage for two reasons. First, 
the role of the local government and its viewpoints to the Euro influenced the viewpoints of 
managers on a local level. In the Netherlands the government fully supported the Euro from the 
start, which had an impact on Dutch managers and their perception. 
`The Netherlands is one of the first countries that supported the Euro programme from the 
start. This influences the perception of Dutch managers and the way to deal with the Euro. 
So, it is not strange that Pioneer Holland was the first subsidiary that was fully prepared to 
deal with the Euro. Other subsidiaries learned from their experience' 
Second, the managers saw no direct threats as a result of the Euro which made the process 
`smooth and easy to handle'. 
'It is more difficult for an Italian or a Frenchman to understand the meaning of I million 
Euro than for a Dutch person, based on the dividing factor. ' 
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Following these statements Pioneer expected that the shift towards the single currency \\ould not 
necessarily lead to complete overhauls of their present strategy. Although they acknowledged that 
the preparation towards the Euro might have affected future (marketing) strategies, they did not 
yet taken significant steps in that direction. The fact that there was very little known about the 
Euro within the company, and that minor official guidance emerged in day-to-day operations, 
partly explained the wait and see attitude adopted by Pioneer in relation to the long term Euro 
strategy. 
In a European perspective the Euro has reduced our currency risks, however, the weakness 
of the Euro at the moment has made the situation worse. Only if this is changing we will 
respond by changing our pricing strategy. ' 
Implementation of the Euro 
Pioneer divided products into `long-tern' and `short-term' products. In general, it could be 
assumed that a specific model of Pioneer CE would have a lifetime of approximately one-year. 
The new products were always introduced in the European CE fair which was held in February of 
each year. Pioneer chose to only `strategically' price the new products. Products with a lifetime 
longer than a year, describes as `long-term products', caused `problems' in terms of 
recalculations. The preparations to the changeover to the Euro started in January 2001 to deal with 
this kind of issues. 
`In our pricing policy we aimed to price our products ending on either 49 or 99. With the 
conversion into Euro's it is difficult to remain this aim, therefore new price points needed to 
be found..... the impact the Euro has got on psychological pricing is significant. The Euro 
forces to set new price points, which are either higher or lower than the present price. ' 
Strategic Evaluation 
While the initial expectation about the Euro was that it might have an enormous impact on price 
related issues, yet after the introduction of the Euro pricing has become less important. Instead, 
the Euro is now interpreted as a technical issue rather than a strategic one. 
`The Euro has been more a symbol than a true strategic issue for our company. Though we 
see that we need to improve our European positioning, we don not think this is a direct 
consequence of the introduction of the Euro.... as a result of the introduction of the Euro (and 
transparency) a European price is set by the EHQ for the strategic products. This implies the 
lowest selling price. EHQ is making sure that this price is utilised. ' 
Despite the fact that the Euro is not directly interpreted as having a significant impact on the 
companies strategy, other European developments such as the ongoing changes in distribution 
channels in Europe and the increasing technological competition play a are clearly becoming 
more important. 
It might be possible that the Euro has amplified the importance of these issues'. 
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Additional steps to the Vision 2005 plan are undertaken to improve the future European 
competitive position of the company. In this strategy there is a shift in the regional interpretation, 
as the current formula is moving away from the traditional country borders and focuses more on 
Europe as one market. 
Strategic (re) positioning 
It is manifest that interpretations of managers advocate that recent changes in the European 
market are reinforcing previous globalisation plans, whilst the Euro is not explicitly mentioned in 
this context. The planned strategy of Pioneer for the near future involves two interrelated key 
elements. Firstly, Pioneer aims to develop a European image that represents the high end products 
in each European market they are active. Secondly, the specialist retailer will play an important 
role to gain added value. Driver of this strategy has been the success Pioneer has in recent years in 
terms of product distinction. Pioneer succeeded to developed distinctive quality and design for 
many of its European products in comparison with its competitors. This has led to numerous 
awards and positive feedback from the critical press. 
`The key success factor of CE products is the written opinion of leading magazines on a 
European wide basis. They set the image for your product, and based on that you can either 
distinguish from your competitors or not. If you can't you need to choose to position your 
product in a broad way, if you can you need to find the marketing to communicate this to 
your consumer... that is why the specialist is so important to us. We see this channel as the 
ideal partner to communicate our image. ' 
Improve the European image 
The most important issue is to develop and improve the company and brand image inherent to the 
business approach on a European level. Essential marketing communication elements are 
therefore focussing on technology which is according to Pioneer a fundamental issue to generate 
the intended product image. Only when the market situation allows Pioneer to distinguish from 
the competitors they aim to use marketing to shape the image and communicate it to their 
consumer. What you often see is that the written product opinion across Europe is similar; 
however there might be a difference in emphasis of what product groups get more attention then 
others, given the local consumer needs. From this perspective, the marketing manager of Pioneer 
Benelux stresses that; 
At the moment we are having the wrong approach on a European or maybe even global level 
because we are not taking the differences of product importance across countries into 
account. Pioneer works with a marketing budget system that gives exact percentage of the 
turnover that need to be spend on a particular product to position the product in a European 
wav. The market circumstances do not allow to approach this using a European policy 
Therefore we think it is essential to improve this approach first before other steps can be 
taken. ' 
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On the other hand, the benefits of a European approach are well understood by Pioneers' Benelux 
subsidiary. Especially because `we always faced the enormous marketing costs on a local level. ' 
Recent standardisation of promotion elements has led to a significant reduction of costs in the past 
few years. Pioneer standardised the in- and out store promotion material to a high degree by using 
the same leaflet, advertising campaigns, and shop items. This approach is made possible since the 
products are standardised to a high degree. Only small technical issue differ across European 
countries, most of the time because the local circumstances require technical adjustments. 
The focus on the specialist 
`We see ourselves as a retailer specialist brand. Pioneer is a brand that needs explanations, 
guiding and conviction before it will be adopted. Only the local specialist can give this 
specific brand service in most cases. ' 
Pioneer emphasis that distribution channels are an important product positioning element. In 
doing so Pioneer uses the local specialist as a representative for distinguishing products. This 
approach has been the policy for many years, however, has been reinforced. 
`Recently there is a clear tendency of specialists refusing cheaper products. Product types 
that are sold by hypermarkets or large specialists are often sold at a low price. The specialist 
will do the opposite. They will judge your product range based on the best product and take it 
from there what product to add to their assortment. ' 
Degree of success of strategy 
Interestingly, European marketing developments are more a result of cost efficiency rather than 
the European market of the past view years. Europe as a whole was moving too much away from 
the global strategy. Particularly, future plans in relation to product group concentration on a world 
wide basis have led to strategy adjustments. Still, European management aligns this new strategy 
to the local market. 
'irre can not act like nothing happened in Europe... what we even see is that internal 
developments are going faster than we anticipated, therefore I even think that the 
developments have speeded up our process. At least it made us realise that our strategic focus 
should concentrate on the combination of global and local strengths, and not on one of these 
element on its oii, n. ' 
Strategic Reformulation 
In order to improve the European market approach, Pioneer partly changed its European structure 
by emphasising more on the European Head Quarters. Most importantly in this context is the 
development of a European marketing programme controlled by a European marketing 
department. Moreover, in the past 5 years subsidiaries reported their market performance and 
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financial situation to the EHQ. From now on this source will be expanded and used to 
communicate in more depth the marketing and management actions taken by local subsidiaries. 
EHQ's aim is to generalise these actions into a European marketing strategy. So far, this has led 
to serious friction among the regional subsidiaries and the EHQ. 
Impact on network integration 
'Friction is caused by the fact that we are dealing with subsidiaries that are used to %t'ork 
autonomous and therefore know how the local market should be approached. All of the 
sudden this perspective needs to be based on a European perspective set by the EHQ. At the 
moment this regional perception and the European perception are clashing. ' 
In order to achieve an internal strategic fit a more advanced control system has been set up, that 
aims to find out if and how guidelines are followed by subsidiaries. This system incorporates cost, 
budget and marketing implementation control. At the moment there are some practical problems 
with the detailed guidelines as they are set up by the EHQ. In practice some issues are too much 
influenced by the market environment [i. e. a product group might be more successful in one 
country than the other] and are therefore articulated in the wrong way. This generalised European 
approach is often one of the main reasons causing friction on a regional level. 
Planned articulation of strategic changes 
In the line of a more global approach, Pioneer Europe is developing standardised communication 
tools and channels to position its product across Europe in a similar way. Especially the 
development of European advertising is interpreted as being an important issue of doing so. From 
this viewpoint, a product orientation stimulates Pioneers way of doing business on a worldwide 
basis. Pioneers' approach from a product perspective is based on the technological issues of the 
product itself. In their focus they concentrate on consumers that are looking for distinguishing 
product quality and features. According to this perception the distribution policy has been 
adjusted as much as possible on a European level. It is important for Pioneer that the product is 
bought based on expertise. It is believed that consumers will search for extra information using 
the specialist as their medium. 
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Case 4 Kenwood Consumer Electronics Europe 
Organisational background 
Originally, Kenwood started producing parts and components for the communication equipment 
industry. Although communication is still one of the divisions of Kenwood, business is expanded 
to home audio, car audio and other electronic equipment. Throughout the years importance of 
industry segments have shifted away from communication towards audio, and in particular car 
audio. Kenwood is now a global company with managing and producing subsidiaries all over the 
world, accounting a total turnover of $2,446,419,000 (Annual report 2002), of which Europe 
covered 13.3 percent. 
European company structure 
Kenwood first local investments in Europe were made in the late eighties. The foundations of the 
European network were laid in Europe's largest countries Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom. Soon after subsidiaries were setup in Belgium, Italy, Spain and most recently the EHQ 
in the Netherlands in 1993. The current European network covers more than 90 percent of the 
total European market. Each subsidiary acts on a local level, most of the time including close 
neighbour countries, with the exception of the European Head as they are also distributing to 
other parts in Europe49. It is manifest that most European subsidiaries act on a country basis and 
the EHQ does not claim to have a strategic role controlling these activities. This viewpoint stems 
from the initial EHQ's role which was to act as a financial institute as well as a representative for 
the countries that did not have a subsidiary in Europe. 
'It is not a very nice way of putting it but Kenwood Europe acted in its first years only as an 
intermediate between Tokyo and Europe.... ' 
Nowadays, the European activity is growing and the strategic role of the EHQ is changing slowly. 
Recent company structure changes 
The changing role of the European HQ from distributor to a European centralisation unit 
managing and controlling European activities has been the result of Kenwood's views and 
response to the changing global market environment. In the late nineties technology developments 
within the industry were moving away from the core business of Kenwood. These market 
developments led to a significant decrease of company growth and inevitably to an overall 
company loss. This in return delayed the introduction of ne« and improved products as no bud`ict 
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was available to finalise the product development. Therefore, Kenwood could not follov, the 
market development which has weakened their competitive position in the past few } ears. For this 
reason structural company changes have been taking place since 2001 with the main objective to 
improve the financial situation of Kenwood in terms of profitability and cash flow. In order to do 
so, three main objectives are formulated; (1) Establish a new corporate culture, (2) withdraw from 
non-profitable businesses and (3) create a new Kenwood style and image. 
In relation to the first issue, the corporate structure dramatically changed on a large (global) scale. 
Four new divisions groups are set up, representing the company as a whole. Each of the Home 
electronics division, Car electronics division, Communications division and the Devices division 
is given full authority within its business, resulting in a radical change towards the 
decentralisation of the decisions-policy creating shorter communication lines. On the other hand, 
each division is responsible for its own profits and losses, which is strengthening the co- 
ordination by markets or even by products opening opportunities to develop global products that 
can be adjusted to the local market if necessary. This has clarified the company structure, with the 
aim to speed up the decision making process in order to improve the profitability. 
Role in the industry and core business 
Kenwood is market leader in the car navigation sector and overall second player in this segment. 
Over the past years, Kenwood invented several new car systems such as MASK (anti-theft 
system) and applied existing inventions into the mobile entertainment sector, such as DVD. In this 
particular segment, Kenwood is producing products that are based on very high standards in 
combination with unique selling points. The combination of both issues has resulted in a strong 
product iinage and brand image for Kenwood. 
`We are developing significant different car audio systems that communicate the image we 
would like to have for our products. Even systems that are too expensive for most consumers, 
contribute to improve the overall image, which is extremely important for the sales in 
Europe. ' 
Management approach in Europe before the Euro 
Since its introduction on the European market, Kenwood focuses on the relative large countries 
such as the UK, France and Germany. For this reason subsidiaries were established in the early 
nineties in order to speed up the distribution process and control sales on a local basis. While 
EHQ main activity was to penetrate into new European markets and improve existing 
relationships with distributors their role as a result of company restructuring is now to make sure 
49 Central and Western Europe. Scandinavia, Malta, Greece, Turke} and Switzerland 
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that the global formulated objectives are realised in the European market. In doing so EI-IQ 
operates in close cooperation with the four product group divisions. 
`Our aim is not only to improve the European financial situation, but also to create a more 
consistent Kenwood brand in Europe with a similar brand positioning.... ' 
Kenwood always focussed on a European network from a local (country) level to improve the 
European distribution of products. This has resulted in an antonymous network, dealing with 
individual companies rather than a European Division. Each individual subsidiary is responsible 
for its own policy, including goals, mission, vision and marketing. Nowadays, the European 
market approach is aimed to be a combination of the individual subsidiary together with the 
marketing and image philosophy of the Japanese Head Quarters. 
`The Kenwood image is something in the head of each subsidiary, ti i' trty to combine these 
thoughts, and so far we are almost on the same level. ' 
Marketing approach in Europe before the Euro 
Product positioning 
From the first moment it introduced products to the European market the Japanese management 
gave one simple message to the subsidiaries: `make sure we are the top brand in the segment. 
This suggestion took into account that Kenwood aimed to be a more exclusive brand. Despite the 
fact that only recently the first steps were made towards creating a consistent image of Kenwood 
in Europe by standardising marketing programme issues, current comparison of marketing 
policies used in the different European countries Kenwood shows that: 
'A similar marketing program is adapted in each country. This is something which is in the 
mind of the local manager but we see many similarities. For example, Kenwood always aims 
to avoid price competition, distributes products via more exclusive channels and only 
advertises in high standard magazines... ' 
Product and promotion standardisation 
Kenwood subsidiaries sold the same products throughout Europe, characterising a high degree of 
product standardisation. Only small technological adjustments were made in order to meet 
European market needs. Production of these products was for ninety percent in Asia, and only as 
an exception to the above statement, some productsS° were sold in less than three European 
countries at the same time. The majority of the products were sold in all the European countries 
that have a Kenwood subsidiary. 
'The fact that we are a product driven company automatically reveals that we have a high 
degree of product standardisation. Once a year the new product line for the year after tit-ill be 
introduced to the European managers, who from there need to decide if thev see potential for 
that product in their market or not. And even this policy is changing; sometimes products 
50 five percent of the European products 
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need to be introduced to all European countries we represent to improve brand consistency 
with products that Japan calls image drivers.... ' 
Key element on a short notice was image consistency on a European level, which in marketing 
terms was translated into similar brand communication throughout the European market. So far 
the Kenwood logo was the only communication element that was standardised. 
`We just finished our first pan-European marketing campaign and the first results are very 
positive. We try to find ways to improve the marketing of Kenwood and make it more 
European. However, these are only very recent developments based on an initiative of the 
marketing managers of the European subsidiaries, in close cooperation with the European 
Headquarters 
.... we all see the cost advantages in standardising promotion elements.... ' 
Distribution standardisation 
Differences in distribution channels across European countries were limiting the standardisation 
possibilities for Kenwood. 
`Especially the upcoming hypermarkets and scarcity of specialists in particular countries are 
an important threat for the brand image standardisation of Kenwood. ' 
Using similar distribution channels will therefore be the `ideal picture' for Kenwood. 
`The essence of the distribution issue is the impact of a retailers' image on your brand image. 
The consumer perception of a Kenwood product will be totally different if when it is only 
available via a specialist or hypermarket. In each country we need to make a choice which 
one to use, or how to combine these channels. As a result we have totally different market 
approaches in Europe. ' 
Hence, the complexity of the European market was based on the diversity of distribution channels 
available in Europe. Consequently, each subsidiary approached their local market based on the 
available distribution channels. 
`The product image of Kenwood in the Netherlands is totally different to that one in France. 
In the Netherlands we work with specialists and try to avoid any large retailer, In France this 
choice can not been made because large retailers represent more than 80 percent of the 
French market. ' 
Price standardisation 
Increasing price standardisation was contradicting the approach of Kenwood in Europe. A 
premium pricing technique was adopted as to distinguish from competitors. Kenwood used this 
technique to create a more exclusive brand image. A more passive pricing approach was used to 
make sure that Kenwood prices were marginally above the average market prices. 
'In the past people were combining components of different brands to create their own hi-fi 
system. Nowadays due to the fact that the specialists are disappearing, people buy a complete 
hi-fi system of the same brand like it is an impulse good.... Taking this into account, there is a 
clear difference in price awareness and importance between a country like France, where 
Hypermarkets are an upcoming phenomenon since the late eighties and Germany where the 
specialist is still very important. Consumers buying via the specialist seem to focus more on 
product features, brand image and product quality rather than price, which are exactly the 
issues Kenwood is focussing on. ' 
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Expected impact of the Euro 
Foreseen Impact on pricing 
Foreseen impact issues directly influenced by the Euro were only related to pricing issues. From 
this viewpoint, three different issues were taken into account, costs, margins and the local 
competition in order to price the products. Especially margin expectations of retailers across 
Europe differed significantly. In France for example retailers (hypermarkets) were more focussed 
on volume-discount, in Germany retailers expected an after sales-bonus and in the Netherlands 
retailers expected a high profit margin. 
`There is a clear difference between pre sales margin and after sales margin. Some countries 
expect the lowest buying price, others expect after sales bonus.... this, among other issues, 
makes developing a European pricing approach complicated. We do not see any implications, 
we even think it is better if the local subsidiary deals with it themselves... they have the market 
expertise and insight.... ' 
Strategic Intention 
Some Euro objectives were established centrally by the Japanese Head Quarters. This process was 
taken over by the European Head Quarters to establish a conversion plan in order to overcome the 
major problems. Therefore, the EHQ has defined European company-wide implementation rules 
for the Euro, in relation to strategy, accounting and IT. The rules were set as guidelines for the 
implementation process, but the implementation itself was decentralised. EHQ objective was for 
all business units able to handle the business unit transactions in Euro as of 1 April 2001. 
According to EHQ, handling the Euro opened two discussions; first subsidiaries needed to deal 
with the Euro in terms of technical changeover and second in terms of strategic introduction. 
Despite the fact that the European network is described as autonomous, in terms of pricing new 
products the Head Quarters (Japan) control the first pricing decisions. Major aims are to make 
sure these price levels maintain the brand-image of Kenwood and that European prices are on a 
comparable level among the European countries. Nevertheless, European management advocates 
that such an approach is executable till a certain level. 
'For each product minimum prices need to be set based on their costs and a minimum 
margin.... local market circumstances will show whether we can compete in that market or 
not. ' 
Despite the fact that there are significant steps undertaken to developed a solid short term strategy 
to deal with the Euro, on a longer term Kenwood prefers to wait and see, so a more intuitive 
strategy was used. Nevertheless, they expected that on a longer term it was very likely that the 
Euro would affect their strategy more significantly. Two main assumptions were made: (1) The 
Euro will reduce currency risks and (2) the Euro will lead to more price competition on a 
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European level. Regarding the impact of the Euro on a longer term, Kenwood Evas concerned vv ith 
the weakness the new currency showed before its commercial launch in 2002. 
`Changing the leading currency before the end of the transitional period, could lead to 
confusion or misapprehension on the part of consumers, which could even negativeli impact 
consumption if purchasing decisions are postponed. Therefore, pricing in Euro 's poses a 
considerable challenge to the retail sector, given the need to arrive at convenient price points 
in Euro's (psychological prices). Nevertheless, this is outside the control of Kenwood ' 
Kenwood did not restrict their Euro changeover efforts to changing their management systems. 
Strategic challenges were shaped and strategic issues related to the new competitive environment 
and market situations were considered. Although believe in the Euro on a long term are lowest, on 
a short term the Euro demanded strategic response on new market circumstances. Therefore, 
strategic thoughts focussed on the introduction moment of the Euro as `the leading currency' and 
overcoming pricing `mistakes'. 
Implementation of the Euro 
Changeover to the Euro itself did not result in any technical problems that could not be overcome. 
In a decentralised manner each subsidiary dealt with the IT changes. Subsidiary communication 
and co-operation was not desirable, although several changeover guidelines were set up in 
advance. Most importantly from the technical perspective was clearly communicating their 
commitment to the Euro. In October 2000, Kenwood wrote its business partners providing them 
specification of their changeover plan, dealing with technical issues such as paying in Euro's. 
From a strategic point of view it was argued that improving the price competitive position would 
become more important as a result of several factors, influencing the price competition in Europe. 
First of all Kenwood advocated that: 
'Price transparency is something that needs time to develop. On the short term we expect that 
prices will only be compared on country border areas. On a longer term the price awareness 
will grow from the country borders to the country and from the country to Europe. ' 
Being aware of the opportunities and threats the Euro might bring, Kenwood preferred to wait 
how consumers were going to respond on the new market situation. Only as a direct result it is 
expected that price competition would move from a local level to a more (pan) European level, 
Kenwood claimed that: 
'I Vc, need to find an acceptable band-width for our product prices. We believe that this width 
needs to be around 5 percent, because even the price aware customer needs service. 
Therefore the local market role will remain the same, however it need to be put in a 
European perspective. ' 
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Strategic Evaluation 
Recent developments in technology have led to an enormous technical upgrade of CE products 
over the past few years. As a result the competitors' gap on technical issues, \ý hich also 
significantly improves the design of the product, is closing rapidly. It becomes ever more 
complicated to distinguish products from competitors on a European level. 
'The competitive market driver is price. When you look at the CE industry nowadays, than 
priority number one when positioning a product is at what price is it going to be sold. There 
is no problem as long as your price is competitive, as soon as it is not you will experience 
serious sales problems, even if your design is much better than that of your competitors. ' 
One year after the structural changes, Kenwood is clearly searching what role to play in the CE 
industry. Previous main product groups such as home audio already lost its world wide 
competitive position as a result of technological development and fierce competition. 
`You see many brands in the CE industry trying to give direction to their approach in 
technological terms. This is particularly important for Kenwood as tit'e are a relative small 
company with not that many products groups to choose from.... Present CE market is ruled by 
digital technology, for a ridicules low price. We can not compete it, ith that because wc can 
not sell that many products to make the economies of scale as our competitors do. The result 
is a DVD player which is double the price, and the same quality. You can not compete with 
that, even not if your brand is Kenwood. ' 
Strategic (re) positioning 
The European market is a relative new market for Kenwood, which is reflected in its European 
market approach. Importance is given to the market in terms of turnover rather than its strategic 
value. In comparison with the United States (trendsetter) and Asia (Home market) Europe is 
viewed as a trend follower. Despite its earlier views, Japanese HQ now sees Europe as one sales 
market, however acknowledges that this market is best approached region wise. 
`Aim is to find similarities in the market in order to combine and maximise the knowledge to 
approach this regions in a similar way. ' 
Monitoring the Internal Environment 
HQ notion of the European market is influenced by the size of the European network. From a 
European perspective, the main advantage of the small size company is that a regional approach 
(pan-European) is used by most subsidiaries in terms of distribution, and tasks can be expanded 
across more nations. On the other hand, Kenwood suffers from a lack of European knowledge 
which makes them less capable of responding strategically and therefore influences its 
competitive position. 
'Kenwood has got the tools to become a major European plmver and expansion of the 
network and tasks are relatively easy to implement. However, there needs to be a clear 
business direction of what Kenwood wants to achieve in this market, and how they want to 
achieve it. ' 
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Degree of success of strategy 
Current developments in Europe have been driving Kenwood to think and act more European. As 
previously elaborated, Kenwood has already been confronted with on a global scale and therefore 
plans were developed how to deal with these threats. However, the action taken to deal with the 
market developments as defined by Kenwood in 2001 have not yet led to the effects the compan\ 
hoped for in Europe. Especially, one of its primary aims, image consistency on European lc' el. 
seems to be more complicated to achieve than anticipated. 
`There are many European obstacles that need to be overcome and we do not alwai s know 
how to deal with them... We would like to see Europe as one market with one consumer..... ' 
Arguments for this viewpoint are twofold. First, the original setup of the European network is 
based on distribution advantages, with a particular focus on the country the subsidiary is located 
in. Second, Kenwoods' strategy is developed on a country to country base in order to deal with 
local market circumstances. 
`Demographic cultural factors are totally different across nations. You see this not only in the 
type of distribution channels but also in the type of consumer. In the past this has led to a 
local market approach. These are so different at the moment that it seems to be impossible to 
draw one European picture to approach this market. ' 
Changes in European market view 
Indirect impact Europeanisation 
In the past a clear choice has been made to distribute Kenwood products via channels that are 
coherent to the exclusive brand image Kenwood use to have based on their design and product 
quality. In most countries an exclusive image was associated with exclusive distribution via 
specialist channels. Yet the upcoming European retailers become a serious threat to this approach. 
This threat is threefold. First, a similar distribution approach can not be continued because; 
'tit'c can not ignore the existence of this type of retailer mainly because they are becoming too 
important for the future of the CE industry business. ' 
Second, European retailers force to follow a more European approach given their buying power. 
'If ire refuse to do business with a European retailer in the Netherlands than it might have a 
direct consequence to the market position of Kenwood in Germany as they already 
distributed products via this retailer over the past few years. ' 
Thirdly, Kenwood is a relative small player in the market with a high dependency on the Car- 
Entertainment product group. Selling these products via large European retailers might lead to too 
much dependency on this retailer. 
'This can make or break our European market position on a longer term. Obviously we nit, to 
avid this, but without closer (European) cooperation it seems to be very difficult. ' 
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Where design use to be the most important driver, it is now not possible to differentiate the 
product purely on this factor. Albeit, some consumers in Europe still have this perception. current 
switches in competition reduces the advantage and yet Kenwood needs to face a price competition 
on a European level. This has changed Kenwood's positioning into a more sales driven compan`. 
'It is very difficult to have a sustainable competitive advantage in CE. An advantage might be 
created; however, it the creation process in terms of design is not in our control. If"he, i we 
receive a new product line from Japan which is different from our competitors it enables us to 
increase or recover our market position. ' 
Strategic Reformulation 
As a direct response to the distribution changes in Europe, Japanese management has decided to 
produce more product types within a product line. This enables them to sell comparable products 
via different distribution channels. The more advanced version is sold via small retailers, «teile 
the `basic' type is sold via large retailers and hypermarkets. From this perspective not only the 
distribution threat is being minimised but it still allows Kenwood to have price differences across 
Europe. ' Most recently, Kenwood changed the authority to a continent HQ level. In the present 
situation, HQ Japan is giving guidelines to the EHQ how to develop the strategy. Only if these 
guidelines can be used from a European perspective, given the local distribution situation and 
business philosophy of the European subsidiaries, then the guidelines will be adapted. 
`Kenwoods' viewpoint is simple; we are expected to have a better view on the European 
market than the Japanese HQ. Therefore it is our mission to find a wa ' how to tackle this 
market... The Japanese HQ tried to control things more in the past, however that did not 
work out the u'uv the expected it to be... our present strategy is too f exible. Now we compare 
other European markets with the market circumstances of this market in order to change the 
strategy of those countries..... Taken this into account, the Euro is now much more for 
Kenwood than it was a year ago. We try to deal with it from a general perspective and aim to 
overcome the threats. Internally the Euro has brought our network together. We are going to 
make European steps in the future, not only as a result of the Euro, but it boosted the 
decision... ' 
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Chapter Four B: 
Case descriptions FMCG 
Industry 
Case 5 Nutricia Europe N. V 
Organisational background 
Nutricia is part of Koninklijke (Royal) Numico N. V., the Netherlands-based multinational holding 
company that operates through brands like Nutricia, Cow&Gate and Milupa. Nutricia is a 
company that is specialised in high quality nutritional products. This quality is the result of more 
than a hundred year of experience in the dairy industry. The close collaboration with the medical 
profession has often given Nutricia the first movers' advantage. Nutricia developed itself more 
and more into a producer of knowledge intensive nutritional products. As early as 1905, the first 
products were exported to Belgium and Germany. Technological limitations did not allow rapid 
growth through exporting until the early sixties. 
European company structure 
Nowadays, Nutricia is active in all European countries and has production and sales subsidiaries 
in most of them. During the years Nutricia grew on a European level not only through export, but 
also by taking over companies on a local level that might have been of influence on either a local 
level or a European level. Decisions to take over companies are not uncommon in this industry, 
and is according to Nutricia management the result of 'the specialised product category ive tire 
working in. 
'In Germany we took over a company called Upar, we did the same in the United Kingdom 
with Cow and Gate. These products use to be only available in those countries. We are 
changing this slowly because we see opportunities for these brands in other countries as 
well..... We have an exceptional high market share in each of the product categories we are 
active in the Netherlands. Although this position is not similar in other European markets, a 
comparable situation can be found in the German and British market. As a result, these three 
countries together represent almost seventy percent of the turnover of Nutricia in Europe. ' 
Some recent changes in the current company structure aims to improve the business thinking of 
the company. Most importantly in this respect are the recently introduced product market 
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organisations (PMO) that need to change the situation on a European Ieý el. The function of the 
PMO is to be the link between subsidiaries and the HQ, with the aim to Europeanise the products 
of Nutricia. 
`What we have been doing is start to think more global while we have been acting local for 
many years. Nutricia has always been a niche player in the market that realised growth 
through acting in the same niche in other countries.... we has been particularly successful in 
the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands .... this is still almost 70 percent of our turnover in Europe..... now we try to expand our business, think more global, but more 
importantly also try to act more global.... the PMO is a direct response on how to realise 
this. ' 
Importance of Europe from a financial perspective 
In 2002, Numico (specific figures for Nutricia are not public) realised a net income of ¬4.339 
million which is almost 14 percent more than the previous year. The high growth as expected 
due to the take over of several companies in America. More than half of the turnover (59 percent) 
is a result from sales in North America, while 33 percent (¬1424 million) is sold in Europe. 
Nutricia sales are approximately 80 percent of the total sales in Europe. An estimated E500 
million of the sales in Europe are infant products which are produced and marketed by Nutricia. 
The food supplements group is the fastest growing product group. 
Role in the industry and core business 
The products Nutricia manufactures are various, yet, they have a clear resemblance. They are all 
specific nutrition products aimed at promoting growth, development and health. Within this 
specialisation, the company distinguishes primary and secondary core activities, reflecting the 
intensity of nutritional science required for product. With a specific focus on primary consumer 
products, Nutricia produces and markets the following product groups; infant nutrition, clinical 
nutrition and diets, consumer diets, vitamins, minerals and disease specific supplements. Within 
this segment there is a clear focus on the development of high value added products based on 
medical and nutritional knowledge. Products that are not closely related to this core business view 
are being disposed from the current portfolio. 
Key Portfolio 
Nutricia is market leader of infant nutrition in Europe. The product group compromises the 
complete range of infant milk formula, meals, drinks, juices and cereals for children up to fl c 
years old. Of particular importance are the products which represent the transition of drink and 
feeds to solid meals where Nutricia markets important brand names such as Olvarit, Robinsons' 
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and Bambix. Nutricia is also gaining a significant market share with clinical nutrition and diet 
products in Central and Eastern Europe. 
'Infant nutrition products are the most profitable products for Niaricia and .` umico. 
Our 
activities in this segment are enormous on a European level. From this perspective we can 
say that Europe is extremely important especially in terms of profit. ' 
Strategic positioning of Key product groups 
Nutricia's strategy is based upon specialisation in the nutrition segment by developing new 
products and opportunities in several food segments for diverse consumers groups'. In doing so, 
Nutricia aims to realise continuing internationalisation and profitable groýýth and safeguarding of 
the highest quality in all stages of production and services. An important factor to realise the 
former is maintaining a good relationship with the medical and paramedical professions, based on 
mutual trust as well as constant improvement of products. It is therefore important that Nutricia 
stays on the forefront of research and innovation of nutrition. To achieve this, Numico has set up 
several close partnerships with the scientific community and nutritional experts on a world wide 
basis. 
Marketing approach in Europe before the Euro 
Product positioning 
Nutricia products were positioned based on product features. These features were often 
customised and based on the high quality standards of the company. Fulfilling the local market 
needs is perceived by Nutricia as 'essential in order to do business in the Nutrition segment. ' It 
was assumed to important for the consumer in any country that they were well informed about the 
contents of the product. 
'The mothers of new born babies are very concerned about the health of their child. They 
always want to make sure they are buying the best product for their child. We gave a different 
definitions to what is the best in each individual country by positioning products in a different 
1t'crv.... this often led to small product differences. ' 
Product positioning has been articulated in most countries by using different distribution 
channels. The advantage of this approach was that specialists were often capable of informing the 
consumers what products to buy, which had a significant impact on the buying behaviour of these 
consumers. This approach was in the line of philosophy of Nutricia who aimed to sell high quality 
products on a medical basis. Being close to the paramedics for a long period has always 
had a 
positive influence on the product image. 
'Using the medical channel, such as the pharmacy is possible in most European countries, 
hotit'LVVL'r in others we are forced to sell through supermarkets.... products sold via this 
channcl are often customised..... we do not believe that it tit-ill 
harm our brand image, simply 
51 i. e. infants, people with specific nutritional needs and 
health conscious adults 
151 
because the competitive situation in Europe is not the same... our competitors are often forced 
to make a similar choice. ' 
Product and promotion standardisation 
So despite the fact that product standardisation was possible in technological terms and eý en 
desirable in terms of economies of scale, there were still many products within the same product 
line to fulfil the local consumer needs. This was particularly noticeable in the infant nutrition 
product group where the three dominant countries still had significant product line differences. 
`You do not only see significant differences of consumer wishes in Europe also most countries 
have several restrictions in addition to the European laws to quality standards of nutrition 
products. This has a negative impact on the standardisation possibilities of this ti pe of 
products in Europe. ' 
While full standardisation might be the ideal picture, external forces lowered the possibility of 
this to happen in the near future. In addition there were still small differences in Europe as a result 
of product standards as set by the local government. Moreover, consumers' needs for these types 
of products were often locally bound. 
`Our portfolio includes pan-European brands such as Olvarit, These types of brands are used 
on a European scale, however, the products sold under this brand-name are cl1J/L'rL'nt. 
Similarities can be found in terms of branding and packaging but not in terms of contents. ' 
Packaging of infant products had been standardised to a higher degree to save costs. This was 
realised by using the same logo, brand name and format for internationalised infant products. 
However, the product description and information was country bound. 
'Using packaging to communicate contents and usage is vital for our products. Present 
packaging does not allow to put this amount of information in six or seven languages. ' 
Expected impact of the Euro 
Foreseen changes in market environment 
Nutricia initially saw the Euro as a threat for some European countries. The local economical 
market circumstances differ significantly per country which according to Nutricia would lead to a 
different expectation of the likely impact of the Euro. 
'We believe that the Euro will have a negative impact in the more developed countries, as it 
will influence the competitive situation in those countries..... in particular it is important that 
it will become easier for potential competitors to enter the market... ' 
While it was expected that this might have a negative impact on the Western European countries 
where Nutricia had a significant market share, it was also believed that it was an opportunity to 
improve the situation in other European markets where Nutricia was not an important player vet. 
I ý, 
'On a long term it will be an opportunity for all the European countries... on a short term we 
see opportunities to increase our market share in southern European countries. ' 
Strategic Intention 
From an overall point of view, Nutricia took an abstaining position in relation to the Euro. 
Expectations in general were low, and potential threats were described as not too difficult to 
overcome. However, there were numerous concerns spoken out in relation to the potential impact 
of the Euro on the market situation. Particularly significant in this context was the expected 
increasing purchasing power of international sales organisations. 
`It is at the moment only a relative small part of the total sales, but we expect that 
international will grow in their importance as an indirect result of the Euro. Their power will 
increase significantly..... ' 
Over time it was expected to lead to a change of the current policy. Nutricia would adapt to this 
expectation when international trading organisations indeed used their potential purchasing power 
to buy products under the same conditions in Europe. 
`We expect that this will take some time before it develops, but we are sure it will sooner or 
later. This will have a significant impact on our competitive position, as it will influence our 
margin on a European scale. We need to find out how to respond to this. ' 
On a short term, however, concentration of the Euro introduction was limited to its technical 
issues and its impact on pricing related issues. 
'The Euro might have an impact on our profit margin forcing us to redefine our goals, but we 
do not expect that it wil/ lead to significant changes overall. ' 
Nutricia stresses that the Euro in this context is seen as an issue that is boosting the trend that has 
already been acknowledged. 
`The purchasing power of large retailers who operate in the international context is 
increasing rapidly. This is an issue that has been arising over the past few years.... we 
already adapted the guidelines for our international production process to this situation.. ' 
Furthermore, Nutricia expected that this trend would develop further in the near future. Although 
it was not suggested that it will directly lead to a change of Nutricia policy, it was expected that 
this might influence the policy on a longer term. 
`It is expected that more a more pan-European retailers will show up in the European 
market. Eventually thc. i will change the competitive situation as they will have more 
international demands. Of course this will influence our policy. ' 
Implementation of the Euro 
Based on the foreseen issues, the approach taken to the Euro has been primary a technical one. 
Initial thoughts were how to change the computer system to deal with the Euro. Some critical 
questions during this process were how to convince customers to start using the Euro at an earl\ 
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stage, when to introduce the new Euro prices to the customers, and for how long and when to use 
double pricing. In order to get used to the financial issues in relation to the Euro, Nutricia decided 
to introduce the Euro internally in October 2000. This relative early adaptation date gave Nutricia 
the time to overcome any unexpected problems. A similar approach is followed by other 
subsidiaries in Europe, using guidelines as set up by the Head Quarters. Individual differences 
occur among the subsidiaries in terms of adaptation dates, though there are no other significant 
differences. 
'So far the changeover went very smoothly. We did not face any problems we did not 
calculated in advance. We get different views from out customers. Some welcome the earhv 
changeover while others are not ready yet and therefore find it difficult to deal with the Euro 
at such an early stage. We made sure that we kept both customers happy... ' 
The Euro was only used to make small adjustments in the pricing strategy. Adjustments were 
made on a product pricing level, and overall it was expected that on the short term no significant 
changes to the existing policy were necessary. Nutricia claimed that it was very likely that a 
changing market situation as elaborated previously would lead to an increase of price competition 
in combination with the Euro. 
'Afore international retailers will lead to more price competition on a European level.... it 
depends however what product you are discussing. The Euro will increase the pressure to 
harmonise prices for more standardised products. Therefore we expect that the impact will be 
not that significant for our company on the short term. ' 
Strategic Evaluation 
Recent developments including the appearance of global players [i. e. Nestle, Heinz and Danone], 
and the internationalisation of retailers, have a direct impact on the competitive position of 
Nutricia. The former has a significant impact on the competitive situation in European countries 
that used to be dominated by particular players. With the upcoming international players response 
should not only be on a local level, but also on a European level. `Nutricia can only lose in these 
markets so we need to make sure that we protect our position. ' The latter highlights the local 
approach taken and forces Nutricia to think and act more European. 
The international retailer comparison will continuously try to find similarities and 
differences of the product portfolio in Europe in order to strengthen their purchase position. 
We either need make sure that this comparison can not be made or make sure that the 
differences are acceptable. ' 
The Euro has shed a light on price differences across Europe, which are according to Nutricia 
explained by local market circumstances. Moreover, Nutricia does not give that much importance 
to price and rather focuses on quality of the product. In most markets the quality element for 
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healthy products outweighs the significance of price. These both explain the impact of the Euro in 
this particular industry as well as the importance given to the Euro by Nutricia itself. 
'The Euro is seen as an technical issue that needed to be overcome. Albeit the introduction 
cost a lot of money to make technical adjustments, we do not see any serious threats as a 
result of the introduction of the Euro. Indirectly it might have boosted the international price 
comparison by our retailers, but we think that this is an issue which would arrive sooner or 
later.... We already expected that international retailers would become an important factor in 
the nutrition market development. We now see, since the introduction of the Euro that their 
power is increasing indeed... ' 
This development is significant for the more standardised products of Nutricia. In particular infant 
products such as milk powder or baby food are not interfered by local restrictions. For this 
product group buying power is very important, especially when taking into account that retailers 
are gathering market price information from other European countries where the same product is 
sold. 
`This can be a threat but it can also be an opportunity. Sometimes during negotiations it is 
important that we are a European firm which enables European opportunities when setting 
up a new contract. We believe in European contracts, as this is becoming a more important 
part of our turnover. Besides, it is a way to avoid parallel import which has always been an 
enormous threat to us. From this viewpoint wi, e see more European opportunities than threats; 
however, we are not always capable to negotiate on a European level. ' 
Strategic (re) positioning 
Nutricia wants to grow in the European market and become less dependent upon the English, 
Dutch and German market. Conversely more importance needs to be given to these countries in 
order to achieve this growth. Nutricia is searching for ways to lower the costs by using the 
production facilities of these countries. Ideally the strategy in Europe will be to protect the market 
share in countries where Nutricia is market leader, which seems to be difficult taking into account 
the upcoming competitors in these markets. Market developments, in particular the 
internationalisation of retailers and the increasing European competition, have led to significant 
strategy adjustments over the past decade. Modifications in the organisational structure enabled 
Nutricia to respond to these changes. 'Changes in the external environment are notitw identified in 
an earlier stage which makes it possible to fine-tune the strategy if necessary. ' Nevertheless, the 
most significant impact on the market strategy of Nutricia is often caused by the introduction of 
new legislation. 
', I lost of our marketing is still country related as there are huge differences in for example 
product standards and legislation. This asks for a local market implementation which might 
be contradicting the initial strategy. ' 
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Importance of local approach 
In order to remain competitive in the European market, Nutricia needed to undergo a structural 
change that meets the `new' market circumstances and enable them to develop a European 
business strategy. In 1998 three product marketing organisations (PMO) were added to the 
existing organisational structure. The Infant nutrition, Clinical nutrition and the Nutritional 
supplement PMO are each responsible for the product development and marketing of this product 
group. In addition to this structure, Nutricia introduced sales organisations for Northern, Central, 
Southern and Eastern Europe, which are responsible for the implementation and control of the 
marketing programme on a regional level. Nutricia hopes to stimulate the opportunities to benefit 
from economies of scale. Not only contributes the PMO organisation to the standardisation 
possibilities, also the present product portfolio the combined production efforts, the consumer 
needs and technology play an important role in Nutricia's standardisation attempts. 
'Standardisation of marketing is contradicting the local market circumstances; however, in 
the present market circumstances controlling the costs seems the only tital to compete. We 
need to make sure we have advantages on this level. This should go further then maximising 
the production opportunities. Products should also be positioned in similar ways in Europe. I 
don not see possibilities for all the products we produce, but I do for most of them. ' 
Possibilities of pan European Approach 
The organisational structural change improved the European thinking of Nutricia. However, it 
needs be noted that this structure is relative new to the organisation, which often causes 
difficulties in strategy implementation that are difficult to overcome. Difficulties which are most 
clearly revealed in the positioning of most Nutricia products. 
'Nutricia's strategy is European. We have clear company goals in combination with 
European guidelines how to achieve them. This includes the tools we need to use. Hotitwcvver, 
implementation of these tools is still local, with a local interpretation and changes to the 
strategy if necessary. ' 
Strategies are developed by the HQ based on advise of the PMO and regional sales organisations. 
This suggests that subsidiaries are `implementers' of this strategy. Practice shows that local 
market circumstances not always allow that the chosen strategy can be followed. Flexibility of 
the strategy is often necessary to make adjustment in order to make a strategy work in a particular 
country. How these adjustments need to be made is up to the subsidiary or the sales organisation 
on its ovy n. 
'We should aini for more strategic control to facilitate consistency of the chosen strategy.... ' 
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Strategic Reformulation 
The local adaptation causes serious problems in terms of strategic consistency. Subsidiaries across 
Europe have conflicting interests which need to be balanced. It is expected that implementation of 
a European policy will take more time. Clear difficulties are found in terms of adapting cultural 
and political factors in this policy. `At the moment the European network is too much guided by 
the Dutch subsidiary. ' This is mainly because of the size of this subsidiary, which has made the 
ideas and interests of this particular subsidiary more prominent. For some countries this policy is 
not acceptable, which causes friction between subsidiaries PMO's and regional sales 
organisations. A paradox situation is the result, where too much flexibility in the present polic` 
allows making changes to the strategy implementation in order to avoid friction. In contrast, 
initial plans when setting up the PMO structure was to improve consistency of the European 
strategy implementation. 
'We need to find a way that we can get to a policy which is acceptable to all of us. That 
structure does not exist yet. At the moment it is too easy to make local adjustments to the 
strategy which is contradicting the European viewpoint. ' 
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Case 6 Hero B. V. The Netherlands 
Organisational background 
Hero is an international branded consumer foods group based in Lenzburg, S«itzerland. It was 
founded in 1886 by Henckell and Zeiler, and after the death of Zeiler in 1889 the company \ýas 
renamed after the shareholders at that time; "Henckel and Roth". The Hero brand name was 
created from the first letters of the shareholders' names. Initially the focus of Hero has been on 
jam production. This production was not only for the Swiss but also for the surrounding European 
markets. Based on its success formula, Hero expanded their European business by opening 
production facilities and sales organisations in France in 1912, the Netherlands in 1914, Spain and 
Portugal in 1922, Germany in 1931, Italy in 1967 and Poland in 1971. 
European company and portfolio structure 
Today, Hero is active in most European countries, either with the Hero brand itself or with local 
brands that came part of the Hero groups as a result of a company takeover in the respective 
country. In this context Hero realised European growth through taking over brand names such as 
St Gallen (France), Roco (United Kingdom), Lido (Italy) and Betuwe (The Netherlands). Most 
brands are nowadays sold as part of the Hero brand. The most important take over in the history 
of Hero was realised in 2000, when the German company Schwartau acquisition took place. Hero 
is a relative small company with 3,500 employees, of whom more than 3,000 are working in the 
European market. Because one country has been more active in terms of R&D there are some pre- 
dominating countries within the European market. For Hero the history and production facilities 
seem to be of more significant importance than market size. As we can seen in the above table, 
there are several countries that outperform countries that are bigger in size. 
Role in the industry and core business 
Hero has achieved the leading position in jams and marmalade products in Europe. In addition, 
Hero has strong positions in the fields of baby food, cereal bars and baking products. Given the 
width of the present product portfolio, Hero draws a general distinction between two sectors: 
Consumer Foods and Baking Aids. The Food segment comprises product ranges such as jams, 
pasta, fruit dessert and baby food. Baking aids is a more recent product sector of Hero and has 
been expanded significantly since the merger with Schwartau. Products in this portfolio are 
mainly sold in Germany, Switzerland, Poland, France and the United Kingdom. 
Key product group 
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The consumer foods sector is by far the most important product group for Hero. Most products in 
this sector are fulfilling local market needs and are therefore only sold in one country''. From an 
international portfolio perspective there are several products which are sold in most European 
countries. The most important product range on this level is the fruit products. In particular jam 
with products such as Hero Delicia, Hero Classica and Hero Extra occupy leading market 
positions in Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands and France. 
Strategic positioning and approach for key products 
Hero's primary strategy was based upon specialisation in fruit related products. Hero aimed to 
resume its position as a leading manufacturer of branded products in this segment. In particular 
consistent concentration on the Hero brand formed a main objective of the company. The 
company's clear focus on branded business, resulted in several withdraws from segments that are 
not in the line of this philosophy. 
`Hero products should always have some kind of fruit element. Recently, we sold several 
companies which had nothing to do with our core business. This is only the first step in this 
direction, in the future we aim to be Europe's fruit specialist. ' 
The strong point of Hero in the past has always been its local approach, fulfilling market needs 
with local products. This was due to a long tradition of producing products on a local level, which 
often gave a different perception advantage for the local consumer. 
'A Dutch consumer thinks that Hero is a Dutch brand, the same does the French, Spanish and 
Italian consumer. This gives a very strong dimension to the Hero brand. Consumers know our 
quality, what we stand for, and based on that have a certain expectation. We always tried to 
fulJll that expectation from a local level, taking advantage of this consumer perspective. This 
has led to a great variety of products in Europe. ' 
Marketing approach in Europe before the Euro 
Product positioning 
The current marketing approach was based on the market position each individual subsidiary had 
in its local market. For example, Spain was market leader in baby food, Germany in serial bars, 
Switzerland in microwave meals and the Netherlands in fruit drinks. The product portfolio of 
Hero was so diverse and based on the local market circumstances that it was difficult to 
standardise all marketing mix elements. 'The brand name Hero has a total different value fron 
one country to another. ' 
If all these elements would match from the start then you would have no problems. But in 
practice we always need to take a closer look at local market circumstances... we simply can 
not ignore these.... It is already difficult enough to create consistency on a local level to 
guarantee a similar brand positioning... ' 
5 For example, Hero drinks are only sold in the Netherlands and Hero cereal bars are only sold in Germany. 
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Product and promotion standardisation 
'75 percent of our product portfolio is still local, and 40 percent of these do not have the 
potential to be sold elsewhere. ' 
This stimulated Hero to follow another approach to standardisation ýý ith a focus on 
communication. 
'Hero is a brand that needs to have the same load or image on a European level. There are 
already several similarities in brand perception. Most Hero products are sold based on the 
emotional aspect, rather than the contents of the product.... We try to sell the brand not the 
product, although the product needs to fit the consumer perception.... What we have are 
products that are exactly the same because they are produced in the same factor-y... for 
several reasons a breakfast juice is sold in The Netherlands with preservative and in 
Germany and France without. This has a significant impact on the taste of such a product, 
which even makes it complicated to compare. ' 
The success of the Hero brand was based on international brand standardisation with a different 
product portfolio sold under the same quality criteria. There were clear international guidelines 
for packaging and logo use for the brand name, in order to create a similar product appearance 
and improve consistency. However, some elements such as physical packaging format and the 
advertising champagnes were still locally bound. A clear boundary in the standardisation process 
of this element was the language. 
'Before there are opportunities to overcome the differences of taste on a European level, we 
need to standardise other marketing mix elements. This implies that there first will be a focus 
on communication, this to influence the consumer perception. At the moment there is a total 
different mind-set across Europe. This is the result of tradition and the autonomous approach 
that all subsidiaries in Europe are allowed to apply. ' 
Distribution standardisation 
The similar aim was to sell the products via retailers that had a collection of A-brands in their 
assortment. European brand consistency was one of the critical issues that preferably was 
reflected in the distribution and pricing policy. 'Hero is in principle a premium priced product 
that needs to be in association with the retailers that are selling our products. We aim to select 
retailers that can communicate our positioning. ' This approach was used in Europe, not as a 
result of European marketing, but more based on positioning guidelines of the HQ. We see that 
existing gaps are closing in Europe. Retailers are also looking for image consistency. ' 
Expected impact of the Euro 
Foreseen changes in market environment 
The foreseen impact of the Euro was only perceived from a local market perspective. Most 
important issues from this perspective were, the impact the Euro might have on pricing related 
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issues in the Netherlands and how to follow a satisfactory introduction of the Euro to their 
customers. 
Foreseen Impact on pricing 
The steps taken to deal with the Euro did not lead to a complete overhaul of the existing strategy. 
A relative simple policy was followed by Hero, whereby the previous prices were divided b\ the 
Euro factor and rounded of to the nearest acceptable psychological price barrier. This method to 
calculate the new prices prevented Hero of making pricing misjudgements. The average customer 
response to the new Euro prices was positive. 
`Our Euro prices show small differences in comparison with the guilder prices. We "e have 
chosen not to change our pricing policy as a result of the Euro which makes the process both 
easy as well as acceptable for our customers. ' 
From a consumer pricing perspective it was expected that price comparison from guilders to Euro 
would only been made one month before the introduction of the Euro on a consumer level. 
Moreover, it was also expected that small price changes would be acceptable for consumers based 
on the time needed by consumers to get used to the new currency. 
`Even if the consumers respond in a it'av we did not anticipate on, it is always possible to 
make small price adjustment. However, we do not expect this to happen... ' 
Strategic Intention 
The Euro has been primary approached as a technical issue that `is the same for everybody and 
just needs to be done, whether we want or not. ' From a technological perspective no significant 
problems occurred and the process has been described as `smoothly'. From a strategic perspective 
the expectations directly related to the Euro are modest and particularly related to pricing issues, 
whereby the pricing policy itself was not influenced. 
'The Euro has no significant impact on our strategy whatsoever. This is mainly because we 
are working on a local level, and it is therefore difficult to view it from a European 
perspective, as there is no such policy. The Euro has an impact on the pricing of products, 
even so it is just a recalculation, nothing special. ' 
The foreseen opportunities and threats in relation to the Euro were in Hero's case country bound. 
Not much attention has been given to the potential impact of the Euro on a European level. 
'The problem is that Switzerland is not joining the Euro. This issue limits the priority given to 
the Euro by the Headquarters. Consequently we needed to arrange everything ourselves. 
[{"hat l ou still see is that we report in guilders to the Headquarters while we tiº'ork only in 
Euro's since three months ago... How pricing are going to develop is difficult to predict 
It 
will be combination of price acceptance by the consumer on the one hand, while competitors 
might introduce new price point on the other... ' 
Implementation of the Euro 
Interesting in this respect was the early technical Euro preparation made by the Dutch subsidiar . 
Hero the Netherlands \\ as ready to switchover to the Euro from January 1998 as a result of IT 
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changes that needed to be made to overcome any potential millennium problems. The pre cilt 
computer intra-network of Hero was based on country specific software. with no significant 
similarities. This reduced to cooperate on a subsidiary level. Hence, each subsidiary dealt ýý ith 
technical Euro issues individually. No specific guidelines were given by the HQ. An identical 
approach was followed for strategic issues. Adaptation dates were set by the subsidiary, and often 
based on the local market circumstances and the expectations of the subsidiary itself. Hero the 
Netherlands followed two different adaptation dates. One for its customers and another date for its 
consumers. All customers of Hero the Netherlands were invoiced in Euro's since January' 2001 
and were obliged to account in Euro's since July 2001. 
'It was important for us that we made arrangements with our customers at a relative early 
stage. Make sure that we have the correct price, but also make sure that our customer is 
ready to deal with Euro's. ' 
From a consumer pricing perspective Hero the Netherlands waited till the end of November 2001 
to introduce the new Euro prices. From this moment the Euro became the leading currency. A late 
adaptation date from a consumer perspective was chosen to overcome any price 
misunderstanding. 
'You can choose to make a nice Euro price such as f 0.99 a year in advance, but it will not 
work. Consumers will look at the price in guilders, as long as they need to pay in guilders. 
The new currency will influence the buying decision only after its introduction on a consumer 
level. ' 
Strategic Evaluation 
Current market developments made Hero rethink their chosen market strategy. The local approach 
has been the key factor of Hero's success in Europe. Differences are created based on cultural 
aspects, and consumer's needs are approached from a local perspective. However, `this does not 
suggest that there are no similarities of consumer needs in Europe. What it does suggest is that 
the needs are fulfilled in various ways. ' The awareness of Hero that consumer needs can be 
integrated in Europe, leads to a new developed market perspective of Hero in relation to the 
European market; products with a proven international potential should be marketed in a 
consistent way whereby cost advantages should be gained. 
'Internationalisation also suggests that marketing adjustments need to be made, and markets 
need to be approached in consistent ways. The other side of the coin is that 
internationalisation enables our retailers to compare marketing related issues across the 
border. We need to make sure that if comparison can be made that there is consistency, or 
titi"e need to make sure that comparison can not be made at all. ' 
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Strategic (re) positioning 
European developments such as the Euro have led to more cooperation on a European level. As a 
result to these developments emphasis of the future strategy is given to a combination of two 
market approaches. First there is the existing local market approach that is build up based on 
fulfilling local market needs that is unique for a particular market and that can not be fulfilled in 
the same way in another market. On the other hand, first steps are taken to improve the 
cooperation between subsidiaries in Europe. A significant step in this direction is the recent 
guideline that aims for consistency on a European level. However, this is more an initiative from 
the subsidiaries rather than the EHQ. Hero is trying to find out how they can apply a local 
success/expertise in a European context. Each subsidiary is going to define a core product group 
which is successful in the host country and has potential to be sold on a larger scale. 
'The Netherlands is the only subsidiary manufacturing cool juices. For this reason they are 
the knowledge-centre for this product within the Hero Group. Thrrelr, re has Hero the 
Netherlands full authority and responsibility to develop a European strategy for this product 
group. 
Monitoring the Internal Environment 
For the European products there is going to be a clear policy with positioning and communication 
guidelines within each subsidiary needs to act. These decisions are made by the HQ and the 
country responsible for the product category on a European level. On the other hand, there are 
many products that have no potential for internationalisation. For these products there are no 
guidelines other than a similar position in the line of Hero brand perception. 
'In the food industry it is of major importance that you sell a variety of products within the 
same range to fulfil the consumer needs. However it is not always possible to market many 
products at the same time. From a retailers perspective the market position you have plays a 
significant role in the possibilities based on the sales potential of a brand. From a consumer 
perspective, it is important that you differentiate from your competitor. First movers' 
advantage is very- important to offer more product variety in the future. ' 
Changes in European market view 
It is expected that on the longer term the Euro will force Hero to standardise strategic issues. 
Several issues have contributed to this decision. First of all there are differences in European 
product standards that do not allow full product standardisation, and therefore are price 
differences acceptable. Secondly, each subsidiary still adds a local element to any Hero product to 
make sure that there are barriers that are difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, these arguments are 
contradicting the previous European viewpoint of product internationalisation. From a European 
level there is an aim to standardise products to a higher degree, despite the European product 
standards. This N\ ill eventually stimulate European thinking and acting as a result of countn 
comparison. 
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`As a direct result of price transparency in Europe, you now get the request from a retailer to 
get a product for the price in Poland, the conditions of Spain and the commercial support of Italy. We need to make sure that we can explain the price differences in Europe.... The Euro 
forces us to think on a European level for these strategic products. That is the issue we are dealing with now. However, no clear decision in relation to this threat has been made vet. Only when this decision is made, we will make specific marketing adjustments. I know that 
this stage will appear sooner or later. ' 
Strategic Reformulation 
The introduction of European product groups is therefore being used to level the brand value in 
Europe. The aim is to influence the local brand perception by adding consistent (European) 
elements to the mix that will harmonise the brand perception to a more consistent European level 
on the long run. Hero is clearly a strategic developing company, who used to be a combination of 
several stand alone companies, and now wants to combine the forces to benefit from each others 
expertise. Despite that these companies are still autonomous in most of the decisions they make; 
there is a move toward European integration on a commercial and a R&D level. Especially the 
concept where one country is responsible for one product group has increased the cooperation on 
a European level. Processes have been started to introduce Hero products which are already a 
success in other countries. To facilitate the European integration, there are now monthly meetings 
to discuss the developments of the European market and the role of each subsidiary in this market. 
In addition, on a equal systematic basis there are projects started incorporating some subsidiaries 
to develop European products. 
`First steps are being taken. We are already discussing how we should differentiate the 
present portfolio to make sure that there is a clear difference in comparison to other 
countries. For example Hero Germany has introduced products that certainly have potential 
in the Dutch market. Then again consumers can compare prices as a result of the Euro, while 
we know that we can not sell the same product at a comparable level as the Germans. Hence 
the Euro improves our strategic visibility. ' 
As previously indicated, Hero aims to achieve a more European approach. One step in this 
direction has already been discussed; a clear focus on fruit related products. Another step is to 
diminish the local brands in Europe and sell everything under the Hero brand name. 
'The Hero brand is the most important asset from a European perspective. Therefore there 
are many guidelines what we are allowed to do with the brand and what not. Especially new 
products need to fit in the Hero brand perception. Moreover, the HQ aims to control the 
product development situation more then they used to do. This is mainly because they try to 
focus on introducing European concepts rather than local concepts at the moment. This does 
not suggest that we can not develop new products, but it does suggest that products with a 
European potential have a privilege above new local concepts. ' 
The international perspective can be related to specific product categories of Hero. Hero is trying 
to find ways how to maximise the synergy in terms of production and distribution, in order to 
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realise growth on a European level. This viewpoint shows that there is a clear move towards 
European thinking. This viewpoint is purely based on the consideration that country expertise 
should be used on a European level. 
Limitations for pan European market approach 
From a European perspective there are three elements that play a significant limit the possibilities 
for Hero. First, Hero does not have the manufacturing facilities to produce internationalised 
products. Secondly, packaging is produced in several countries that have their own demands how 
this packaging should look like. Main factors from this perspective are the size and format of the 
package and the language used on the package that leads to significant product differences. 
Thirdly, and maybe even the most important issue, is the technical possibilities to align the 
process in order to fulfil the needs of consumers that are often different based on local market 
circumstances such as culture and eating habits. A specific process need to be started to fulfil 
these needs. Standardisation from this perspective is difficult to achieve, or will not lead to the 
expected economies of scale. 
`The wish to standardise the products if obviously there, but much needs to be changed to 
realise this. That is why we start with the concepts that are already internationalised. WVe also 
aim to standardise new concepts with a international potential. ' 
Planned articulation of strategic changes 
The European thought has only been established recently. Initial steps in this direction are made 
by developing strategic product categories in Europe. The product categories definition derived 
from a product portfolio analysis among the countries that have their own production facilities. 
Aim of this approach is to find a clearer strategic focus on the four core areas of fruit products, 
muesli bars, baby food and baking aids and to develop leaner European group structures. 
`For each manufacturing country we announced one product categoryfor which this country 
will be responsible in Europe. This responsibility includes that the country itself needs to 
make sure that this product group becomes successful on a European level. ' 
Products need to be put in a local perspective to estimate the sustainability of a specific concept in 
the local market. A concept will only be introduced if the potential [based on research] will 
indicate that Hero will be among the top three producers in a specific segment. This position can 
be interfered by numerous market factors such as market potential, competition, margin 
possibilities, legislation and expected marketing budget. Even so, international products can be 
compared, which makes it dangerous not to have a European marketing system. 
'Our aim is to make sure that we can both work with a national and international product 
portfolio. In addition, internationalising food products is possible to a certain extent. There 
always comes a moment that you reached the taste and eating habits/attitudes boundaries of 
countries. We (Hero Netherlands) expect that the local element will not disappear in the near 
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future. In contrast, knowledge of other countries will be used to introduce new products to the 
Dutch market. This will not make a difference to the Dutch consumer, but it will for the Dutch 
and international retailer. ' 
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Case 7 McCain Foods Ltd. Northern Europe 
Organisational background 
McCain was founded in Florenceville (Canada) in 1957 by the brothers Harrison and Wallace 
McCain. Today, the company is still privately held by the McCain families. From a small scale 
French fries operation the company has become the world leader in the frozen potato industry. 
The McCain group of companies has reported $6.1 billion in international consolidated sales for 
the fiscal year ending June 2002. This is almost one third of the world vide French fries 
production. This makes McCain the world's largest French fries producer, which employs 18,000 
people globally and operates more than 55 food processing plants in 13 countries serving over 
120 countries worldwide. 
European company structure 
McCain is active in all European countries; however they only have production facilities in 
Belgium, France, Poland, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. These production facilities 
produce products for the European market. The French production facilities have a similar role as 
the Dutch facilities and therefore produce for the south European market. Poland does the same 
for Central European market. 
'Holland is a regional base for Northern Europe; France is a regional base for Southern 
Europe; and Great Britain serves the UK. There are great advantages in having such a 
structure across Europe's potato growing region, because if you have a problem in one 
region you can always supply your key customers from another and never let them dotitwn. ' 
The plants are located in strategic countries to serve the other countries in Europe, with the 
exception of the plants in the U. K. which only produce for the British market. The Netherlands is 
the largest producer in Europe, since Holland is a major source of potatoes. This also makes the 
Netherlands the most important European exporter, serving besides the Dutch market; the German 
market, the Scandinavian market, and all southern European countries with the exception of 
France, Spain and Portugal. 
The importance of the European Market 
McCains' first export activities to Europe started in 1965. For over ten years the company sold 
potato products to the United Kingdom only. Nowadays the McCain network is spread all over 
Europe; however the activities exploit in the United Kingdom are still of significant importance to 
the total European business. In terms of turnover it implies that the UK on its own is 17 percent of 
the total turnover of McCain. To point out the significance of this market, Northern Europe 
includino Germany the Benelux and Scandinavia are representing 7 percent of the total turnover. 
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The European market is McCain's largest market after North America. In terms of turno%er this 
implies that 37% of the total is realised in Europe. The importance of the European market is 
based on its selling potential given the cultural habits and the importance of potato products in 
most European countries. This potential was recognised by McCain at an early stage of its 
existence which nowadays results in a long tradition of selling frozen products in this market. 
'I am continually surprised when looking at markets regarded as mature in Europe. One 
would think that England is a mature market. But the growth there, and our share, is venv 
solid. Then when you look across the rest of Europe, say Germany where for years we havvi 
been very successful and have been the market leader by a large margin, consumption is 
nowhere near what it is in Britain. I don't know if Germany will get to the level of the United 
Kingdom in terms of consumption, but the indication is there is lots of scope for greater 
growth. So, at the moment we are working hard to both build the market and our share in 
Germany.... The Dutch subsidiary is the most important European subsidiary in terms of 
European export. This is mainly because there is a lot of high quality raw material available 
in the Netherlands. Therefore we produce about one third of the potato products consumed in 
Europe. ' 
Role in the industry and core business 
McCain manufacturers about a million pounds of potato products every hour. These products 
were initially targeting the caterers in the European market, before expanding into the retail 
market in response to the growing demand for convenience goods. Frozen potato products are still 
targeted to both caterers and consumers. The caterers are the most important target groups in 
terms of turnover in Europe. This position has been strengthened in recent years with the growing 
number of Quick service restaurants. The fastest growth is occurring in the emerging European 
markets such as Southern and Eastern Europe. Almost 35 percent of the European turnover is 
realised by serving these restaurants. 
'In most markets in which we are active, joint businesses have been built in retail and 
foodservice sectors. We try to balance them. The McCain name is advertised and marketed in 
retail, and on the foodservice side we place great emphasis on providing good service to our 
clients. ' 
While frozen potato products is still the core business for both the caterers and the consumer 
market, McCain also produces green vegetables, desserts, pizza, juices and beverages, oven 
meals, entrees and other food products. Nevertheless, almost 90% of the European business 
concentrates on frozen potato products. McCain is overall market leader of frozen potato products 
in Europe. In some small countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium they occupy the second 
position in the market, due to the potato background of these countries and its strong competition 
in these markets as a result of large amount competitors. 
'.... in a number of the European countries we are going head-to-head with Dutch 
com/? t'titors. ' 
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Strategic positioning of Key products 
McCain's strategy was based upon an unchanged mission statement for the past 40 years: 
`McCain will produce products that are of a consistent high quality'. In order to achieve this 
mission, McCain was operating very close with both buyers as well as potato suppliers. MIcCain. 
invested large amounts in the later to make sure that the highest quality for their products can be 
guaranteed. `No matter to what extend our company is operating internationally, the success of 
our business is the result of cooperation with our partners of trade on a local level. ' Therefore, 
the investment made in suppliers was for McCain a key factor in order to realise business groýýth. 
Being a family owned company gained certain advantages that positively influenced the global 
opportunities. McCain worked with a worldwide marketing committee. It got together for the 
purpose of sharing ideas. 
It's no good being a global company if you can't leverage your strengths. We do it hI' 
gathering six or seven people - who are leaders in their function around the world - to let 
them talk. We do it with retail marketing officers. We do it with our manufacturing vice 
presidents, who meet twice a year somewhere in the world - generally at a plant. So, we are 
very much coordinated globally. ' 
A high degree of network integration was possible to a certain extend. Subsidiaries tried to follow 
similar strategies in Europe, however, practice showed that local market circumstances played 
such an important role in strategy formulation and implementation of McCain that cooperation 
limited to advising issues. Integration in this context focused more on improving production 
processes and sharing R&D ideas. From a strategic perspective the integration was on a relative 
low level. 
'In principle titre have the same strategy, however we apply it to the local market which asks 
for alignment of the strategy. Moreover, we are working on a marketing budget basis. You 
can not apply similar marketing in all European markets if this budget is not comparable. 
That is tit'hy you see local advertisement in the major markets, and no advertisement in the 
other markets. From a marketing perspective we all work on local level, pure budget driven. ' 
As McCain's business mission noted, product quality was a key factor to the success of the 
company. Because McCain was dependent upon the raw material available their aim was to 
control this process as much as possible. Therefore McCain employed agronomists and potato 
specialists to assist growers in producing the best potatoes. Main focus was to ensure that 
dependability and consistency of supply and top quality end products for the consumer can be 
guaranteed. In addition, McCain had a large agricultural research team who worked with farmers 
and governments to develop new varieties of potatoes. Above all it was important for McCain that 
they stayed at the leading edge of technology by continuously developing ne\N technologies and 
upgrading machinery. The knowledge and expertise McCain has gained over the Nears 
contributed to their possibilities to develop new products based on the core product; potato. 
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Therefore, McCain has been influential in the development of new sectors within the frozen chips 
market. 
`The biggest success in the past few years has been with Home Fries in the UK, where it is 
brand leader. Our team there has done an outstanding marketing job. Some of the ideas have 
been spread throughout the McCain world. We also have a good range of new products in 
Germany. In France the Smiles product has also done ven- well, and there are a raft of others 
now testing which will soon be launched. ' 
Marketing approach in Europe before the Euro 
Product positioning 
From a process viewpoint, McCain always strived for the best product quality, through upgrading 
the technology of the production. In the last five years McCain invested more that $880 million in 
new plants and upgrades. The results were evident in unsurpassed quality assurance. In addition; 
'McCain's agricultural research teams work with farmers and government agencies to 
develop new varieties of potatoes and new methods of handling and processing to assure 
dependability of supply and product excellence. ' 
While global positioning was a must for McCain, practice showed that the strategy was driven by- 
budget rather than standardisation. McCain's argument was based on consistency in terms of 
product quality. However, it was evident that based on a different marketing budget per country; 
there are significant differences in expressions across Europe. This had an impact on market 
development, market positioning and product success rate. However, its impact was not only 
caused by its internal limitations, external limitations played a similar role. 
Product and promotion standardisation 
There was one major issues that limited the possibilities of product standardisation in Europe; the 
availability of raw material. Each country had its own class of potato with its own `colour, shape 
and taste. ' This caused quality differences in Europe, which coul not be overcome during the 
production of the frozen potato products. Moreover, local consumers had different perceptions 
how the products of McCain should taste based on the different raw material used, but also based 
on a different technological process used to give a particular taste to the product. The promotional 
issues directly related to the product were standardised to a relative high degree. Consistency 
could be found in terms of packaging. The logo, lay-out and colours were standardised, however, 
the product communication was local. This included the product brand-name. 
Distribution standardisation 
McCain products in Europe were sold by large retailers such as supermarkets or frozen products 
specialists. The guideline from a distribution perspective was that retailers should be chosen based 
on their positioning in the market. This would fulfil a certain profile that was in the line of or an 
addition to the McCain brand perception. 
'In principle there are similar retailers in the European market fulfilling the same role, 
however, these retailers do not position in a European way. What you see is that this is 
locally bound, based on the wishes of consumers. On the other hand , vou 
do see European 
concepts that are more successful in one country than in the other. For example a retailer 
such as Aldi is a low profile retailer using a similar concept in more than one European 
country. Although this profile does notfit with our brand vision, we can not avoid this ti pe of 
retailer if they have a very important market position, like Aldi in Germany it'ho represents 
more than 40% of the supermarkets. ' 
Expected impact of the Euro 
Foreseen changes in market environment 
The foreseen impact of the Euro on the business opportunities of McCain was mostly perceived as 
a technical issue rather than a strategic one. From a strategic perspective, some concern has been 
showed from a potential increase of price competition in Europe. 
Foreseen Impact on pricing 
Price competition is very intense in the frozen food sector across Europe. `It's much more price- 
sensitive than one would think. ' While pricing was competition based, the quality of frozen 
product was pretty erratic, due to the existence of many private labels in this sector. McCains' aim 
was to consistently raise the level of quality. Any focus on price rather than product quality works 
against McCains' market approach. Therefore the potential impact of the Euro on price 
competition was being identified as a serious threat. 
'We already identified a trend towards more price competition in the European market as a 
whole. Retailers use this tool much more often to increase or maintain there market share. 
We expect to see this trend developing even more rapidly after the introduction of the Euro. ' 
Strategic Intention 
Despite this concern the Euro has been primary approached as a technical issue. While it was 
expected that the technical implementation would bring some serious problems, the 
implementation was described as `easy. ' McCain found it important to deal with technical issues 
at the first place, so the organisation could get used to the Euro and employees could be trained to 
deal with the Euro to make sure that no other technical problems would occur. 
'The first issue was to make sure we would be ready on time, get people trained and get used 
to the nctit, currency as soon as possible.... we needed to make sure that we could deal with 
Euro's if our customer demanded that. IVe expected that changeover would happen at an 
earlier stage, but it is actually something you see happening now, six months 
before its 
introduction. ' 
From a strategic perspective no issues NNere identified other than 
its potential impact on pricing 
competition. McCain chose not to respond on these speculations, 
instead they preferred to «ait 
and see what was going to happen with the market as soon as the Euro was introduced. Althougli 
McCain foresaw a changing market environment, in particular from a future strategic pricing 
perspective, no significant steps in that direction were undertaken in order to deal ith these 
potential changes. The fact that there was very little known about the Euro ýý ithin the company, 
and that very little official guidance has emerged in day-to-day operations, partly explains the 
wait and see attitude adopted by McCain in relation to the long term Euro strategy. Instead, the 
concentration of the introduction of the Euro was on technical implernentation. From that 
perspective, some guidance has been given to most of the subsidiaries in Europe. This has been 
the result of close cooperation between McCain the Netherlands the EHQ and the Canadian HQ. 
`We believe the close cooperation smoothened the Euro changeover process for the 
company... McCain the Netherlands could give the support to other subsidiaries because o> its 
commitment to the Euro. This is more the result of a long advertising campaign stimulating 
the Euro by the Dutch government, rather than the subsidiary's believe in the Euro..... ' 
Implementation of the Euro 
McCain added the new currency to their IT system in October 2000. The computer intra-network 
of McCain was based on country specific software, with no significant similarities. This reduced 
technical cooperation on a subsidiary level. Instead each subsidiary dealt with technical Euro 
issues individually. No specific guidelines were given by the HQ other than a deadline before 
changeover should have finished. Strategic implementations are limited to the re-calculation of 
prices from guilders to Euro's. A relative simple technique was used to calculate the new price 
levels. Interestingly, from January 2001 the Euro became the leading currency, so prices were 
made Euro-proof and consequently psychologically less acceptable in guilders. McCain did not 
receive any negative response to their chosen strategy. 
`We do not have a final vote in the consumer prices, though we can influence at what level 
the retailer is going to compete. Our early switchover to the Euro did not have any significant 
impact on the consumer prices... ' 
Strategic Evaluation 
Six months after the introduction of the Euro on a consumer's level, McCain claim that no 
significant changes in the frozen potato industry have occurred as a result of this phenomenon. 
McCains' strategy is based on the following perspective: 
'We always try to achieve the goals we and the HQ set in advance. From a subsidiary 
perspective the response on the external environment is simple; trn, not to respond; only if it is 
having a significant impact on the industry we would reconsider our strategy.... But win 
should we, we are seeing excellent growth in Europe. This year has been interesting, 
inasmuch as there have been harsh economic conditions around the world. The Euro has 
fallen lower in relation to other currencies. There has hee ia very low Dutch potato price. 
There have been BSE scares in Europe, and the terrible foot and mouth disease disaster in 
the CUK. Yet, in spite (? l'this, in just about even- single market in ºt hich we are doing business, 
172 
our tonnage is up anyway. Its across the range - potato specialty products as well as french 
fries. That's in a harsh year, so I think we are going to see in future some ver' good results. ' 
McCain sees no need to make any significant adjustments to the present strategy as a direct result 
of the introduction of the Euro. McCain management perceives the Euro as `a pricing issue, 
nothing more and nothing less. ' This viewpoint did not change after the introduction of the Euro. 
The reason why management defines its impact as non significant is based on two different 
elements. Firstly, McCain's objective is to avoid price competition as much as possible, and aims 
to compete on other elements such as unique product quality. 
`McCain is in nine of the ten countries market leader. In most European countries there are 
only two other players and the rest will be private labels that sell their products based on 
price. We will not do that, on the contrary, our product price must indicate the quality we are 
selling. Therefore we are always the most expansive brand in its segment. ' 
The second argument that McCain sees as an important element reducing the potential impact of 
the Euro is the followed product customisation across Euro which makes it difficult to compare 
products and prices. Products are not more customised as a direct result of the introduction of the 
Euro. Management chose to make product comparison more complicated in the early nineties to 
fight the upcoming threat of parallel import in the European countries. 
`McCain products are customised to a relative high extent. This has many advantages, we 
can adopt the products to local market wishes and we can avoid an, ' 
cannibalisation .... 
Customisation happen is several ways, it can either be total product 
adjustments, or just simple techniques such as selling different quantities. ' 
Strategic (re) positioning 
McCain encourages entrepreneurship through autonomous, local management as regional 
executives are responsible for establishing and executing their own strategies as they see fit. `This 
decentralised approach holds bureaucracy at bay and is often seen as the key element to the 
success of McCain'. This is important in relation to the European potato industry as its nature is 
based on local competition, with local players selling private labels. 
'McCain has a local marketing approach. Most European subsidiaries concentrate on 
introducing new product to the local market. Most of the times we need our entire marketing 
budget to promote these products. 
The present strategy to achieve growth is leading the company philosophy and is often put into 
perspective in relation to external market influences, such as the Euro. 
'In relation to the e- tc'rnal factors we ask ourselves to what extend it would have an impact 
on our possibilities of growth in Europe.... the Euro does not influence this what so ever. We 
still see the same possibilities to grow in the existing markets... ' 
Degree of success of strategy 
McCain has had virtually continuous growth and not having to go through the tough times that 
many other companies experienced in the way of restructuring, downsizing, disposal of major 
assets, and so on. When one thing didn't work, McCain could move over to another idea. Onl\, 
early in the company's history there were a few ups and downs. The company on average has seen 
volume double every five years for the past forty-three years. `It gets tougher as the numbers get 
bigger. But then the opportunities get bigger as well, and you can take advantage of it. ' Part of 
the success comes from organic growth, and part comes from acquisition. Acquisitions are 
opportunistic. `You don't just say: I am going to make acquisitions this Year., It depends on if 
good ones are there to consider. One of it factors then taken into account are various economic 
conditions in the world, all of which can have impact on growth. But over the long run it is 
expected that the business will keep growing. 
'Over the forty-three years there have been years when volume or profits have been behind 
what they may have been in the previous four or five years. One year lyou may take a breath 
before surging forward again. That will happen. You can't have a continuous straight line of 
profit growth. The world is not like that due to macro economic factors. But broadly 
speaking, if we could double it again over the next five years from today's base, I think the 
shareholders would be pleased. ' 
Strategic Reformulation 
While McCain stresses that the Euro itself not significantly influence the strategy of the firm in 
the European market, there are certainly some recent market changes as a direct or indirect result 
of the Euro that are welcomed by McCain. Most importantly in this context are the upcoming 
international retailers. 
'People bemoan the fact that there seem to be fewer retail operating companies. I don't see 
what the problem is. Most retail markets are, or are becoming, more concentrated with fewer 
outlets. The big are getting bigger and better. There are some wonderful retail groups around 
the world that are going global. They are good companies. They force us to be more efficient, 
and there is nothing wrong with that. ' 
The potential threat of price transparency is not perceived as such. One argument, product 
customisation, has been discussed previously. Another argument that is reducing this threat for 
McCain is the fact that there are not that many A-brand manufacturers in this industry often gives 
McCain the advantage that retailers, based on a reduced choice, are likely to choose for McCain. 
'the retailers has the poi t'r in terms of what products will be adopted to the assortment on 
the other hand if the retailer is looking for a particular quality, product and them would like to 
add qualim, to this product line then McCain is very often the only option..... 'We like our 
retail business. 11' you are No. 3 in the market maybe you will have a tough time, but if you 
are No. I or, Vo. _' you will tend to survive and 
do grell'. 
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Importance of local market approach 
McCain chooses for a local approach based on our understanding of consumer behaviour which 
is diverse across nations, and even within groups within a nation. We aim to understand this 
diversity and adopt our strategy. ' A modification of promotion is the result of local consumer 
needs which lead to different (localised) products. The result is that McCain advertisement 
concentrates on local product development. Only when this product is adapted to another 
European country then McCain will find out if the promotion concept used in the original country 
is suitable for the other market. 
`In Germany the television commercial shows potatoes served on a diner table with a glass of 
beer nearby. If the same advertisement would be used in France, consumers tit'ould probably 
find it offensive and ineffective, based on the fact that wine is the usual drink in that country. 
Simple elements show that our product is very cultural sensitive. ' 
Planned articulation of strategic future 
'The reason why we choose for this approach is again based on the marketing budget 
available. These budgets are extremely important to our market approach, in other words 
plans will be based on a budget. It is difficult for us (subsidiary) to change the budget based 
on every market change we notice. ' 
The budget driven approach of McCain has certain limitations because it is driven by financial 
issues rather than content issues. The company has a clear goal in what to achieve in Europe and 
how to achieve it. Any external factors that are coming across are viewed as a potential threat and 
from there how they can be reduced so that growth can still be achieved. Marketing from this 
point of view is serving the growth objective, and is therefore often viewed within the company 
from a programme adaptation perspective. The key question for McCain is how the subsidiary can 
make sure that growth is realised within the subsidiary region. Local adaptation and product brand 
awareness are driving this approach based on a country specific budget. The following argument 
explains this statement in more detail; 
'Once a quarter we have a European meeting in which the management control reports 
(MCR) are discussed with the EHQ. These reports include all kind of standard measurements 
such as market share, turnover, profit etc. Underlying statement of McCain in this context is 
if you can 't measure you can 't mange...... we discus the itICR on an individual subsidiary 
basis. If anything is going in the wrong direction than the EHQ advices us how we should 
deal with it temporary. If it turns out to be a long term issue than adjustments will be made by 
the HQ, based on our advice what are the possibilities in the market. ' 
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Case 8 Nestle the Netherlands 
Organisational background 
Nestle the Netherlands is a subsidiary of the Nestle group. world's largest international food 
group with 479 factories and over 230,000 employees worldwide. Nestle directly operates in 88 
countries and sells their products all over the world. This outlines the company's wide 
geographical spread, which has been expanded through both organic growth and numerous 
acquisitions. The Nestle group is controlled by the Nestle SA holding company, based in 
Switzerland. Nestle began in 1867 as a producer of milk and dietetic foods for children. However, 
numerous other food products have been added to the range over the years, and the company is 
now a leading player in the international food industry with a diversified range of food and drink 
related products, as well as pharmaceutical and cosmetics interests. Nestle is in general highly 
acquisitive, which leads to growth in existing business and expansion of the brand portfolio. It 
also creates new business as there is not only a core focus of acquisition activity but also a 
strategic expanding focus. The most common motivations for diversification include growth, 
profitability and risk reduction. Nestle's approaches for increasing growth are geographic 
expansion, innovation and renovation and channel growth. 
One of Nestle's strengths lies in ability to diversify while still maintaining a line of products 
and strategic brands that support the company... Nestle is able to maintain a focused product 
line in those sectors in which it has already invested. ' 
European company structure 
In terms of geographic expansion, the management of Nestle's businesses in the food industry has 
first and foremost concentrated on the European continent. The importance of the European 
market is not only reflected in terms of sales but is also clearly affected by the European origin 
that influences the company policy and decision making processes on a world wide basis. In terms 
of sales Europe accounted for almost 32 percent of the groups' food sales in 2001. The growth of 
the European market is relatively low in comparison with the other zones that are recognised by 
Nestle. 
IVe have a corporate goal to achieve a real internal growth of -1 percent. This goal does not 
apply for Europe. We realise that Europe is much more developed than the other markets we 
operate in. That is why in principle we are happy when we realise a growth of 2 percent. ' 
In addition, Nestle aims to work as decentralised as possible, within the limits imposed by basic 
policy and strategy decisions, as well as group wide need for co-ordination and management 
development. 
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All our research centres, wherever they are, are financed and controlled by the headquarters 
and receive necessary input mainly from the strategic business units, based upon requests 
from the markets. ' 
Importance of Europe from a financial perspective 
The degree of success Nestle has achieved varies among the components of its corporate strategy. 
Overall, Nestle's success can be seen by the profits made on an annual basis. The followinyg table 
give a better insight in the turnover development, the zone development and product group 
development in the 2000 and 2001. In this table it can be found that sales are growing while 
earning are slightly decreasing. This is the result of an increasing competition in Europe which 
can be seen in the sales-result relation from this zone. Moreover, the beverage product group, 
which is the most profitable group of Nestle, is more successful in zone Americas than in Europe. 
t aoie u-i: ivestie saies result in 
Net Sales (in millions of CHF) 
Sales 
Luuu- 
2001 
84698 
Luui per r 
2000 
81422 
egion anu 
% of sales 
001 
per prouuct 
%of sales 
2000 
group 
results 
2001 
results 
2000 
Earnings before interest 12444 12516 14.7 15.4 
Net Profit 6681 5763 7.9 7.1 
Sales per region-' 
Zone Europe 26742 26285 31.6 32.3 2783 2753 
Zone Americas 26598 25524 31.4 31.3 3531 3503 
Zone Asia, Oceania and Africa 15458 15710 18.2 19.3 2598 2673 
Other activities 15900 13903 18.8 17.1 2149 2015 
Sales per product group 
Beverages 24023 23044 28.3 28.3 4259 4318 
Milk pro., nutrition, ice cream 22953 21974 27.1 27.0 2572 2620 
Prepared dishes, cooking aids, pet 21324 20632 25.2 25.3 2026 1948 
Chocolate and biscuits 11244 10974 13.3 13.5 1234 1 166 
Pharmaceutical products 5154 4798 6.1 5.9 1255 1212 
Source: Nestle A nnual report 2001 
Role in the industry and core business 
Nestle bears its activities in Europe towards both the consumer market and the professional 
market. The marketing of consumer products is organised in five product groups; Drinks, Dairy 
products (dietetic products and ice cream), Culinary products, chocolate and sweets, 
Pharmaceutical products (mainly baby food). Not all the products in this group are 
internationalised. On the contrary, most Nestle brands (approximately 3,050) are sold locally. 
With a product port folio of more than 9,000 items worldwide represents a wide range of 
products. Among these products are several brands and concepts that stand out because of their 
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international performance. Moreover the subsidiary is free to develop products. This might be on 
the level that a particular strategic brand is not introduced in a particular country, but instead an 
alternative product is introduced. If any local product becomes successful then the European SBU 
will try to find ways to introduce the product on a larger scale54. In other words, the combination 
of two elements are predominantly important in the decision making model of Nestle: the local 
market circumstances and the local R&D. 
'Local product innovation is extremely important. Each subsidiary is given enough space to 
develop and improve this element. Only if it is successful in one country products will be 
introduced on a larger scale. If this is the case, we will tni" to produce efficiently on a 
European level. In a meeting of marketing managers the possibilities for a particular concept 
in other countries are being discussed. If it is agreed that there are possibilities then the 
positioning, packaging, logo etc. are developed by the SB U. ' 
Strategic Brands 
Nestle has a variety of brands representing the different product sectors in which it operates. 
Nestle's six strategic brands include Nestle, Nescafe, Nestea, Button], Maggi, and Friskies. The 
most successful brands in terms of sales are Nescafe and Kit Kat. 
European management approach 
In 1997, Nestle established a four-pillar strategy to improve all aspects of business, from the 
supply chain to consumers. This strategy should act as an inspiration for day to day management 
within Nestle, to continue to seek to deliver improving profitability and increasing sales growth. 
The four pillars include innovation and renovation, consumer communication, product 
availability, and operational efficiency. Innovation and renovation was mainly implemented 
through marketing and R&D. Within this strategic pillar, synergies were created so that 
inventions are applied across diverse product lines. The strategy to maintain consumer 
communication focused on building brand loyalty. Product availability, which is motivated by 
maximizing sales, is realised by ensuring the distribution of the best products for consumers. 
Nestle's strategic priorities were focused on delivering shareholder value through the achievement 
of sustainable, capital efficient and profitable long term growth. Nestle's vision to achieve this 
continuous growth was based on two elements; high quality standards and a continued 
strengthening of the brand portfolio. `For the later the Nestle group needs to invest heavily, which 
has been a strong point of the firm for a long time. 
5' In this table the sum of the region result is not the same as the sum of product group results. This is the 
result of capital investment in Europe and zone Americas, which is included in the former and not in the 
latter. 
i. e. Kit Kai Chunky was de', eloped in the UK five years ago, and is since this year available on a 
international level 
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1estle was a company that in principal worked on a local level, and believed it needed to be close 
o the local consumer. This most clearly reflected in the decentralised approach Nestle set up as 
. arly as 1865. Each subsidiary was responsible for its own achievements. ': Nestle only provides 
he tools to work with. ' However, there has been a changing situation where the HQ aimed to 
; ontrol more than R&D alone. Financial aspects, such as decisions about how a company Xý as 
'nanced, branding, quality management and certain core competences were directly controlled by 
he HQ. 
`We don't do corporate level strategic planning in a separate corporate planning department. 
Instead, we use a combination of bottom-up and top down approaches in markets, regions, 
and strategic product groups.. What you see is that this communication is getting more and 
more important. In the past we were only reporting financial issues, while now adal s AWL' 
present complete plans which are discussed in detail with several other business units. 
'Marketing approach in Europe before the Euro 
Product positioning 
1estle approached the European business opportunities no different then other regions around the 
; lobe. Nestle's aim was to maintain a business strategy based on long term sustainability. In 
)ther words a similar approach was used in any European country where Nestle was active taken 
nto account the local legislation, cultural and religious practices. These guidelines were all 
lescribed in Nestle's corporate business principles, which are used to create similar 
-esponsibilities and values. These basic rules were developed to make sure that the highest 
; tandards of conduct were aimed for. Most important issues from a European viewpoint were 
nnovation and operational efficiency. In all European countries there was the aim to innovate in 
iew products and technologies to meet the needs of the consumers in a sustainable manner. 
While the business principles in Europe were similar, there were numerous local drivers that had a 
ignificant impact business approach. Most important from this perspective were the many 
; onflicting legal requirements. Nestle continued to maintain its commitment to follow and respect 
Il applicable local laws in each of the European countries. Therefore there were often limitations 
br pan-European business approaches as a result of the present low degree of law harmonisation. 
'Certain local restrictions are another local driver. This also explains the danger of using a 
centralised approach, you will end up with either a customised product or a product that is 
opposite to our business philosophy of fulftlling the local consumer wishes. 
since the four pillar strategy has been introduced in 1997, more thought has been given ho« to 
ptimise the European growth and margin through focus and concentration. No significant 
hanges on an external level regarding competiti\ e advantages creation took place, however, 
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lore focus has been given how to optimise European opportunities for strategic brands by 
ptimising internal aspects. 
'roduct and promotion standardisation 
ýs soon as consumer similarities were found, a European approach would be followed in terms of 
, roduct and promotion standardisation. Brands with a similar image needed to be positioned in 
he same way. Nestle aimed to standardise the marketing mix elements for this type of product. 
\Ithough, for other global brands such as Magie the guidelines were less detailed. Despite you 
ee similar promotional issues such as the same logo, packaging colours etc., clear differences can 
ýe found in product contents and advertising message. 
'The brand philosophy of Nestle is simple; it is ideal to have a strategic brand, but if the local 
consumer wishes are different than you are forced to position this brand differently in this 
country ..... 
Standardising promotional elements is important from an efficiency perspective. 
We aim to have the same handling during the production process, so titwe can optimise the 
costs. It also allows us to produce the same packaging in the same factoryfor more regions. 
But if there are local market wishes such as a different format like 100 grams instead of 150 
grams than we will fulfil these wishes.... ' 
)istribution standardisation 
Jsing the same (European) retailer was not excluded in Nestle's distribution policy, aim was to 
ºegotiate with these retailers on a local level. On a European level, the aim was to avoid retailers 
hat might had a negative impact on the Nestle brand. However, this policy could not always be 
Ldopted. 
'rice standardisation 
lestle used a local market based pricing concept to price their products and be competitive on a 
ocal level. Prices were the result of market circumstances, and price competition with similar 
)rands was often not being avoided. 
' If hat you seen in Europe are enormous consumer price differences which most of the time is 
the result of a different margin expectation of the retailer. We can try to influence the 
consumer price, but will never succeed for the fill hundred percent. We do not have the 
power to do so. ' 
Expected impact of the Euro 
oreseen changes in market environment 
4estle saw the Euro merely as a technical issue that `needed to be otiercome'. The only direct 
elationship made with strategic issues was its potential impact on pricing related elements. Most 
mportantly from this viewpoint was the relative low expected impact of the Euro on the pricing 
, olicy of Nestle. 
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`When you take a closer look at who is making the consumer price decision, then you will 
realise it is not often Nestle, but more often the retailer. Nestle obviously has a vote in %t'hat is 
going to happen with the prices, however, the final consumer price is set by the retailer. ' 
resides dealing with the Euro from a technical perspective, Nestle also welcomed the Euro from a 
uying perspective as they saw clear opportunities to benefit from the Euro to optimise cost 
fficiency on a large European scale. 
'This has led to a review of the existing buying process, we try to optimise cooperation in 
order to benefit fully.... ' 
l oreseen Impact on pricing 
The approach taken by Nestle to pricing related issues was to a,. oid that the Euro would have an 
rnpact on the pricing policy. According to Nestle this could be accomplished by minimising the 
rnpact of the Euro on the existing margin. While retailers could then still use the Euro to change 
he final consumer prices, it would not influence the strategy of Nestle. This strategy was possible 
follow as Nestle did not use psychological price setting techniques to sell their products. 
For its it is only a recalculation of prices to another currency. This will not influence our 
margin as we will not change our price at all. ' 
also from a price differences perspective in the European market, the company did not expect 
hat the Euro would lead to significant changes of buying behaviour of their customers. In this 
espect it was noted that many factors influence the price setting of Nestle products and often 
, rice differences are unavoidable and therefore easy to explain. From this perspective it was 
nentioned that margin expectation is one explanation of price differences, distribution costs, 
urrency risks, production efficiency, product standardisation are just some other aspects that had 
significant impact on price differences in Europe for Nestle products. 
'There are price differences for comparable products, but itwe think that these are acceptable 
in Europe. What bothers us are not the international price differences, because these are 
explainable, the problem is the local price differences for our products. We aim to control 
these, however that is not always possible. ' 
strategic Intention 
ýt an early stage of the Euro adaptation process the company realised that pricing issues stiere 
elatively easy to overcome and could even be ignored. This approach led to three different issues 
i relation to the Euro that needed to be dealt with. First, and most importantly, were the 
Jentification and implementation of technical issues such as IT changes and accounting issues. 
econd, was when the introduction of the Euro to the company and their customers should take 
lace. From this perspective a distinction has been made between the introduction on an internal 
, vel and on a customer level. Finally a strategic moment needed to be chosen NN hen to 
hanoeov er to the Euro on a consumer level. 
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Waking the Euro leading by introducing psychological Euro prices on a consumer level at 
an early stage does not make sense. We prefer to wait as long as possible before making the 
Euro leading on a consumer level. ' 
'he planning process of Nestle in relation to the Euro also reflects their chosen standpoint in 
elation to the potential impact of the new currency. Therefore, from a corporate perspecti\ e, 
mphasis was given on the technical problems that were faced as a result of the Euro adaptation. 
the software that was used by Nestle was identical at all European subsidiaries, so change over to 
he Euro was organised by the HQ, while subsidiaries were free to choose a moment to implement 
t, however not later than January 2001. 
`No guidelines were given by the Headquarters, other than final dates for implementation and 
more technical related issues.... ' 
Implementation of the Euro 
Jestle the Netherlands chose to introduce the Euro internally as soon as possible to 'get used to 
he new currency in terms of accounting'. The possibility to invoice and pay in guilders for their 
; ustomers was still there till the official changeover in July 2002. However, Nestle the 
Jetherlands stimulated their customers to invoice in Euro at the earliest convenient date. 
strategic Evaluation 
\fter the introduction of the Euro, the potential impact of the new currency became more 
ransparent. As a result standardising the price element for strategic brands in Europe to a higher 
legree has become particularly important, because it was found that both national and 
nternational retailers started to compare prices across borders. Price differences for strategic 
)rands are being avoided for two reasons. Firstly, price differences need to be explainable and 
acceptable for retailers otherwise it will harm the negotiation position of Nestle which might lead 
.o margin reduction. Secondly, large price differences endanger the possibility to re-import 
)roducts. This can be avoided if similar price arrangements are made across countries. 
Strategic (re) positioning 
['he two arguments present the most significant direct and indirect impact of the Euro for Nestle. 
-rom a direct impact perspective, Nestle has the same opinion about the Euro as before its 
ntroduction. 'We did not foresee a strategic impact of the Euro in the past, and we do not foresee 
one now. ' Nestle's aim has always been to make sure that all rules set by the consumers' 
)rganisation and governments are being obeyed so no additional problems would occur, so the 
uro can be seen as just another currenci'' for Nestle. 
is, 
'We did not do anything with our pricing strategy to make sure we did not ignore and rule set by any organisation.... we did not misuse the Euro to implement price changes.... ' 
rom an indirect impact perspective, Nestle's has always been very careful v ith setting up 
, uropean contracts with international retailers. This approach has been based on the fact that they 
re afraid that European negotiations might lead to lower margins. 
'Setting up a European contract will cut our margin, given the negotiating power of the 
international retailer. ' 
lowever, there are significant changes in the market environment that oblige Nestle to respond. 
`A international retailer such as Ahold is smart enough to use their power to make its think 
how to do business on a European level. Of course there can be a win-win situation there, but 
I we believe that we will harm our position if we start negotiating on a European level...... we 
often get threats from these retailers that they will not do any business in the future if we do 
not change the current situation. Ue need to respond, but how is not vet clear..... . 
strategic Reformulation 
`We as Nestle Holland have on/, guidelines how to operate within a specific product 
portfolio. In principle we are free to develop, change or extent this portfolio, as long as we 
stick to the guidelines of this specific brand. So in a way you see a clear European business 
strategy, however, it is very flexible to marketing it your wary. ' 
'he response to the market changes has been twofold. From a European perspective there is the 
wish to Europeanise the strategic concepts to a higher extend, while on a local level the 
ubsidiaries prefer to fulfil the local consumer wishes. 
mpact on network integration 
)eveloping a European campaign for most brands causes friction between the HQ and 
ubsidiaries. Subsidiaries are used to a certain freedom of business with clear guidelines, and are 
ven sceptical about the potential of European marketing programmes as they are set up by the 
; uropean SBU's. The belief of this type of programmes is modest based on previous European 
allure of similar concepts. 
'Some years ago, a CEO Manager aimed to standardise all marketing elements of the 
Nescafe original product. After the development of the advertising campaign the first protests 
started, simply because the positioning of the Nescafe brand is not similar in all countries. 
This can either be the result of culture, consumer preference or product customisation that 
took place in the past.... this is not something you change from one day to the other-As it is 
difficult to predict in advance how successful a European approach for a certain concept tit'ill 
be, the first step that is done as soon as the results are available is tying to improve them by 
adding local advertising campaigns. ' 
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he conviction of the HQ to focus more on internationalisation of concepts to realise gromh will 
-rtainly have an impact on the network integration. As previous attempts have shown limited 
access, the European SBU's now see it as a key issue towards growth in the European market. 
`What you see is that recently more and more issues are centralised in order to improve the 
European policy. ' 
he small changes in the matrix structure of the organisation have flatten European organisation 
umponents in which a few layers of management have a large span of control. Europe is being 
, en as one market managed by zone (European) managers. Each division works in close 
ooperation with these European managers to find out to what extent global strategies can be 
nplemented. All technological tools are available to optimise the relationship between 
ubsidiaries. Aim is to share information in order to overcome inefficiency. Therefore, close 
ooperation is focussing on a product management level and on a marketing level. 
`This is the advantage of being such a large company; many concepts are already developed 
so there is no need to do it again. That is why Nestle S. A. stimulates regular meetings to 
create new ideas. ' 
resides that the steps undertaken are driven by European growth, it is also stressed that a more 
fficient European network will solve other strategic problems faced by Nestle. Top management 
vould like to turn its large size into strength and eliminate liabilities associated with overcapacity. 
ýs a result, Nestle is using its current array of brands and products as a strength against 
ncontrolled growth and overcapacity accumulation. The company has had difficulty in doing 
his, particularly in Europe where employees have formed unions making cutbacks to the labour 
Drces a difficult task. Emphasising more on existing strategic concepts, also suggests that other 
oncepts need to be cut back, to make sure Nestle is operating in its core business. 
'lanned articulation of strategic changes 
ncreasing efficiency in Europe has been one of most important topics since 2001. With the aim to 
ncrease internal efficiency, Nestle introduced GLOBE, a programme that is intended to enhance 
, erformance and efficiency in all geographic areas where Nestle operates in order to better 
ompete. GLOBE aims to standardise information systems and all master data to streamline the 
eternal organisation. In addition, another programme has been set up to optimise the competitive 
, osition in Europe by reducing the complexity of the network. First steps in this direction were 
he addition of European zone managers, while in the future other elements will be added to 
latten the organisation to a higher degree. 
)rganisational change is the main steps to improve the European competitive position. With the 
dded dimensions to the organisation the decisions of a subsidiary are now influenced by se` oral 
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: eels. First of all are the targets set by the HQ, which are often the financial issues. Second. the 
, uropean managers put this in a European perspective and give more detailed budgets hoxý to 
chieve a particular goal. More in relation to marketing strategies is the interference of the third 
; vel, the SBU of a particular product. On the other they give clear definitions of product related 
; sues such as packaging, logo and image they want to achieve. 
`We as Nestle Holland have no vote in decisions made for strategic brands such as Kit Kat. 
We simply need to follow the rules set up by the SBUfor that particular product. ' 
'hese SBU units are also responsible for the consistency of strategic brands on a European level. 
Therefore, reporting plans and development for these products is extremely important. In order to 
chieve consistency these SBU's try to control the external environment in close cooperation with 
he local managers. 
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Chapter Five: 
T° analysis 
Phe analysis comprises two chapters; a T° analysis which examines the situation before the 
ntroduction of the Euro and a T' analysis which examines the same situation after the 
ntroduction of the Euro. The current chapter involves the To analysis. This chapter is divided into 
hree sections; the identification of the European positioning, the definition of sensemaking 
lirection dependency, and the interpretation and development of the intended Euro strategy. 
Fhe first part will serve as a starting point to find the extent to which the companies have a 
3uropean strategy and translated this into marketing actions before the introduction of the Euro. 
n this part, cross comparison and preliminary analyses are made to compare and contrast 
imilarities and differences to assess the firms so they can be positioned in the T° matrix 
ccurately. In doing so, three sub-parts are defined to accurately position the firms in each 
ndustry based on the within case analysis definition of T° to finally make the comparison 
Between both industries. 
'he second part will look at sensemaking of managers under the condition of equivocality. We 
re particularly looking for evidence in terms of processes that stimulate the sensemaking of the 
nanager to potentially treat the Euro as a technical issue, a strategic issue, or a combination of 
pese two. The outcome of this analysis will provide a path of dependency indicator that defines 
he extent to which actors are guided in terms of European thinking which is based around the 
; sue of coordination on a European level. 
lased on the first two parts the third part will identify the extent to which managers reveal 
ensemaking taking place on a higher level in relation to the Euro, which is translated into steps 
lat are undertaken to understand the potential impact of the Euro. The outcome will distinguish 
free distinctive strategic options [levels of commitment] of managerial interpretation how to deal 
iith the potential impact of the Euro. 
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5.1 Cross CE case comparison of European positioning T° 
5.1.1 European portfolio 
% European orientation of the product portfolio indicated the extent to which firms identified 
similar opportunities in Europe. The firms differed significantly in terms of portfolio spread in 
Europe. The widest spread was found at Philips and Sharp, while Pioneer and Kenwood operated 
with a smaller portfolio in this market. In case of the Japanese firms Xý e saw a product dri\cn 
approach based on the development of the products which took place in Asia. Who vas making 
he decision where these products should be sold significantly influenced the consistency of the 
uropean portfolio. In case of Sharp this decision was made by the Japanese management ýýho 
vere advised by the EHQ. The sales potential was often based on market structure and market 
; ize. The local management could not significantly influence what was going to be sold in their 
. ountry. 
%t Pioneer and Kenwood, the local management had a significant vote in the decision making 
)rocess. Although one would expect portfolio differences as a result of the more autonomous 
ipproach, this was only the case at Pioneer, and even in a very limited scale. What it implied was 
hat Pioneer subsidiaries had some small differences in what portfolio products they would adopt. 
; mall differences in portfolio could also be the result of product fine-tuning on a local level. At 
(enwood the choice what to adopt was not significantly different across the European 
, ubsidiaries as they saw a similar potential for the products in their country. At Philips, by 
: ontrast, the consumer was more often taken into account when the European potential was 
lefined. In recent years the company considerably lowered the degree of product variation within 
ach product group to create a consistent portfolio in Europe. To sum up, Philips, Kenwood, and 
ioneer showed small differences in Europe whereby Pioneer had some differences that occurred 
lue to product adjustments that were made to some products on a local level. The lowest degree 
f European portfolio similarity was found at Sharp. 
L1.2 European production: network integration 
)ifferences in the product portfolio were not necessarily the result of strategic choices made by 
le companies. It was not always possible to produce the products on a large scale as the result of 
mitation in production facilities, the technological possibilities to produce on a large scale, or the 
ecessarv European product adjustments. The companies invested heavily in technological 
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ntensity to improve the extent of proprietary technology aiming to produce in as least facilities as 
possible. This allowed them to reduce costs and control the quality of the production, and on the 
ether hand it increased global integration. 
X11 companies produced global products as a result of the production investments: however, not 
ill global production could be sold as it was in European countries. Most products needed some 
echnological adjustments to meet the local requirements. Important factor of adjustment 
iecessity was the location of the production facility. Products that were produced in Europe often 
lid not require adjustments, while products produced elsewhere needed to be adjusted if this 
nterfered with the consumer experience. Kenwood particularly faced this problem as all products 
vere produced in Asia. Sharp products were also produced in Asia, and so were the majority of 
'ioneer products. These companies faced a significant increase in costs when the adjustments 
seeded to be made afterwards. For Pioneer and Sharp this led to small scale European production, 
vhile it also reduced the European potential for some products produced by these companies. 
'hilips had production facilities that were producing for the EU only, which lowered the number 
)f adjustments that needed to be made. 
5.1.3 European Sourcing and Benchmarking 
Phe continuous search of the companies to reduce costs illustrated the pressure for cost reduction 
n this industry. Cost reduction was seen as benefiting from global sourcing opportunities such as 
ow factor cost locations or exploiting economies of scale. Both issues imposed a need for global 
ntegration. From this perspective the Japanese cases were less integrated than the European one. 
, his difference was caused through the location of the production facilities. Whereas Kenwood 
-ould benefit from low labour costs in Asia, so could Philips in Eastern Europe. The potential 
ºenefit for Kenwood was often minimised as a result of the additional costs of transport and 
import) taxes. Pioneer and Sharp were often in the same situation; however, they sometimes 
ould manage to produce the products in Europe which significantly lowered the additional costs. 
>. 1.4 Identification of a European consumer 
1s previously pointed out, selling similar products in the European market could be a product 
evelopment decision. On the other hand the decision could be the result of the identification of 
imilar consumer wishes. The segmentation policy therefore aimed to find out if the firms saw 
ny possibilities to group consumers of various European countries in a similar «a` . 
Based on the 
utcome, the complexity or simplicity of the firms' understanding and definition of the European 
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)nsumer could be analysed. These revealed that for all four cases guidelines were set up how the 
)nsumer should be approached. However there were significant differences in the extent to 
'hich these guidelines were implemented. This resulted in the fact that Philips was the only 
ampany that successfully identified global segments by focussing on consumer experiences and 
nowledge. In addition to this identification there was a strict policy how the guidelines should be 
nplemented by the subsidiary. 
he other firms chose for a product bound segmentation technique that focussed on the price 
wareness of consumers and the importance of product features and design. There Ný ere 
ignificant differences to what extent these guidelines were implemented by the subsidiary. For 
lost products this meant that segmentation was the result of local decisions. There were some 
xceptions at Sharp who successfully introduced European products with strict guidelines; 
owever the majority of the Sharp products did not follow similar rules. It can therefore be 
oncluded that Pioneer and Kenwood did not have a definition of a European consumer, while 
harp showed some notion of a European consumer. According to the identification of Philips the 
', uropean consumer met the picture of the global consumer so a global segmentation technique 
ould be applied. 
º. 1.5 European product positioning 
'he existence of a European product portfolio and the extent to which a European consumer 
egmentation policy was followed were two important elements that helped to understand the 
roduct positioning similarities and differences of the firm. Positioning strategies can be 
haracterised as attempts to move a brand to a particular location within a perceptual product 
pace. The location (actual or desired) of a brand in the perceptual" space portrays the image of a 
rand vis-ä-vis its competitive alternatives. Significant differences in this positioning can be the 
ýsult of within country differences [i. e. product portfolio] and across country differences [i. e. 
'ifferent substitutes]. Sharp most clearly struggled with the product portfolio differences that 
aused a different perception within the country as the portfolio contained low profile products 
aced on selling similar products at a competitive price and high end products based on a 
istinctive technology and innovative product features. The concentration on low profile products 
1 the past still negatively influenced the brand perception at present. Moreover, the shift in 
Positioning is viewed from the intended product position and country stereo typing. Stereo ty ping is how 
le consumer is 'biased' and 'colours' believe, which 
is causing a difference in perceived positioning. 
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)roduct portfolio was happening at a different speed in Europe. This led to significant differences 
n brand-perception for Sharp. 
or Pioneer some European positioning differences occurred as a result of the product 
ustomisation. However the customisation took place on such a small scale that the overall effect 
vas not significant. Pioneer, like Kenwood, had more trouble dealing with the distribution 
hannel differences in Europe. This clearly limited the sales opportunities for more advanced 
)roducts both within countries as across countries. Both companies aimed to positioning products 
it certain channels that fitted the brand positioning. Specialist retailers were often interpreted as 
idding value to the product and were therefore preferred above other channels. Philips on the 
)ther hand did not experience positioning consistency problems in Europe. Channel consistency 
as being searched for by selling identical products via identical channels. A lower availability of 
; hannels limited the sales possibility for a particular product in a particular country. Philips 
)referred to accept this rather than selling similar products via different channels. In this way 
)ositioning confusion in Europe could be minimised and consumer expectations could be tilled in 
i consistent method. 
5.1.6 European competition 
kll four companies pointed out that they were only competing with multinational competitors. 
ionsequently, the presence of multinational competitors called for global coordination. While 
'hilips was concerned about the increase of competition in recent years on a global level, the 
Japanese companies only discussed this from a local perspective. Technological differentiation 
vas becoming more difficult for all four players. This increased the focus on price competition 
significantly in most product segments. Pioneer and Kenwood aimed to escape the price 
: ompetition. They partly succeeded based on the brand image, while Philips focussed on product 
eatures if possible. Sharp on the other hand had been focusing on price competition in the past 
, ears and now aimed to focus more on technological differences. 
5.1.7 European marketing actions 
ýs pointed out in the European strategy analysis, the companies operate within certain path of 
lependency. The number of possibilities are often based on the degree of centralisation that could 
ie found within the firm in relation to marketing decisions. For each of the firms there was a lo« 
egree of product customisation, as most products were the result of global/European production 
, aced on product developments that were 
designed for global consumers. Pioneer as the onI} 
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ase that showed some degree of product customisation, however, on a ver' limited scale. From 
his perspective it can be concluded that all cases were selling similar products in Europe. 
)ifferences only occurred as a result of product portfolio differences, indicating a high degree of 
, roduct standardisation for all producers. 
4oreover, the products sold were all sold under the same global name that was communicated 
hrough the same communication tools56. This indicated an initial high level of promotion 
tandardisation for all four cases. However, there were small differences to vvhat extent the 
promotion was standardised. Philips and Pioneer used exactly the same tools and message in 
; urope to create brand consistency. No local promotion was allowed, and adjustments to the 
ommunication could only be made in terms of language. Sharp followed a similar approach, but 
. 
flowed subsidiaries to add local advertisements to the existing global communication, indicating 
lower degree of promotion consistency. Kenwood on the other hand did not have a global 
dvertising programme and therefore fully depended on the campaigns set up on a local level, vet 
vith global guidelines. 
; ignificant differences in standardisation could be found in the pricing element. Philips could not 
. void 
have small price differences in Europe as the result of local market competition. I lowever, 
he multinational always aimed to minimise the price differences by controlling the European 
Bandwidth. In this way extreme price differences were avoided. The opposite was true for Sharp. 
'his company focussed with 70 percent of their portfolio on price competition, by selling bellow 
he market average. Although they have been trying to improve this situation, it could not be 
. voided that the price 
image limited the possibilities of portfolio upgrading in the Netherlands. 
: enwood and Pioneer aimed to avoid price competition as much as possible. For Kenwood this 
vas because they were not capable of competing on price due to the limitations faced in the 
; lobal sourcing opportunities in comparison to other players in the market. Pioneer tried to 
iaintain a brand image in Europe and found it inappropriate to compete on price. Nevertheless, 
Dr some products the situation could not be avoided for both Kenwood as well as Pioneer. This 
, suited in significant price differences in Europe. For these two players the differences of 
istribution structure in Europe was creating a particular focus on price. Limited availability of 
pecialist retailers forced these companies to sell via other channels as well. This often meant a 
iercer competition With more difficulty to distinguish the product. Philips and Sharp could avoid 
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his situation to a certain extent as their portfolio was w% ]der spread. From this point of % le%w tile 
listribution standardisation for Philips is high, while it was for Sharp slightly lox%er. This was the 
"esult of the bargaining power of the retailer, which was based- on the market share of the 
; ompany and in case of Sharp this was also based on the product quality and image. This limited 
he distribution opportunities for Sharp. 
5.2 Cross Food case comparison of European positioning T° 
5.2.1 European portfolio 
['he investigated food multinationals showed similarity in the orientation of the product portfolio 
n Europe. However, there was clear differentiation to what extent the product concept needed to 
)e adapted to the local market. From this perspective, Nutricia and McCain sold similar products 
; oncepts and customisation was done in terms of content variation and product line extensions. 
Be wide spread in the portfolio of Nestle led to different degrees of customisation, which varied 
-rom almost no customisation for strategic, internationalised product concepts to local products 
; old under the Nestle brand. This latter approach was also adopted by Hero, who produced and 
; old products on a local level using the Hero brand name. Differences in product portfolio were 
therefore the result of differences in market potential identification, the choice to make 
adjustments to meet local needs, and the requirements for product adjustments to meet local 
; overnment demands. 
5.2.2 European production: Network integration 
the significant differences in product portfolio consistency and the degree of customisation 
applied to many products sold by the firms lowered the possibilities to use the same production 
acilities. On the contrary, to produce local products it was often found important that these 
)roducts were produced on a local level. While this led to significant local cost advantages, it was 
also the result of the extent to which it was possible to make product adjustments afterwards. 
['herefore subsidiaries were almost always accompanied with at least one local production 
'acility. However, this did not suggest that all products were produced on a local level. Nestle 
Limed to produce internationalised concepts in as least facilities as possible, and therefore showed 
ome degree of European production. The highest extent of global technology usage could be 
. ound at McCain who produced all European products at four different production countries 
pread across Europe to serve the Northern, Eastern and Southern part of Europe. These facilities 
5 I. e. logo, colours, structure etc. 
ý ýý, 
sere capable of producing large scales of customised products. The production capacity was the 
lost important limiting factor for Hero to use facilities abroad. While, in the case of Nutricia for 
ome product standards a combination could be made which meant that concepts were produced 
t one facility and customised at a local facility. What x Ne therefore could see in the European 
ood industry is that the four cases to a different extent made use of Pan-European production. 
;. 2.3 European Sourcing and Benchmarking 
he local production, the wide spread product portfolio and the high degree of product 
ustomisation often found in the food industry were only some of the limiting factors to benefit 
. rom global sourcing advantages. Local advantages such as speed of delivery, low transportation 
osts, and accurate production often outweighed the potential benefits of economies of scale and 
ow labour costs. European sourcing benefits were therefore often searched in terms of production 
)rocess advantages, by using similar techniques and expertise in multiple countries. Nevertheless, 
s has been pointed out in the European production section, the companies still manage to benefit 
"rom global sourcing advantages to a certain extent. This was particularly important for McCain, 
Nho based its market position on producing the highest quality at the lowest price by focussing on 
post reductions as the result of combined production efforts. To a more limited degree this was 
ilso true for Nestle who produced under the same circumstances. Nestle could also benefit from 
ts enormous investments it made in production facilities on both a global and local level, which 
-nabled the firm to benefit from large scale production benefits on both levels. Nutricia's product 
portfolio allowed some European production which created cost reductions. For Hero none of 
these benefits could be gained on a European level. However, local production often took place 
in 
one facility which minimised the local costs to the highest possible extent. All 
four producers 
zould benefit from cost reductions in comparison to local competitors. 
5.2.4 Identification of a European consumer 
In the food industry firms found it often complicated to group consumers of various European 
countries in a similar way. Clear limitation for doing so could be 
based on the complexity caused 
by significant differences in culture, which often was related to the 
food consumption habits. 
Despite the fact that the MNE succeeded to sell similar concepts in the European countries, 
it has 
previously been pointed out that there are significant 
differences of product consistency in 
Europe. Targeting similarities could therefore be defined as finding a consumer with a similar 
interest in Europe. This could be accounted for all investigated companies. As soon as the product 
concepts were comparable to a 
higher degree then the companies choose to sell these products in 
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more consistent way. This was particularly the case at Nestle, and to a lower extent at Nutricia. 
, onversely, Hero and McCain did not follow any segmentation guidelines, but consumer 
argeting similarities were more the result of product positioning aims. From this perspective it 
an be concluded that none of the four firms formulated a definition of a European consumer. The 
firms chose the follow a local product bound segmentation technique that significantly differed 
[cross countries and product groups. 
5.2.5 European product positioning 
nterestingly, the four companies were trying to sell their products in a consistent manner in 
, urope by aiming for a similar product positioning. Nevertheless there stiere different levels in 
vhat extent the companies expressed this European positioning. The most coordinated approaches 
: ould be found at Nestle who offered several global concepts that were accompanied with clear 
uidelines how and where to sell the products in the subsidiaries country. Similar guidelines were 
etup for the local produced products; however, these were not as strict as for the global concepts. 
ositioning from this point of view aimed at consistency in terms of brand communication and 
)roduct quality to associate Nestle with a particular product standard. McCain setup similar 
uidelines to sell their products which were often relatively simple to adapt in a particular market 
tructure due to the small number of A-brand competitors represented in this sector. This gave 
vIcCain a comfortable position which enabled the company to create a consistent positioning 
)olicy. Nutricia also positioned most of their products according to guidelines which were 
brmulated by the PMO organisations of the company. Hero, by contrast, did not work according 
o guidelines. Instead the company had a brand perception aim that was being followed by the 
ubsidiaries, based on their interpretation of this aim. 
, imitations in the rate of success were caused 
for numerous reasons. In case of Nutricia this was 
particularly the result of local government laws and differences in distribution of medical and 
iealth related products in Europe. McCain's limitations in positioning consistency were mainly 
aused by the differences in product quality. The company was forced to customise products due 
D the constrained availability of raw materials. This often caused significant differences in taste, 
vhich led to a different consumer perception. Nestle was experiencing a combination of many 
lements that limited the firm to position the products similarly, although none of the elements 
vas particularly dominating. From the respondents point of view the most important limitation 
, as the companies aim to 
fulfil local needs which was contradicting the European positioning 
iewpoint. The company chose to do so to overcome the cultural differences in the region and to 
11) 1 
tilise the local opportunities. Hero on the other hand was limited due to the lack of European 
oordination to create a consistent positioning environment. The companies' success was primar\ 
, ased on its local approach, and the company HQ made no significant steps that would led to 
omplete overhauls of its positioning policy. 
;. 2.6 European competition 
he pressure for global coordination due to the presence of multinational players in this industry 
vas often minimised by the studied firms. Although there was a clear awareness of this type of 
ºlayers, they were often only used as a marketing benchmark from a local perspectiv e. This 
uggested that MNE competitors were not often treated differently then local competitors. 
lowever, all firms stressed the impact of MNE competitors on local market circumstances. These 
ypes of players were often capable of competing on a different level than the local competitors as 
hey could afford the necessary investment of growth. In recent years this has led to an increasing; 
tumber of substitutes. Nevertheless the firms claimed that they had a significant advantage to 
hese and other market players based on distinctive quality and the long market presence. 
5.2.7 European marketing actions 
\s discussed in the European strategy analysis the firms operated in different degrees of 
; entralisations. McCain showed the most centralised approach, while Hero was operating 
elatively autonomously. Most important factors explaining the degree of centralisation were the 
, pread of product portfolio, the possibility of 
European production, the degree of product 
; ustomisation and the size of the firm. These factors clearly influenced the extent to which firms 
mplemented a local or European marketing decision. All firms showed a high degree of product 
; ustomisation and local product development. This indicated that the firms were either consumer 
Iriven, or there were limited possibilities to standardise the product due to other factors such as 
Lvailability of raw materials and local government requirements. As a result of these factors some 
ºan-European product customisation could be found at McCain, Nestle and Nutricia. 
Iore consistency could be found on a promotion level. Each of the four companies aimed for 
grand consistency in the European market. This showed by the usage of similar (global) 
promotion tools that were often accompanied with European guidelines to create consistency. 
While this was important for all four companies, McCain and Nestle took significant steps to 
ssure brand consistency while Nutricia and Hero subsidiaries could deal with this relativvelN 
utonomously. Limitations in promotion standardisation could 
be found as the result of language 
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arriers, the usage of local product names and differences in product portfolio, which could give a 
ifferent association to the brand. Differences in product standardisation and local promotion 
nplementation, as well as external differences in market structure and legislation led to 
ignificant price differences of the products in Europe. None of the firms made clear attempts to 
Dntrol these differences. 
imilarities in usage of distribution channels could be found in terms of product positioning. The 
rms all strived for consistency, whereby the retailer should fit the brand name positioning. 
election of retailers was therefore often based on retailers that would prefer A-brands. The 
ompanies could often make a selection were to sell their products based on their status and 
argaining power. Nutricia faced some restrictions due to significant differences of similar 
hannels in Europe. The same limitation occurred for McCain, who needed extra in-store facilities 
sell their (primary frozen) food products. Overall it can be concluded that the food products 
rere sold via similar channels with the exception of some of the Nutricia products. The increasing 
iternationalisation of retailers stimulated the distribution standardisation. Nevertheless all the 
ompanies aimed to avoid any bargaining power that could arise from the internationalisation by 
eating with these retailers locally. McCain was the only company that welcomed the 
iternationalisation of the retailers, as it opened more opportunities to standardise the distribution 
pproach, and it positively contributed to the company goals because of the limited availability of 
rozen food specialists. 
;. 3 European strategy positioning matrix To 
'he starting point behind the European strategy positioning concepts is the notion of the 
ivestigated companies how they see the European market. As this perception can be viewed from 
ie individual perspective, we aimed to combine this with organisational processes by giving an 
isight in the extent to which the European strategy is centrally planned and implemented. Main 
idicators that were used were based on the (internal) organisational structure and the market 
tructure. European strategy is therefore the activity by which a similar strategy is being used in 
, urope. Based on the 
identification of the European strategy we secondly want to point out the 
xtent to which this strategy is translated into European marketing actions. This dimension reveals 
ie degree to which the processes are implemented and decoded into strategic marketing 
rogrammes, which shows ww hat tools ww ere standardised and ww hich were not. 
5.3.1 Positioning technique 
Viewed in a multidimensional space, the European strategy of the firm can be graphically 
-epresented by a point defined by its constructs57 scores. These scores are being used to position 
he firms in an assessed manner to point out what firms in the industry is strategising in a more 
Huropean way, indicating a more European orientation than its investigated competitor. In this 
Tontext, a Likert type of scale from 1 to 558 is being used to signify the firms' position in relation 
:oa particular construct. No particular weight is given to the constructs as each construct is 
nterpreted as equally important to point out the European strategy definition. The score ýý ill 
indicate the firm's position in relation to the construct, taken into account the market context. The 
; core will also position the firms against each other. Finally, the score of each individual construct 
is totalled in order to divide these by the total number of constructs defined. The outcome will be 
in average number which will indicate where on the X-axis the firm is positioned. 
The same approach is being used to express the extent to which the European strategy is 
translated into marketing actions. The construct scores are a direct result of the marketing actions 
analysis. These scores are being used as an indicator in order to position the firms against each 
other in relation to a particular construct. Again these scores are being totalled and averaged by 
the total number of marketing actions constructs. This will indicate the Y-axis coordinates. 
5.3.2 Positioning coordinates of T° positioning 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the 
European strategy analysis. The constructs are scored based on the positioning technique and are 
used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the X-axis. 
" The defined constructs are the result of the within case analysis 
58 1 is referring to the lowest score indicating the lowest European strategy, 
indicates the highest score. 
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i ante -1: rositionin g coorui nates A-axis of i- position ing 
Consum er Electronics ... cases 
Construct Philips Sharp Pioneer Kenwood Nutricia Hero McCain Nestle 
European Portfolio 4 3 4 4 2 1 3 2 
similarity 
Ncty ork integration 5 3 4 2 2 1 4 3 
Global Sourcing and 5 4 4 3 2 l 3 2 
benchmarking 
European Consumer 5 3 2 2 2 1 l 2 
identification 
European product 4 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 
positioning 
European competition 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 
Total 27 18 20 17 11 7 15 13 
Average 4.5 3.0 3.3 2.8 1.8 1.2 2.5 2.2 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the 
marketing actions analysis. The constructs are scored based on the positioning technique and are 
used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the Y-axis. 
" awe -z.: rositionin g cooruinates r -axis of i position ing 
Electronics Consumer cases Food cases 
Construct Philips Sharp Pioneer Kenwwoo(I Nutricia Hero McCain Nestle 
Degree of marketing 5 3 4 2 2 I 3 3 
implementation control 
Degree of European 4 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 
product standardisation 
Degree of European 4 3 4 2 2 2 3 3 
promotion standardisation 
Degree of European price 4 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 
standardisation 
Decree of European 5 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 
distribution standardisation 
Total 22 16 18 14 9 9 12 13 
Average 4.4 3.2 3.6 2.8 1.8 1.8 2.4 2.6 
5.3.3 T° matrix 
The following figure gives a graphic overview how the firms are positioned against each other; 
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Figure 5.1: T° Matrix 
ExpI cit 
The purpose of this matrix is to set out the cognition/action relationship between the European 
strategic viewpoints (i. e. planning) and European marketing actions (i. e. implementation). Despite 
that both factors are effectively measuring the same effect this measurement enables us to point 
out to what extent the two factors of thinking and acting are positively co-related and indeed 
confirm this linearity. As such, the positioning matrix confirmed the distinction between the 
global CE products and the regional food products as defined beforehand in the case study design. 
In the CE industry, the most advantageous position is taken by Philips. This yields the highest 
rating among the targeted firms. This position is mainly the outcome of the centralised definition 
and planning of the European strategy. In addition, the firm clearly outperformed the Japanese 
firms with their European implementation and control. The feasibility of a European strategy and 
implementation of the Japanese firms seemed to be very depended upon the production and 
marketing capabilities of the firm. The Japanese firms were able to manufacture the kind of 
product that could technologically out-compete the Philips products, however, these products 
were not always available in the European market. Even if they were, the Japanese firms often 
chose to sell these products to the local consumer, strongly taking into account the local market 
circumstances including consumer needs, pricing and distribution availability, which caused 
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Non European 
European ''r'J' '` 
significant differences in terms of product and brand positioning in Europe. Not only indicated 
this approach a relative local expression of the marketing actions, it also made it more difficult to 
control the consistency on a European level. 
In the food sector, analysis has revealed that the firms, despite being a multinational, aimed to act 
as local as possible. Product customisation, local segmentation, positioning adjustments pointed 
out the implementation of this approach for these firms. However, there were clear indications of 
significant market changes in recent years which caused a shift towards more internationalisation, 
enquiring a higher degree of European coordination. The concentration in product portfolio of 
McCain and the wide spread portfolio of Nestle opened some opportunities to respond early to the 
development. We therefore saw Nestle and McCain being more determined to realise cost 
reductions to respond on issues such as internationalisation of retailers and the continuous 
increase of substitutes. On the other hand, Heros' local approach has resulted in significant 
achievements in the past, and the firm aimed to benefit from this position as long as possible. In 
the meantime initial steps how to respond to European developments were designed. Nutricia was 
in between both positions. Significant steps were already undertaken to improve the European 
position of the firm, however time was needed for it to develop. 
5.4 Sensemaking direction dependency analysis 
As pointed out in the literature review chapter, sensemaking is an interpretative process in which 
people assign meaning to ongoing occurrences (e. g. Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1995). As 
such, sensemaking is a necessary precursor to all purpose activities such as planning actions, 
making decisions and so fort. What we will analyse in this section is sensemaking under the 
condition of equivocality (e. g. Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Smircich, 1983). Equivocality is defined 
as existing when two or more prospective meanings appear clearly applicable and equally valid 
(Weick, 1979). Equivocality usually serves as a sensemaking stimulant that triggers a search for 
evidence favouring one prospective meaning over others. We are therefore looking for processes 
that stimulate the sensemaking of the manager to potentially treat the Euro as a technical issue, a 
strategic issue, or a combination of these two. This has previously been defined as the path of 
dependency that guides the actors in terms of European thinking which is based around the issue 
of coordination on a European level. 
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We will analyse the extent to which European coordination takes place by looking for similarities 
and differences in terms of organisational structure59 and the configuration of corporate decision 
making processes60. Subsequently we are interested in how these issues influenced the integration 
of the European network. This will help us to make reasonable interpretations and judgements 
that can be linked back to the Euro. Judgement will be based on their direct domain of inquiry, 
which indicates different levels of importance. We therefore distinguish between first and second 
order equivocality that can be linked directly or indirectly to sensemaking in relation to the Euro. 
In other words, first order processes can directly be linked to the European thinking of the 
company, while second order processes might have a longer chain which can not directly be 
linked to the Euro but they still are of significant importance on the European interpretation of the 
firm. After this process is defined we will make a comparison to what extent the path of 
dependency is followed by the managers by comparing the deliberate strategy (planned strategy 
including the effort made to analyse the environment) with the identified path. This comparison 
enables us to position the firms in the Euro sensemaking matrix using the same construct 
positioning technique as used in the T° definition. 
5.4.1 European Coordination Elements: Organisational structure 
Among the most important decision areas that can influence the design61 of organisations are; 
" Orientation, 
" Height, 
" Centralisation, 
" Formalisation and 
" Coordination 
Taken these points into account we are going to examine the organisational structure by 
comparing the observed company structures with the most frequently found forms of 
organisational structure. The importance of doing so is based on the notion often expressed in the 
organisational behaviour literature (e. g. Chandler, 1962) that the manager uses the organisational 
59 Primary the setup and characteristics of the European network 
60 I. e. level of centralisation, European coordination, formalisation and so fort. 
61 Orientation is designed around the functional activities which indicates different structural arrangements; 
Height refers to the different structural frameworks which can differ from small to tall, depending on the 
number of organisational layers; Centralisation refers to the degree in which an operation operates in a 
centralised manner; Formalisation relates to the notion of formality and degree of prescription in terms of 
written rules, procedures, instructions and communications; Coordination is the mechanism for ensuring the 
integration between the sub-units. 
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design process as a fundamental tool for implementing and communicating the strategic direction 
of the firm. Many organisations are designed as hierarchies, with considerable variation in the 
number of levels and in the set of activities grouped together. The two main groupings 62 are 
"divisional" and "functional" (Chandler, 1962). Other organisations employ a matrix structure in 
which each lower level reports to two or more superiors. It may be difficult to classify specific 
multinational firms into only one of the categories; however, indications of the organisational 
structure will help us to understand in more detail to what extent direction is given to the 
individual managers' strategic interpretation. 
5.4.1.1 Orientation and height 
In the consumer electronic industry it is manifest that all four companies worked with a 
comparable divisional structure that was initially based on a product group definition. The number 
of divisions could be related to the product portfolio of the company, which in all cases could be 
classified as having low or medium product diversity. For Philips and Sharp this implied that the 
CE was a specific division along side the other divisions indicating different business orientations 
of the company. At Philips CE eight product divisions were identified. A much less complex 
product group structure was found at Pioneer, Kenwood, and Sharp CE with three product 
divisions each. For all four cases it could be accounted that the product divisions were directly 
operating with world regional HQ, including a EHQ. However, there were significant differences 
in terms of functionality and responsibility of the four EHQ. The functional activities of Kenwood 
Europe were restricted to specific region responsibility in terms of marketing and management. 
There were no direct functional activities between the EHQ and other European subsidiaries. A 
similar situation could be found at Sharp with the clear divergence that some European functions 
were developed. The functional aspects of Pioneer Europe were much clearer defined. Marketing 
and Management decisions were clearly controlled on a European level, however, there was still 
space for local interpretation and definition. The opposite was true for the European functional 
activities of Philips EHQ. These were well defined on a European level which was clearly 
indicated by the product groups not only existing on a global level but also on a European level. 
Each product group took care of European functions such as marketing, management, sales, 
logistics and so fort, whereby the function of subsidiaries could be described as local executers. 
62 In a divisional hierarchy all activities are pertaining to a single product, group of products are grouped 
together in a division. In a functional hierarchy activities pertaining to a particular function are organised 
into departments. Matrix structure can combine these two structures 
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In the food industry a more diversified structural approach was found. This diversity was mainly 
the result of significant differences in product portfolio availability in Europe. Despite the fact 
that a product group structure could be found in the food firms there was diversity at what level a 
product group approach was introduced. At Nestle and Nutricia there were PMOs both on a 
European level as well as on a regional level. This suggested that each product as related to a 
specific product group that was managed and controlled to a certain extent on a European level. 
Differences of control depended on the degree of European availability. Hero also used a product 
group approach, however, these product groups differed significantly in Europe, which led to a 
localised definition with no European management or control. McCain, in contrast, did not use a 
product group approach but instead concentrated on production facilities. Each country producing 
McCain products was taking care of as many other countries as possible given the production 
capacity. On a local subsidiary level no product group distinction was made which indicated 
overall functional activities on a local level. Hero, Nestle and Nutricia related the functional 
activities to each product group and linked these activities matrix wise across the product groups 
to ensure a consistent approach. 
It seems safe to say that highly diversified firms such as the food industry are less likely to handle 
their foreign operations through a world wide functional structure. It cannot be said, however, that 
low diversified firms are apt to handle their foreign operations through a world wide structure, 
although the outcome of the structure comparison showed that CE firms are more likely to use 
such an approach. One of the explainable variables could be that CE firms largely deal with more 
homogeneous products that do not have to be altered substantially from one country to another. 
Their key strategic need therefore would very likely concentrate on coordination among functions 
(e. g. productions, sales, marketing, and so fort) on a global or regional level. As a result we saw 
more significant differences in structural frameworks in the food industry than in the CE industry. 
Likewise the CE firms, Nestle and Nutricia used an international division structure that was 
operating alongside the domestic structure that was organised by product. The significant 
difference with CE firms is that functional activities were not often internationalised in this 
industry. What it did indicate was that an international division structure was adopted by 
companies that depended on product divisions. Hero and McCain, on the other hand, did not turn 
over resources to product divisions, but rather centralised these to a considerable extent at a 
corporate level in the case of McCain or decentralised these in the case of Hero. For this reason, 
McCain and Hero could be described as a relative flat structure, while the other firms are taller in 
their structure. The structures of Philips, Sharp and Nestle stiere significantly taller than the other 
-1O3 
firms. This was mainly due to the relative wide spread of the product portfolio and the total size 
of the company. 
5.4.2 Configuration of corporate decision making processes 
5.4.2.1 Centralisation, formalisation and coordination 
Following Edstrom and Galbraith (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977), who argued for the importance of 
normative integration is another primary structural element in multinational organisations, «e 
believe that centralisation, formalisation, and coordination analysed singly and together, 
constitute a comprehensive characterisation of the configuration of HQ-subsidiary relations. As 
pointed out in the literature review, centralisation has been defined as the division of decision 
making authority between HQ and subsidiaries. In other words what is the level at which a 
decision need to be approved before being implemented. The cases can be related to two different 
centralisation perspectives; production centralisation and non-production centralisation. 
From a production perspective, there were several indicators that accounted towards the degree of 
production centralisation. The first indicator is the number of factories used and the location of 
these factories. In this respect a clear distinction between both industries could be defined. 
Relative few factories were used by the CE firms, while the food subsidiaries were often 
accompanied with a local production facility, with the exception of McCain who had production 
facilities that were producing for regions rather than countries indicating a high degree of 
production centralisation. In the CE industry the companies were faced with price competition 
which pressured the firms to look for cost reductions. CE firms, therefore, were aiming for 
production scale benefits. This was indicated by the use of large factories by Philips in Eastern 
Europe, Asian factories by Kenwood and European and Asian production by Pioneer and Sharp. 
A second indicator was the complexity of the product portfolio which could be divided into 
product diversity and product modifications. First from a modification perspective in the CE 
industry similar adjustment were made by the firms to meet the local technical requirements of 
the host countries. However, there were significant differences where and when these adjustments 
were made, indicating a different level of centralisation. The highest degree of centralisation as 
found at Philips, Kenwood and Sharp who produced in as least factories possible to maximise the 
scale benefits. Pioneer chose to modify some products to a higher extent to meet local 
requirements. This indicated a lower degree of production centralisation. 
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In the food industry, by contrast, a much higher level of internal complexity in terms of product 
modification was found. All four food cases posited the need to alter products to better reflect 
local environmental or cultural differences, which led to a higher degree of decentralisation of 
production. The highest degree of centralisation was found at McCain «ho produced products for 
regions rather than countries, while Nestle and Nutricia produced some products on a European 
scale that needed a relative low degree of modification. However, most products sold by Nestle, 
Nutricia and particularly Hero were modified to a high extent. In addition, this made the food 
portfolio much more complex in terms of product diversity. This diversity was also linked to the 
third indicator, the response to market environmental changes in terms of products and 
competition. A local response to local competition with product differentiation was apt to force 
the subsidiaries into different market segments, with different buyers, distribution system, and so 
fort. This approach was mostly chosen by Hero, and to a smaller extent by the other food 
companies. 
The relative high degree of centralisation of the CE required an additional coordination between 
the subsidiaries and the HQ on a non production level. The same accounted for the food 
companies, who despite the localised approach for many products, all strived for image 
consistency on a European level that indicated a degree of European coordination. The tendency 
to manage non-production activities on a European level by integrating European or global 
strategies more closely into the local economies showed different levels of success across 
industries and companies. Part of its success rate can be explained by taking a closer look at the 
role of the subsidiary in the multinational structure. This approach revealed a clear distinction 
between the CE firms and the food firms. CE firms tended to work closer with the HQ to develop 
and implement strategy. The subsidiaries often had worldwide support for a product line, however 
none of there had an unconstrained product scope and there were significant differences in the 
value added scope of the subsidiary, indicating different levels of decentralised centralisation. The 
functional scope of the Japanese subsidiaries in Europe could be closely related to the local 
implementer strategy as described by Bartlett and Ghoshal (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). This 
implied that some value activities were integrated globally, while the subsidiaries had local 
autonomy to implement these. This approach gave a certain direction to the functional activities 
of the Japanese firms, whilst they were not totally restricted in how to put these actin ities into 
practice. Philips subsidiaries, on the other hand, were significantly restricted due to the clearly 
formulated global guidelines that needed to be followed. These subsidiaries could therefore be 
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defined as world mandates (Roth & Morrison, 1992) that implement the strategy developed on a 
higher level. This specified the high level of coordination centralisation at this firm. 
The food firms tended to be more specialised contributors (Roth & Morrison, 1992) to the 
organisational structure. This indicated that the firms had considerable expertise in certain 
functions or activities, however differences occurred to what extent these activities ýý ere 
coordinated with the activities of other subsidiaries. The extent of coordination often depended 
upon the specialisation of the firm. This was in this particular industry always a combination of 
product and market specialisation. The Hero subsidiary tended to depend more on a high level of 
product expertise that pointed out specific specialised capabilities, whilst, the opposite was true 
for McCain who concentrated on specific European market regions with clear product 
coordination on a central level. Nutricia and particularly Nestle had subsidiaries that were experts 
of implementing the functional activities on a local level. This expertise was combined with local 
product specialisation, and European product development that indicated a higher level of 
coordination centralisation going on in these two firms. 
Some of the most salient conflicts over centralisation between HQ and subsidiaries were the result 
of host market circumstances. Several aspects interfered with the centralisation process, of which 
the host governments' demands, local distribution differences, and cultural differences were 
among the most significant issues. Particularly the first two issues played a significant role in the 
CE industry. Centralisation of production was reconsidered by the Japanese firms as a result of 
extra costs that needed to be paid on a local level for additional taxes63. The role of the local 
government in the food industry concentrated more on product technical aspects such as contents. 
In many cases this resulted in significant product adjustments or lower internationalisation 
potential for food products. The four food companies all faced these problems while the extent to 
which this happened was product dependent and therefore difficult to generalise. In addition, local 
adjustments based on different taste, expectations or habits were often made to products in the 
food industry as a result of cultural differences. Whilst technical adjustments needed to be made 
for some CE products as well, this was not mentioned of significant importance, due to the 
similarity of industry production and therefore the impact on an industry level rather than a firm 
level. Cultural differences on the other hand were not dealt with as a threat on the sales potential 
of identical CE products. Local distribution differences both played an important role in the food 
and the CE industry. These differences led to a wide spread of channel usage of the food cases 
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that limited the consistency on a European level. This was of even more significant importance in 
the CE industry where there was a clear distinction between large retailers and specialised 
retailers. This second group of retailers could add value to the product and was therefore often 
used to sell more sophisticated technical products. The strategy of Pioneer and Kemýood 
depended to a certain extent on these retailers. Distribution differences in Europe therefore 
seriously influenced the functional activities of these two firms. 
5.4.3 European network integration level 
As the previous analysis revealed, our findings suggested that multinational interactions stiere 
characterised by degrees of localisation, based on the characteristics of the subsidiary and its host 
country influenced by the degree of coordination of the HQ. This coordination was formalised 
across the firms to a different extent, which indicated that there was a different level of European 
network integration. It was clear that one could not assume that the positions taken and the 
methods used in each country were equally prudent. However, what the analysis revealed was that 
some multinationals were more successful in achieving European centralisation than others. This 
section therefore continues the debate by focussing on the objectives of the network, based on the 
previously discussed roles of the subsidiaries as well as the extent to which knowledge was shared 
within the multinational. What the European integration level therefore aims to find out is if the 
more integrated a subsidiary was with its affiliates in a strategic sense, if this integration also was 
greater in a political sense. 
What the role of the subsidiaries indicated was that knowledge integration across CE firms was of 
more significant importance than it was for the food firms. This argument was also confirmed 
with the organisational structures found in these companies. From this perspective it was 
particularly argued by Philips that making information available to all departments was vital in 
order to ensure project success. In addition, information sharing had an influence on the process 
of centralisation. One key issue behind information sharing is how subsidiaries get to know about 
the progress of the programme. In the case study firms, monthly reports, appraisal systems and 
meetings were set up to inform the subsidiaries. All cases used the Intranet as a vehicle to 
illustrate the programme's development and to emphasise the progress that had been made. This 
was particularly apparent in the Philips and the Nestle case, where the Intranet was used to inform 
and interact with subsidiaries located in worldwide branches. 
63 i. e. import tax 
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However, evidence from the food and the CE cases suggested that the use of the Intranet did not 
always achieve the expected outcome, because the use of the Intranet was not a common practice 
in either organisation, especially among senior managers. Instead, face-to-face interactions [either 
formal or informal], e-mails and phone calls were preferred. What this indicated NN as that the 
communication rate and communication intensity played a more significant role to achieve a 
higher degree of centralisation. The case-study firms adopted different approaches to sharing 
programme-related information. In contrast to the centralised approach observed in the Philips 
case, the approach employed in the Japanese CE cases and the food cases was comparatively 
decentralised, particularly during the implementation stage. Main argument of doing so was the 
level of autonomy given to these cases to implement functional activities on a local level and the 
extent to which the guidelines setup at a higher level were formalised and coordinated by a 
European team. Philips already operated on this level, while Pioneer started this process some 
years ago and clearly made improvements since. The same situation was apparent at Sharp with 
the clear notion that the process started recently. No significant steps in that direction were made 
by Kenwood. Based on these developments we found in the CE industry that there was an 
increasing degree of knowledge integration which was translated in more communication on a 
European and global level. The highest degree of strategic fit was found at Philips followed by 
Pioneer then Sharp and finally Kenwood. Strategic fit was significantly more complicated to 
achieve in the food industry. 
Nutricia and Nestle added several levels of communication sources in the organisational structure 
to increase the effect of network integration. Nestle succeeded with some brands and products to 
centralise the policy. In this respect we found a clear formalised approach related to the functional 
activities of these products. Communication from this perspective was one-sided with 
straightforward EHQ guidance. In relation to these products the subsidiary fulfilled a world 
mandate role. For Nutricia the guidance was not as strict as suggested at Nestle, however, EHQ 
aimed to control the implementation process for these products that was managed through 
European meetings and intranet progress measurement. In contrast, McCain was more integrated 
due to the production focus of the company. This approach was also revealed by the monthly 
European meetings that took place to improve European growth goals. Even though, growth was 
not necessarily achieved through functional centralisation. On the contrary, McCain subsidiaries 
were autonomous how to realise these growth strategies. The lowest network integration was 
found at Hero who operated with stand alone organisations. European communication was rare, 
and subsidiaries did not search for communication increase. 
208 
5.5 Definition of the path of dependency level 
As argued in the literature review, a number of theorists have observed that the control of the 
individual is carried out in a framework of organisational control that exists on several connected 
levels. What this suggests for multinational corporations is that integration is clearly more than 
the sum of relationships between individuals at adjoining levels in the hierarchy. What wwe would 
like to stress with the definition of the path of dependency is that control and coordination of 
specific individuals are part of the integration system, but patterns of corporate European thinking 
that exist will persist despite changing personal relationships and will therefore influence the 
interpretation of the manager by guiding her thoughts in a certain direction. By conceptualising 
integration at this level, the sensemaking process of the manager can be more clearly understood. 
Hence, the path of dependency indicates what the most likely direction of the manager vv ill be 
when interpreting the Euro. 
The following table will provide a summary of the previous discussed organisational structures 
and processes stimulating managers to interpret the Euro more strategically or more technically. A 
distinction is being made between processes and structures that can directly be linked to the 
European notion of the firm, and processes and structures that can be indirectly linked to the 
European notion of the firm. 
In this context, a Likert type of scale from Ito 10 is being used to signify the firms' position in 
relation to a particular construct. Both first and second order effects are measured in the same 
scale. We have chosen to do so because first order effects can be directly linked in relation to the 
European strategy definition, however it does not necessarily suggest there is a stronger impact as 
a result of this effect. In other words, first and second order only acknowledges that there is a 
different length in chains of effect. The score will indicate the firms' position in relation to the 
construct, taken into account the market context. The score will also position the firms against 
each other. Finally, the score of the individual construct is totalled so these can be compared with 
the maximum total construct score. The outcome will indicate the extent to which the firm is more 
technically or more strategically dependent. 
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" awe 3--s: rosinoning cooruinat 
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Construct Philips 
es of patn of ue 
mer Electronics ca 
Sharp Pioneer 
penuencv 
ses ... cases 
Kenntood \wricia IL", 
Oranisational structure 
European Functional activities 9 7 5 5 
M 
1 
European [IQ responsibilities 9 7 8 4 -1 1 3 
Complexity organisation 
structure 
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8 7 5 5 4 2 2 4 
Production Centralisation 
Usage large scale facilities' 10 5 5 10 1 1 3 
European facilities vs. local 
production 
9 7 7 1 2 1 3 2 
Portfolio Complexity 67 6 7 8 9 3 2 4 1 
Product modifications' 8 7 7 2 1 3 2 
Coordination and formalisation 
69 Role subsidiary 9 5 5 5 3 1 2 3 
European Formalisation 9 6 7 4 4 3 3 3 
Local Responsiveness'' 7 6 6 5 3 1 4 3 
Level of Network Integration 
European communication sources 9 8 8 6 6 5 6 7 
Level subsidiary information 
sharing 
5 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 
Frequent European meetings 8 5 5 2 5 2 5 4 
Total score 166 80 77 66 44 23 47 -13 
Average 8.2 6.2 5.9 5.1 3.4 1.8 3.6 3.3 
The firms are positioned based on the extent to which the firm as a whole revealed European 
structures or European processes. It therefore needs to be stressed that there might be significant 
differences when this analysis is conducted on a product level, as this table takes both 
internationalised as well as localised product concepts into account. It aims to show more clearly 
what historical steps of Europeanisation are taken by the firm to respond to European integration 
that legitimate the action the organisation want to take in the future to respond on European 
developments like the Euro. The path of dependency definition as defined in the above table 
highlights the main findings of the European notion analysis. It reveals that most CE and food 
firms are clustered in a small region of dependency. Based on the outcome there is a significant 
`'' Responsibility for European tasks, the extent to which the EHQ pulls the European programme together, 
indicating European programmes. 
More complexity with more layers indicates more control on product level and on a functional level 
66 The outcome is the existence of large production facilities indicating a higher degree of production 
centralisation (and consistency) 
`'' The more complex the portfolio the lower the degree of centralisation, the lower the score 
bs Modification level indicates where and when the adjustments were made. Lowest score is local 
production, highest score is European modifications at the same moment. 
69 World mandates indicate a high degree of centralisation, local implementers a lower degree, and 
specialist contributors the lowest degree. Differences in scores indicate the existence of multiple roles 
70 The highest score indicates a low degree of local responsiveness, a lower score indicates a high degree of 
local responsiveness 
71 Score indicates the frequency 
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distinctive behaviour between the food and the CE industry which is most clearly illustrated by 
Philips and Hero. The most advantageous position is taken by Philips. This result is mainly the 
outcome of the centralised definition of European constructs. The opposite is true for Hero, who 
is acting as a local expert and therefore clearly focuses on the local market. European market 
constructs either do not play an important role in the firm or are actively avoided by 
differentiating in as many levels in the firm as possible. 
The following figure will position the firms on a path of dependency dimensions which will show 
to what extent the firm is likely to treat the Euro as either a technical issue or a strategic issue. 
Degree of strategic dependency 
Nestle 
McCain 
Hero 
i. 
Nutricia 
Ke nwood 
Pioneer; 
Sharp 
Philips 
Technical 
dependency 
Strategic 
dependency 
Figure 5.2: Path dependency towards the Euro 
The identified path of dependency will serve as evidence to find out the extent to which 
individuals reveal sensernaking taking place on a higher level. In other words we will use the 
above indication and the organisational structure and process analysis to measure the significance 
of the suggestions made by the individuals. The following section will analyse the deliberate Euro 
strategy of the cases. 
5.6 Interpretation and development of the intended Euro 
strategy 
This section examines the intended strategy conducted by each organisation. The section 
comprises two parts; within case narratives to outline the contextual situation in order to 
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concentrate on the second part which is the analysis of the resulting contextual strategic 
alternatives. First a within case analysis will reveal what steps the firms have undertaken to 
understand the potential impact of the Euro. From these narratives, three distinctive strategic 
options [levels of commitment] of managerial interpretation are distinguished, each of which is 
based on key issues of importance as derived from the managers impact understanding. These 
alternatives will be compared with the path of dependency definitions as found in the previous 
part. This comparison enables us to position the firms in the Euro sensemaking matrix using the 
same construct positioning technique as used in the T° definition. 
5.6.1 Response to market environment change 
The essence to what extent the Euro is being faced as a strategic problem differed significantly 
across the firms. As we have seen in the previous section, this can partly be explained by industry 
structural differences, firm positioning, market structures and so fort. What we are interested in at 
this stage is what efforts were being made to understand the Euro before its introduction. These 
efforts could either be the result of steps undertaken on a higher level or on the case level. We will 
therefore firstly study the notion72 of the environmental change as a result of the Euro. And 
secondly, we will adopt the dynamic capability perspective73, which will reveal what various 
functional and personal expertise were being pulled together to make strategic choices how to 
deal with the Euro. This will also outline the firm characteristics and capacities74 that either 
positively or negatively influenced the efforts made to understand the potential impact of the 
Euro. 
5.6.2 Euro Perceptions 
Consistent with the literature on the expected impact of the Euro (e. g. Verdin & Van 
Heck, 1999), most CE and Food managers considered the Euro mainly as a technical and 
operational issue at the primary stage of the Euro planning development, and devoted 
their attention and effort to these aspects, rather than strategic implications. While one 
72 What is important about these changes is how individual managers perceive them. How do they see the 
nature of the `new' environment in competitive market terms? Indeed it is unlikely that everybody in the 
same organisation would give the same answers. There are ways in which different people cognitively 
construct views about the world they are operating in. To some extent the managers are able to transient 
those perspectives. Sometimes the transaction is more through action and through cognitive discourse. The 
notion therefore refers to the combined managers views. 
73 The dynamic capability perspective is defined in the literature review as the firms ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly to changing environments 
(Teece et al., 1997) 
74 Existing knowledge, available resources, usage of resources. and so fort. 
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might found this surprising, it opened up two different managerial interpretations that 
could be further examined. On the one hand, the Euro was interpreted as not necessarily 
as overwhelming as some would expect, on the other hand the implications might not 
have been as obvious or general as simplistic slogans seemed to imply for those 
managers. What this indicated was the link between the analysability of the environment 
and the orientation of the manager. Those managers that did not see strategic implications 
for the Euro also did not view the Euro as a positive business opportunity. However, 
most managers used the introduction of the Euro as an opportunity to rethink their pricing 
strategy. The studied cases did this in various ways. While, Philips was focussing on 
European consistency and Euro-challenges, the non-European cases and the Food cases 
tended to combine this rethinking of pricing strategies with the technical `obligation' to 
changeover to the Euro. The following table provides more detailed information about the 
expected practical implication of the Euro; 
Logistics 
Competition 
Customer relationship 
Suppliers 
Price policy 
Accounting controlling 
Finance management 
Information Technology 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Inforrnalion Finance Aoco canting Custortv 
TochroIo9y management controlling 
Price policy Supplýars 
roIalior *-p 
Comp etýlion Logýstlcs 
o Ser i es 1 89 4 72 1 68 3 372 318 22 7 18 245 
Figure 5.3: Practical impact expectations 
5.6.3 Intrusiveness of the Euro 
There are several issues that gave an indication to what extent the environment was actively 
searched to deal with the potential impact of the Euro. The first indicator is the structural steps 
undertaken to deal with the Euro (process structure). A second indicator is the time frame used to 
prepare for the Euro (process intensity). A third indicator is the implementation timetable used 
(process speed and accuracy). A forth indicator is the major marketing challenges that were 
identified (Stacey, 1995). 
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5.6.3.1 Euro Project teams 
Structural processes in relation to the Euro influenced several departments within the firm. The 
most obvious Euro internal impact relationship identified by all firms was related to IT and to 
financial control issues. From a marketing perspective concentration of Euro project control 
focussed on customer relationship management and pricing issues. The degree of priority and 
importance given to the Euro could therefore be based on the level of commitment of each 
department. This led to different roles and responsibilities of the various Euro groups in the 
project organisations across the firms. From this perspective there was clearly a significant 
difference in size and complexity of the various Euro teams found in each firm. The most 
complex Euro project team was found at Philips, who established the ESCP, attended by a 
selected number of business representatives. This group was accompanied by national sub- 
working groups in every EMU member country, with a separate group for Finance and 
Accounting in order to deal with the first technical problems. At a later stage the ESCP was 
transformed into a large Steering Committee with about 40 senior managers, empowered to take 
corporate decisions. Finally, one project director per product group was appointed, and sub- 
working groups were established in the product divisions. In total more than 400 people were 
involved with the implementation process of the Euro on a corporate level, who in this way aimed 
to take full responsibility of the introduction of the Euro. With this project team Philips was the 
only company that fully dealt with the Euro on a corporate level. 
Corporate support on a technical implementation level could also be found at Sharp, Pioneer, 
Nestle and Nutricia where the HQ setup a Euro management team that was responsible for 
ensuring sufficient commitment for the Euro on a subsidiary level, and providing guidance and 
tools to deal with IT related problems. This approach was the result of the sophisticated intranet 
and IT facilities at these four companies which were integrated on a high degree and technical 
changeover therefore needed to be done in a more centralised way. For Sharp this meant that IT 
changeover should be done on the same moment, while for Pioneer, Nestle and Nutricia the 
changeover moment was more flexible. Furthermore, all the cases except of Philips and Nutricia 
dealt with additional Euro changeover issues in a decentralised manner. With local Euro project 
groups, each subsidiary had their own responsibility for the day to day management and control of 
the Euro project. This project teams were generally formulated with two or three subsidiary 
managers with a financial and accounting background. Company departments such as marketing 
were often not that closely related to the Euro project team, which indicated lower commitment at 
this Icv cl. While for the food cases this low level of marketing commitment was primary due to 
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the low expectations of potential impact of the Euro in this industry, the Japanese CE firms 
stressed significant more impact of the Euro on a competitive pricing level. Although expectations 
in this direction were mentioned, it was evident that none of the Japanese firms took significant 
steps to face the potential impact. On the contrary, the Japanese firms preferred to wait and see 
what was going to happen. 
5.6.3.2 Euro timelines and timetables 
As a result of the Euro commitment we could break the task into two distinct projects, each «ith 
crucial Euro adaptation dates. The first project included the technical implementation of the Euro, 
whereby the companies were guided by the official Euro time table, with a transitional period of 
three years75. During this period the rule was that there should be no compulsion-no prohibition' 
on use of the Euro. Most crucial official date was therefore I January 2002 as only Euro based 
scriptural transactions could take place from that date onwards. The second project was dealing 
more with the strategic relevance of the Euro based on the interpretation of the managers. 
Implementations from this perspective involved Euro adaptation dates dealing, with issues such as 
customer satisfaction, pricing strategy and supply chain management. The cases studied varied 
considerably with respect towards the potential benefit and drawbacks of the Euro. Some 
managers saw great opportunities, while others had mixed feelings and expected serious threats 
related to the Euro. Although, managers of all cases stressed clear opportunities and treats with 
the introduction of the Euro it is manifest that only Philips and Nutricia started the Euro debate 
well for its introduction. 
i aline D-4: 1, riticai r. uro imp lement ation sat es 
Consum er Elec tronics Food cases 
Construct Philips rp Pioneer Kenwood Nutricia Hero McCain Nestle 
Starting date technical 1-1- 1-1- 1-11- 1-10- 1-1- 1-9- 1-1- 1-1- 
process preparation 1994 2000 2000 2000 1998 2000 2000 1999 
Internal date of 1-1- 7-1- 1-1-2001 3-1- 1-10- 1-1- 1-10- 1-]- 
implementation 76 1999 2001 2001 1999 2001 2000 2000 
Furo leading 77 1-I- 3-1- 1-1-2001 2-1- 1-3-2001 1-6- 1-7- 1-5- 
1999 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 
Difference internal 0 0 2 4 1 4 7 2 
implementation date 
subsidiaries (months) 
75 Earliest implementation date was 1 January 1999, latest was 31 December 2001 
7" Euro becoming the leading currency from an administrative point of view 
7' Offering the possibility to suppliers to pay in Euro's based on Euro price lists. Administrative Euro 
payments where often possible at an earlier stage as IT adjustments were made priory to pricing 
adjustments. 
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It was found that several issues had an impact on the adaptation process of the Euro.. pioneer 
approach in terms of early adaptation was found in the Euro zone originated cases. The firms 
either choose to take a period of time to change the inter company financial traffic into Euro's 
which was the case at Nutricia. On the other hand, a specific date might be set to changeover in 
order to overcome difficulties when dealing with two currencies at the same time and to create a 
clear situation at once. We could therefore distinguish three key elements that seemed to play an 
important role to adapt the Euro at an earlier stage. 
First, based on the nationality of the firm there was a difference in dependency upon the new 
currency. Early adaptation was recommended when the currency had a direct impact on the 
reporting unit. Second, the complexity of the changeover process was largely influenced by the 
size of the European network. Thirdly, early adaptation gave the firm the flexibility to overcome 
any problems they might face, taken the official changeover timetable into account. Moreover, 
there seemed to be a relationship between the time taken to prepare for the Euro and the attitude 
related to the Euro. Despite that the Euro zone originated cases needed considerable more time to 
prepare for the Euro, it was also manifest that the preparation and thoughts of early starters such 
as Philips, Nutricia and Nestle were in a significant more developed stage than those of their 
competitors. This viewpoint was clearly reflected in the strategic approach of these firms. 
5.6.3.3 Marketing challenges 
Philips saw the Euro as `a catalyst' that would help firms, already operating in the Euro-zone, to 
benefit from cost advantages. In addition, there was a strong believe that the same financial 
language would result in acceleration towards market globalisation in this zone. Therefore, Philips 
believed that the cost advantages gained from elimination of exchange rate risks and improvement 
of cross-border transactions together with the price transparency would result in a new, more 
competitive environment with numerous opportunities to fully benefit from pan-European 
possibilities. The opposite was true for the managers of most other companies. Expectations about 
the Euro in general were low, and foreseen opportunities related to the effect of the Euro were 
nearly there. Managers in the CE industry were primary concerned with calculating new price 
points. In addition, they foresaw that the Euro would have an impact on profit margin as a result 
of increasing price competition with introduction of price transparency. Although this concern 
was commonly expressed, it had not let to significant steps to overcome this potential threat. 
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In the food industry, by contrast, marketing expectations were modest. Most used argument of 
explanation was the cultural dependency of this industry that significantly influenced the potential 
opportunities and threats of the Euro according to the food managers. It can be concluded that 
Philips had a more positive Euro attitude than their colleagues. The other cases often viewed these 
marketing challenges for the first time, or judged them as not significant. Yet, solutions needed to 
be found, which was shaping the attitude of these managers over time. The following table 
summarises the characteristics that were stressed to have a negative or positive impact on the 
faced marketing challenges as a result of the Euro; 
Takle 5-5_ Kev elements chnnin i the managerial attitude tow: arrlc the Euro 
Characteristics and expectations that Characteristics and expectations that 
positively pressured flrms 1 respond negatively pressured firms 1 respond 
Firrn-Level Iligh degree product standardisation Optimising profit potential 
"I ligh degree promotion standardisation Accurate product positioning 
" Global product positioning Product differentiation 
"1 ligh degree of centralisation " Low degree of centralisation 
" high Degree of Internationalisation " Localisation 
"I ligh price differences 
Industry-Level Increasing bargaining power of retailers Different country related trading 
" Formation of buying groups cultures 
" Intensity of price competition Channel protection 
" Decreasing amount of specialists Customer tastes 
" Existence of gray Markets 
" high price transparency 
" Increasing price awareness 
" Large number of global competitors 
" Industry internationalisation 
" Customer focus 
Macro-level " Ilarmonising demand patterns 41 Local taxes 
" Information availability Different European tax levels 
Import duties 
" Local regulation 
5.6.3.4 Level of Euro commitment 
While constructs were broadly comparable, they have a situated and inter-dependent nature within 
the cases which is realised as the level of Euro commitment. That is, each case has a different 
meaning arising from the mutual dependencies between managerial interpretation and 
anticipation, and market and industry conditions. However, this meaning is pointing in a certain 
direction indicating a level of commitment to the Euro that can be defined as either more 
strategic, more technical or a combination of both. This last group is based on the awareness of 
the interpreter indicating that the manager has a certain expectation how the market is going to 
develop as a result of the Euro. This awareness is based on knowledge rather than ignorance. 
From this perspective, we want to point out that this alternative is arguably a subset of the more 
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strategic alternative, with the difference that no explicit action has been undertaken to resolve the 
uncertainty of expectation. On the contrary, the manager consciously prefers to ýýait and see ho\\ 
the expectations are going to develop in reality to reduce the uncertainty at a later stage. We "" ill 
therefore define this level of commitment as the wait and see alternative. 
The other two levels indicate an alternative direction that explicitly has been chosen by the 
manager to follow. The technical alternative is chosen when the manager either expected that the 
implications of the Euro were not that overwhelming for the particular firn, or the strategic 
implications were not that obvious for the manager and the manager was therefore not aware of 
the potential opportunities and/or threats. The strategic alternative implies that the manager 
identified clear strategic implications as a result of the introduction of the Euro and therefore has 
undertaken significant actions to deal with these implications. In addition, the three alternatives 
can be distinguished based on the level of recognition. This indicates that the technical response 
involves a tactical response with a low level of recognition. The wait and see response involves 
recognition as a strategic issue, however there is no action at this stage, in comparison to the more 
strategic alternative that shows strategic recognition and response. Using the three alternatives of 
Euro approach the viewpoints of the managers may be characterised thus: 
218 
Table 5-6: Categorised managerial views about the Euro before its introduction 
Philips Philips as a Euro zone originated firm dealt vý ith the direct impact of the Euro at a 
significant early stage. The centralised project team made sure that technical 
difficulties were overcome before its introduction. Adaptation at earliest possible 
moment was stimulated by the currency dependency, the size of the European network, 
and the complexity of the IT structure. This clearly influenced the commitment and the 
attitude of the managers in respect to the Euro. Concentrations on the strategic 
implications have guided the discussion. Significant expectations of direct impact on 
the market structure and levels of competition have led to strategic actions on a firm 
and product level. 
Sharp Sharp's approach taken was primary driven by the complexity of the IT structur-c. The 
centralised guidelines and tools illustrated how the firm aimed to overcome the 
technical difficulties. Changeover to the Euro took place at a late stage due to the low 
commitment of some European subsidiaries that significantly influenced the timetable 
of the process. Managers were primary concerned with meeting the guidelines as set by 
the HQ to smoothen the technical changeover. As a result of the Euro, managers 
experienced some market changes going on during the changeover period, and 
therefore expected further market development in the future, especially after the 
introduction of the Euro on a consumer level. Despite these expectations no significant 
steps were undertaken. 
Pioneer The managers of Pioneer were guided by the centralisation of the technical changeover 
process. Major concern from a strategic point of view was how to satisfy the Pioneer 
customers and what price changes needed to be made as a result of the Euro. Actions 
undertaken to solve these issues led to an earlier adaptation process than their Japanese 
colleagues. From a pricing perspective the predicted impact was only expected on a 
longer term. The product life cycle negatively contributed to the expected pricing 
pressure as most products were replaced with an updated model on a yearly basis. The 
strategic perspective was more focussed on short term problem solving. Long term 
market changes were expected, however, Pioneer managers found it too early to 
translate these into actions and preferred to wait and see how the market was going to 
change as soon as the Euro was introduced on a consumer level. 
Nutricia The financial dependency on the single currency has positively contributed to an early 
technical implementation. The fact that this happened in close cooperation with the HQ 
was perceived as time and cost-effective. This has shifted the attention of managers to 
the strategic relevance of the Euro. General concerns were modest as managers did not 
expect a significant impact of the Euro on a short term. Actions therefore concentrated 
on satisfying the customers during the changeover period and adjusting the price 
policy. However, many more expectations were there in relation to long term market 
effects of the impact of the Euro especially in terms of increasing bargaining power of 
purchasers. Despite the fact that no direct action was undertaken to respond to these 
concerns before the introduction of the Euro on a consumer level, the managers 
expected to do so shortly after the changeover. 
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Nestle The Euro changeover process has been perceived as a complex technical process that 
took some time to implement. The HQ guided subsidiaries in their implementation 
process, and IT tools were provided. Nestle managers at the Dutch subsidiary had low 
expectations of the Euro, which resulted in no significant actions undertaken during the 
changeover process other than the necessary price calculations. It was not expected that 
the Euro would influence the customer behaviour as long as potential differences in 
Europe were explainable. However, on a longer terms it was expected that the Euro 
might have a more direct impact on the market structure and would influence issues 
such as purchasing power, internationalisation of retailers and price competition. 
Nevertheless, at this stage Nestle managers did not find it important to respond. 
Kenwood The decentralised approach to introduce thy; Luro on a sub,, idian Icvcl. dcnºon; tratcd 
the low level of Euro commitment. Managers were locally concerned with the IT and 
financial problems related to the Euro. Managers claimed that the Euro did not play a 
significant role from a strategic point of view. This was primary driven by the price 
competitive behaviour of the firm in the past. Kenwood managers did not expect that 
the Euro would increase the price competition in the CE industry on the short term. 
Continuing the competitive approach of the past was perceived as an ideal strategic 
approach to overcome potential threats of the Euro. This resulted in a low Euro 
commitment where significantly small change took place other than the necessary 
technical adjustments. 
Hero The Euro changeover process has been approached from a local market perspective. 
Subsidiaries were primary solving the technical problems that were faced as a result of 
the Euro. The IT system of the Dutch subsidiary has been made Euro-proof in 1998. 
Managers did not foresee any significant additional technical other than financial 
adjustments. Actions concentrated on calculating, new price points and convincing 
customers of new price calculations. The most significant impact of the Euro was 
expected on a longer term. It was found likely that it would positively contribute to the 
appearance of new market players, and distribution channels were expected to gain 
more power. Despite, managers did not find it appropriate to make strategic 
adjustments based on these expectations. 
McCain The companies origin, the relative simple market structure, and the currency 
dependency were significant arguments used by the managers to illustrate the technical 
approach of McCain. Primer importance was given to solving IT structural problems 
and training personnel to deal with the Euro. Impact expectations on a strategic level 
were low and only related to pricing issues. Actions taken as a result of the Euro 
concentrated on recalculating price points. The high degree of product customisation 
and local marketing approach of the firm were interpreted as important drivers 
lowering strategic diversity. 
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5.7 Euro interpretation matrix 
5.7.1 Positioning coordinates of Euro interpretation positioning 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the 
intended Euro strategy analysis. The constructs are scored based on the positioning technique as 
discussed in the T° definition and are used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the X- 
axis explaining the extent to which the firm made an effort to understand the environment. 
i amte r. uroº inter 
('mrstrncl 
pretatio 
Consum 
Philips 
n posit 
er Elec 
Sharp 
ioning co 
tronics ca 
Pioneer 
orotnates 
ses 
Kenwood 
X-axis 
Food cases 
Nutricia Hero s1cCain Nestle 
Expected impact on 
European isation 
5 4 3 3 4 3 2 3 
Expected impact on 
competitive environment 
4 3 3 1 3 3 I 2 
Expected impact on price 
competition 
4 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 
Structure and complexity 
luro project team 
5 4 4 2 4 1 2 4 
Process speed and accuracy 5 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 
Process complexity 5 2 3 2 4 2 2 3 
Total 28 19 l8 12 23 13 12 IS 
Average 4.7 3.2 3.0 2.0 3.8 2.2 2.0 3.0 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the 
intended Euro strategy analysis. The constructs are scored based on the positioning technique as 
defined in T° and are used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the Y-axis, explaining 
the extent to which the managers viewed the Euro as either more strategic or more technical. 
i ante 71-5: euro inter 
Construct 
pretation positi 
on . Elec 
Philips Sharp 
oning co 
tronics 
Pioneer 
orainates 
Kenwood 
r -axis 
... cases 
Nutricia Hero McCain Nestle 
Centralisation guidelines 5 5 5 2 5 1 2 5 
Complexity IT structure 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 l 
Provided IT tools ý 4 4 2 4 1 2 4 
Dependency on the Euro 5 2 2 2 5 3 2 2 
Start technical process 5 2 1 1 3 1 2 3 
Adaptation date 5 1 2 1 3 2 2 3 
Date Euro leading 5 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 
Expected impact on price 
competition 
4 3 3 3 l 1 2 1 
Total 26 16 17 11 23 12 14 18 
Average 4.3 2.7 2.8 1.8 3.8 2.0 2.3 3.0 
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5.7.2 Euro interpretation matrix 
The following figure gives a graphic overview how the firms are positioned; 
Euro interpretation Matrix 
Strategic 
5 
Euro is a 
Strategic 
Issue 
O 
W 
.. r 
0 
c 
Passive 
cv 
... a> 
a 
a> 
c 
Euro is a 
Technical 
Issue 
Response to European market environment changes 
Figure 5.4: Euro interpretation matrix 
Active 
5.7.3 Following the path of dependency 
The purpose of this matrix is to set out the cognition/action relationship between the interpreted 
impact of the Euro and the extent to which the firm undertook actions to better understand this 
impact. Similar to the T° matrix we aim to explain if and to what extent there is a linear positive 
co-relation between thinking and acting, which in this case primarily refers to the relationship 
between the effort that is being made to understand the environmental change and managerial 
interpretation. The Euro interpretation matrix shows two cluster groups and the two Euro-zone 
origin firms separating from these groups by taking a more advantageous position. This yields a 
higher rating among the targeted firms. What it implies is that Euro zone originated firms took the 
matter more seriously than their colleagues. On the one hand this was driven by financial 
dependency on the single currency as a reporting unit; it is also manifest that on the other these 
two firms were more dependent on the Euro-zone region in terms of sales than the two clusters. 
Moreover, early adaptation clearly shaped the attitude towards the Euro as managers aimed to 
increase their knowledge by searching the environment more actively in what was most likely 
going to happen. Between these two firms the developments and thoughts of Philips were more 
advanced than Nutricia. Nutricia clearly identified opportunities and threats arising with the 
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Passive Active 
environment Techn»cai environment 
analysis analysis 
introduction of the Euro, however they did not undertake significant action where Philips did 
found it important to undertake actions to take full advantage of the Euro. This is partly driven by 
the fact that there are industry differences that clearly pressure firms to harmonise or differentiate 
their European strategy to a higher extent demanding different responses to the Euro. 
However, the fact that the firms are not clustered per industry also reveals that other issues played 
a significant role in this process. Interestingly, the significant difference between both clusters is 
the degree of interference of the companies HQ in steering the Euro project and ensuring 
technical and/or strategic commitment. Cluster one [managers that viewed the Euro as a more 
technical issue] operated in a decentralised manner. Managers in this cluster were more concerned 
with technical implications of the Euro as the changeover effects were being dealt with on a local 
level. Not only indicates this low level of network integration, it also shifted the concentration of 
the managers on other aspects of the impact of the Euro. While it was expected, based on the path 
of dependency, that Hero and McCain would be positioned in more technical quadrant of the 
matrix, it is surprising that Kenwood managers also revealed such a low commitment related to 
the Euro. The polarisation in the path of dependency of Kenwood showed some degree of 
strategic dependency upon the Euro, however this was not sensed by the managers during the 
changeover period. Within this cluster the concentration on technical issues was combined with 
low recognition level of the managers, and the pre judgement of seeing the Euro as a technical 
issue. This resulted in a passive environment analysis as the managers did not expect to need 
additional information to deal with the Euro. 
Cluster two [managers that preferred to wait and see what was going to happen] «ere more 
guided by the HQ. Detailed IT tools were often provided, and the local (subsidiary) concentration 
focused on strategic consequences at a significant earlier stage as technical problems were being 
dealt with on a higher level, which clearly influenced the attitude of these managers towards the 
Euro. Despite the two CE firms were expected to show a higher degree of strategic commitment 
based on their path of dependency it was clear that the managers recognised that some changes 
were going to happen in the market environment, however they anticipated that it «as too early to 
respond. The position of Nestle was the result of a strategic recognition of the managers to deal 
with the Euro in a short term, problem solving way. Managers explicitly chose for a tactical 
response by focussing on the threats that might have risen with the introduction of the Euro. The 
environment analysis shoxN ed it was not necessary to respond on a short term, ho« ev er it \N as 
expected that there would be a long teen effect. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the first level of analysis based around the sub-questions; Does the 
firm have a European strategy?, To what extent and in what way will the current strategy `guide 
the response to the introduction of the Euro?; What impact of the Euro is perceived by managers`? 
and; How does this impact influence the intended Euro strategy? In answering these questions, the 
first section examined the European positioning before the introduction of the Euro based on cross 
case comparison and preliminary analysis. This positioning matrix revealed the extent to which 
European strategies were developed and the extent to which the developed strategies were 
expressed in European marketing actions. The matrix confirmed the distinction between the more 
standardised CE industry and the more localised food industry as defined beforehand in the case 
study design. 
Following this European positioning identification, we presented evidence in terms of processes 
that stimulated the sensemaking of managers to potentially treat the Euro as either more strategic 
or more technical issue. This path of dependency definition indicated that most CE and food firms 
were clustered in a small region of dependency which was more technical related for food firms 
and more strategic for CE firms. 
The combination of the first two parts of this section served to identify the extent to which the 
firm was committed to the Euro strategically and how this influenced the intended Euro strategy. 
These indicated that industry differences played a less significant role than expected based on the 
European positioning and path of dependency analysis. Commitment to the Euro was clearly 
driven by financial and Euro zone sales dependency, which influenced the extent to which the 
environment was searched to decrease the uncertainty. This in return had an impact on the attitude 
towards the Euro, whereby firms that more actively searched the environment clearly found more 
significant strategic implications. 
The next chapter will analyse the situation ten months after the introduction of the Euro at a 
consumer's level. 
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Chapter Six: 
T' analysis 
Strategy formulation is understood as a continuous interaction of emergent learning alongside 
deliberate planning. We will therefore combine the T° definition and the intended strategy as 
analysed in previous the previous chapter and use it as the starting point to find out the extent to 
which the intended Euro strategy became the realised Euro strategy. First we try to understand 
what the firms learned after the initial plans were developed and implemented by studying the 
market changes from a macro perspective as they are perceived within each industry. This enables 
us to go one level down to analyse what exposed emerging issues were perceived and defined by 
the managers ten months after the introduction of the Euro on a consumer's level. 
From this perspective, we are interested in the rate of success of the intended strategy. This rate of 
success is based on the managers understanding of the market development since the Euro 
strategy is implemented which indicates their definition of the `right' problem at the `right' time. 
This particular section analyses the extent to which the Euro was or was not a major discontinuity 
for the firm and if it led to a re-anticipation and reformulation of the intended Euro strategy. Not 
only will this outline the extent to which managers view the Euro afterwards as a more or less 
strategic issue, it also points out the extent to which an effort is being made to understand the 
market environment. This leads us to the third issue as from there the managers determine an 
appropriate course of action. From this viewpoint we define this issue as action oriented 
sensemaking which is reflective in the sense that action is guided by knowledge. We are 
particularly interested in the fact if the thoughts of the managers have Europeanised to a higher 
extent since the introduction of the Euro. If so, to what extent are these thoughts translated into 
more European oriented actions. 
Based on this distinction we will first analyse the extent to which the intended strategy became 
the realised strategy by dividing the emergent strategising process into sensemaking [i. e. itwhat did 
the nuinagc'rs learn after the introduction of the Euro] and strategising [i. e. the extent to which the 
intended strategi' became the realised . tute y]. Second we will analyse the extent to which the 
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perceived changes in market environment led to a new course of action. This implies that the 
following discussions are structured based on the interplay between sensemaking and strategising. 
6.1 Interpretation of the impact of the Euro 
Following the argument of Miles and Snow (Miles & Snow, 1978) that strategic management is 
the process through which managers ensure the long term adaptation of their firm to its 
environment, we assume that managers continuously try to optimise their effort. More explicitly, 
at the planning stage the goals desired determine the process. Yet, after implementation, an 
opposite functional holds. This suggests that, after the implementation of the Euro strategy, the 
outcome achieved and the goals realised become the dependent variable. Usually, the 
uncontrolled contingencies in implementation result in deviating the process followed from that 
planned. From this perspective, the actions and characteristics are no longer determined just by 
the aspirations of its managers and founders, but by characteristics other wider organisation 
environment linkages. It is the patterning of these linkages and interdependencies which enables 
the deterministic nature of strategic change to be examined. Strategic success therefore depends 
on how the market changed since the introduction of the Euro, and how this influenced the 
desired goals of the company. This section will therefore analyse the environmental changes as 
they are perceived by the managers. 
The primary unit of analysis in defining environmental changes is the industrial level. The 
industry in which the firm participates helps define the manager's involvement with its 
environment. The core of a firm's industrial environment is represented by its competitors, 
suppliers, and customers. We will focus consideration of the firm's environment to its industry 
environment to provide an indicative analysis of the market changes that occurred. These 
indicators are a combination of the suggestions made by the managers in the industry. In both 
industries we can distinguish first and second order effects as the result of the introduction of the 
Euro. First order effects are creating a direct industry impact on the core industrial environment 
which can directly be related to the Euro and only emerged with the introduction of the Euro. 
Second order effects are occurring when the Euro can be indirectly related to the ongoing 
environmental changes in this industry. This can be related to the impact the first order effect has 
on the market environment and therefore is leading to market changes. In addition, the Euro can 
also be interpreted as a symbol that is pushing towards market integration, speeding up or 
facilitating current European thinking. 
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6.1.1 Environmental turbulence in the CE industry 
6.1.1.1 Audit of environmental influences: key drivers 
The continuously increasing technological advances have been leading to a convergence of 
production in the CE industry. In turn the competition in this industry progressivel` focuses more 
on other issues then product features. Hence, cost reduction has become one of the most important 
assets in recent years and price erosion has seriously shortened product life cycles. Taking this 
into account, the informants stress that the most significant impact of the Euro from a macro 
environmental perspective comes from an economic point of view. The CE firms clearly see cost 
advantages in the Euro zone as a result of the elimination of transaction costs on cross border 
trade, and the end to exchange rate uncertainty on intra-EU trade. However, the scale of these 
benefits does not outweigh the potential threats that appeared as a result of the price transparency 
in this market. While this has a consumer's impact it also implies that corporate buyers are able to 
compare prices in the Euro-zone which enables them to identify unjustified price differences 
which increases the bargaining power. The direct effect of the introduction of the Euro on the 
competitive environment is particularly important for the CE industry due to the high degree of 
technical standardisation which increases the likeliness that market parties will respond sooner or 
later. We will therefore concentrate on the impact of the Euro on the competitive environmental 
changes. 
6.1.1.2 Key competitive forces 
Arguably, the single most important influence of the Euro, and one that is likely to have a more 
lasting effect is the impact of price transparency on the bargaining power of both the suppliers 
(the firms themselves) and the buyers. Price transparency has led to a significant rise of 
comparative buying behaviour in the CE industry. While the CE firms can use the Euro as a tool 
to compare buying conditions in the Euro-zone, of more significant importance is the direct 
implication of these changes on the comparative behaviour of retailers. The fact that it is easy to 
compare prices between the participating countries increases cross border trade. This is 
particularly evident in the CE industry due to the high degree of product standardisation. Previous 
existing pressures such as grey market imports and cross country price comparison are being 
pushed, which in turn creates opportunities for retailers that CE firms need to deal with. As a 
result, the CE firms noted that many retailers are moving across borders, or combine the forces 
with international parties. Although this internationalisation of retailers is an upcoming trend in 
this industry the first signs of impact \\cre clearly evident. 
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The second influenced force is the impact of the Euro on price competition, increasing the 
competitive rivalry on a Euro-zone level. The increasing price competitive pressure has se, eral 
implications. It has been acknowledged by the respondents that the Euro is clarifying the market 
situation as the Euro can be used for both internal and external benchmarking. From an internal 
point of view the Euro has helped to simplify communication among the Euro-zone subsidiaries, 
which has similar implications from an external point of view. In both cases it is easier to spot 
price differences, questioning why other subsidiaries or competitors are capable of creating a 
certain business environment. Yet, the benefits of benchmarking are becoming clearer in the CE 
industry. Internally it increases the competitiveness of Euro-zone subsidiaries as it potentially 
increases efficiency. Externally, it has an Europeanising effect as it increases rivalry on a Euro- 
zone level. 
The third force that has been significantly impacted by the Euro is the consumer demand 
condition. While the Euro itself does not directly influence the consumer needs, it increases the 
price awareness to fulfil these needs. What this implies is that comparative buying behaviour as a 
result of price transparency is also having effect on a consumer level. CE firms note that in recent 
years the advent of the internet has significantly changed the buying behaviour of consumers. In 
addition, increasing standardisation and convergence of technology have also contributed to the 
changes in buying behaviour. From this perspective, CE firms expect that the Euro will take this 
behaviour one step further. CE firms are pressured to differentiate products or explain price 
differences across nations. 
6.1.2 Environmental turbulence in the Food industry 
6.1.2.1 Audit of environmental influences: key drivers 
The cultural sensitivity, the differences in legislation, and the high degree of customisation are 
only few of the arguments why the impact of the Euro is perceived as less significant in the food 
industry. Nevertheless, from a macro environmental perspective, the respondents do relate the 
impact of the Euro with economical and political issues. Particularly from an economical point of 
view the price transparency in the Euro-zone is mentioned as a facilitator to market changes. This 
refers to price competition, the standardisation debate and the internationalisation of retailers. 
6.1.2.2 Key competitive forces 
A much more significant vote is given to the symbolic effect of the Euro on the food industry in 
terms of new' (multinational) entrants, the internationalisation of retailers, increasing 
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collaborations and mergers, which are pushing food firms to think and sometimes act more 
European. On the one hand this stimulates the cooperation of subsidiaries in this zone, while on 
the other hand it might lead to friction between the subsidiary and HQ, due to the fact that most 
firms in this industry have operated on a local level for a long time. Taking this into account, the 
respondents related the Euro as a stimulator of the ongoing market changes in this industry rather 
than referring to its direct pricing impact. In this respect we find two key arguments arising. 
Firstly, price transparency as a result of price comparison is identified as an important tool for 
retailers to find out the similarities and differences of food multinational products in the Euro- 
zone. Although the internationalisation of retailers is not a new issue in this industry, respondents 
stress that the Euro clearly stimulated retailers to look across borders, which might strengthen 
their bargaining position. It is expected that on the long term the developments in Europe, 
including the Euro, will significantly impact the channel availability and construction in the Euro- 
zone. While this might be perceived as a threat, some firms see it as a clear opportunity to sign 
European contracts to create a more consistent environment. Secondly, the Euro signified the 
existence of a large free trade area that invites exporters to compete in this market. The threat of 
new entrants depends on the barriers there are to entry. With the arrival of the Euro some 
significant economical barriers have been taken away, which is perceived as another stimulator 
for international players to enter the European market. 
6.1.3 Detecting change of impact interpretation 
The environmental turbulence analysis provides an indication of the impact of the Euro as it is 
perceived in each industry. This helps us capturing the experience and wisdom of organisational 
members to what extent they believe that the Euro impacted the market environment. Most 
significantly we try to capture the sensemaking of a group of individuals within the firm that 
created a shared meaning and shared experience, so collective intuitions facilitate enacting rather 
than reacting on the environment. This will analyse what firms have learned since the introduction 
of the Euro by looking at two different aspects; what effort has been made to understand the 
environment, and what impact of the Euro is understood. This will reveal if and how the 
perception about the Euro changed since T°. 
229 
6.1.3.1 Degree of environmental scanning 
The extent to which the environment is scanned78 by the firm is not only based on managers' 
understanding of the changing environment, it equally depends on the starting point of the firm. In 
other words what did the managers learn in the past what actions were taken before the 
introduction of the Euro and how do the present developments interfere with these actions. This 
primer judgment made by managers partly explains the scanning behaviour of these managers. 
From this perspective we find that firms that viewed the Euro as more technical in the past move 
in two directions. Either they still do not see any strategic implications which subsequently lead to 
a low degree of environmental scanning, or they see strategic implications leading to a higher 
degree of scanning. In comparison to the firms that were more strategic oriented in the past, these 
firms firstly need to close the gap, before they can move forward. What we find in these firms is 
the need for environmental scanning [information gathering, analysis and interpretation] in order 
to take novel actions that lead to a significant strategic change. A comparison with the Euro 
interpretation matrix positioning as found in T° will help us identify the extent to which the 
attitude towards the Euro changed. 
6.1.3.2 Euro Impact understanding 
Consistent with the Euro interpretation matrix we find that managers' interpretations are not 
sector based, but more driven by the judgement of managers whether the Euro is a technical issue 
or if they find strategic implications. From the three firms that saw no significant strategic 
implications of the Euro before its introduction, only McCain maintains sharing this view. Main 
arguments that are put forward are related to the simplicity of the frozen food sector, and the 
bargaining power of McCain in this sector. What this implies is that issues such as price 
transparency are not interpreted as important as the managers do not notice any pressure to make 
adjustments to the current approach. Further implications, beyond pricing, are not being sought 
after. This indicates that McCain identified some environmental changes, however, the impact of 
these changes is judged as non-significant. From the other two firms Hero revealed a significant 
interpretation shift, which can be divided into two stages. 
Firstly, short after the introduction of the Euro Hero experienced a temporary effect which 
negatively influenced the sector image and the turnover of the company. This effect was mainly 
78 Environmental scanning is divided into three levels. First the gathering of information concerning the 
organisation's external environment. Second the analysis and interpretation of this information, and thirdly 
the use of the analysed intelligence in strategic decision making. We concentrate here on the interpretation 
and analysis of groups of individuals assuming that the interpretation refers to a high or low degree of 
information gathering. 
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due to the price changes on a retailer and catering level that significantly influenced the 
consumers' price perception. Secondly, the impact of this effect on the market leads to an 
increasing awareness of the impact of the Euro. Implications are not only related to pricing issues, 
but also to the changing competitive position in Europe. Although environmental scanning on this 
level only started recently, managers feel pressured to think and act more European. This 
notification searches for solutions how to improve and use for example internal and external 
benchmarking, network integration, communication, and European production. Kenwood is more 
concerned with the impact of the Euro on price competition. Managers notice that price 
differences cause European instability and should therefore be reduced. This aim increases 
internal benchmarking and European network integration. Furthermore, Kenwood managers 
expect that the impact of the Euro needs more time to develop, both on an industry and consumer 
level. The Euro is therefore interpreted as a facilitator or symbol which is only one of the many 
drivers that will increase industry transparency which eventually will have a significant impact on 
the competitive position of the firm in this market. The attention of Kenwood managers is 
focussed on how to differentiate in this industry, and how to improve their position. The result is a 
more active environmental scanning behaviour whereby the impact of the Euro is being studied in 
more detail. 
Among the firms that were in anticipation of what was going to happen, significant strategic 
implications were only noticed by the Sharp, and to a less significant extent by Pioneer. Sharp 
managers expect that the price transparency and the resulting price comparative behaviour of 
market players is only the start of the market changes. As a result of price transparency the 
managers find significant strategic implication that need to lead to a more stable European 
environment with less price differences across the European countries. Sharp sees this as an ideal 
opportunity to optimise internal benchmarking. The benefits of internal price comparison have 
been welcomed and now managers want to apply this to other issues to optimise the consistency 
of the European strategy. The Euro is therefore interpreted as a facilitator with a direct impact on 
market transparency that indirectly inspires to think and act more European. Pioneer only sees 
strategic implications in terms of pricing. Managers feel pressured to respond on transparency, 
and therefore aim to reduce the price differences in Europe to avoid instability. Further 
implications are not being sought after. According to managers of Nutricia and Nestle the impact 
of the Euro in terms of price transparency has not really become an issue in their sector. For 
Nutricia this is being explained by the fact that the he health and nutrition sector is being 
protected by local legislation that allows price differences in this region. Nutricia sees that the 
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recent market developments are going in the line of expectation, and the Euro did not bring other 
implications that were not anticipated. Nutricia managers stress that the internationalisation of 
retailers and the arrival of more global players in the Euro-zone has been ongoing for years and 
the Euro might only have speeded this process to a certain extent. Nestle's abstaining position is 
maintained after the introduction of the Euro. While some strategic implications were expected, 
environmental scanning has taught the managers that it is not necessary to respond. Market 
changes are perceived as similar for every market player, so the impact is only steering the 
players in a certain direction. Despite that there is a global pressure to lower the costs and 
improve the competitive position in Europe, Nestle does not attribute this to the Euro. 
Philips, who has been aiming to take an advantageous position in relation to the Euro, continues 
to do so after the introduction. Managers use the Euro primary as a strategic benchmarking tool. 
Competitive and internal analyses are taken to a higher level and managers perceive that the Euro 
is contributing to the goals of the company. Despite that the introduction of the Euro increased 
potential threats, Philips managers take this threats seriously and believe that they can be 
overcome. Strategic implications are for example related to improving European consistency, 
contribute to the global identity, level with the main competitions on a European scale, and 
diminish the product variety to create a more consistent image. 
6.1.4 Euro interpretation Matrix at T1 
6.1.4.1 Construct consistency 
The intended Euro strategy could be based on the Euro notion in combination with a dynamic 
capability view as managers were facing similar technical applications to define the Euro strategy. 
Yet, after the introduction of the Euro, potential technical problems are likely to be solved and the 
discussion moves forward to patterning the implication to the wider organisation environment. 
This can partly be explained by strategic learning as managers before the introduction of the Euro 
acted based on intuition. Managers cannot be effectively intuitive unless one has intimate 
knowledge of the subject in question. Intuition during T° is therefore based on impact expectation 
and during T' it is based on impact perception. Both expectation and perception are `given 
meaning based on the environmental analysis (data collection) and this in return shapes the 
interpretation of the manager how to deal with the Euro. What we see is two different approaches 
both indicating the level of environmental understanding and the extent to which a technical or 
strategic meaning is given to the Euro. In T° the impact expectations are translated in Euro project 
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team complexity, process speed and accuracy79. Moreover, these expectations are driven by 
technical complexity, financial dependency and centralisation of decision making which 
significantly influences the (technical and strategic) response. While the outcome leads to 
different constructs, the type of constructs can be mapped to similar interview questions. 
indicating the reality of the strategic movements: 
Table 6-1: Construct consistency 
Construct TO TO question examples Construct T1 r question examples 
Expected impact " Will the introduction of the Euro Cross border " Has the introduction of the I uro 
on influence the MNE objectives in trade, influenced the NINE objectiýcs 
Europeanisation, terms of profit, sales and market Parallel import, in terms market approach? 
Centralisation approach? Think and act " Is the Euro used strategically to 
guidelines, " What is the impact of the concept of more European, push to any changes? 
dependency on price transparency that arises with Change " Did the Euro led to a higher 
the Euro the introduction of the Euro on the European level of Europeanisation of the 
business strategy? positioning, business strategy? If so, how? 
" Does the MNE, have a European Create European " Does the MNE see Europe as 
strategy? stability, one market or does it work with 
" Does the MNE see Europe as one Benchmark pan-European segments? Did the 
market or does it work with pan- internally Euro change the perception" 
European segments? " Do you believe that a European 
" Is parallel import currently an issue? market is starting to evolve" 
Expected impact " What where the first thoughts of the Competitive " Did the Euro lead to any 
on competitive Euro related to the competitive rivalry, significant competitive changes? 
environment environment? Purchasing " How did the chosen strategy 
" Will marketing mix elements power of the (global/local) and the perception 
become more standardised as a retailer, of the European market 
result of the Euro? If so, how and Benchmark influence the marketing actions? 
why? competition, " Did the bargaining power of 
" What kind of competition is there in Customise distributors increase as a result 
the Euro-zone, global or local? products of the Euro? 
" What kind of competition is 
there in the Euro-zone, global or 
local? 
Expected impact " What is the impact of the concept of Price " Did the Euro increase price 
on price price transparency that arises with competition, competition? 
competition the introduction of the Euro on price Price " Is it possible and desirable to 
setting? comparative standardise prices? 
" Do you expect that the Euro wiII behaviour, " Does the company respond on 
lead to more price competition'? Explain price competitive price changes? Are 
" To what extent does the Euro force differences retailers pushing to do so? 
you to put prices on the same level " Do you notice an increase of 
within the Euro-zone? price comparative behaviour on 
a retailer level? 
These constructs are defined in T° and are interrelated to the Euro expectations before its introduction. I. e. 
firms with higher expectations are likely to approach the problem more seriously and are therefore 
searching the environment more thoroughly by using more advanced project teams and techniques to scan 
the environment, in order to deal with uncertainty. 
2 3; 
Therefore, the extent to which the changing patterns are interpreted as strategic can be based on 
the scanning behaviour of a group of managers. This allows us to reposition the firms in the Euro 
interpretation matrix. However, sensemaking and analysis of managers is now based on the 
strategic implications these managers define, which significantly influenced the constructs used. 
We therefore describe managers that do not see significant implications as more technical than 
those that see significant implications. 
6.1.5 Positioning coordinates of Euro interpretation positioning 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the post 
Euro analysis. The constructs are scored80 based on the positioning technique as discussed in the 
T° definition and are used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the X-axis explaining 
the extent to which the firm noticed the impact of the Euro. 
" ante o-z: nuro inter 
Defined impact of the 
Euro on: 
pretatio 
Con 
Philips 
n posit 
sumer E 
Sharp 
ioning co 
lectronic 
Pioneer 
oruinates 
s cases 
Kenwtiood 
A-axis a 
Nutricia 
t1 
Food 
Ilero 
cases 
McCain Nestle 
Price competition 5 4 5 4 3 4 2 2 
Price comparative 
behaviour 
5 4 4 3 3 4 I 3 
Purchasing power of the 
retailer 
4 4 2 2 4 3 1 3 
Parallel import 5 4 3 3 3 3 1 3 
Cross border trade 5 3 2 2 2 4 1 2 
Competitive rivalry 4 4 2 3 3 3 2 3 
Total 28 23 /8 17 18 21 8 16 
Average 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.5 1.3 2.7 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the post 
Euro analysis. The constructs are scored based on the positioning technique as defined in T° and 
are used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the Y-axis, explaining the extent to which 
the managers feel pressure to respond on the impact of the Euro. 
40 1= not noticed, 2=noticed but not important, 3=noticed but no novel action, 4=noticed and novel action to 
be taken, 5=noticed and novel action taken 
234 
Table 6-3: Euro inter 
Defined pressure of the 
Euro to: 
pretatio 
Con 
Philips 
n posit 
sumer E 
Sharp 
ioning co 
lectronic 
Pioneer 
ordinates 
s 
Kenwtiood 
Y-axis a 
Nutricia 
t1' 
Food 
Hero 
cases 
McCain Nestle 
Ex lain price differences 5 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 
Customise products 5 4 2 2 2 3 1 2 
Create European stability 5 4 3 3 3 4 2 2 
Change the European 
positioning 
4 3 2 2 3 4 1 2 
Think and act European 5 4 3 3 3 4 2 2 
Benchmark internally 5 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 
Benchmark competition 4 3 3 2 3 3 1 2 
Total 33 26 20 17 19 24 10 16 
Average 4.7 3.7 2.9 2.4 2.7 3.4 1.4 2.3 
6.1.6 Euro interpretation matrix T' 
Euro interpretation Matrix T-1 
Euro is a 
Strategic 
Issue 
0 L 
W 
Q) 
4ý- 
0 
:Z Pass. tve t0 
.r 
0 
i 
i 
0 
c 
I- 
Active 
Euro is a 
Technical 
Issue 
Passive Active 
environment T ech n cal environment 
analysis analysis 
Response to European market environment changes 
Figure 6.1: Euro interpretation matrix T' 
6.2 The rate of success of the intended strategy 
Based on the emerging development of the Euro we find significant differences in attention and 
interpretation of managers. While before the introduction issues such as urgency, understanding 
and importance helped managers to apply meaning and definition to the issue, now visibility, 
emergent learning and occurrence, help managers to refine their judgements. The learning 
235 
processes and significance given to changes in the environment differ significantly across the 
studied multinationals. The importance given to the Euro depends if the managers interpreted the 
effect or impact after its introduction as an interruption in the ongoing floe of sensemaking. 
Whether the impact of the Euro is perceived as significant can be based on the understanding and 
definition of its impact. From this perspective we can define five levels of perceived impact of the 
Euro; 
1. The organisation might not notice the environmental changes 
2. The organisation notices the changes but does not take action 
3. The organisation notices the changes but does not take novel action (routine, non learning 
sequence) 
4. The organisation notices the changes and is planning to take novel action 
5. The organisation notices the changes and takes novel action 
What these levels indicate is that the impact of the Euro varies based on the fact if attention is 
given to its impact, it stimulates to take action and that the action taken is indeed novel action that 
leads to re-formulation of the strategy. Following figure 6.1, we find that Philips takes the most 
advantageous position with a high level of deliberation 81. Actions of the past are further 
developed and adjusted to the current situation. The opposite is true for McCain who defines the 
Euro as non significant and further implications are not being sought after. Before the 
introduction of the Euro McCain expect some implications, managers now see no opportunities 
or threats that require strategic adjustments. 
The majority of the firms, however, interpret the Euro as a strategic routine and do not find it 
important to take novel action. These firms are clustered in the centre of the matrix. The 
surprising firms in this cluster are Nutricia and Kenwood, who made the most significant changes 
in relation to the intended strategy. Kenwood experienced some market changes that are more 
significant than anticipated in advance. While Kenwood only saw technical implications in the 
past, the managers now reveal a strategic impact on price related issues. In addition, they also 
foresee future developments that need to be taken into account. The opposite is true for Nutricia 
and Nestle who both recognise market changes, however, they did not find it important to 
respond. Surprisingly this thought is also applied to price transparency. 
81 the extent tip which the intended strategy became the realised strategy 
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While most firms revealed increasing pressure as a result of price transparency, Nutricia and 
Nestle managers judged this to be less significant in their sector. For both firms this re- 
anticipation resulted in a significant decrease of environmental scanning as the impact faced could 
be dealt with in a sequential way. Among these four firms the highest level of deliberation is 
found at Pioneer. Managers of Pioneer foresee some strategic implications, however only on the 
anticipated price level. Interestingly we find a cluster of firms who make significant adjustments 
to their intended strategy in order to deal with perceived strategic implications. Most importantly 
these firms expect that the market changes as a result of the Euro pressures them to think and act 
more European. 
Based on the chosen market approach82 before the introduction of the Euro, we identify a 
significant difference of impact. For Sharp this implies an increase of Europeanisation pressure 
that requires adjustments and fine tuning of the present European strategy. For Hero the 
awareness of the impact of the Euro will lead to a strategic shift that requires the development of 
European elements. 
6.2.1 Euro interpretation matrix T° versus T1 
The following figure gives a graphic overview how the firms are positioned against each other, 
and how they moved from T° to T' per industry; 
82 Referring to local or (pan) European market approach 
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Despite the fact that the levels of perceived impact of the Euro are not industry bound. ýý e see 
similar sensemaking patterns in the CE industry and conflicting movements in the food industry. 
Surprisingly, we find that most of the firms that took an advantageous position in relation to the 
Euro at T° are now drawn closer to the initial defined strategic path of dependency. This indicates 
that managers either underestimated or overestimated the impact of the Euro. Overestimation 
generally took place in the food industry, while managers in the CE industry tended to 
underestimate the impact of the Euro. This does suggest that the impact of the Euro was greater in 
the CE industry than in the food industry, which confirms the expectations. 
6.3 Strategic intentions and actions at T1 
Managers learn and reanticipate based on their perceived impact of the Euro. The previous 
knowledge generating analysis showed that similar impact perceptions are sensed significantly 
different, leading to different impact interpretations. While T° sensemaking seemed to be more 
guided by short term tactical response driven by technical issues, we now find that some 
managers expect significant long term implications which indicate different degrees of 
Europeanisation thoughts. As previously noted these thoughts can be more guided by the path of 
dependency of the firm, while on the other hand it might imply a significant shift in the identified 
path. What we aim in this section is to analyse the extent to which the Euro is integrated into the 
strategy as a legitimate device to undertake more European oriented actions. Strategic change in 
this context involves either a redefinition of organisational mission and purpose in the European 
market or a substantial shift in overall priorities and goals to reflect new emphasises or directions 
in the European market. We assume that strategic shifts are the result of manager's interpretations 
which implies that for this analysis strategic plans are interpreted as novel actions. This allows us 
to redefine the T° cross case comparison of European marketing strategy and the extent to which 
this strategy is translated into actions, by looking at the extent to which constructs changed after 
the introduction of the Euro. Definition will take place per industry and between both industries. 
6.4 Cross CE case comparison of European positioning T1 
6.4.1 European portfolio 
There are product portfolio changes taking place at all four CE firms. Both Philips and Sharp are 
concentrating on diminishing the product variation in the European market. For Philips this 
implies a reduction of model differentiation and a clear focus on high end products to upscale the 
consumer perception. Changes in this respect are directly attributed to the introduction of the 
Euro, \\ hich has been used to harmonise the portfolio to a higher extent. Sharp's variation 
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reduction is the result of an ongoing process of product upgrading that has been ongoing; for some 
years. Recent market developments speeded up the search for portfolio consistency in the 
European market. The product spread of Pioneer and Kenwood seems to be unaffected, howev er, 
both firms reveal a shift in product type concentration. This shift is mostly attributed to the 
technological development competition. From this perspective Pioneer is continuously focussing 
on improving developments and upgrading products in order to distinguish from competitors. 
Kenwood is experiencing difficulties to fully concentrate on a distinctive product design, ýý hich 
slightly shifts the attention towards becoming more price competitive, resulting in product cost 
reduction which very likely influences the overall product quality standard. To sum up, European 
product portfolio changes are resulting in decrease of portfolio spread for Philips and Sharp which 
directly can be related to the Euro. Shifts in portfolio concentration take place at Pioneer and 
Kenwood as a result of competitive developments which indirectly can be related to the Euro. 
6.4.2 European network integration 
The previous section showed that the Euro pushed the CE firms to a certain extent to make 
adjustments to their portfolio in order to be more consistent on a European level. This implies that 
the CE firms aim to respond on a European level indicating the need of cooperation between HQ 
and subsidiaries. One of the indicators might be the extent to which European network integration 
is actively stimulated after the introduction of the Euro. From this perspective we find that 
significant efforts are being made by Sharp and Kenwood, while Philips and Pioneer undertook 
action in the past and do not see any further implications to make significant adjustments other 
then fine-tuning the current situation. We therefore can identify a relative consistent network 
environment within these two firms. Consistency is in this case being created by clear 
organisational structures with centralised decision making mechanisms. Sharp bases the European 
inconsistency on a lack of European centralisation of decisions. The existing organisational 
structure enables the firm to make adjustments by authorising the EHQ to guide subsidiaries and 
stimulate closer cooperation between the European subsidiaries. The European Kenýwood network 
clearly lacks knowledge to stimulate integration at this stage. European subsidiaries are guided on 
a global level and only the first signs of European cooperation are showing. Most significant step 
in this direction is the recently achieved combined effort of introducing a specific product in all 
the subsidiary countries using the same tools to position the product. 
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6.4.3 European benchmarking 
Another indicator of European consistency might be the extent to which European subsidiaries are 
benchmarking each others strategy. In this respect managers often mention the impact of the Euro 
as a tool simplifying the comparison of subsidiary strategies. This reveals that Philips is the only 
firm that actively uses the Euro to compare strategies and analyse competitors' behaviour across 
European markets. Other firms recognise the benefit, however, did not take any significant steps 
to take advantage. 
6.4.4 Identification of a European consumer 
A third indicator of European consistency might be the extent to which firms see possibilities to 
group consumers of various European countries. Based on the outcome we can observe that the 
complexity of the understanding and definition of European consumers has increased significantly 
within Sharp who identify the importance of the identification and approach of European 
segments to realise their European goals. In comparison to Philips identification who already 
focused on the customer intimacy scheme by satisfying global consumer needs with innovative 
R&D, Sharps' identification is more based on the recognition of the importance of European 
segmentation. The perceived market changes as a result of the Euro are being related to the 
European consistency of actions targeting similar consumers. Identification is being related to 
positioning guidelines that aim to approach consumers in a similar way. However, no clear 
definition is given who these consumers are other than the subsidiaries interpretations of who this 
consumer should be in their market. On the other hand no significant change in European 
consumer definition or notion took place for Pioneer and Kenwood. 
6.4.5 European product positioning 
The European product positioning is here interpreted as the combination of the above indicators to 
consistence the strategic approach in the European market. As identified in the sub-level 
indicators, we observe several stages of Europeanisation of the strategy that do indicate vv hat the 
firms currently concentrate on to improve the European approach. Rather than viewing this as 
separate steps we note that managers give importance to a stage in a non-particular sequence. 
However, the sequence confirms that there are similar interrelationships it also confirms that these 
each of the variables is given different importance by the managers involved. From this 
perspective we note that Philips takes the most advantageous position based on their previous 
identification and response of European developments that has led to a relati`e consistent 
European marketing mix. Current developments prioritise a solid execution of this European mix 
h\ standardising European marketing processes to a higher degree. Sharp is recent],, being guided 
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by retailers that are becoming active across borders. This stimulates Sharps' search for European 
consistency. Most significant step taken in this direction is the product portfolio changes in order 
to improve the image consistency in Europe. Simultaneously, closer network integration aims to 
contribute to this European goal from a different perspective. Developments at Pioneer indicate 
that the European notion seems to meet the global strategy of the firm. Recent global 
developments positively contribute to the Europeanisation of Pioneers strategy. In this respect we 
observe improving marketing mix standardisation within Europe on a product, communication 
and distribution level. However, no further steps are indicated by managers that further action is 
going to be undertaken in the near future. The opposite situation is true for Kenwood managers 
who reveal a changing European notion, requiring improvements on a European level. Despite the 
necessity definition of European improvements Kenwood faces a lack of European experience. 
Clearly there is a need for more internal and external knowledge before future steps can be 
undertaken. First steps in this direction are taken from a product perspective. Recently the 
company launched a product on a European level indicating a high level of marketing mix 
consistency and network integration to achieve this. 
6.4.6 European competition 
All four firms pointed out the significant impact the Euro has on competition in this industry. 
Most important argument in this respect from a purchasing power perspective, which is changing 
the comparative price buying behaviour of retailers, stimulating them to improve the European 
situation as a whole. Philips and Pioneer already started a programme to harmonise prices to a 
higher level in Europe so that price differences are explainable and extremes would disappear. 
Sharp is currently aiming to improve the price comparative situation in the Euro zone. And 
Kenwood particularly focuses on the internationalisation of retailers as a significant limiting 
factor to distribute their products via the traditional channels they use in this market. 
6.4.7 European marketing actions 
As previously being pointed out, the Euro has a significant impact on particular aspects within 
each of the CE firms. All four firms actively search the internal and external environment to 
improve European consistency. From a marketing perspective we find that product portfolio gaps 
are closing and CE products are becoming more standardised on a European level. The 
introduction of the Euro particularly increased the awareness of European portfolio consistency. 
Sharp and Philips therefore take significant action to standardise the portfolio. Pioneer and 
Kenwood respond less actively but instead focus on a technological shift in their portfolio. At all 
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four cases it is found that the underlying thought is based on the notion of increasing price 
competition, which significantly speeded up since the introduction of price transparency. 
Eventually, all four firms expect that this will lead to an increasing pressure to harmonise the 
price to a higher degree. However, at this stage only Philips and Sharp undertake significant 
action to justify price differences and to deal with any unjustifiable pricing extremes. Pioneer 
aims to avoid extreme price competition by focussing on technology and distribution 
differentiation, which indicates a low level of price response. Ken ood moves away from their 
previous price positioning perspective by facing the price competition and finding alternative 
ways to deal with this type of competition. Most significant step taken in this direction is the 
recent evolving product production actions in order to lower costs. 
The increase of European product introductions positively contributes to the European 
consistency for all four of the firms. However, there are significant differences in the extent to 
which advantage is taken from European product introductions. Interestingly, all four firms aim to 
improve image consistency and are therefore continuously trying to combine the subsidiaries 
efforts. This results in an increase of promotion and advertising consistency on a European level 
at all four firms. Simultaneously these firms are aiming to increase efficiency to `generate cost 
advantages. Philips is the most advanced firm from this perspective, while respectively Pioneer, 
Sharp and Kenwood show increasing efforts resulting in European marketing actions since the 
introduction of the Euro. 
6.5 Cross Food case comparison of European positioning T1 
6.5.1 European strategy 
The food firms show differences in interpretation and perception of the impact of the Euro, which 
significantly influences the actions taken. Taken this into account we find three levels of response 
in the food industry. The first level encompasses the firms that either do not recognise the 
ongoing market changes, or define these changes are non-significant and therefore choose not to 
respond to these changes. The second level includes firms that recognise the market changes, 
define them as significant and choose to customise their strategy to emphasise the local market 
approach. This will confirm the path of dependency of the food firms. A third level includes firms 
that recognise the market changes, define them as significant and choose to act more European by 
standardising strategic aspects on a regional or European level We will therefore analyse the 
extent to which firms customised or standardised their market strategy. 
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6.5.2 European portfolio 
In comparison with the T° situation we find no significant changes in the European product 
portfolio of Nutricia, Nestle and McCain. All three firms stress that the current market approach 
of customised products is protected through internal variation and external market differences. 
Product customisation is the chosen product strategy for McCain to avoid European competition 
and to fulfil local market needs based on cultural differences. Customisation at Nutricia and 
Nestle is taking place for the same reasons, while these companies add that these products are 
customised because there is no European potential or there are market limitations to 
internationalise the concepts. Current market changes do not affect the market situation according 
to the respondents of these companies. The opposite is true for Hero. Where Hero has been 
concentrating on a local market approach in T°, the current situation shows that there is a 
significant shift towards a higher degree of product concept Europeanisation. This implies that 
actions are taken to internationalise some of the current product groups. Current concepts with 
international availability are going to be standardised to a higher degree based on core product 
group steering from a particular subsidiary level that is appointed based on its expertise in relation 
to that concept. In addition, based on a country potential analysis, new products will be added to 
the current subsidiary product portfolio. 
6.5.3 European network integration 
Whilst there are no significant changes in the product portfolio since the introduction of the Euro 
at Nestle and Nutricia, we do find that earlier Europeanisation efforts are being given significant 
more importance. This results in an increasing emphasis on centralisation of decision making 
results in a limitation of strategic flexibility for subsidiaries. These companies feel pressure as the 
result of country comparative behaviour on a marketing level, and therefore aim to maximise the 
consistency in Europe. There clearly is a wish to improve the consistency of Europeanised 
concepts, however, there are several reasons among which friction between subsidiaries and HQ 
and country to country differences in Europe are the most significant limitations to achieve this 
goal. A similar wish starts to play a role at Hero, who aims to combine the previous local market 
approach with a newly to be adopted European approach. It seems to be a clear advantage for 
Hero that the initiative of this approach is a collective decision of European subsidiaries, which 
limits the potential threat of friction. First actions taken include the appointment of the product 
group responsibility per subsidiary, and European product deg elopment. Moreover, these 
developments are accompanied with monthly European meetings. Surprisingly, there is no 
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pressure being felt by the managers of McCain, which results in no significant changes in the 
network integration, other than the existing high level of integration on a production level. 
6.5.4 European benchmarking 
The internal and external limitations to increase European consistenc\ additionally limit the 
possibility of benchmarking on a European level. However, most managers do see implications to 
use the Euro as a tool to compare subsidiary strategies within Europe. Particularly from a pricing 
perspective the Euro is being interpreted as a useful tool to find out more about subsidiary and 
competitive pricing behaviour. Nevertheless, none of the firms made significant steps to apply the 
potential benefits yet. 
6.5.5 Identification of a European consumer 
An increase of the complexity of the understanding European market led to a more advanced 
definition of the European consumer at Hero. The search for similarities in consumer needs in 
Europe increases the awareness of European segment definition. Aim from this perspective is to 
approach similar consumers in a consistent manner from a marketing perspective. However, like 
Nutricia and Nestle, the view of target group definition in Europe does not go further than the 
identification of similar consumer interests. Despite the simple definition we can conclude that 
among these three firms there is an increasing awareness of the existence of a European 
consumer. Although this does not suggest for these firms these groups are identical across the 
European nations, it does suggest that similar needs can be identified and targeted in a more 
consistent way. 
6.5.6 European product positioning 
Unlike the CE managers, food managers have a much loý, ýer strive to search for European 
consistency. Although it is important for some strategic concepts to identify the potential highest 
degree of positioning consistency in Europe, this identification is often limited by internal and 
external factors. Moreover, the strategic concepts account for a relative small amount of the total 
product portfolio. Based on the strategic concept dependency we can identify different levels of 
European product positioning consistency. The highest level of European consistency can be 
found at Nestle based on the relative large amount of global concepts with strict positioning 
guidelines and high levels of standardisation. The importance of these concepts for growth in the 
European market in combination with the internationalisation of retailers and the role of price 
transparency, prioritise the actions taken to improve consistenc` for these concepts continuously. 
The Euro from this perspective has actively increased the importance of consistency for these 
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products of Nestle. The impact of the Euro on European consistency of Nutricia products is much 
lower due to the significant impact of local legislation on strategising concepts. Consistenc\ is 
being sought after by developing a European strategy with European goals. However, this strategy 
is very flexible and strategic control is relative low which implies that significant changes can be 
made if necessary to meet the local standards. On the one hand this lowers the consistency 
potential, while on the other it protects Nutricia from potential threats such as the 
internationalisation of retailers. McCain is not actively looking for European consistency, on the 
contrary McCain aims to customise the products to the highest extent to optimise the local 
barriers. Despite the fact that products are positioned based on local interpretation, there is a 
consistent factor due to the simplicity of the frozen food industry and the similar approach 
McCain takes within this industry. However, recent market changes do not motivate McCain 
manager to take action. Even though the lowest degree of European consistency is found at Hero, 
there are clear plans and actions that indicate a changing situation. Most evidently is the policy 
that is set up including clear communication guidelines to position internationalised concepts 
similarly. The addition of internationalised concepts aims to add a consistent factor in the 
portfolio on which the brand perception can be harmonised. 
6.5.7 European competition 
The introduction of the Euro stimulates European competition in the food industry from two 
perspectives. Firstly it makes it easier for market players to move across borders which increase 
the substitutive competition and the purchasing power. Secondly it increases the comparative 
behaviour of market players, which increases the price competition and it pressures firms to 
justify price differences. In relation to the first argument, we identify a significant impact of the 
internationalisation of retailers for those firms who sell internationalised concepts. McCain is the 
only company that welcomes this development as they see European contracts as an important 
tool to increase growth in Europe. Nutricia and Nestle both anticipated the increase of purchasing 
power and took action before the introduction of the Euro. Hero realises the threat however no 
action is taken yet to deal with it. In relation to the second argument it is manifest that none of the 
players took action to deal with price differences in Europe. All four firms claim that price 
differences at the moment are acceptable and justifiable. 
6.5.8 European marketing actions 
As indicated in the European strategy the diversity of the food industry creates a context 
dependent view of the impact of the Euro. This context dependency can be based on the 
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availability of (potentially) internationalised product concepts. We identify an increase of 
standardisation or customisation pressure perception in the Euro zone countries. However the 
extent to which firms respond to the changing market environment significantly depends on the 
extent to which the perception of managers leads to an identification of importance to emphasise 
current standardisation, customisation, or to move in either one of these directions. What we find 
in this respect is that the chosen market response is based on the extent to which response 
opportunities are identified often limited through the existence of market response barriers. From 
a marketing perspective we observe that the market changes do not significantly impact the extent 
to which products are customised or standardised. Three out of the four companies claim that 
current market barriers limit the standardisation possibilities of their products. The same barriers 
also protect these firms from direct product comparison which justifies the current degree of 
customisation. Hero is the only company that perceives the current level of customisation 
unjustifiable for certain concepts and therefore choose to undertake significant actions to increase 
the current level of standardisation for some products. Moreover, the changing market is also 
perceived as an opportunity to internationalise new products. Particularly the increasing pressure 
of market comparison by players on several levels has increased the awareness to take action. 
Interestingly, we observe that the pressure of European consistency on internationalised concepts 
significantly influences the search for communication consistency in the Euro-zone. Firms 
actively aim to improve the European positioning by standardising promotional activities to 
outline the Europeanisation of the concept. This recently increases the standardisation of tools 
such as branding, logo, and packaging for some of the products of Nestle, Nutricia, Hero and 
McCain. However, limitations such as cultural differences, eating habits and language barriers 
clearly influence the extent to which the communication is consistent. The combinations of 
limitations in the degree of product and promotion standardisation lead to country specific 
products. This in return significantly influences the price and distribution policy used. On the one 
hand it causes price differences for these concepts in Europe as there are different cost structures. 
Although these price differences are evident, none of the firms takes significant steps to 
harmonise these differences. 
Then again, the customisation of products (and image) creates a more flexible distribution policy 
\\ hich allows choosing for country specific distribution channels rather than European consistent 
channels. Although some of these channels seems to move across borders and start to compare 
negotiating standards in Europe since the introduction of the Euro, this is not }et perceived as a 
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threat to undertake action for Nestle and Nutricia. Instead this companies aim to tackle increasing, 
purchasing power by avoiding European contracts. For Hero, this market development did not 
direct to distribution changes, it did however stimulate the firm to take action and create a more 
consistent European environment where necessary. 
6.6 European strategy positioning matrix T1 
Primary aim of the T' analysis is to find out to what extent the Euro has an impact on the 
European strategy of the firm which lead to marketing actions. This indicates the extent to which 
the European notion has changed since the introduction of the Euro (T°). A direct comparison 
between T° and T' can be made based on the same constructs. Minor interpretation differences 
occur in the network integration construct, which moved from more technical (production) 
integration towards more strategic integration (network cooperation). A similar situation occurs 
for global sourcing and benchmarking, which before the Euro concentrated on the first while after 
the Euro the discussion focussed on the extent to which the Euro in particular led to strategic 
comparison of the network. Although this leads to a slight shift in discussion, it focuses more on 
the impact of the Euro which contributes to the goal of this section to point out the changing 
European notion as a result of the introduction of the Euro. From a similar construct perspective 
we can directly compare To with T'. An unchanged construct score will therefore indicate that no 
significant changes took place. A higher construct score indicates a growing degree of 
Europeanisation while a lower score indicates that the Euro led to a higher degree of localisation. 
6.6.1.1 Positioning coordinates of T1 positioning 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the 
European strategy analysis. The constructs are scored based on the positioning technique as 
discussed in the T' analysis and are used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the X- 
axis. 
248 
i awe u-w: r, uro inter 
Construct 
pretatio 
Con 
Philips 
n posit 
sumer E 
Sharp 
ioning co 
lectronic 
Pioneer 
ordinates X-axis a 
s cans 
Kenwood Nutricia 
tl 
Food cam 
Hero McCain Nestle 
European Portfolio 
similarity 
5 4 4 4 2 2 2 
- 
Network integration 5 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 
Global Sourcing and 
benchmarking 
5 4 4 3 2 1 3 2 
European Consumer 
identification 
5 3 2 2 - 2 2 1 2 
European product 
positioning 
4 3 4 3 3 1 4 
European competition 5 4 4 3 2 2 1 2 
Total 29 22 22 18 1-1 13 /3 16 
Average 4.8 3.7 3.7 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.7 
The following table provides a summation of the constructs identified and discussed in the 
marketing actions analysis. The constructs are scored based on the positioning technique and are 
used as an indicator where the firm is positioned on the Y-axis. 
u arme Euro inter pretatio n posit ioning co oruinates 1-axis a t1 
Con sumer ... cases 
Construct Philips Sharp Pioneer Kenwood Nutricia Hero 
'NIcCain 
Nestle 
Degree of marketing 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
implementation control 
Degree of H uropean 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 2 
product standardisation 
Degree of European 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 
promotion standardisation 
Degree of European price 5 3 3 3 
standardisation 
Degree of European 5 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 
distribution standardisation 
Total 24 19 18 16 11 /3 10 13 
Average 4.8 3.8 3.6 3.2 2.2 2.6 2.0 2.6 
6.6.1.2 European positioning matrix To vs. T' 
The following figure gives a graphic overview how the firms are positioned against each other, 
and how they moved from T° to T' per industry; 
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6.6.2 European strategy direction analysis 
The T' positioning matrix also confirmed the distinction between the CE industry and the food 
industry after the introduction of the Euro. Overall we can identify three types of European 
strategic development since the introduction of the Euro. First we see firms that recognise the 
market changes, which Europeanises their marketing view and strategy; however, this view does 
not direct the firm to take any significant action yet. These firms are specified with a horizontal 
direction arrow. Secondly, we see a firm that might or might not have recognised the market 
changes, but at least defined these changes as less significant as long as the strategic differences 
in Europe are justifiable. To emphasise this viewpoint marketing actions taken are customised to a 
higher degree to increase the current differences. This firm is specified with a downwards 
diagonal arrow. Thirdly we notice that most of the firms make a diagonal upwards move, which 
indicates that the introduction of the Euro increased the Europeanisation view of these firms, 
which is translated in a higher degree of marketing programme and/or process standardisation. 
Among the firms that standardise to a higher degree we detect that there are firms that standardise 
relatively more since the introduction of the Euro than others. This partly can be explained by the 
fact that some firms learn more and re-anticipate to a higher extent than others. However, it could 
also indicate that the impact of the Euro was more significant for one firm than it was for the 
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other. In other words, there seems to be a relationship between the initial European positioning 
starting point and the extent to which the Euro has been used as a trigger to 'catch up ' wN ith the 
market leading strategy. This is being confirmed in the CE industry where these firms re-cluster 
on a higher level in the matrix, significantly closing the gap with the firm that takes the more 
dominant position. Similarities in European development perceptions are being transferred into 
European marketing actions differently based on the previous European strategy and the market 
knowledge and capability to respond. Strategic development is being articulated in a confirmative 
way, pointing out the sensemaking of managers in this industry. 
In the food industry the re-clustering of firms is significantly evident since the introduction of the 
Euro. This clustering is taking place because there is no significant action taken by the more 
Europeanised firms, or the action taken leads to a lower degree of Europeanisation which is 
indicating a differentiation/customisation strategy. What this explains is the fact that there are 
clearly different perceptions of the impact of the Euro, and the extent to which it is affecting the 
European strategy. While this is also based on the previous European strategy the Euro in this 
industry is being interpreted from extreme perspectives either leading to no significant market 
changes or as a trigger to make significant changes in the current strategy. This points out the 
sensemaking perspective of managers in this industry. The extreme perspectives of 
standardisation and customisation are confirmed, while strategies of firms where managers 
interpret the impact of the Euro as a strategic routine do indicate that the strategic implications as 
a result of the Euro are not always leading to no response. In some cases we found that despite the 
managers' interpretation the sensemaking is still leading to a higher degree of marketing 
standardisation. What this suggests is that manager are overruled, or do not fully reveal the 
European coordination of the firm making the suggestion or sensemaking of individuals of less 
significant importance. This finding is confirmed by the extent to which these firms are moving 
closer towards the initial defined strategic path of dependency. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Following the T° level of analysis this chapter has made a comparison how the perception and 
strategic intentions changed ten months after the introduction of the Euro. We particularly 
concentrated on the sub-questions; What impact of the Euro is perceived by managers? How does 
this impact influence the intended Euro strategy? And, what new actions are intended in response 
to the impact perceptions'? 
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In answering these questions we first investigated the environmental changes as they were 
perceived by managers to develop a narrative which described the industrial market changes and 
the behavioural of each firm. The narratives were then subjected to cross-case comparati\ e 
analyses to specify the extent to which the Euro has been interpreted differently since its 
introduction. These indicated that different levels of strategy deliberation are evident based on a 
significant difference in understanding and definition of the impact of the Euro. Although the 
level of perceived impact was not industry bound we found that food managers generally 
overestimated the impact of the Euro while managers in the CE industry tended to underestimate 
it, suggesting a greater impact of the Euro in the CE industry with different levels of 
Europeanisation thoughts. 
The second section therefore focussed on the interplay between impact perception and strategic 
intentions by analysing the extent to which the Euro is integrated into the strategy as a legitimate 
device to undertake more or less European oriented actions. This indicated that the Euro has 
significantly influenced the European viewpoint of most firms. Interestingly this viewpoint was 
articulated in various ways. Unlike the sensemaking perspectives of some of the managers this 
articulation was leading to either significant change in the present path of dependency while 
for 
most cases the strategy confirmed the path of dependency to a higher degree after the 
introduction 
of the Euro, which advocates the Euro as a reinforcement driver. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Discussion 
This present chapter presents a further analysis and discussion of the main findings of the 
research. Although the analysis up to this point has identified discrete characteristics which are 
context dependent and case-specific, this chapter does not engage in an in-depth comparison of 
these points of contrast and commensurability between the cases. The intention of this chapter is 
to further explore and discuss the themes that have been arising from the eight cases. These 
themes concentrate on the perceived impact of the Euro and the extent to which this has activated 
firms to undertake further action. Hence, the focus is not upon aspects of cross case variance. 
While variance clearly provides a useful platform for future research, it is beyond the scope of 
this research, which aims primarily to conceptualise the relationship between the introduction of 
the Euro and its perceived impact on the Europeanisation of strategy in the Euro-zone. This 
chapter is focused around three key-questions that are central in the debate how the behaviour of 
each of the firms is influenced between T° and P. The key-questions we address are; 
1. To what extent and in which ways do managers anticipate the impact of the Euro? 
2. To what extent and in which ways is the Euro a stimulus for strategic change? 
3. To what extent do changes in interpretation about the impact of the Euro lead to changes 
in strategic response? 
What we aim to distinguish between is those firms that see more direct impact since the 
introduction of the Euro, those that start to act more proactive and those that did both. Given these 
central questions together with the above objectives and the analysis of the previous chapter, the 
themes can be grouped into three distinctive but interrelated levels: The anticipation on emerging 
market changes, the interpretation of loci of causality after the introduction of the Euro, and the 
resulting transitory states of adaptation. This study acknowledges that the three levels identified 
here are not as definitive as they might seem. Different research findings may arise from similar 
social settings, when research foci and perspectives taken to anticipate the social reality can vary. 
Eloý\ever, the following analysis is based on the researcher's interpretation and knowledge \ýhich 
best conceptualises the dynamics of the studied phenomena. 
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The remainder of this chapter is presented and discussed in three sets of analysis that refer to the 
above mentioned key-questions. The first question present the analyses and discussion of 
interpretation before the introduction of the Euro, question two presents the analyses and 
discussion of interpretation of the impact of the Euro after its introduction. Finally, the third key 
question of interest is the interrelationship between the changes in interpretations and the changes 
in strategic response. 
7.1 Strategic behaviour before the introduction of the Euro 
Summary of key findings 
Probably one of the most distinctive findings arising from the T° level of analysis on Euro 
perception is based on the extent to which firms vary coevolving with their environment before 
the introduction of the Euro. Based on the process of scanning and interpretation (Daft & Weick, 
1984) a series of interrelated constructs were identified exploring the variation of strategy 
alignment for each firm. 
The key constructs indicating environmental scanning behavioural differences can be related to: 
0 Environmental complexity definition 
0 The selection of environmental themes 
0 The strategy in use before adaptation takes place 
As a result of these constructs we could identify different ideas, values, beliefs and expectations 
about the potential impact of the Euro that indicated two distinctive ways firms dealt with the 
Euro before its introduction: 
0 Preventive homeostatic intention 
0 Anticipatory strategic intention 
7.1.1 Pre Euro Adaptation: Variation of strategy alignment 
lt is often asserted that whilst firms must continually monitor the environment and make strategic 
decisions that keep them aligned with new opportunities and threats in the environment (e. g. 
Miles & Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1978; Quinn, 1980), they only actually do so from time to time. 
The underlying assumption is that organisations are naturally change resistant and . ti ill only 
change when forced, `kicked' or disturbed into doing something (see for example Miller & 
Friesen, 1984; Pettigrew, 1985). When the need for fundamental change is recognised, 
management embarks upon a significant strategic initiative, requiring a shift into a more 
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structured strategic process. Although there are obvious benefits of adjusting the strateg` early to 
meet the changing demands of the environment (e. g. Haveman, 1992), it is also pointed out that it 
is often difficult or even impossible for some firms to make adjustments to their current strate(-, \ 
(Miller & Friesen, 1984). For example, limitations on strategic change have been attributed to 
established commitments and the development of standard operating procedures (Hannan 
Freeman, 1989). It is therefore not surprising that firms in a profoundly changing environment 
vary significantly in the timing of their attempts to alter strategy. 
In this research this timing is primarily affected by managers' interpretation of the environmental 
impact on the firm as understood as a result of environmental scanning. Different levels of 
scanning behaviour significantly influence the alternatives that can be envisaged in the form of 
distinct configuration of environmental variables. In other words, managers only anticipate a few 
events or trends based on what they know and how they understand it. Other trends are not yet 
recognised. Similarly, the strategy in use also plays an important role in guiding interpretation 
(Daft & Weick, 1984). The organisation's strategy amounts to a statement of intention that 
influences perceptions of key issues reducing the interpretative focus. What our findings clearly 
indicate is that both strategy and environmental scanning shape predispositions that focus 
attention on some information and exclude others. This in turn shapes the interpretation and 
anticipation process of the manager. Following this argument figure 7.1 provides an interpretation 
schema based model for understanding the interrelationship between scanning and interpretation 
on which the findings on variation of strategy alignment before the introduction of the Euro will 
be discussed. 
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Environmental 
Scanning 
Adaptation of the 
Euro 
Identification of No 
Change 
Yes 
Interpretation of 
Impact 
Definition of O&T that affects 
performance 
Improvement No Homeostatic 
necessity Intension 
Yes 
Strategic Intension 
Figure: An interpretative schema ofthe impact of the Euro 
Figure 7.1: An interpretative schema of the impact of the Euro 
7.1.2 Environmental scanning: the identification of change 
In a situation of overwhelming complexity (Kauffman, 1995) or limited environmental knowledge 
due to a lack of experience as the event happens infrequently which causes accumulating 
knowledge difficulty (Sproull et al., 1991), organisations seek to increase information. Various 
gatekeepers aim to draw attention to environmental themes, thereby selecting out noise and 
distilling the most relevant considerations for the firm (Ansoff et al., 1982). What this indicates is 
that managers are initially interpreting selected information and observations using these 
environmental themes to shape their decisions and behaviours. They are actively constructing a 
series of mental maps along the way that are instrumental in making sense of the experience in 
guiding behaviour and actions, and ultimately in realising the success of the transformation itself. 
The extent to which the manager has awareness of complexity is critically depended upon the 
information available and the capability to interpret this information. It therefore does not seem 
surprising that we found that limited information availability withholds managers of taking action 
before the Euro is introduced. Particularly, whether the correct decision is made can only be 
judged after the introduction of the Euro as views are reconstructed as new information becomes 
available. 
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Findings in relation to the Euro show that the information gathering distillation process t} picall} 
can be divided into two levels of environmental scanning; 
" Problem solving scanning: there is a compulsory approach that focuses on the technical 
impact of the Euro 
" Analytical scanning: there is an exploring approach that goes beyond the technical 
process and aims to seek insight into the impact of the Euro on the business 
Firms active in the Euro-zone were forced to adopt the currency within a given timeframe. A level 
of fundamental scanning was based on the compulsory adaptation of the Euro as a currency that 
needed to be adopted. Response to this compulsory requirement indicated similar types of 
transition to deal with the basic (technical) issues that needed to be solved along different, context 
dependent, `tracks' or `pathways'. Second, environmental scanning appeared to be encouraged 
among firms that were financially dependent upon the Euro as a reporting unit as well as those 
that had a significant level of sales dependency in the Eurozone. We clearly found that the track 
Euro "awareness" took through the organisation and the degree of transformation it generated 
differed over time. Different timeframes were adopted for distinctive reasons. Environmental 
scanning behaviour shaped the attitude towards the Euro with early adopters such as Philips and 
Nutricia who showed a more complex understanding before the introduction of the Euro. In 
addition, this resulted in a significant variety of understanding which most obviously showed in 
specific definitions of opportunities and threats. This diversity of internal understanding is seen as 
a fundamental argument to degree of adaptability to the external environment. What is 
particularly important in the context of the Euro is the set of stimuli that are identified by the 
managers so it can respond to environmental threats and opportunities. Different stimuli 
identification (through environmental scanning) therefore leads to a different theme definition. 
7.1.3 Identification of impact of the Euro 
Interdependent linkages between components of disturbance understanding appear to have a 
cumulative positive effect on attitude, shaping the interpretation and level of anticipation. The 
level of understanding was often the result of the time taken to prepare for the Euro. This task 
could be separated into two distinct projects, each with crucial Euro adaptation dates. The first 
project included the technical implementation of the Euro, whereby the companies were guided 
by the official Euro time table, with a transitional period between January 1999 and December 
2001. The second project was dealing more with the strategic relevance of the Euro based on the 
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interpretation of the managers. Thus, at Philips, where the Euro preparation process started long 
before its introduction, the linkages between Euro impact understanding and attitude were strong, 
consistently pushing them to be a market leader in this area. 
However, at Sharp, Pioneer, Nutricia and Nestle, the linkages between impact understanding and 
attitude were weaker, as predictions were being made and expectations were being expressed but 
further effects on market players were not being interpreted as significant at that stage. Impact 
understanding among these firms was often the result of the time taken to prepare for the 
compulsory changeover to the Euro. In other words, firms whose intercompany financial traffic 
was dependent upon the Euro, or those that had a complex IT system which complicated the 
adaptation process, often took more time to prepare for the changeover which significantly 
enhanced their understanding of the potential impact of the Euro. 
At Kenwood, Hero and McCain, the linkages between Euro impact understanding and attitude 
were weak, as no significant strategic predictions were being made and concentration focussed on 
technical implications such as IT adjustments and Euro price calculations. The impact 
understanding was being judged as not that overwhelming, which either indicated a low level of 
expectations or a low level of awareness that decreased the search for information which clearly 
lowered the level of anticipation. The changes in strategic frames associated with the timing of 
strategic change identified in this study are directly consistent with performance and inertia 
theories of change which suggest that inertial forces that build in firms over time work to prevent 
strategic intention until they are surpassed by higher levels of impact understanding (Ginsberg, 
1988; Huff et al., 1992). 
7.1.4 Improvement necessity 
What is clearly evident is that with the passing of time, more information about the nature of the 
impact of the Euro becomes available and interpretations of managers become more specific. This 
was most clearly illustrated with a high level of recognition that could be linked back to the firms 
that started the adaptation to the Euro long before its introduction on a consumer level. However, 
the patterns of change exhibited in interpretations of the impact contradict Isabella's (1990) 
findings. Early interpretations before the introduction of the Euro were not vague, but clearly 
implied a need for only limited response. Managers from this perspective expected that numerous 
internal and external elements would be unaffected, which would protect them from the potential 
impact of the Euro. For example, the basis of the uncertainty of expectation was well understood 
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by Nestle, Pioneer, Sharp and Nutricia. Other firms such as Kenwood and McCain judged the 
implications as not overwhelming for their firm and therefore explicitly choose not to respond to 
the potential impact of the Euro before it occurred. This supports the view of the interpretative 
model of strategy (see Pettigrew, 1977; Cauwenbergh & Van Cool, 1982) as the emerging product 
of the partial resolution of environmental and intra-organisational dilemmas. Strategic response to 
the introduction of the Euro is only likely to take place when the specific ways of change are fully 
understood. This suggests that a direct link needs to be made between the impact of the Euro and 
the extent to which the current strategy requires adjusting to this impact. 
Thus far we argued that the identification of this link is primarily the result of environmental 
scanning of managers. Different scanning behaviour in terms of depth and timing resulted in a 
variation of understanding which significantly shape predispositions that focused attention on 
particular information. In this context it is important to address the second order question that 
underlies this argument; Why is there a significant difference of strategic environmental scanning 
behaviour? We found that the answer to this question is guided by the determination of 
improvement. This determination appears to be the result of the strategy in use (and its heuristic 
devices such as operating procedures) before the introduction of the Euro. Initially this influences 
the timing of environmental scanning. Consequently, those firms that take more time to scan the 
environment are also likely to define the gap between current strategy and potential impact more 
accurately. Improvement necessity therefore depends on the interpretation of the manager in what 
way the firm should act. More depth of scanning is given by those managers that interpreted the 
gap to be significant. On the other hand, managers that define the gap83 as non significant 
preferred to wait and see before taking action. Based on this interrelationship between scanning 
and strategy in use we can define two distinctive types of strategic intention the sampled firms 
adopted before the introduction of the Euro; (1) Preventive homeostatic intention and (2) 
Anticipatory strategic intention. We will discuss both types of intension in more detail. 
7.1.4.1 Preventive homeostatic intention 
We define preventive homeostatic intention as retrospective behaviour that can be characterised 
by its pending behaviour and the repetition of familiar decisions. It is important to highlight the 
notion of repetition of familiar decisions as effortful rather than habitual. This is consistent with 
Weick's proposition that organisations require `chronic rebuilding' (Weick, 1979 p. 44), 
83 This gap definition can be the result of the fact that the managers sees fit between the current strategy and 
the future developments. Alternatively, inadequate, low levels of scanning might result in a non-significant 
gap definition. 
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occasioned through continual re-accomplishment of processes. As such re-accomplishment is 
enacted; it may be considered a short term interpretative process. Accordingly eke found that 
seven of the eight organisations revealed a relatively low level of anticipation that indicated an 
incremental adaptation84 with error controlled regulation (Cyert & March, 1963; Stacey, 2000). 
Strategy from this incremental point of view was particularly concerned with establishing broad 
parameters, rather than specific actions. In addition, managers primary focussed on compulsory 
changes in relation to IT and financial issues. Strategic decision making therefore concentrated on 
pricing issues, such as price point definition and price margin. This was particularly evident for 
those firms that showed the weakest responses between Euro impact understanding and attitude. 
Firms with a stronger linkage such as Pioneer and Nutricia showed a more complex 
understanding, however, this understanding could not be linked back to specific actions. We 
found in this context that this relative short term view to the impact of the Euro satisfied 
prevailing expectations; however, longer term problems were clearly suppressed. Despite the fact 
that it is arguable whether the manager noticed the environmental changes, the most important 
interpretation of this incremental view was the judgement that the current strategy was robust 
enough to face the short term changes. Homeostatic intention is therefore the result of explicit 
assumptions that are driving the low motivation, lack of creative response or other inertial reasons 
to avoid change. What we would like to point out in this respect is that resistance to change is not 
as negative as suggested by some authors (e. g. Ansoff, 1991; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1997) since 
change is not inherently beneficial for organisations. 
7.1.4.2 Anticipatory strategic intention 
We define anticipatory strategic intension as a proactive, future-oriented interpretation where 
predictions play a significant role. Strategy from this anticipating point of view is particularly 
concerned with designing specific actions to deal with the identified opportunities and threats. 
This anticipatory behaviour was clearly evident at Philips where the managers interpreted the 
impact of the Euro as a positive business opportunity to improve asset accumulation and enhance 
their competitive position through the scale or scope of activities that were generated though 
historical path selection. In other words, the Euro was perceived as a facilitator or unambiguous 
signal to reinforce and further develop previous steps taken towards Europeanisation. Philips' 
information acquisition and processing made managers aware of the potential impact of the Euro 
84 Incremental learning stresses that organisations adapt to their environment by monitoring their experience 
and repeating past actions that appeared to be successful, without requiring improbable capacities for 
securing and processing information 
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that in one extreme could be mild in potential impact while to the other pole it could be regarded 
as an environmental `shocks' or significant disturbance that required action. Philips strategic 
decision making primarly focussed on the long term predictions of other market pla} er's 
behaviour at various market levels. This approach clearly showed a significant higher extent to 
which encouragement took place among the subsidiaries to help their colleagues to move to new 
paradigms or create a desirable future. 
The anticipatory intention revealed significant differences in terms of Euro preparation time, 
process structure, process complexity, process accuracy, and process speed among many other 
indicators of encouragement in comparison to the homeostatic intentions. Findings suggest that 
the most significant device of anticipatory intention is timing. Indeed, managers that completed 
the interpretation process the earliest where also more advanced in their strategic response. This 
suggests that the content of strategic change is partly driven by change in interpretation. The 
significance of this interpretation shift appears to point out if change takes place before or after 
the introduction of the Euro. Firms are unlikely to make significant changes unless they are 
certain such changes are required (Dutton et al., 1983). We therefore argue that if the key changes 
observed as a result of the Euro follow the strategy of the firm, the changes are better understood 
and could therefore serve to articulate the strategy. In other words, the development of strategic 
response to the Euro appears to be characterised by the cycling back and forth between 
interpretation and action. This argument supports the view of proponents of a sensemaking 
approach to organisational action (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
7.2 Consensus after the introduction of the Euro 
Summary of key findings 
This section presents the consensus building process with a particular focus on causal attribution. 
We discuss the perceptions of managers on impact causality, degree of impact stability, and 
impact controllability after the introduction of the Euro. We argue that the type of response to the 
impact of the Euro is the result of the interrelationship between the perceived stability and the 
controllability of the cause. 
The key findings on consensus building in the T' analysis concern; 
0 Locus of causality; there is a converging understanding of plausible impact causes 
" Degree of stability; there is a significant difference in consensus of causal stability 
" Controllability perception; there is a significant different causal controllability perception 
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As a result of these findings we could reveal a significant variation in perceptions of stress [an 
indicator that current routines are not appropriate which is based on the perceived impact effect 
of the Euro] that can be related to the diversity of timing and response to the introduction of the 
Euro. So the extent to which the impact of the Euro leads to significant changes in strategy 
critically depends on the perceived level of stress. Key findings have revealed that; 
" Stress perceptions are the result of interpretation rather than the modelling of the impact 
itself; 
" Stress must accumulate before renewal of strategic implications occur; 
" Stress is primarily caused when the actual magnitude of the impact of the Euro is seen as 
unexpected 
7.2.1 Post Euro perception: Causal attribution 
Strategic actions of the firm before the event are primarily guided by beliefs, expectations and 
interpretations. Yet, after the event takes place the impact interpretation shifts from a prospective 
form to a retrospective form (see Heider, 1958; Weick, 1979). Managers experience a certain 
impact on the organisation and try to understand what is causing this impact. We define the 
outcome of this process as causal attribution. Weiner (1979) proposed that each cause can be 
categorised along three dimensions: 
" Locus of causality: What is causing the impact? 
0 Degree of stability: What is the relative duration of the impact? 
0 Controllability: What is the decision-makers' perception of their ability to directly 
influence the cause? 
The significance of locus of causality is that it `tells' decision makers the source of impact (Ford, 
1985). From this viewpoint there is a widely shared assumption in the strategy literature that the 
strategy process involves a consensus building process (Lyles, 1981) during which organisational 
members develop a general level of agreement based on shared understanding. The attention 
problem that was initially leading to a reduction of organisation forecasting ability and causing 
di\ ersit` of understanding, can afterwards be shifted towards the relevant alternatives as 
environmental conditions are better understood (Durand, 2003). The new identified causes can be 
classified by their temporal stability (Curren & Folkes, 1992). Unstable causes are temporary and 
fluctuating; stable causes are more permanent and unchanging. Hence, the ke` drivers of 
downturn of performance are generally managerial perceptions of opportunity or relative 
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weakness or threat the stability effect has on the current strategy (Hendry et al.. 1993). \lo t 
importantly managers must be paying sufficient attention to their environment to recognise this 
impact (Dutton & Duncan, 1987) . 
Moreover, managers must be motivated to act as the 
experience stress, tension, or conflict (Milburn et al., 1983). The degree of threat is informed by 
the magnitude of the downturn and its sustainability: deep downturns fostering interpretations of 
greater threats (Curren & Folkes, 1992). All downturns may therefore be seen as varying in level 
of crisis they precipitate, with that level being a function of managers' interpretation. 
We therefore argue that if managers respond to specific causal attributions critically is the result 
of prior judgement of the interrelationship between the perceived stability and the controllability 
of the cause. The influence they have on attribution depends on the information to which decision 
makers attend. Again the analysis of information depends on the predicted outcome of stability 
and controllability, the strategy in use and the interpretation of managers themselves. 
Locus of 
Causality 
Perceived Perceived 
Degree of Ability to 
Stability Control 
Attribution 
Response 
Dynamics 
Figure: Prior response perception 
Figure 7.2: Prior response perception 
In the following section we will discuss each of the dimensions of this consensus building process 
in more detail. 
7.2.1.1 Locus of causality 
All eight firms interpret that the most significant impact of the Euro as facilitating the changing 
role of intermediaries. Two closely linked constructs particularly driving this argument are; 
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" The internationalisation of retailers and; 
0 The increasing bargaining power of this channel 
The most common used argument driving this development concerns the expectation that the 
increase of price awareness in the Euro-zone reveals significant implications for retailers that 
encourage them to broaden their competitive perspective. More specifically, the increasing price 
awareness is fundamentally interpreted from two different perspectives; 
" Current price differences are out of proportion and are therefore unjustifiable vv Il ich 
increases the pressure to lower the existing pricing bandwidth in the Euro zone or; 
" Current pricing differences are relatively easy to justify, however, justification gives a 
better insight in international trading conditions. 
Findings suggest that the Euro is a significant driver redefining the balance whereby the 
traditional retail specialists are making place for large stores, specialising in broadly defined 
sectors and international concept stores. This process is stimulated as retailers identify 
international growth opportunities through price comparison. This results in retailers moving 
across borders by applying domestic market conditions to new markets. Hence, the Euro amplifies 
structural change as it is contributing to the increase in international activity. This implies that 
retailers are either combining forces or are indeed expanding to other countries to fully benefit 
from existing price differences. Although we found that a similar movement is expected in the 
food industry in the near future, at the moment the impact is characterised by its high level of 
market condition comparative behaviour. Retailers use price comparative behaviour to pressure 
firms to align the services and conditions in Europe. This is clearly evident with the increase of 
European contract negotiations. Retailers aim to negotiate better market conditions by using the 
Euro as a comparative tool. 
7.2.1.1.1 Change in causal interpretations 
Changes in concepts and linkages related to the impact of the Euro result in a change in meaning 
and interpretation. In most cases the change begins with incremental changes in causal concepts 
that clearly shift away from the initial anticipated price impact. For example, Sharp's 
interpretation of the impact of the Euro dramatically changed over the study period. Before the 
introduction, the Euro has been interpreted as a technical problem with no significant additional 
implications. 
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After the introduction, this rather consistent belief begins to give «av for strategic implications 
during a period in which a number of incremental changes take place. The underlying model is 
what has been happening as the result of the Euro is depending critically on the behaviour of 
others, particularly intermediates. The notion of anticipation therefore becomes more complex 
after the introduction as the strategic implications clearly shift to the interpretation and 
anticipation of these third parties in terms of actions and time scale. This change in focus 
represents significant shift in causal interpretations, because at the same time feýýer concepts 
related to internal price opportunities are mentioned, references to outside impact threats begin to 
appear. The anticipation and response patterns of the food and CE firms therefore focus on 
exploiting the impact of this external behavioural change on their strategy. What we find is some 
similarity of environmental change understanding that has a significant different impact on the 
strategic intent of the firm. However, anticipation has been articulated as the Euro triggered the 
direction of the strategic change. These results are consistent with other interpretation pattern 
development studies (e. g. Isabella, 1990; Barker & Barr, 2002). 
7.2.1.2 Degree of impact stability 
All downturns may be seen as varying in level of crisis they precipitate, with that level being a 
function of managers' interpretation. Though increasingly dynamic environments make it 
appropriate to describe renewal as an ongoing activity (van de Ven, 1986), there is an empirical 
observable distinction between dramatic, status quo changing efforts and other equally important 
but less dramatic changing efforts that maintain the current trajectory of strategy. We found 
different levels of motivations to respond resulting in significant variation of foci in their response 
that indicate an interpreted temporary or permanent effect. This difference in interpretation is at 
least partly responsible for diversity in timing and response to the impact of the Euro. We 
therefore discuss both concepts and its findings in more detail below. 
7.2.1.2.1 Temporary downturn effect 
The key findings on downturn effect show that the interpretation of the impact of the Euro as a 
temporary effect on the current strategy critically is the result of two interrelated constructs; 
" The relative low extent to which the manager noticed the impact or; 
" The high extent to which this impact is interpreted as non-stressful. 
Although we can not know for certain to what extent firms overlooked the impact of the Euro, ý, ýe 
believe that the managerial perceptions not to act should have strong justifications why the firm 
has chosen not to do so. Moreover, on the longer term a low stress level indicates that less 
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attention is given to the impact resulting in a lower degree of environmental scanning that might 
influence the impact judgement, as it is through interpretation of the information that the 
possibility of latent downturn is identified (see Daft & Weick, 1984). From this perspective ýýe 
find that McCain is the only firm that does not exhibit the association of the impact of the Euro 
with non-pricing issues. Despite the fact that there is awareness that intermediaries change their 
behaviour, they did not demonstrate a further understanding of the implications of this 
development. This is mainly due to the fact that potential threats such as increasing bargaining 
power are not perceived as stressful. Main arguments used against these threats are primarily 
based on the simplicity of the frozen food sector and the position of McCain within this sector. 
A relatively non-stressful interpretation is also found at Nestle, Nutricia and Pioneer. These firms 
share that the perceived consequence of the changing behaviour of intermediaries is not sufficient 
to significantly change performance expectations. This perception is based on impact 
understanding and change interpretation. Based on this understanding these firms expect that the 
current strategy is robust enough to cope with any additional changes that might occur. 
Given these two arguments it appears reasonable to conclude that strategic adaptation is triggered 
through interpretation rather than the notification of the impact itself. In other words, noticing 
appears to be necessary; however, managers must understand and interpret its connection to their 
own activities in order to respond. The general consensus is that there must be a significant 
modification in understanding before adjustments in the current strategy are made. This provides 
a particular lens through which the impact of the Euro is perceived and understood. Nonetheless, 
this does not suggest that managers that only see a temporary effect will not respond to the impact 
of the Euro. It does suggest however that explicit action will only be taken when the impact itself 
is revealed to them. 
These findings strongly support the idea that stress must accumulate before change occurs (Huff 
et al., 1992). Early stages of accumulations are therefore characterised by points of view that 
remain transparent and unrecognised. As long as this level of consciousness is not disturbed it ýý ill 
lead to no additional examination or understanding. In sum, we identified two levels of temporary 
effect interpretation. The first level is indicated by McCain who is the only firm that interpreted 
the impact of the Euro as a temporary effect. The second level is represented by the other three 
firms who are not yet facing a stress level that stimulates them to respond. However, in 
comparison to McCain these firms demonstrate a higher level of environment scanning which 
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makes it more likely for them that through the interpretation of information the possible latent (if 
any) downturn can be identified. Thus, if stress increases over time than renewal is 
simultaneously more likely in the second level and less likely in the first level. 
7.2.1.2.2 Permanent downturn effect 
Key findings reveal that the impact of the Euro is interpreted as permanent when decision makers' 
experience or anticipate a detrimental change as a result of this impact. A stressful situation is 
arising from the mismatch between the demands and opportunities facing the organisation and the 
capacity of the current strategy to respond to those conditions. These permanent effects engage 
adaptation even though the signals might be weak (Ansoff, 1977). The responses to these effects 
are mostly evident through strategic planning, environmental scanning and other forecasting 
activities to provide basis for such anticipatory actions. 
We find that those firms that were already pursuing a European strategy are to some extent 
reinforced in that approach. At Philips for example, reinforcement takes place through notification 
and interpretation of arising opportunities and threats that accelerate the current strategic path in a 
particular direction. In their path selection Philips takes into consideration the realised outcome of 
the previous European strategy in combination with the likely actions of significant stakeholders 
in trying to understand what to do next. In other words, these developments point out the 
inadequacies of current strategy that allows Philips to fine tune their strategy. For example, 
managers at Philips note that the impact of the Euro is more significant than anticipated in 
advance. Now that its exact impact is better understood, re-interpretation takes place to improve 
strategic implications in relation to European consistency, European identity, and European 
competition levelling. 
Secondly, among those firms that kept their options open in the past, Sharp and Hero emphasise 
that they should now make a greater commitment. Anticipation therefore shifts the attention to 
making sure that the firm positions itself so that if Europeanisation of retailer behaviour becomes 
more evident it will be able to respond effectively. Anticipation does not suggest that the firm 
takes the action to exploit the opportunity, because the opportunity only arises in this case if 
others choose to take steps as well. However, anticipation from this perspective implies managers 
taking precautionary steps as they expect that the impact will hit the firm sooner or later. The 
impact of these changing efforts is evident through radical shifts in current strategic patterns. We 
observed significant shifts of strategic anticipation at Hero and Sharp. Both firms initially 
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interpreted the Euro as a shock; its effect afterwards is interpreted as being of more si`-unifcant 
strategic importance. Findings suggest that permanent interpretation is the result of the more 
fundamental changes in the market place on a European level. Both options indicate an 
identification of the need for European consistency as a result of this impact that implies 
significant changes in the internal environment. 
Based on these two distinctive interpretations it appears that firms that view the impact of the 
Euro as having a permanent effect are primarily driven by its potential effect on the longer term. 
In terms of path of development abruption there are some non-anticipated effects whereby 
changes in the path selection are based on the fact if the magnitude of these effects is taken by 
surprise in terms of dimension and impact. What it then clearly represents is a rapid and 
fundamental shift in the basic circumstances of the organisation that requires a redefinition of 
internal logic. The key idea behind permanent downturn effect is therefore the judgement that a 
direction for renewal needs to be developed to align the strategy to the new circumstances. 
Moreover, there is awareness that this process takes time. Steps to significant transformation are 
taken even though the exact details are still being worked out. This finding is consistent with 
Quinn's (1980) description of rational incrementalism who argues that firms can not move 
immediately into a new way of acting. In addition, the firm now must come to grips with 
implementation, which involves trial and error. This implies that there is a substantial risk of 
reverting back to previous strategies (Sproull & Hofmeister, 1986). In other words expectations 
might be high, while the actual effectiveness of the newly (to be) formulated strategy is likely to 
be low. It should also be taken into account that the environment itself, does not remain static 
during the process. It is assumed to evolve to more complex states over time (Webb & Pettigrew, 
1999). 
7.2.1.3 Controllability perception 
A recurrent theme in adapting to the Euro has been the notion of strategic awareness, 
understanding and interpretation of its impact. This identification process suggests that there is a 
sensing of development of the potential influence of the impact on the current organisations 
strategy. Yet, this understanding of impact is followed by problem diagnosis to specit` the 
assessments involved (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). This process is critically important for 
understanding if, how and when managers intentionally respond to the environment. The 
fundamentals of this identification are based on a prior judgement if the impact is controllable or 
not (Lazarus, 1991). Perceived control is the believe of managers that they can manage the impact 
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of a situation. When managers perceive that they can control the outcome, they are more likely to 
view the impact of the Euro as attractive (Walsh et al., 1988). In contrast, when managers 
perceive the impact of the Euro as less controllable, they are likely to perceive the impact of the 
Euro as one with negative implications. Although this suggests a relationship between 
controllability and the appraisal of the impact (see for example Dutton & Jackson, 1987; \\ bite et 
al., 2003; White et al., 2003), this study suggests that, unlike previous authors, a negative impact 
perception is not related to uncontrollability. We find that the controllability perception is the 
result of the interpretation of available information and the anticipation ability of the manager. To 
better understand the interwoven nature of controllability, environmental scanning and 
interpretation, we will develop the debate on downturn stability by adding two additional 
dimensions: 
" Internal-external attribution and; 
" Global-specific attribution. 
The implications of these dimensions to explain controllability is often suggested in the 
reformulated helplessness literature (for an extensive review see Deuser & Anderson, 1995). 
7.2.1.3.1 Internal-external attribution 
Attribution to internal factors indicates that the manager believes the opportunity or threat can be 
tackled by reformulating the current strategy. We found in this respect that the level of 
controllability is the result of impact interpretation. Interestingly, managers that perceived the 
impact of the Euro as a temporary problem do not necessarily attributed the potential downturn to 
uncontrollable (external) issues. Instead, these companies do not respond strategically until the 
impact is interpreted as having a direct effect on the performance of the firm. In contrast, the 
managers that do interpret the impact of the Euro as having a permanent effect on the firm 
. attribute this impact to internal issues of misalignment that can be solved through strategising 
Thus what we find is that decision makers first attribute the impact of the Euro to controllable 
causes. The extent to which this motivates the manager to regain control clearly depends on their 
interpretation of the effect on the performance of the firm. In the case of McCain no direct link is 
being made between the changing behaviour of intermediaries and the performance of the Firm. A 
second cluster of firms interpret the impact of the Euro as controllable but, however, define that 
no response is currently necessary. 
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In comparison to the results of other empirical tests on managerial interpretations of specific 
events (Staw et al., 1981), we find that threats do not necessarily trigger defensiv e-tv pe of 
responses but, in the short term, can also lead to no response. Thus the impact of the Euro can be 
isolated, as the nature of the response can be linked back to the interpretation of this impact. The 
believe that control can be regained is far more consistent among those managers that perceived 
the impact of the Euro as permanent. By engaging in related activities, these managers suggest 
that they can engage in the activity in which they have lost control. For example, the Philips. 
Sharp and Hero cases suggest that although control cannot be regained directly. clear attempts are 
made to regain control by making the environment more predictable, which most evidently shows 
in their significant increase in strategic planning after the introduction of the Euro. 
Overall it seems reasonable to suggest that these interpretation differences can be linked back to 
the achievability and the desirability of a change the current strategy. One explanation for its 
different expectations can be based on the state of the strategic process during the changeover to 
the Euro. An important factor in this respect is the moment the manager sensed the Euro as a 
trigger to entail diversification and confrontation of views. This indicated different motivation 
levels that appears to be linked to different timing patterns. The notion that decision makers 
attempt to restore perceptions of control suggests that movement along the controllability 
dimension is temporally sequential. Downturns are at first attributed to controllable causes. At 
this stage there is a relative low level of interpretation. However, it can be beneficial if conflicting 
views lead to consideration of critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints, and initial 
confrontation of views is consolidated later on in the process if necessary. Further on in the 
controllability dimension sequence we find firms that are going through trial and error processes 
to regain control in the longer term. It is important to note that the attempts taken do not actually 
restore the control, however, it restores the managers perception of their ability to control. At the 
most developed stage we find Philips who aimed to regain control from the start of the process. 
We did not find that commitment to a certain course of action for this firm that anticipated the 
event has blocked accommodation to changing conditions, as the changes have strengthened their 
previous degree of interpretation in addition to the increasing scope since the introduction of the 
Euro. Further research however, should investigate if the degree of consensus increases further 
over time. 
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7.2.1.3.2 Global-specific attribution 
The manager might attribute failure to specific factors that raises the expectation that respon'c 
only needs to be applied in relation to those factors. In contrast, global attribution refers to a ýH idlc 
range of factors for potential failure. Whether attribution of impact will lead to specific or ý-, Iobal 
failure depends significantly on three distinct but interrelated constructs; 
0 Degree of stability, 
0 Anxiousness, and; 
9 Magnitude interpretation. 
Stability refers to the duration of the impact and anxiousness refers to the level of perceived stress 
as a result of the impact. Magnitude interpretation refers to the outcome of the first two constructs 
and outlines the question; how much harm will result from the impact of the Euro? In other 
words, what opportunities and threats are defined by the manager as a result of the impact'? From 
this perspective we find two levels of Europeanisation of magnitude that can be linked to 
subsidiary specific or European attribution, indicating a proactive or reactive response pattern. 
In this research, specific (reactive) attribution is an interpretation issue that is characterised by the 
simple causal maps that are made between the impact of the Euro and downturn perception. In 
addition, specific attribution is also characterised by a relative insignificant disruption of the Euro 
on the continuity of the existing strategy. Disruption is perceived at a local level. Firms from this 
perspective attribute the impact of the Euro to pricing issues in particular. The implication of price 
transparency is less significant in the food industry, due to the lower degree of price 
comparability. Interestingly, both Pioneer and Kenwood reveal an increasing pressure as a result 
of the changing market environment; however, both chose not to respond during the period 
studied. A similar approach is followed by Nutricia and Nestle, who are both aware of the 
changes but that its actual impact is not as strong as anticipated in advance. Most managers that 
attribute the impact to pricing issues, with the exception of McCain managers, reveal an 
awareness of additional changes. 
Conversely, the degree of learning is assumed to be incremental and vti ilI only have a major effect 
if the wider changes also happen. For instance, if price transparency increases the awareness of 
intermediaries and stimulates them to internationalise their actions, then these firms might be 
exposed to additional pressures. So far exposure has been not significant enough for these firms to 
attribute the impact of the Euro to these additional pressures. On the other hand, global 
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(proactive) attribution is characterised by a more significant change understandimg as the 
interpretation of behavioural changes amongst intermediaries result in neýý linkages that can be 
linked back to the impact of the Euro. Managers from this perspective also attribute the initial 
changes to price related issues; however, they clearly reveal additional attributions as a result of 
the environmental shift. For example, Sharp and Hero expect that the identified market chanýyes 
will create pressures for them to act on a more European level. As a direct response to the 
expected increase of comparative behaviour of intermediaries, consumers and competitors in 
Europe, significant adjustments to their current strategy are required. 
To sum up, it seems reasonable to suggest that managers test and experiment with a construed 
reality that moves beyond the traditional boundaries of past sensemaking. Thus, characteristics of 
collective interpretation are still in search for consequences. From this perspective we find 
significant differences in active seeking that can be linked back to motivation and anxiousness. 
Firms that do see impact implications experience a more significant magnitude that drives to find 
more advanced solutions. For these firms we clearly notice a shift in interpretation. Firms that 
limit the implications to specific issues reveal a much lower magnitude that holds them back from 
in depth environmental scanning at this stage. We assume that this interpretation and behaviour 
will shift as soon as the magnitude increases for these firms. We therefore conclude that it appears 
that collective interpretations move from an unformed and tentative to well-constructed, well 
processed viewpoints at significant different speeds. This might indicate that a fuller 
understanding still needs to be accomplished by those firms that do not see additional implications 
at this stage. 
7.2.2 Transitory states of consensus 
Prior to continuing the debate on impact response patterns it seems to be important to combine the 
first two sections of this chapter to outline the transitory states of consensus. Pre-Euro findings 
have suggested that most managers adapted a retrospective behaviour that could be characterised 
as a short term interpretative process aiming to prevail expectations. Most importantly, the 
managers judged the strategy in use as being robust enough to deal with short term changes. 
Managers at Philips, however, adapted a longer term view and predicted some permanent 
controllable effects that required further action to align the strategy in use to the anticipated 
market changes. After the introduction of the Euro the impact causality is better understood. 
resulting in a converging understanding of plausible impact causes. Nevertheless, the impact of 
this cause results in variation of perception. Most of the managers identify a mismatch betýýeen 
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current strategy and the impact. However, only in a few cases this results in the consensus to 
adapt the strategy in use to this environment. The following figure 7.3 indicates the shifts and 
reinforcements in states of consensus that could occur as a result of the changing perception o% er 
time; 
Temporary Temporary --' Controllable Uncontrollable 
Permanent & Permanent & r Controllable 
L 
Uncontrollable 
l, 
- 
Figure: Transitory states of impact consensus 
Figure 7.3: Transitory states of impact consensus 
The consensus building section has revealed that decision makers first attribute the impact of the 
Euro to controllable issues. This indicates a shift or reinforcement to controllable states. When the 
impact is interpreted as controllable decision makers are primarily concerned with the extent to 
which they should confront the impact. The extent to which this motivates the manager to regain 
control depends on the predicted degree of stability. If the impact is seen as temporary it is likely 
that they adapt an incremental approach that opts to defend the current domain which might result 
in no response. If the impact is seen as permanent it is likely that they adapt a more rational 
approach that aims to manipulate the current domain by fine-tuning or renewing the current 
strategy. 
7.3 Change in response patterns after the introduction of the 
Euro 
Summary of key findings 
This section aims to link the belief systems, representing the concepts and cause: -effect 
relationship employed by the dominant coalition of the firm, with the strategic behaviour of the 
firm, which refers to the actual patterns of response. Different patterns of alignments of belief 
systems to the impact of the Euro explain how anticipation and interpretation play a role in the 
strategising function (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Findings suggest three types of response 
patterns that Miles (1982) might call domain manipulation: 
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0 Domain defence; No drastic changes in belief systems, other than a concLptual refinement 
or strengthening of existing cognitive maps. 
0 Domain offence through fine-tuning; Some drastic revisions in belief systems in response 
to detected changes that create opportunities for improvement. 
0 Domain offence through new domain creation; Drastic revision and reversal of belief 
systems in response to detected changes which threaten the central goals or survival of the 
firm. 
The type of response pattern that is adapted is a logical interrelationship between cause-effect 
belief systems, strategic orientation, and organisational inertia. 
7.3.1 Post Euro adaptation: Variation of strategy alignment 
The causal attribution section has revealed that internal factors such as information-processing 
constraints, organisational history, and external factors such as legal and fiscal barriers guide, and 
to an extent lock-in the manager's belief system to certain interpretations and predictions. This 
resulted in a variation of consensus explaining if managers where going to respond to the impact 
of the Euro. In this section we will continue this debate by examining how firms are responding to 
the impact of the Euro. According to the belief system, response is likely to occur when the 
controlling dominant coalition is convinced that there is an obvious (controllable and permanent) 
opportunity or threat that requires further actions. However, response does not only relate on 
individual factors. Each firms' adoptiveness will also be determined by a variety of organisational 
factors, which include the availability of slack resources, the level of internal complexity, and the 
degree of centralisation and formalisation of decision making. In other words, the type of change 
that is occurring is to some extent bound also to this strategic orientation and its related 
organisational inertia (Chakravarthy, 1982). We will define both concepts and explain its context 
within this study. 
7.3.1.1 Variation as the result of strategic orientation 
Adaptation patterns often refer to significant changes in organisational strategy and structure 
(Miles & Snow, 1978; Miles, 1982). Several authors (e. g. Miles & Snow, 1978; Miles, 1982; 
Miller & Friesen, 1986; Porter, 1980) have tended to concentrate on the development of strategic 
orientations that rate these patterns in terms of organisational domain change. This posits that 
over a period of time successful organisations develop a systematic, identifiable approach to 
environmental adaptation. This embodies the approaches taken by businesses ith 
differing 
perspectives on the competitive environment to address three types of problems: entrepreneurial 
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problems that deal with the definition of market product domain, engineering problems involving 
the technical system, and administrative problems arising from structure and process issues (see 
adaptive cycle Miles & Snow, 1978). These intricately interwoven problems highlight the various 
areas where an organisation might be affected by when taking a particular strategic decision. 
These views of strategic adaptation provide useful analytical metaphors, however; we contend 
that they overly depict adaptation content in terms of static states. We therefore conquer with the 
notion that organisations are not rationally moving from one static state or stable equilibrium to 
another, but instead are moving across dynamic and complex patterns in order to adapt to the 
environment (e. g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Bartlett & Ghoshal Sumantra, 1998; Miles et al., 
1997; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). As the empirical result show, 
there is the belief system that firms should pursue multiple (product) strategies at one point of 
time to deal with the impact of the Euro. These are likely to be altered and converged overtime, 
which arguably can be a trigger towards changing the strategic orientation. However, focussing 
on a single causal attribution relationship, as one of the patterns among many other changes, does 
not allow us to indicate the extent to which organisational domains are affected by the impact of 
the Euro. However, it does allow giving a better insight into what elements of the adaptive cycle 
(Miles & Snow, 1978) are affected in which ways. 
7.3.1.2 Variation as the result of organisational inertia 
When planning to alter product-market domains, the manager will to some extent be limited in his 
viewpoints as the strategic orientation provides a particular repertoire of idiosyncratic collective 
actions that are based on past experience of problem solving (e. g. Nelson & Winter, 1982). It is 
often argued that organisational success is marked by achieving fit or consistency between this 
strategic orientation, on the one hand, and internal and external environment on the other (e. g. 
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). In other words, organisations establish and maintain critical 
competences based on this consistency. As a result, managers face organisational inertia that often 
hinders to implement and support (e. g. structure, controls, coordination of power etc. ) a new 
belief system. We therefore argue that there appears to be a distinct line between design of a 
belief system and the system or structures evolved to execute these activities. We assume that a 
given structure is capable of executing only a highly constrained set of response patterns. 
Moreover, different designs and different element of design among the cases consequently result 
in different ways and varying degrees in which firms adapt to the impact. In a way this implies 
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that the response is automatically contingent upon the structure of the firm. Alternatively, 
structural inertia needs to be overcome in order to implement these changes. Even so this not 
lead to complete overhauls of the current strategy as the diffusion of this organisational 
innovation will be extremely slow compared to the diffusion of for example technological 
innovations (Armour & Teece, 1980; Quinn, 1980). 
7.3.2 Strategic development framework 
Figure 7.4 provides a plausible cause interpretation schema for understanding the interrelationship 
between locus of impact and firm-level response patterns. It will be used as a framework to 
discuss the strategic development of each firm after the introduction of the Euro. 
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Degree of 
" Stability 
Permanent .. Temporary 
Controllability Uncontrollable 
perception 
Controllable 
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I control 11.0 
= Domain 
?0 Europeanised Defence 
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Figure. Plausible cause interpretation schema of the ir-npact of the Euro 
Figure 7.4: Plausible cause interpretation schema of the impact of the Euro 
7.3.3 Locus of Control: Strategies for domain manipulation 
Response patterns seem to be dynamic and complex in character concerning their emergence and 
development (see also Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Pettigrew, 1985). It appears that the 
complexity that the organisation chooses to adapt to is determined by its product-market strate`gyý. 
Obviousl\', it would be impossible for firms to cope with the entire complexity of all dynamics 
'77 
associated with the environment. Thus the dynamism the firm chooses to cope with is a choice of 
the decision makers. Effectively what managers are doing when responding to the impact of the 
Euro is evaluating to what extent a product-market strategy is affected by the identified causal 
attribution. Each product-market strategy is going through a rational and independent choice by a 
clear and certain belief system in which the impact of the Euro is faced. In doing so a firm can 
simultaneously use different product strategies to deal with different facets of the causal 
attribution as some product-market strategies might be affected to a higher extent then others. 
Nevertheless, when change is required it appears that the same decision is being made. We 
therefore found that there is a predominant strategy within every firm, which dictates whether it 
will avoid, react or create to respond to the impact of the Euro. Findings indicate that domain- 
adaptation is occurring in three different modes (Miles, 1982); 
" Domain defence; No drastic changes in belief systems, other than a conceptual refinement 
or strengthening of existing cognitive maps. 
" Domain offence through fine-tuning; Some drastic revisions in belief systems in response 
to detected changes that create opportunities for improvement. 
" Domain offence through new domain creation; Drastic revision and reversal of belief 
systems in response to detected changes which threaten the central goals or survival of the 
firm. 
We will discuss the extent to which the perceived impact of the Euro created tension between full 
local autonomy and the control structures in the organisation. In particular, we will consider 
whether there are any structural role changes within the HQ or subsidiary that can be used as 
evidence that the previous decision making authority between HQ and subsidiaries (control 
strategy) is changing since the advent of the Euro. We find that different belief systems suggest 
different degrees of structural control between local (autonomous) and European (centralised). 
Indeed these choices may range from attempts to manipulate environmental features to make 
them more consonant with organisational goals, strategies, and structures to the choice of the 
environments in which an organisation wishes to operate. In some firms, managers minimise the 
constraints on adaptation and manoeuvre their organisation through or around environmental 
obstacles into domains more abundant in resources and opportunities. From this perspective, the 
actual response depends on the firm's belief system combined with both the strategy in use and 
level of organisational inertia. 
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7.3.3.1 Localised Control: Domain defence 
We define a localised approach as referring to autonomous affiliates which are more actin e and 
sentient agents, able to develop, and implement their own variant of a local strate-zv that will 
contribute as required towards overall organisational objectives. We view this response pattern as 
domain defence (Miles, 1982) as these managers aim to preserve or restore legitimacy to an 
existing domain. This localised approach is therefore not necessarily a static approach. Dynamism 
occurs in a variety of ways in which local agents can help to increase the vibrancy of corporate 
strategy at the local level (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). The key element in this context is the 
judgement that the identified impact of the Euro does not have a (negative) effect on the European 
strategy of the firm. In other words, the 'old' strategic frame is likely to hold concepts 
corresponding to the impact of the Euro. Even if managers are aware of potential changes in the 
business environment, other indicators are needed before strategic change is enacted. At the 
subsidiary level it may even be that managers are not completely open to new ideas as only few 
direct connections to subsidiaries performance are made. Moreover, disagreement may exist about 
the cause and its effect, which delays the formation of organisation consensus on the wvay to 
respond. 
These arguments suggests that the timing for strategic change are directly consistent with stress 
and inertia theories of change which suggest that inertial forces build in firms over time and 
prevent change until they are dominated by higher level of stress (Huff et al., 1992). Underlying 
conditions of sensemaking add to the domain defence approach of Kenwood and Pioneer as they 
judged their current strategic frame as robust enough to incorporate the identified issues of 
impact. Although both firms stressed some concern about necessary consistency (and hence 
coordination) across Europe, both argued it was too early to respond further to the impact. Indeed, 
historical aims to align the strategy to global trends in the CE industry provided some evidence 
that Pioneer was likely to cope with these issues in the short term. At Kenwood however, it 
appears that the limited capability to process complex information in an efficient manner 
significantly influenced the company's viewpoints on European coordination at this stage. 
Localisation of decision control in the food industry can be attributed to the importance `giv cri to 
an orientation based on the local business, cultural, and political environment. At Nestle, the 
nature and durability of this approach was not questioned after the introduction of the Euro. On 
the contrary, local alignment of specific issues emphasises the essentials of this defensive strategy 
in the Eurozone. Nutricia and McCain demonstrated the same degree of local freedom which 
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allowed the subsidiary to develop a partial or complete strategic response to the perceived impact 
of the Euro that met the local pressures, needs, and requirements 
To sum up, a domain defence approach is adopted when the collective level of stress is low. This 
low level of stress can be the result of the drivers of motivation that indicate that no significant 
gap is identified between the current strategy and the required fit with the environment. This can 
be the result of an interpretation that the impact is in line with the current strate`gy`, so no 
significant negative impact is identified. On the other hand, it might be that the issues of fit itself 
had no significant triggering effect [i. e. it is not an issue of complexity the manager chooses to 
cope with]. Most importantly, both issues of motivation indicate that environmental fit is not 
being seen as crucial at this stage as nonhuman elements such as structures, systems, procedures, 
routines, and strategy are interpreted as not significantly affected. 
7.3.3.2 Europeanised control: Domain offence 
We define an Europeanised approach as an integrated network of European subsidiaries that are 
merely distant tools of corporate management, reacting as ganglia to impulses sent downward 
through the bureaucratic system (e. g. Doz & Prahalad, 1981). We view this response pattern as 
domain offence (Miles, 1982) which can result in fine-tuning of the current strategy or creation of 
a new strategy. The former refers to maintenance and improvement, the later refers to 
supplementing current domains with new domains by adding or replacing activities. The 
dynamics of domain offence suggests that all key managers understand and accept the basic 
strategic posture. Even when decision makers may disagree about the causes and its impact, there 
seems to be some sort of centralised power that supports a given position. What this indicates is 
that domain offence within large organisations can be associated with single loop learning and 
centralisation of coordination. To implement a domain offensive European strategy, it may be 
necessary for the EHQ to influence the direction of the subsidiary strategy, indicating a shift in 
power within the organisation towards a more ethnocentric mechanism (Birkinshaw, 
2000, 
Birkinshaw et al., 2000). 
Among the firms where domain offensive strategy was suggested we find that the type of offence 
response to regain control at a European level can be linked to the strategic frame 
in use before 
the change takes place. Prior to strategic action taking place, these firms need to undergo certain 
internal changes to align the strategy to the new market circumstances. Implementation of these 
changes typically go through interrelated adaptation phases that can be characterised as, 
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0 Power orientation; 
0 Change of power relation and; 
" Power balancing 
The first phase refers to the consensus that the effect of the impact is permanent and controllable. 
This phase is interpreted as the trigger to change. Hero and Sharp were respectively at a late staue 
of power orientation and at an early stage of changing the power relationships within the 
European network. Managers in these two firms point out the necessity of European 
configurations to achieve distinctive patterns of strategic change that indicate the creation of an 
appropriate structural context. This re-patterning finding is somewhat similar to Doz and 
Thanheisers' (1993) shift of `minor or major transformation'85. This study suggests that only a 
finite number of stable strategic changes are feasible, and that transformations are not as rigorous 
as found by Doz and Thanheiser (1993). There is an emphasis on structural re-patterning to 
reconfigure the European network and create internal linkages that help to improve external 
relationships. This creates more effective communities of practice on a European level in order to 
respond to potential behavioural shifts of stakeholders. 
Alternatively, structural re-patterning at Hero reveals an adaptation of domain offence through 
new domain creation. The strategy in use before the adaptation involved subsidiaries which were 
significantly differentiated having been build up over time from- their own unique capabilities. 
We should stress however that the suggested network changes were taking place at a sub- 
subsidiary, typically product group division level. This suggests that domains were added to the 
current strategy, replacing some old domains and creating new ones. This finding is consistent 
with Miles (1982) who suggested that domain manipulation is often happening in combinations. 
Contextual domain changes in the case of Hero are therefore referring to a dynamic approach to 
European initiatives rather than European strategy. Domain manipulation at Sharp is happening at 
a more developed stage. Minor changes to European structures are made as the conflict resolution 
is more a search for coordination whereby control needs to be appointed to the appropriate 
divisions within the current network. Domain offence from this perspective refers to a expansion 
of current domains, by replacing old domains. Domain offence in this case leads to strategic 
reorientation in terms of strategic shifts and adjustments that achieve increased efficiency on a 
85 Firms that undergo strategic change might need to alter their structure in order to achieve this. This 
structural transformation might be minor (adjustments in structures and processes) or major (reorganisation) 
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European level rather than complete turnaround strategy (see also Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977). In 
comparison to these two cases, Philips is clearly at a more advanced stage of European 
development. 
Although changes in European strategy could suggest some small adjustments in the power 
orientation, there is a focus on domain offence through fine-tuning to optimise the balance 
between subsidiary autonomy and EHQ control. This does suggest that for some decisions full 
control is given to HQ, resulting in the exclusion of subsidiary managers. 
7.3.4 Strategic capabilities 
Strategic response seeks to ensure the continuous adaptation of the goals and strategies of the firm 
to the changes in the environment. Successful adaptation is possible if managers expend some of 
the current resources86 or invest in new resources when building new strategic positions (Loran`ge, 
1980). The above discussion on domain offensive response patterns has revealed that domain 
offence in this research refers to a higher degree of centralisation through an increase of 
formalisation, a restriction of some communication within subsidiaries and the development of 
new ones. Resources and capabilities87 such as high cohesion and centralised power contribute to 
attribution consensus. If organisations lack these characteristics to respond to the effect of impact, 
managers are likely to create them as soon as they expect a permanent and controllable outcome. 
While some firms can modify existing resources other need to create new resources to deal with 
the impact of the Euro. These resources are complex and path dependent on the accumulation of, 
and interaction between, resources such as physical assets, technologies and people (Marcus & 
Nichols, 1999). Typically, the internal structures and systems seem to be altered most rapidly; 
more time is required to convert closed mindsets to the need of change which clearly is the result 
of different expectations and beliefs. 
Corresponding to the availability of resources are two distinct domain offensive purposes. The 
first purpose aims at preparing the firm for strategic responses to future environments; ýýhereas 
the second purpose seeks to fine tune the strategies for better fit with its environment. The 
former 
implies that internal structures and systems need to be renewed or replaced to fit the needs of the 
environment. This renewal takes place through the creation of new capabilities, or through 
extensive alteration of existing capabilities. This alteration process takes time and significant 
86 Freestanding assets that can be evaluated in isolation from other freestanding assets 
87 Organisational abilities to integrate and coordinate resources (Teece et al., 1997). 
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effort as the resources are not available for immediate use. The later refers to an adjustment of the 
current strategy to improve the fit with the environment. Resources from this point of ie%% can be 
generated by paying careful attention to the firm's efficiency. These resources are available for 
immediate use to support the adjustments. We will discuss the above response patterns in more 
detail. 
7.3.4.1 Creating new capabilities 
To create new strategies the managers need to pool their various business, functional and personal 
expertise together to make choices that shape the strategic moves of the firm (e. g. Eisenhardt, 
1989b; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Judge & Miller, 1991). A reconfiguration of existing 
organisational skills, however, becomes much more complex when the requirements of a 
changing environment go beyond the current capabilities to renew cornpetences. This 
reorientation appears to be the case when the changing environment requires a strategic shift in 
articulation from the national to the international level. The multifocal approach (Prahalad & Doz 
1987) indicates a shift in the domains of competence. When perceptions of the impact of the Euro 
are shared then the impact itself changes these orientations, however, the opposite is true when 
managers do not share the perception. What this indicates is the complexity to dehne and 
implement managerial mechanisms to change the power relationship within the firm causing 
friction between global operations and their subsidiaries (Prahalad & Doz 1981; 1987; Picard, 
1997)(Picard, 1997; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Findings indeed confirm that European articulation 
of the Euro impact is significantly limited when there is a high degree of subsidiary autonomy. 
The `control vs. empowerment' dilemma supports both arguments for explicitly articulated 
strategies. Findings therefore reveal the need for an integration of two, previously contradictory 
theories under the umbrella of one, more all-encompassing theory (see also Ansoff, 1987 for a 
discussion). 
Development of this approach is clearly evident within Hero, where managers argue that different 
levels of environmental variation (impact pressure) require different degrees of decision making 
comprehensiveness. The development of such an approach is taking place at a division level. The 
focus is on product concepts that are likely to face pressure at a Eurozone level. For example, in a 
collective decision of Eurozone active subsidiaries, Hero appointed European product 
development responsibility for a specific product group to each of the Eurozone subsidiaries. The 
aim of this initiative is to create consistency of European concepts and to add European concepts 
to the current portfolio by internationalising local concepts with European potential. The 
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recognition that strategic capability creation is influenced by multiple factors such as 
stakeholder's pressure is suggesting a `contingency' approach, whereby elements of European 
consistency are carefully added to the existing local approach. For these 'European' product 
concepts it is found that the current routines are likely to be less appropriate which stimulates the 
exploration of alternative routines. Product-level knowledge shapes a schema that guides 
managers in defining problem spaces, identifying possible solutions, and predicting the 
performance of alternative strategic behaviour in a specific area. 
In the longer term this specific problem solving technique is likely to influence the strategic 
behaviour of the firm as a whole(Harris, 1994). These findings reinforced the importance of 
maintaining both efficiency and flexibility capabilities (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 
1982). We concur with the view of convergence as defined by Tushman and Romanelli (1985) as 
`relatively long time spans of incremental change and adaptation which elaborate structures, 
systems, controls and resources towards increased coalignment. '(p. 173). The longitudinal 
development of Hero's strategic behaviour can therefore be viewed as beginning with a series of 
strategic behaviours as part of the shift from the previous stable generation mechanism. The 
`European' initiatives represent a pattern that directly confronts the product strategy with the 
complexity of the (Euro) environment. It also points out that a belief system can result in multiple 
strategies as response occurs in particular cases. 
What this response pattern demonstrates is the fact that the concept of strategic `fit' with the 
environment is more problematic than assumed by others (e. g. Miles & Snow, 1984; Quinn, 
1980). `Fit' is a combination of many responses to complexity, of which the impact of the Euro is 
one. From this point of view we can conclude that response pattern might contribute to strategic 
`fit'. A formulation of what fit needs to be established is significantly influenced by the extent to 
which individual managers perceive and understand this fit. The overall process of strategic 
behaviour is not predetermined but shaped by the knowledge and information acquired. This 
argument is transferred into different levels of understanding, predictions and expectations which 
can be explained through the fact that strategic decisions are made under conditions of limited 
rationality, uncertainty, and ambiguity (Ansoff, 1965). 
7.3.4.2 Configuring existing capabilities 
In this research we find that firms that were already pushing toward higher integration and loýýer 
local responsiveness are encouraged to go further in this direction. As a result of unique and 
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idiosyncratic processes that emerge from path-dependent histories of the firm (Teece et at. 1997), 
it appears that among those firms reinforcing their existing developments, there are likely to be 
cushions in terms of slack resources (Cyert & March, 1963). These resources reduce the impact of 
external shocks, fuel adaptive responses to them, and most importantly foster learning that 
increases the managers understanding. The existence of slack resources (Meyer. 1982) provides 
organisation capabilities that enable to act in ways that are not (yet) possible for other 
organisations. This possibility to respond directly to the perceived loss of control results in the 
belief that threats are being countered more easily. This in turn stimulates managers to explore the 
potential opportunities more fully. The perceived buffer to uncertainty as experienced by the 
managers may increase the willingness to take more risky actions in response to the perceived 
impact. This partly explains the proactive behaviour of these firms. In other words, slack 
resources enable key managers to implement their decisions (Cyert & March, 196-3), Meyer, 
1982). 
From this viewpoint we define two levels of facilitation that can be associated with pro-action 
which will be magnified in organisations with higher levels of slack. Typically these levels are 
classified as either `available' or `unavailable' slack resources for discretionary use (Nohria & 
Gulati, 1997). Available slack resources are slack resources that are immediately available to an 
organisation to support initiatives. Unavailable slack resources are those embedded in the 
organisations structure or otherwise committed to other processes and thus not available for 
immediate discretionary use, however they can be applied in the longer term. As it is arguable to 
what extent slack resources are available, we assume that those firms that made significant steps 
toward Europeanisation in the past have, through previous experience, developed the ability to 
respond to various demands from the dynamic European environment. This flexibility increases 
both the potential for adaptation as a range of strategy options for environmental change can be 
addressed and the speed of response. 
Following Chakravarthy's (1982; 1986) argument of adaptation to environmental change we can 
point out if slack is available and how fast it can be applied. From this perspective we found that 
Philips is improving overall goodness-of-fit by exploiting the current environment to improve 
performance. Current steps point to further formal institutionalisation of this European approach. 
Most evidently it leads to a fine-tuned relationship between the company and the environment. 
Early actions in the strategic behaviour design process are taken within the established frame of 
reference. Actions taken in a peripheral part of the organisation are not considered as a critical 
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challenge to the establishment. On the contrary Philips experiences the pressure as a stimulation 
to explore the opportunity. For example, Philips actively uses the Euro as an internal and external 
benchmarking tool to compare subsidiary strategies and analyse competitors' behaviour across the 
European market. The anticipated impact of the Euro ex-ante concentrated on the direct impact on 
the business that rose as a result of the compulsory transaction in the new currency . Anticipation 
of third party behaviour was not yet actively in the picture until after the introduction. However, 
this unpredicted effect can be relatively easily tackled as the availability of slack allows Philips to 
rapidly develop strategic options to pursue this effect offensively. In the short term this resulted in 
fine tuning that removed European inconsistencies within the current frame of reference. For 
example, product portfolio en its related marketing mix elements were harmonised to a higher 
extent within most of the product groups of the company. 
In comparison to Philips, Sharp is concentrating on improving capabilities for adapting to 
uncertain and unknown future environments. The purpose is to exploit long term opportunities to 
gain long term improvements in performance. Consequently a more significant change needs to 
take place as the slack resources first need to be modified before these can be invested in new 
strategies to adapt to the future environment. In other words, managing the slack resources is the 
key in this adaptation process. What this requires is an old fit being replaced by a new improved 
fit. The time necessary to develop is significantly delayed as old assumptions of autonomy will 
survive and be incorporated into new ones. For example, portfolio harmonisation that was 
activated some years ago is still not fully adopted by all Eurozone subsidiaries. Some successfully 
upgraded the portfolio, while others combine the upgrading with previous products, diminishing 
the upgrading effect. This illustrates that a strategic development is a process that represents a 
long-run adaptation. Major shifts in strategic capability are the outcome of new patterns of 
development. In the early phases only small adjustments are made to adapt to the new 
environment. For example, as a direct result of price transparency Sharp has launched a project 
that compares prices in Europe and makes adjustments if necessary. Although the initial changes 
might not be of major significance, we expect that accumulation of small changes overtime 
increase the experience that triggers additional changes towards consistency. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has further analysed and discussed the findings from each level of anal\ sis as a -series 
of building blocks leading to the overarching findings. Given the richly detailed approach of this 
study, there are numerous small findings. However the main findings before the Euro %s as 
introduced on a consumer level were: 
" The timing of strategic adjustments is significantly affected by managers' interpretation 
of the environments impact on the firm that is understood based on information gathering 
behaviour; 
0 Interdependent linkages between understood components of the likely disturbance appear 
to have a cumulative positive effect on attitude, shaping the interpretation and level of 
anticipation. 
Focus is initially on the short term to satisfy prevailing expectations. Only when the effect on 
performance exceeds expectations does the Euro act as a trigger to articulate the strategy itself, 
which appears to be characterised by the cycling back and forth between interpretation and action. 
Thus such findings complement extant research on strategic adaptation to unfamiliar events and 
make a contribution to unpacking the black box of interpretation processes, an under-researched 
area (Barr, 1998; Lant & Mezias, 1992; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Specifically, it appears that 
managers are motivated to take action as a result of the creation of understanding when this 
understanding is linked to an improved fit of the strategy. This process seems to be less dependent 
on previously-held interpretations [i. e. Europeanisation efforts] as the Euro is pre-dominantly 
approached as a standalone issue with specific belief systems. 
At a second level of analysis, after the introduction of the Euro, the identification of four 
interrelated constructs outlined the interplay between interpretations and response patterns that 
contributed to: 
" Enhanced comprehension but despite the converging impact understanding there remain 
significant differences in views about causal stability and causal controllability; 
"A further understanding of the interrelationship between locus of impact and strategic 
movement. 
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Together these approaches provided a more dynamic explanation of host interpretations evol%e 
over time. The key shifts in interpretation resulted in three main findings: 
" The notion of anticipation has become more complex as strategic implications clearly 
shift to the interpretation and anticipation of thinking and acting of intermediaries. 
" Experienced loss of control is articulated through interpretation, and its related stress, 
rather than the understanding of the impact itself. Regaining control only occurs after the 
collective interpretation of stress has accumulated, or when the magnitude of the impact is 
taken by surprise. 
0 Reinforcement only takes place through consistent articulation at a European level. 
Implementation of these changes typically go through three interrelated adaptation phases 
that can be characterised as; Power orientation; Change of power relation and, Poý\ er 
balancing 
Findings from each level of analysis were brought together so as to provide an insight into how 
the response patterns evolved over time. This revealed the continuing and varying tension 
between the anticipated impact of the Euro on the behaviour of external stakeholders and the 
forces to resistance to change within the firms. These patterns of change could be divided into 
three levels: Primarily reactive; proactive through change of power relation; proactive through 
change power balancing. What pattern of change was followed critically depended on the 
perceived balance of power between the local and the European level. A reactive response pattern 
occurred when the perceived impact was interpreted as temporary and controllable, indicating that 
the current strategy was found robust enough to stand the perceived impact. Power relation 
changes took place when reorientation led to need to articulate the strategy at a more international 
level. The development of this approach was shaped through the exploration of alternative 
routines which were carefully added to the existing approach and aimed to create a more efficient 
and flexible strategy. The outcome, however, depended on the perception, understanding, 
predictions and expectations of individual managers that were translated into the ability to 
integrate and coordinate new resources. Power rebalancing occurred when the impact was 
perceived as a trigger to further reinforcement to articulate the strategy. Resources in that case 
were provided, which enabled key managers to implement their decisions. This flexibility 
increased the potential for adaptation as a range of strategic options. The outcome, however, 
depended on the time needed to make the resources available to deal with the interpreted impact. 
Direct availability indicated a fine-tuning of current strategy, while indirect availability indicated 
that resources first needed to be modified before they could be implemented. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Conclusion 
In this final chapter we do not intend to offer global conclusions about cognition, interpretation 
and its relationship to strategic behaviour. That would be presumptuous. Rather, the chapter ends 
with suggestions about the need to continue exploring the substantive organisational issues. As 
such, the findings create opportunities for future research. The following sections give an 
overview of the study, identify some of the study's contributions, limitations and suggest avenues 
for future work that will enable researchers to gain a better understanding of the realm of strategy 
formulation. 
8.1 Overview of the study 
As discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, the effect of a common currency on trade is 
an important issue. By lowering transaction costs and enhancing price transparency, the single 
currency represents a major contribution to fostering competition and efficiency in goods and 
financial markets across the Euro area. As such, the advent of the Euro represents a development 
which is expected to have far reaching implications for businesses operating in this area. With its 
arrival many questions about its impact emerge. This dissertation makes a marked contribution to 
this aspect by examining if and how the introduction of the Euro has an impact on strategies of 
multinational firms in the Consumer Electronic and the food industry. A real time dual phase case 
study approach is adopted to trace the intended strategy before the event took place, and compare 
it with the realised strategy after the Euro was introduced to find out to what extent and in which 
ways managers (re)anticipate the impact of the Euro to determine an appropriate course of action. 
Findings presented in this study not only provide insight into how the response patterns evolve 
over time, but also how this process is influenced by perceptions, understanding, expectations and 
predictions of individual managers. 
Reflecting on previous discussions, Chapter Two critically examined the current literature 
focusing mainly on the areas of strategy formulation and sensemaking. As already elaborated, 
strategy making processes refer to a sequence of activities or events such as scanning, anale sis 
and planning that help to make decisions (Van de Ven, 1992). Based on this notion. two different 
289 
categories of strategy processes could be identified. The first category conceptualises the idea that 
organisations respond to an evolutionary and unfolding pattern of activities that appears overtime 
(e. g. Mintzberg, 1978; Pettigrew, 1973). This category provides a more in-depth understanding of 
the macro dimensions of strategy, referring to changes and transformations by organisations. 
From this perspective the strategic process measures if a change occurred at different points of 
time. To find out how a change occurred an in-depth understanding of an underlying pattern of 
cognitive transitions is required. What this category particularly refers to is the view of the (group 
of) strategist(s) as a sensemaker who formulate a strategy based on their anticipation and 
interpretation of the company surroundings (Weick, 1979). The review of current literature 
indicated that although the concept of strategy making processes has been implied in many 
previous studies, there are few which have tried to explore both categories simultaneously. We 
argue that both viewpoints are complementary as the understanding of the impact of the 
individual manager influences what happens in terms of the enactment of strategy of the firm. 
This perspective recognises the dynamic and multilevel character of the content of strategy which 
allows us to raise a number of important questions concerning the emergence and development of 
the Euro strategy over time as well as the factors that might influence this development. 
In chapter three we described the methodology adapted for our empirical research. We first 
presented a analytical framework and its underlying theoretical and philosophical underpinnings 
to provide an early classification of the constructs used in the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
After that we detailed the contextualist approach (Pettigrew, 1985b; 1992) as adopted in this study 
which involved a detailed description of the multilevel approach and its related units of analysis. 
We drew upon elements of the sensemaking process to design a unique model for this thesis. 
Moreover we explained how and why we adopted Mintzbergs's and Waters' (Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985) model of strategic formation. Following these two models we explained how we 
used elements of the incident methodology (Flanagan 1954) and the reflexive methodology 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000) to trace the impact of the Euro through the organisation over time. 
In the second part of the chapter we detailed how the dual phase research strategy was utilised 
which incorporated the strengths of the comparative case study method (Yin, 2003). The design of 
the protocol is detailed, in which we explained the use of multiple case studies, the case selection 
process, and the cases selected. After that we detailed the multiple instruments used to collect 
data. At the early stage of analysis we addressed the notion of open and axial coding (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990) to categorise the data collected from interviews and documentation. We then 
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outlined how the coded data was used for pattern matching using causal mapping to define cause 
and effect relationship and matrices to compare and contrast these relationships. The themes that 
emerged from the case studies through this coding process were transferred into two schemas 
(figure 7.1 and 7.4) that were used as a route map to discuss and further analyse the findings of 
the study. 
Over the course of the last four chapters we have addressed different elements of the analysis - 
the case study descriptions (Chapter 4), industry level, firm level, and micro level patterns and 
contexts before the introduction of the Euro (Chapter 5), industry level, firm level, and micro 
level patterns and contexts after the introduction of the Euro (Chapter 6), and the discussion of the 
main findings (Chapter 7). The results of this analysis suggested that before the introduction of 
the Euro the content and timing of strategic adjustments was significantly affected by managers' 
anticipation of the impact on the environment of the firm. Interdependent linkages between 
understood components of the likely disturbance appeared to have a cumulative positive effect on 
attitude, which shaped the interpretation and level of anticipation. For most firms this implied that 
the focus initially was on the short term to meet the compulsory changeover issues and to satisfy 
prevailing expectations. However, additional steps were being taken when the direction of 
anticipation was consistent with the European strategy in use. In that case, the Euro would act as a 
trigger to reinforcement that stimulated to articulate the Europeanised aspects of the strategy. 
Amplification occurred in terms of broad parameters and direct business implications. These early 
implications appeared to be less dependent on previously-held interpretations [i. e. 
Europeanisation efforts] as the Euro was pre-dominantly approached as a standalone issue with 
specific belief systems. 
After the introduction of the Euro, we found that the notion of anticipation has become more 
complex as strategic implications clearly shifted to the interpretation and anticipation of thinking 
and action of market intermediaries. This revealed a continuing and varying tension at an 
organisational level between anticipated impact of the Euro on the behaviour of external 
stakeholders and forces resistant to change which eventually determined the change that was 
occurring. While this changing environment to some extent necessitated a broadening of 
European thinking, it also appeared that no immediate action was required as this action critically 
depended on the behaviour of others. As a result we could distinguish between those that saw 
European consistencies with their strategy that could be articulated; those that saw 
European 
inconsistencies with their strategy that required adaptation; and those that were aware of the 
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inconsistencies with their strategy but had the view that the changes were not vet significant 
enough to adapt to. With this shift of impact attribution and interpretation vve could identify a 
significant change in response patterns. A reactive response pattern occurred v dien the perceived 
impact was interpreted as temporary and controllable, indicating that the current strategy Evas 
found robust enough to withstand the impact. More proactive changes took place when 
reorientation led to the requirement of an articulation shift to a more international level. 
Adaptation was shaped through exploration and Europeanising of alternative routines and 
resources that could be carefully added to the current strategy to protect the firm from foreseen 
effects of the market change by improving the consistency of some marketing elements in the 
Euro zone. Proactive changes also occurred when the impact was perceived as a trigger to further 
reinforcement to articulate the strategy. Adaptation was shaped through existing resources and 
capabilities primarily to increase the centralisation of decision making and to improve the 
standardisation of marketing mix elements. 
What our study suggests is that the probability of firms introducing new strategies quickly and 
proactively depends on the anticipation, interpretation and capability of managers to recognise 
and to exploit changes in their environment as a result of the impact of the Euro. The extent to 
which the managers are motivated to exploit the environment is based on the perceived match or 
mismatch of the developments with the current strategy. Managers that do see impact implications 
are driven to find more advanced solutions. For these firms we clearly notice a shift in response 
patterns that indicate an aim to improve elements of European consistency. The timing of this 
response is most evidently related to the availability of (slack) resources. Managers that limit the 
implications to specific issues hold back from in depth environmental scanning at this stage. We 
assume that this interpretation and behaviour will shift when and if the impact increases for these 
firms. We therefore conclude that it appears that collective interpretations move from an 
unformed and tentative to well-constructed, well processed viewpoints at significant different 
speeds. 
8.2 Main contribution of the research 
This study reports empirical findings into patterns of strategic development in eight MNEs in the 
CE and food industry that were facing the introduction of the Euro and its consequences. The 
292 
nature" of the introduction of the Euro provided us with a unique frame of reference that alloýýed 
us to study one particular strategic pattern within a complex organisation. In contrast to other 
work on strategic development (Ansoff, 1977; Porter, 1980) we took a more dynamic view akin to 
developments within the strategy process literature (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Miles et al., 
1997; Mintzberg, 1978; Pettigrew, 1985; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). We argued that within 
this dynamic view of strategy it is important to have an understanding of the underlying patterns 
of sensemaking of managers. As such, this study presents a unique insight into the strategic Euro 
processes adapted by the sampled firms. It also provides additional depth to our understanding of 
the relationship between cognition and changes in strategic action over time. Moreover, it raised a 
number of important issues regarding the emergence and development of strategic response, 
problematising the relationship between individual events and strategic change. 
Following these aspects the central finding of this thesis is that: 
Table 8-1: Central findings 
(Cognition) Firms aim to respond to an identifiable constitution change when it fits their 
current flow of sensemaking, and when the impact is taken by surprise. Whereby; 
(Content) Prior dispositions in terms of cognitive processing, strategic orientation, and 
structural inertia influence the timing and the way in which firms respond to an 
identifiable constitution of change. 
This powerful conceptualisation of the response process to an external event may be broken down 
into smaller constituent parts, which in a fragmented way enable analysis of the composition of 
this process. Grounded in data, each of these constituent parts explains some specific factor or 
stage of this process. Most of these constructs have been topic of investigation in diverse fields of 
management and social research such as strategic planning, knowledge management, and decision 
making. However, the novelty of their use lies in positioning them together within an explanatory 
framework of reference (figure 3.1). In this study we further divided this framework into two 
interpretation schema's (figure 7.1 and 7.4) to illustrate the interrelationships before and after the 
event takes place. Constructs within these schemas variously explain the anticipation of emerging 
market changes, the interpretation of loci of causality, and the resulting transitory states of 
adaptation. Brought together, these constructs allow us to present a holistic view of the 
88 In addition to a compulsory element of adaptation (technical issues) that will guarantee that the Euro is 
indeed an issue for the firm, the introduction of the Euro would happen no matter what, forcing the 
managers to reanticipate their initial viewpoint and attitude. 
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interrelationship between the changes in cognition and the changes in strategic rc; ponse. 
Moreover, it is essential that the context (the introduction of the Euro) is the centre of our theor` 
of cognition, interpretation and strategic behaviour, as context is a large part of cognition itýeltý9. 
8.3 Further Contributions and Implications 
Building on a critical examination and analysis of the response of multinationals to the 
introduction of the Euro, this thesis provided an empirical account that is explorative in design 
and synergistic in nature. By concentrating on strategic development and placing additional 
emphasis on the cognitive processes instead of the concrete and observable actions connected 
with changes in the environment, insights generated by this study enhance our understanding by 
providing a more comprehensive picture of the chosen area. Our aim here is to discuss the above 
mentioned central contribution of the study by integrating the contribution and compare these 
constructs with existing research in organisation studies and strategic management. Furthermore, 
we will point out the importance of these findings and their implications both from a theoretical as 
well as a managerial position. 
8.3.1 Theoretical contributions and implications 
8.3.1.1 Managerial anticipation 
The discussion before the advent of the Euro process revealed that the degree of strategic 
intention is based on the awareness the manager has about the complexity of the changing 
environment. This awareness is driven by the strategy in use and its related path dependent 
cognitive frameworks. These frameworks influence the components of the sensemaking process 
(Daft & Weick, 1984) by making some stimuli more salient than others. This result in a diversity 
of understanding as different rules to scan the environment are set. Moreover, different 
relationships are used that influence the interpretations of what is noticed, which ultimately 
suggests what actions should be taken (degree of adaptability). While the low levels of scanning 
withhold most managers from taking action before the Euro was introduced, it is an interesting 
observation that those that do anticipate primarily do so by taking actions directly related to the 
firm, rather than the anticipation of others' actions. 
89 Connecionists architectures use the human brain as a metaphor to suggest how cognitive processes might 
operate. See for example Weick (1995), who devoted a chapter to 'belief-driven' sensemaking processes. 
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Despite the fact that the strategy literature has long been concerned with understanding how 
organisations adapt to their changing environment (e. g. Bogner & Barr, 2000; Ginsberg. 1988, 
Thomas, 1993; Van De Ven & Huber, 1990), relatively little is know about to what extent 
speculative pieces of information are being used to construct a frame of reference that provides 
the managers with an understanding that might lead to anticipatory actions. Some notable 
exceptions are the concepts of rumour effect on cognition (Isabella, 1990), strategic thinking 
when dealing with uncertainty (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; March & Olsen, 1976). scenario 
planning (van der Heijden, 1996), strategic issue diagnosis (Dutton et al., 1983), and strategic 
innovation (Mintzberg, 1994). However the theoretical frameworks used neither detail action 
taken as a result of interpretation nor do they discus the direct effects on the interpretation of 
others actions. Instead the focus is on how managers collectively construe events. 
The main contribution of this construct is that it provides empirical evidence that manaoers 
primarily think through their actions when planning for the Euro, rather than anticipating third 
parties actions. This finding suggests that before the impact is revealed, the manager will focus on 
conceptions and expressions of how the impact is likely going to affect the firm. The complexity 
of this impact understanding towards the Euro is shaped by the environmental scanning 
behaviour. The meaning given to the information is significantly affected by managers' mental 
maps such as (path-dependent) experience and intuition. Thus, the combination of scanning and 
mental mapping structures the interpretations of `opportunity' or `threat' that will have a 
significant impact on the nature of response. 
However, most managers found it difficult to predict the consequences of these opportunistic 
actions. It was relatively rare that interpretations were defined along clear dimensions such as 
positive/negative, gain/loss or controllable/uncontrollable, resulting in a high level of ambiguity 
and confused priorities for action. This uncertainty holds most managers back from taking action 
before knowing how the landscape is changing. Even among those managers that do make 
predictions we find that they protect themselves from overestimation (Makadok & Walker, 2000) 
or forecasting errors (King & Zeithaml, 2001) by responding to obvious 'macro-patterns' 
(SIN votzky & Morrison, 2000) which emphasises a preference for operational improvement 
in 
response to anticipated opportunities or threats, rather than strategic change. This 
implies that 
managerial anticipation is concerned less with specific actions and more with establishing clarity 
of direction. Until a reasonable picture of the nature of change is constructed or a predicted nature 
is confirmed, managers seem to restrict themselves from involvement in the resolution process. 
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8.3.1.2 Managerial interpretation 
Although causal attribution theory has been commonly used to gain insight into interpretation 
(Ford, 1985; Ford & Baucus, 1987) and link interpretation to resulting strategic actions (Lant et 
al., 1992), ironically very little is understood about how this interpretation develops and changes 
over time as the outcome of a constitution of change unfolds. Based on the empirical evidence 
and the development impact perception over time, this study has been able to enhance 
understanding in the areas of causal attribution and consensus formulation. Findings about these 
processes revealed interesting relationships between cause/effect perception, cognitive inertia, and 
stress perception that enhance our understanding about how the cumulative interpretation of 
managers are being shaped. 
By exploring the concept of `causal attribution' within the setting of the Euro, this study extended 
Weiner (1979) and Ford (1985) event dimensions of locus of causality, degree of stability and 
controllability perception by providing empirical evidence on how managers shape understanding 
about the impact of a specific event. The most distinct pattern of change in interpretation found is 
the shift in notion that what the Euro does to the firm directly becomes less significant, while, on 
the longer term, what the Euro does to those that are indirectly related to the firm becomes more 
significant. This notion results in a more specific definition of the Euro as facilitating the 
changing role of intermediates90. Nevertheless, the interpreted impact shortly after the advent of 
the Euro has not been so substantial that those that did not anticipate before hand are proven 
wrong. On the one hand the interpretation advocates that managers should think more broadly, 
while on the other the actual response significantly depends on the interpretation and anticipation 
of the actions and timing of intermediates. 
In reply to Barr and Huff (1997), who suggest that action may reflect the anticipation of a third 
party, we employ the dual tendency between stability and controllability to study the connections 
managers make to their own activities. This process involved examination and evaluation of 
interpretation and understanding if and why adjustments in the current strategy are made. Drawing 
from various theories and ideas derived from the causal attribution literature (e. g. Barker & Barr, 
2002; Ford, 1985; Lant et al., 1992; Thomas, 1993; Weiner, 1979) we explored causal stability 
and causal controllability perceptions of managers to explain the level of stress that the managers 
perceive to questions the strategy in use. More specifically, a strategy that is interpreted as 
90 It is expected that intermediates will be encouraged to grow nationally and internationally as their 
competitive perspective is broadened as the Euro significantly improved their bargaining power. 
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sufficiently robust to withstand the rigours imposed by the causal attribution identified will not be 
changed until the levels of stress rise to unacceptable levels, and, accordingly, a range of 
psychological `defence' mechanisms come into effect. Thus, stress is an interpretativ e issue as a 
situation might be interpreted as stressful in one organisation while it is overlooked or perceived 
as not stressful in others. 
The analysis highlights that these levels of stress are the result of a significant interplay between 
interpretation of stability and controllability. This interplay adds to the current interpretative 
models of strategic change process, such as those described by Barr and Huff (1997) and Huff et 
al. (Huff et al., 1992) that conceptualise increased stress levels as a major precursor to change. In 
this study we retained a broad view of the nature of stress and how it should be interpreted, as 
supposed to the proxies as used by these authors. As such, the notion of stress refers to the tension 
that is caused by the mismatch between the market opportunities and threats and the capacity of 
the current strategy to respond to these market developments. The key contribution derives from 
the underlying discussion that there is a significant difference in motivation to regain control that 
reveals further insight in the consensus formulation of belief systems. 
From a cognitive inertia perspective, we explored the fact that there is the danger that managers 
may become overly dependent upon their mental frameworks that are related to the strategy in 
use. To some extent it reveals that the findings of the cause effect development are consistent with 
evolutionary theories (e. g. Nelson & Winter, 1982) that help to understand why organisational 
routines are the repertoire of the manager's idiosyncratic collective belief system. Our findings 
indicate that internal factors such as information-processing constraints, organisational history, 
and external factors such as legal and fiscal barriers guide and to an extent lock-in managers to 
certain interpretations and predictions. This resulted in significant differences in stability and 
controllability perceptions and interpretations that suggest varying ways in which the company 
should respond on the impact of the Euro. This contributes to the debate that the scope of action is 
bound by path dependent cognitive frameworks (Lant, 2002; Porac et al., 2002). However, 
observations also reveal that within this framework there is space to move beyond the traditional 
boundaries of past sensemaking. For instance, those managers that identify `permanent' and 
`controllable' impact implications experience a more significant magnitude that drives them to 
find more advanced solutions through additional environmental scanning and reorienting their 
vision that suggest steps of renewal and improvement. This relationship between cognitive inertia 
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and meaning seems to be not surprising as managers must poses an understanding of existing 
strategies to effectively influence a firm's strategic agenda. 
Thus, from a consensus formulation of belief system perspective the empirical observation 
confirms that consensus develops during strategic change (see also Markoczy, 2000; 2001). In 
particular, observations reveal that attention to a wide array of information tends to influence the 
interpretation of strategic considerations. Such information use can be associated with heightened 
interpretation of stability and controllability as this enhances the understanding of complexity, 
which positively contributes to the accuracy of managers' interpretations. Moreover, the diverse 
contributions managers make to the organisational interpretation process appear to have a 
significant impact on the content91 and strength92 of consensus as this understanding facilitates 
other managers to understand the key strategic commitments, which on the longer term increases 
the scope93 of consensus. 
8.3.1.3 Strategic Behaviour 
Despite the fact that the question of if and how organisations change their competitive strategy 
has become a central question in organisational research (Ginsberg, 1988), the approaches taken 
to answer these questions are often limited to defining the barriers or enhancements to the ability 
or likelihood of strategic change (e. g. Chakravarthy, 1982; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et 
al., 1997) or linking managerial cognition to the process of strategic change (Barr & Huff, 1997; 
Bartunek, 1984; Barr & Huff, 1997; Thomas, 1993). A vital contribution of this study is that we 
build upon strengths and weaknesses of both paradigms, which allows us to point out the interplay 
between belief systems, strategic orientation and strategic capabilities. The analysis of this 
interrelationship reveals interesting findings about the transitory states of strategic behaviour. 
8.3.1.3.1 Strategic orientation 
The first application of the combined views involved the examination of the extent to which belief 
systems are incorporated in planning procedures that lead to a `formal' strategy (Mintzberg, 
1979). This process involved examination and evaluation of interpretation and understanding that 
further explain in what way adjustments in the current strategy are made. By exploring the 
concept of `strategic development' within the virtual setting, this study has extended dynamic 
views of strategising and confirmed the notion that firms move across dynamic and complex 
91 The content of consensus refers to what people actually agree upon. 
92 The strength of consensus refers to how strongly people agree on the content. 
93The scope refers to how many people share the consensus. 
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patterns to adapt to a certain environment (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Webb & Pettigrew, 1999). 
Comparing the adaptation of belief systems with the adapti%e cycle (Tiles & Snow, 1978), this 
study has shown that the complexity that managers adapt to is often determined by its product- 
market strategy. This is because managers within our sample evaluate to %ý hat extent a product- 
market strategy is affected by the identified causal attribution, pointing out that some product 
strategies might be affected to a higher extent then others. This clearly results in the development 
that firms should pursue multiple strategies at one point of time to deal with the impact of the 
Euro. 
This evaluation process also points out that if change occurs, it appears to be applied with a 
predominant view that is consistent upon the belief system. Building on Miles (1982) modes of 
adaptation, predominant views can be described as defensive when strategic change focuses on 
remaining the current strategy, or as offensive when the change focuses on reinforcement of the 
current strategy. Findings suggest that in times of uncertainty and turbulence firms tend to use 
more of traditional, defensive, strategic management techniques. In this case a defensive mode is 
adapted which characterised by routine driven, incremental behaviour that is focussed on 
maintaining organisational stability (Sproull et al., 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). However, 
findings also illustrate that management could be receptive to critical everyday activities, if they 
clash with historical and existing business and strategy since this might indicate a more 
fundamental shift in products-market strategies. Either way, the response patterns that do occur 
either indicate `small' reinforcements in terms of fine-tuning the current strategy, or additions to 
the current strategy with replacing some old domains. Paramount difference between the to 
strategies is that offensive strategies are driven by a reorientation (centralisation) of control, while 
defensive strategies are driven by retaining this (often autonomous) control. 
8.3.1.3.2 Strategic capabilities 
The second application of the combined views involved the extent to which managers face 
organisational inertia that hinders the support of assessing belief systems. This process involved 
examination and evaluation of interpretation and understanding that further explore if adjustments 
in the current strategy are made. As suggested above, change requires extremely strong signals. 
Delays in recognising and understanding the need for change limit the options available for 
decision-makers, resulting in defensive patterns of change. Even when managers recognise the 
need for change, the extent to which and the timing of their response effectively depends on the 
availability of capabilities and resources. Our findings confirm the notion that current routines are 
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only capable of executing a highly constrained set of response patterns (Teece et al.. 1997: 
Wernerfelt, 1984). The domain mode changes explained that the adaptive behaviour of the firme is 
determined by a variety of organisational and managerial factors, which include the a\ ailability of 
slack resources, the belief system, and the degree of centralisation and formalisation of strategic 
decision making. This implies that early adapters are those that possess sufficient slack resources 
and are able to balance these resources with the impact of the Euro on their strategy. 
Within this context we demonstrate that the timing of response significantly depends upon the 
reorientation of power that is required to align the strategy to the (more Europeanised) belief 
system. Based on resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) we could reveal to 
constructs that are particularly important to the timing of response. First, being able to access 
strategically important resources can be critical to an organisations timing. Second, the capability 
to absorb and utilise such resources is equally critical for the timing of response. As such, the 
research contributes to a growing research agenda in strategic management which turns its focus 
upon the internal dynamics of the organisation, often to understand its competitive advantage. 
Although we do not link this specifically to competitive advantage, this research provides insight 
into the availability of resources and capabilities (see Teece et al., 1997). Furthermore, the 
modelling of domain offensive types of response through reorientation of power makes an 
empirically grounded contribution to the complexity of strategic 'fit' as this further moderates the 
relationship between the timing of response and firm performance. 
8.3.2 Methodological contributions and implications 
Investigating factors that influence the environmental interpretation process may ultimately lead 
to a better understanding of why organisations can be differentially effective even though the 
environmental changes they face are virtually the same. This research contributes to this 
understanding by conducting a study that to a certain extent holds the objective conditions of an 
environment constant by focussing on the `true' variance in interpretation of one particular c` ent. 
Reflecting on the previous accounts related to research methodology, it is clear that emphasis is 
typically placed upon how research can be conducted and how data can be analysed (e. g. 
Huberman & Miles, 1994; Yin, 1994). There are relatively few studies that provide clear 
guidelines on how to overcome various problems faced by the researcher(s) before and during the 
data collection process. In particular, it is comparatively rare to see empirical studies stating the 
problems or failures they faced during their fieldwork, with an exception of how the researcher(s) 
is overwhelmed by the richness of the collected data. It is these problems that dro,, e us to measure 
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the interpretation process by drawing upon elements of the critical incident methodolo, -, `. 
(Flanagan, 1954) and the reflexive methodology (Alvesson & Sköldbera. 2000) that resulted in 
additional strengths of our research design, as this improved the interaction v ith the data. 
A particular strong point of this research design is its real-time, longitudinal character that yields 
rich data to identify a series of strategic actions over time. This encompasses both on-going 
actions and those at the preliminary stage and at emergent stages. A series of interviews at mo 
time-intervals provided the perceptions necessary to establish insight into the course of strategic 
action. This analysis provided an empirical basis for interrogating theories of perceptual filters 
(Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) while it also elaborates on existing empirical work on the 
relationship between perception and action (e. g Barr, 1998; Porac et al., 2002; Thomas. 1993). 
Exploring unique aspects of one particular phenomenon help to capture the inherent complexity 
because it pushes the researcher to get deeply into the actual situation and try to understand all the 
nuances, interplay and connections. The focus on one specific event as the source of change to 
find out the extent to which it affected the strategic setting of the firm seems to be an appropriate 
approach if this event contains elements of compulsory adaptation. This real time approach helps 
to overcome some important problems as prior knowledge of the outcome of an event may bias a 
study. Specifically, this real time approach maximises the probability of discovering short lived 
factors and changes of temporary importance (see also Pettigrew, 1985). 
From the aspect of interpretation processes it is crucial for the researcher to understand and take 
the `inner/outer' frame of reference, as proposed in the concept of perspective taking (Boland & 
Tenkasi, 1995; Sessa, 1996). We therefore need to consider not only what beliefs managers hold 
but also how managers maintain their beliefs in order to document the persistence of paradigmatic 
affiliation in the face of vigorous dispute in order to understand how they interpret the ongoing 
changes in the market. This refers to the patterns of thinking and acting that are collectively 
meaningful to managers in the situation, and includes the interactions through which managers 
generate and enact shared interpretative schemes, those schemes themselves, and the frameworks, 
roles, rules, procedures, routines, and so on that embody meanings (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975; 
Weber, 1947). Without observing an interpretative process from the manager's perspective, it 
becomes difficult to understand the dynamics confronting managers who are directing the change 
effort, and thereby generate new knowledge that advances the theory and practice of managing 
change. 
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In comparison to previous interpretative studies (Barker & Barr, 2002: Barr & Huff, 1997; Tripsas 
& Gavetti, 2000) the research designs contains opportunities for multiple comparisons and 
contrasts among industries, firms, and individuals in order to trace the potential theme thoroughly. 
A `good' set of data always captures alternate situations or variations of some kind (Strauss, 
1987). Finally, there are several different perspectives which capture different aspects of the same 
process (Pettigrew, 1990), which indicates that when researchers have only a single perspective or 
theory, they tend to twist and rationalise facts to fit their model. Consequently, we believe that a 
strong point of this thesis is the way in which theories are juxtaposed (particularly cognitive and 
strategy making) to determine which theory better explains the data, or how these theories 
overlap. 
8.4 Limitations of the study 
In Chapter 3 we commented extensively on the issue of the credibility and the relevance of our 
findings. We particularly put these criteria forward for the assessment process. From this 
viewpoint we presented arguments of generalisability, validity, creditability and reflexivity as 
proposed by Alvesson and Skölberg (2000), Eisenhardt (1989), Pettigrew (1985; 1992; 2001) and 
Yin (1994; 2003). We discussed in-depth the steps and efforts we have undertaken to ensure 
validity of our study. Through the course of this thesis we demonstrated how the findings of our 
study are well supported by existing literature. We also verified in what way the empirical 
evidence are generalised to link these findings to the focus of our research. However, the above 
criteria also highlight the main limitation of this study as it questions the extent to which the 
account accurately captures the phenomenon being described. The `inner/outer' frame of 
reference as proposed in this study maps the perceptions and interpretations of participants and to 
some extent documents the cultural resources by which these were produced. Although this 
represents people's perspectives and/or behaviour and context accurately, this view is limited as it 
does not consist simply or fixed response, but it involves interpretation of stimuli and the 
construction of responses. From this perspective we notice two key limitations that influence the 
validity and generalisability of our findings. 
Firstly, the frame of reference as used in this study introduces a unit of analysis problem as ýýc 
asked managers about the nature of their decisions. From this point of view, the decision makers 
also provide the explanation of ww by this decision is taken. The danger with this type of research is 
not whether the managers are right or wrong, but the pitfalls arise that it is a tacit frame of 
reference which cannot be scrutinised and challenged. It would have strengthened the research if 
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we could have tested the balance between their intentions and their interpretations. Even so. 
subjectivity is inherent and cannot be eliminated. As such, we attempted to minimise the effect of 
the researcher on the researched and aimed to maximise the depth of information obtained. 
Secondly, the finding that the complexity the organisation chooses to adapt to is determined by its 
product market strategy points out that it is difficult to generalise the current impact 
interpretations for all product markets. Nevertheless, this clearly influences the way managers 
view and interpret the impact of the Euro. In this context managers often drop back on a 
particular, often product market, framework to explain what decisions have been made to deal 
with the impact. This inevitably influences, and to some extent, colours what is focussed upon as 
the problematic, as well as what is emphasised in the analysis. 
Another limitation of this study is caused by the difficulty in separating the Euro process from 
other strategic development issues which potentially limits the study as some variance in 
interpretation about the impact of the Euro might be conflated with other potential differences. As 
our findings reveal, actions taken following a significant event in the environment are not just a 
response to that event. Rather, strategic response occurs to a perceived trend in the environment 
that is triggered by many issues. Even though some attempts were made to define other issues, we 
did not explore in depth how these issues influence the response pattern. We recognise that the 
focus on one strategic pattern among many others is to some extent to be a simplification of 
reality as there might be an emerging consistent view in relation to the Euro, running in parallel to 
the development of a European strategy, that is not being explained through the impact of the 
Euro. Consequently we believe that a firm's long-run European adaptation is realised through a 
critical series of strategic behaviours, organisational capability to design effective strategic 
behaviours and organisational structure. 
Another limitation is the way in which the management process is studied. The notion that 
organisational actors at all levels contribute to the consensus building process is gradually 
accepted (Burgelman, 1994). This study explores particularly how top management team 
members shape their strategic knowledge to achieve consensus about the impact of the Euro on 
their organisation. In a way this has prevented the examination of potentially interesting avenues 
relating the interpretative nuances of strategy making. As such, the thesis, while clear in its 
theoretical origins and consistent in using these to structure the research design and further 
arguments, may present an overall partial view of the perceived impact of the Euro. 
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A final remark is that our findings are based on a comparatke case study of European based 
multinationals in the CE and Food industry. Consequently, there must be questions as to the 
extent to which these findings are applicable to other contexts. Because the extent to which our 
findings are supported by elements of the literature on strategic development and interpretation 
processes, some level of generalisability can be claimed. However, the originality of this work 
within the strategy literature cannot be claimed until further research into other industries is 
carried out. This is a critical issue which needs to be resolved before we can claim generalisability 
of the findings. 
8.5 Future research agendas 
The literature to date has concentrated most of its attention on passive or reactive modes of 
adaptation that are motivated mostly by discomfort and threat. Moreover, only few linked this 
process to interpretation and cognition (Barr & Huff, 1997; Isabella, 1990; Mezias et at., 2001). 
As a result, little is understood about how interpretations of a changing environment and the 
resulting actions and reactions evolve over time. This lack of research is not that surprising as 
studies that attempt to capture multi level interpretation often face considerable difficulties to 
trace both interpretations and their salience between for example, people, units, departments, 
divisions, and subsidiaries. In other words, within dynamic cognitive driven models of strategy it 
is very difficult to ground the underlying ideas, concepts, and beliefs. We could avoid these 
difficulties to some considerable extent as the Euro presented us with a traceable path for 
observation and discussions. Consequently, the empirical evidence of this study provides an 
additional viewpoint about the interplay between interpretations and actions which recognises the 
dynamic and complex character of the content and context of strategy. These findings raise a 
number of additional questions concerning the emergence and development of particular 
strategies within a firm over time and the factors that trigger such changes that should be further 
explored in the future. In this section we will highlight the key issues that deserve further 
attention. 
From a cognitive point of view much is still to be learned regarding whether collective cognition 
is the aggregation of individual cognition or the outcome of interactive, social processes (Fiol, 
2002; Lant, 2002; Porac et al., 2002). An interesting question in this context is how a convergence 
in collective frames of reference come about. Does it arise because individuals use the same 
cognitive processes, or is social interaction a more important element? We argue that is most 
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likely that the answer lies somewhere in between. We therefore suggest that cognition should be 
conceived of not as `frames' but rather as a situated process of 'framing', «here cognition is part 
of the social and material circumstances and collective in that it is the product of interactions 
among people (Hutchins, 1995). Rather than continued effort to document consensus in a static 
way, we propose a more dynamic approach that incorporates time-dependent analysis. It therefore 
is relevant to further examine the relationship of both the cognitive process of developing and 
using mental models and the content and structure in the organisation itself to understand the 
emergence of a collective belief system within the organisation. 
This suggestion has broad implications. For example from a `framing' perspective it would be 
interesting to explore how knowledge transfers take place in organisations. Our current learning 
theories rest on older assumptions about cognition and organisations. In other words, if one 
assumes a fixed cognitive structure and a centralised organisational form, learning is assumed to 
flow from knowledge content that is transmitted across organisations. Another interesting 
question is to what extent do managers anticipate the changing nature of an event and take 
(preventive) action to deal with this change. It seems reasonable to expect that announced changes 
such as deregulation or economic integration are anticipated to a certain extent, leading to early 
judgments about how the change is going to affect the firm. This study suggests that prior 
attention is given to what might be called `first order anticipation' that refers to direct business 
implications rather than the anticipation of third party behaviour. 
From a strategic content perspective, our findings that domain mode changes happen through 
(significant) fine-tuning and creation of new resources point out that opportunistic adaptors are 
intrinsically motivated rather than driven by perceived threats or failures. This thesis argues that 
the availability of capabilities and resources and particularly the ability to utilise these resources 
significantly affects the timing of strategic response. Despite the fact that this study elaborates the 
nature of development, it clearly requires more research to examine how the resources are made 
available, and what issues influence such decision making process. Concepts of the resource 
based view (Wernerfelt, 1984) and inertia (Cyert & March, 1963) will provide a useful foundation 
in anticipating such issues. In particular, this additional viewpoint to the resource based view 
should he tested in different settings, as timing is an essential issue for competitive advantage and 
firms' performance. As such, it is essential that a longitudinal approach is adopted as actions 
unfold over time. 
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From an interplay point of view, this thesis has stressed that a Ley component in a firm's strategic 
response to a change in market conditions is the result of the interpretation people deN elop about 
the event itself. As previously argued, there is an intercorrelated relationship between both factors 
that is measuring the conceptual distinction between thinking and acting. While this study has 
primarily focussed on the interrelationship between both factors, future research should further 
identify and explore a range of suitable variables on the micro and macro level that correlate ýý ith 
this cognition/action relationship. 
From an empirical point of view, we adopted an interpretative methodology associated vv ith 
subjective and qualitative analysis of managerial perceptions to gain in depth insight in the 
strategic response process to the impact of the Euro. We aimed to answer if and how firms 
responded to the introduction of the Euro as the event unfolded overtime. Although bringing these 
two approaches together provided us with the tools to investigate our research goals, it also mixes 
methodologies which are inherently complex. While this approach has clear advantages, it also 
should be treated with caution as it has the potential to lack theoretical rigour (Alvesson 
Sköldberg, 2000) as the outcome depends significantly upon the change process studied. We 
therefore argue that there is an important challenge to craft empirical research to understand the 
interesting interplays between cognition and action further. 
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Appendix A. 
Interview guide T° 
30- 
The multinational firm (firm characteristics) 
General MNE characteristics 
Question Prompt 
In what markets is the NINE operating? " Which European countries 
" Importance of Europe as a market 
In what industries is the MNE operating? " High tech (technology)? 
" Money spend on R&D (% sales) 
What kind of products do you sell in these 
industries? 
What are your main (most important) products? Brand, sales, history, other 
Why? 
To whom are these products mainly sold? "B to B, Industry, final consumer 
In your opinion, what are the main reasons for 
success or failure of these products? 
The market context (Macro characteristics) 
0 Importance of the Euro-zone for the MNE 
Question Prompt 
How important is Europe as a market for the main products? Why? 
As a percentage of sales in Europe, how much is sold to the Euro-zone countries? 
Market approach: Segmentation 
Question Prompt 
Does the MNE see Europe as one market or does it work 
with pan-European segments? 
" If so, how segmented 
Has the Single Market changed this viewpoint? " More local or more global 
Will the Euro change this viewpoint? If so, how? " SM vs. Euro-zone 
The Industry context (industrial characteristics) 
Global competition 
Question Prompt 
at kind of competition is there in the Euro-zone, global or local? 
Who do you see as your main competitors? " Euro-zone 
J08 
Product competition (product characteristics) 
Question Prompt 
How important is the quality of the product in " Product features 
this industry, especially in the Euro-zone? " Uniqueness 
" Culture specificity 
Are there uniform consumer patterns in " Difference in competition among 
Europe in relation to the products you sell? countries 
Is there an enormous difference between your " If so, what are the main differences 
products and those of your competitors? " If not, more price competition" 
Price competition 
Question Prompt 
Is the industry price sensitive? Importance to consumers 
" Buying behaviour 
" Price awareness 
" Differences among countries 
How much price difference is there in this sector? " Competitors 
The multinational firm (firm characteristics) 
The Host MNE and subsidiary relationship 
Question Prompt 
How important is the nationality of the MNE " Impact on management 
in terms of company culture? 
Does the nationality of the MNE have any " European experience (European vs. non 
positive or negative influence in relation to European) 
the European market, the Single market and " Costs of production and distribution 
the Euro? " Impact on the price 
How many subsidiaries are there in Europe? " International experience 
" Number of foreign markets 
" Importance of Euro-zone 
What is the role of the subsidiary? " Profit centre 
Does the host MNE set objectives or does " Strategic: Competitive response 
every subsidiary set its own objectives? 
To what extent does the Host MNE influence " Centralised versus Decentralised 
the marketing of subsidiaries? 
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Subject Area: Standardisation 
Question Prompt 
To what extend is the MNE " 4p's 
standardised in terms of marketing? " Process oriented standardisation or programme 
oriented 
Does the MNE see standardisation as a " Impact on 4p's interrelation-ship 
focus on consumers and products? " Adaptation strategy 
Does the present technology make " Benefit Economies of scale 
standardisation of products possible? " European standardised products? 
" Impact on production/logistics/price 
On a scale from 1-5 how standardised 
is the firm's marketing activity 
relating to for example: Brands, 
positioning, product features, 
promotional activity, channels, price? 
Does a more/less standardised " Lower? 
approach influence the price? 
What do consumers in this industry 
prefer: lower price or variety of 
products? Why? 
Subject Area: Standard isation: Product and Promotion 
Question Prompt 
Does the MNE have any global (Pan- " Standardised Product, price (extent) 
European) brands? 40 Standardised marketing strategy (advertising) 
Is it possible to standardise the (some) " Nature of the product 
products? " Desirable 
Subject Area: Level of contingency 
Question Prompt 
Is the MNE product or market driven? " Combination 
Which internal/external factors influence this decision? 
Has there been a move towards one position over the past years? Specific products 
Subject Area: Pricing Strategy 
Question Prompt 
How does the MNE relate the " Other internal aspects 
marketing-mix elements to pricing? 
What are according to the respondent " Politic, economic and market aspects 
the key external factors that influence 
the pricing strategy? 
How are pricing decisions made? " management 
; io 
To what extent can subsidiaries make 
their own price decision? 
" Influence of host M NE 
On a scale from 1-5 how important are " Any more external variables 
the following issues in relation to the . Influence the decision to mop e to« ards price 
pricing strategy: harmonisation 
- Nature of the Product/industry 
- Location of the production facility 
- Distribution system 
- Location and environment of the 
foreign market 
- Foreign currency differentials 
- Political environment 
- Government regulation 
- Cultural differences 
- Product quality 
Subject: Euro general 
Question Prompt 
When did the MNE implement the Euro? 
Was this done at the same moment as other subsidiaries? 
Can you explain the implementation process at this 
MNE? 
What where the first thoughts of the Euro related to the 
strategy of the MNE? 
How is the Euro perceived in general, as an opportunity 
or threat? 
" Financial problem 
Did this viewpoint changed in the past period? " Strategic 
Has the introduction of the Euro influenced the MNE 
objectives in terms of profit, sales and market approach? 
Subject Area: Euro impact 
Question Prompt 
To what extend did exchange rates influence pricing " Influence on profit margin 
strategies in the past? " More expensive product 
Did the arrival of the Euro reduce these risks? " Transaction cost reduction 
" If so: lower prices? 
" More price-competition? 
Subiect Area: Euro Strateav 
Question Prompt 
Do you agree with the expectation that " How does this influence the pricing strategy? 
the Euro will shed a light on price . Do you expect more competition from abroad? 
differences in the Euro-zone? 
Do you expect that the Euro will lead " Will you lower the price? 
to more price competition? " In what other ways can you respond on 
price competition? 
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What is the impact of the concept of " Price strategy 
price transparency that arises with the " Lower prices introduction of the Euro on price 
setting? 
To what extent does the Euro force " Price harmonisation 
you to put prices on the same level 
within the Euro-zone? 
Does the respondent expect that " Short term/ long term 
consumers will be more aware of price 
differences in the Euro zone? 
Has the price become more 
standardised as a result of the Euro? If 
so, why? 
Is this the same for all brands or does 
the Euro affect certain brands more 
than others? 
What is the impact of the Euro on " Same or different? Why? 
global brands? 
Are price differences acceptable for 
your customers within the Euro-zone? 
How does the MNE deal with present Impact on profit margin 
price differences in the Euro-zone? " Product differentiation 
How is being dealt with psychological 
pricing issues? 
Subject Area: European Union 
Question Prompt 
Are there any European laws (restrictions) that " Other marketing mix elements 
influence the price of your product(s)? " Industry related laws 
How did the MNE respond on the introduction of " Opportunities/ Threats 
the Single Market in 1992? " Influence on market conditions 
Are the harmonising efforts of laws and regulations 
in the EU an advantage or disadvantage for the 
MNE? Why? 
What impact did the Single Market as a Free Trade " Segmentation 
Area have on the MNE? " Products 
" Pricing 
Are the European standards, higher or lower than 
those of the NINE (production)? 
Does this influence the overall costs of the product, " Change quality? 
and therefore the price? 
Does the respondent think that cultural differences " Language barriers 
in the Euro-zone will influence the demand, and 
therefore possibility of globalisation, 
standardisation and price harmonisation? 
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The market context (European viewpoints) 
0 European viewpoints: Possibility of clustering 
Question 
How does the MNE see Europe? 
What are the MNE viewpoints and expectations about the emerging European market? 
0 Market approach: the Euro consumer 
Question 
Are European consumers meeting the global picture? 
Do you see any European clusters? 
What is the role of consumer differences based on culture, habits, income etc. during the 
segmentation process? 
What main characteristics are taken into account to identify these clusters? 
0 Importance of the Euro-zone for the MNE 
Question 
How important is Europe as a market for the company? Why? 
0 Market approach: Segmentation 
Question Prompt 
Does the MNE see Europe as one market or does it work with pan- " If so, how 
European segments? segmented 
Did any market changes stimulated re-segmentation over the past 10 " More local or 
years? more global 
Do you see any possibilities to see Europe as one market? Why 
(not)? 
Are there similar consumer patterns that transcend national 
boundaries? 
How are consumers grouped? Based on environmental variables or 
marketing based? 
The Industry context (industrial characteristics) 
" Global competition 
Question 
Is the industry global or local in character? Why? 
What kind of competition is there in the Euro-zone, global or local? 
What drives the competition on a national level? European level? Is the industry price 
sensitive? 
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The Business context (how to approach the European market) 
0 Subject Area: Level of contingency 
Question Prompt 
Is the company in favour of a global strategy? Global positioning 
versus accurate 
positioning. 
Is the MNE product or market driven? Combination 
Is it necessary and desirable to market and marketing on a European 
level? 
Do you believe in the European market as it starts to evolve? 
How does it effect the business strategy? 
Are products positioned similarly in Europe? 
Is the marketing strategy an extension of the business strategy`? 
Are subsidiaries representing a global competitive advantage? 
Do subsidiaries aim to create there own competitive advantage? 
The marketing context (the European marketing approach) 
" Subject Area: Standardisation 
Question Prompt 
How is the firm using standardisation? " Extend 4p's 
" Process oriented standardisation or 
programme oriented 
Does the present technology make " Benefit Economies of scale 
standardisation of products possible? " European standardised products? 
" Impact on production/logistics/price 
" Subject Area: Standardisation: Product and Promotion 
Question Prompt 
Are the same promotion tools used in " What tools? 
Europe? 
Is it possible to standardise the products? " Nature of the product 
" Desirable 
Subject Area: Standardisation: Distribution 
Question Prompt 
Are there many European retailers? " Percentage 
; 15 
Do distributors have bargaining power in this industry? 
Is this the same in other European countries? 
Is the main product group of the company sold via similar 
distribution channels? 
" Same in Europe 
What is the impact of the distributor image on the product image? 
Global positioning or local accurate product positioning? 
Subject Area: Pricing Strategy 
Question 
Is it possible and desirable to standardise prices? 
Are there any external forces that stimulate price harmonisation in Europe? 
What is the role of the Euro in this context? 
How are pricing decisions made? 
What role plays the market environment on pricing? 
Does the company respond on competitive price changes? Are retailers pushing to do so? 
Strategy formulation (firm characteristics) 
Formulation 
Question 
How are strategies formulated? 
What is the importance of flexibility in strategic formulation? 
How does the company make certain strategies work in particular environments? 
What issues are taken into account when formulating strategies? 
Do strategies need to be aligned to the local market? 
The European Network 
Question Prompt 
How integrated is the European network? " Regular meetings 
" European control 
How is market knowledge shared, only to HQ 
or also with other subsidiaries? 
Is knowledge integration stimulated 
throughout the company? On what level? 
How many subsidiaries are there in Europe? " International experience 
" Number of foreign markets 
" Importance of Euro-zone 
What is the role of the subsidiary? " Profit centre 
Does the host MNE set objectives or does " Strategic: Competitive response 
every subsidiary set its own objectives? 
To ww hat extent does the Host MNE influence " Centralised versus Decentralised 
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the marketing of subsidiaries? 
How does the subsidiary contribute to the 
MNC goals? 
The level of autonomy 
Question 
How does the chosen strategy (global/local) and the perception of the European market 
influence the marketing actions? 
To what extend does the HQ have certain control over the national strategies? 
What level is the company focussing on, global, European or national`? 
To what extend do subsidiaries formulate strategies? 
Strategic Control (inta-firm characteristics) 
0 The Host MNE and subsidiary relationship 
Question Prompt 
How important is the nationality of the MNE " Impact on management 
in terms of company culture? 
Does the nationality of the MNE have any European experience (European v's. non 
positive or negative influence in relation to European) 
the European market, the Single market and " Costs of production and distribution 
the Euro? " Impact on the price 
How many subsidiaries are there in Europe? International experience 
" Number of foreign markets 
" Importance of Euro-zone 
What is the role of the subsidiary? Profit centre 
Does the host MNE set objectives or does Strategic: Competitive response 
every subsidiary set its own objectives? 
To what extent does the Host MNE influence " Centralised versus Decentralised 
the marketing of subsidiaries? 
Does the global strategy (if desired) restrict 
firms on a local level? 
Strategic Control (extra-firm characteristics) 
" The external environment (changing environment) 
Question 
What is the influence of the market environment on management decisions? 
How does the MNE respond to changes in the Market place? 
How are these changes articulated? 
Are strategy adjustments made across nations as a result of political/economic issues? 
Is the Euro used strategically to push to any changes? 
What other external elements play a significant role when defining a strategy? 
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How does the firm reduce globalisation forces? 
Are global drivers such as the Euro and the single market replacing local barriers" 
Are there different product standards in Europe that increase local adaptation? 
Subject: Importance of the Euro 
Question Prompt 
Is the Euro important for the company? Why (not)? 
How does the firm see the Euro? Strategic vs. technical 
How does the firm characterise the significance of the 
Euro? 
What where the first thoughts of the Euro related to the 
strategy of the MNE? 
How is the Euro perceived in general, as an opportunity 
or threat? 
Financial problem 
Did this viewpoint changed in the past period? Strategic 
Has the introduction of the Euro influenced the MNE 
objectives in terms of profit, sales and market approach? 
0 Subject Area: Euro impact 
Question Prompt 
Did the Euro lead to any strategic changes? " Before, or after introduction? 
How did they pattern these changes? " 
Why did they pattern it in the way they did? " Reasons of doing so, i. e. 
origin 
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